A;
| | “eee BIBLIOTHECA INDICA;
COLLECTION OF ORIENTAL WORKS PULLISHED UNDER THE PATRONAGE OF THE | Won. Court of Directors of the Gast invita Company, AND THE SUPERINTENDENCE OF THE ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL.
1701717 By Dr. K. Roer. Vou. [X.—Nos. 32 ann 35.
विश्वनाथपच्राननकृतसिद्वानमुक्तावलौप्तदित- भाषापरिडेदः ¶
DIVISION
OF TILE
CATEGORIES OF THE NYA‘YA PHILOSOPHY,
न WITH A COMMENTARY # BY
VISWANATHA PANCHANANA, EDITED, AND TIIE TEXT TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL SANSCRIT, By Dr. E. Rorr,
# NPRINE RSS
CALCUTTA : PRINTED BY J, THOMAS, BAPTIST MISSION PRESS.
1850.
PREFACE.
Tne Asiatic Society accepted already in 1847 my offer to publish the text of the Nydya with a translation, but only the Introduction to this work appeared in the Journal of the Society, the MS. of the translation having meanwhile been lost (vide Journal of the Asiatic Society, July, 1847). The present translation is based upon a rough copy of the former, which I afterwards found among my papers. The notes are entirely new, and the introduction has received so many addi- tions, that it is almost a new essay. The Sanscrit text, in ac- cordance with an enlarged plan, is now accompanied with its commentary ; it will thus form another edition of the one pub- lished by the Committee of Public Instruction, which is out of print, and satisfy thereby a desideratum, long felt in the Government Sanscrit Colleges, where the Bhasha Paricchéda is
introduced as a class-book.
i: INTRODUCTION.
In the following introduction to a translation of the Bhasha Pari- cchéda,* one of the most celebrated works of the Ny4ya philosophy, it has been my endeavour to subject the logic of the Nydya, as well as the leading ideas of this and the Vaiséshika systems, to a critical re- view, in order to bring the discussion about the merits of the philo- sophical researches of the Hindus more toa point. Colebrooke’s ex- position of those systems, though founded on the ablest and most exact researches, as well in a philosophical as in a critical point of view, does not suffice for this purpose, as it is a mere abstract from the works of those schools, and does not enter upon the discussion of the position they are to hold as systems of philosophy.
It is well known, how difficult it is to write a history of ancient India, only a few strictly historical records having been left to us by the Hindus themselves. ‘The same difficulty obtains with regard to the history of their philosophy, as in the mind of the Hindus philosophy was associated with the idea of being raised above change, and no regard therefore paid to the social and intellectual condition of the time, in which lived the founder of asystem or his successors who more
* ब have translated Bhasha, in deviation from its ordinary sense ‘‘ speech,” by ‘ categories of the Nyaya philosophy ;’’ for Bhasha means here evidently not ५५ speech”’ in general, which would give no sense whatever, but ‘‘ Nyaya Bhasha,”’ speech in the Nyaya, that is to say the philosophical language or terms of the Nydya. In the Sabda Kalpa Druma, “ Bhasha’’ (under the head of Bhasha Paricchéda) has the meaning of Paribhasha, which is explained by the authoritative language of the teachers which considers the meanings of the words (Padartha). This sense agrees essentially with the rendering which I have given,
B
11 Introduction.
developed it. Still it is not impossible to write a history of Indian philosophy, if it be limited to.the task of tracing the gradual develop- ment of philosophical principles and modes of thinking, without reference to a strict chronological order; for the internal nature of a doctrine will point out its more ancient or modern date. At the same time we must admit, that even in this attempt, we can only partially succeed. The doctrines even of those who are considered as the founders of the different schools, bear the marks of a far advanced progress in systematical arrangement, and must therefore have been the result of a long series of preceding philosophical enqniries.* Hence it would be preposterous to expect, that we should be able to discover the first steps of their researches. We, however, decline here embarking upon a historical research of such a kind, believing, that under the present circumstances, when only so few of their philosophical works have
> Lassen’s Indische Alterthumskunde, vol. ii. ए. 477, His (Panini’s) text-book continued to be the norm of the whole following time, and the labours of his suc- cessors were limited to the task to narrow or amplify his rules or more lucidly to arrange them. From his work the same effect results, as from other pursuits of the Hindus on the field of science. By a person of superior talent the labours of his predecessors were rendered more perfect and brought to a close; he united them in a system of rules, or Sutras, which he condensed as much as possible. This ex- position remained the standard of all later times, and formed the foundation for the succeeding teachers of the same science, whose efforts were in general directed to the correct explanation and elucidation as well as to the emendation and perfection of the fundamental work, and by whom the science was carried to a higher degree only as to its extent, but not as to its contents. We may discover a double motive, from which this manner of exposition took its rise. First, the sum total of the results which had been gained, should be condensed in the shortest form and hence the learning by rote facilitated... .. Secondly, this mode of exposition rendered the understanding of the text difficult and often impossible, unless it was accompanied by an explanation. Such an explanation was at the disposal of the teachers, and by their guidance alone the pupils were able to comprehend the obscure sense of the text-books. The Brahmans, the only possessors of the sciences, thus secured for themselves the privilege of communicating them only to those whom they thought worthy of this information, and of preventing the other castes from an initiation with them. It is only in this sense that a secret doctrine of the Brahmans can be ad- mitted. From the circumstance, that for each single science text-books of this kind were generally acknowledged as standards, it was a consequence, that the works of the first founders and of the predecessors of the person who brought a science to perfection, were forgotten and frequently lost.
Introduction. 1
been published, and in general so many more materials are required for the task than we can boast to possess, it is more important to ‘place an original work of Hindu philosophy before the public, and to examine the principles under which it has been constructed. For this end we consider the Nydya in that shape, which it has acquired by its amalgamation with the doctrines of the Vaiséshika, since we are of Colebrooke’s opinion, that both sprang from the same root, and are but branches of the same school; the one being directed ‘more to the explanation of material, the other of logical forms.* Or to state it more exactly,—to the Nydya belong the logical doctrines of the forms of syllogisms, terms and propositions ; to the Vaiséshika the systematical explanation of the categories (the simplest metaphysical ideas) of the metaphysical, physical, and psychical notions, which notions are hardly touched upon in Goutama’s (the supposed founder of the Nydya) Sdtras. They differ in their statement of the several modes of proof; the Nydya asserting four modes of proof—from per- ception, inference, analogy, and verbal communication ; the Vaiséshika admitting only the two first ones.t
The name of logic, usually applied to the Nydya, does not correctly define it. It does not treat of the theory of syllogisms and the notions connected with them, as its direct object, but only as a component part of its investigation. It rather aspires to the distinction of giving a “complete system of philosophy, based upon the most elementary meta- physical notions, and the division dedicated to the explanation of syl- logistical forms, is not even more explicitly treated than other parts of the system. To call the Nydya logic, would be the same as to assign this name to the philosophy of Aristotle. There is no doubt, however, that the Nydya has first among the philosophical systems of the Hindus thoroughly. examined the art of reasoning, and shaped it into its present form. प्रात it gained such ascendancy among the learned Hindus, that all of them, however they may deviate from other doctrines of the Nydya, refer toit as to their standard in logic, and deem its study necessary for the purpose of giving a firm basis to their reasoning.
* Vid. Colebrooke’s Miscell. Essays, Vol. i. p. 261.
+ The view above given, was based upon the Sutras of Gautama, without a re- ference to a work of the Vaiséshika school. f have since compared the Sitras of Kayéda and found my view completely confirmed. .
B 2
iv Introduction.
It is indeed one of the principal merits of the Nydya, that its pro- gress is marked by an admirably exact division of the topics, treated in it, and in this respect it is not only superior to all other systems of the Hindus, but even modern philosophy might, with advantage, study it on account of its clearness and exactness. Though none of its inves- tigations has been carried on to a satisfactory end, the Nydya has, with the means at its command, fully described the circle within which it moved. We must at the same time admit, that notwithstanding its exactness, there is one inherent fault in its exposition, viz. the neglect of all analytical method, a fault of all systems of the Hindus, which has, perhaps, more than any thing else, contributed to the narrow limits of their mental horizon. This fault, which, however, it shares with many other expositions of philosophy, for instance, to mention a cele- brated name, with Spinoza’s system, is rather a fault of exposition than of the system itself; for no synthesis (in science) is possible without analysis, and having well understood the leading notions of a system, we can easily trace the analytical way by which they were obtained. This apparent absence of analysis in the construction of the philosophi- cal systems of the Hindus is the reason why so many enquirers have done injustice to their philosophical talent. For want of a clear analysis, unable to understand the aphorisms of the Hindu schools, composed in a language in form as well as in thought, foreign to them, they thought the philosophical productions of many centuries and of an ingenious people, a web of either abstruse or puerile notions. On a closer exami- nation we shall come to a juster opinion of them, and although we find a limit as well in the range as the depth of their enquiries, we shall come to place them among the nations which advanced the intellectual progress of mankind.
That Hindu philosophy will, however, have any great influence upon the development of European philosophy and mediately of European civilization, must be denied. Why should this be the case? Although we must admit, that the philosophical researches of the Hindus are as worthy of attention as those of the Greeks, still it is at the first glance evident, that the philosophical works of the former are unfit to be transferred to another soil, while those of the latter will have always the game influence upon every rising generation in every clime and age. This difference lies not so much in the development of the system
Introduction. ष
as in the form. एप are compelled to think by reading the works of the Greeks, they introduce you into the process of their thoughts, and by this force you to accompany them with your own thoughts, until you arrive as it were by your own mind at the principles of their systems, from which point it is easy either to look back upon the way you have made or to advance further. The Hindus, on the other hand, are dog- matical. They commence synthetically with a statement of their principles, yet do not condescend to unfold the train of thought which has led tothem. MHence it is impossible for any one to understand their writings who has not previously, to a considerable degree, been practised in philosophical enquiries. The punishment however of this mystery and exclusion is the want of interest, felt in the study of their writings. ‘The same doctrines which might have been instrumental in enlightening thousands, are now forgotten, or in the possession of a few who are hardly able to comprehend them.
Among the general metaphysical notions, the notion of substance is the most important one, as upon it all other notions are either founded or are closely connected with it, and whatever may be the solution of all other metaphysical problems, it must be influenced by the notion of substance. |
Substances are, according to the Nyaya, the substrata of qualities and actions,* a definition, which is the right one, as the basis of further in- vestigation—it is the right one, because founded on experience. Sub- stance, we add, is in so far the substratum of qualities and actions, as the existence of qualities and actions depends upon the existence of substance ; if quality were independent of another, it could not represent another, whose quality itis. The existence of substance must there- fore be absolute, that is to say, not dependent upon the existence of another ; for in this case, it would be comprehended, not by the notion of substance, but by that of quality. And consequently, to think the idea of substance by any notions including dependance, is a contradic- tion. This contradiction (of comprehending substance under the notion of quality, and therefore of dependance) was committed by the Nyaya by the distinction between eternal and non-eternal substances, because the
* Or rather of qualities alone according to the mod ern school of the Nydya. The definition, that substances are the substrataof qualities and actions, belongs to Kanada,
ष] Introduction.
existence of the latter is not independent. In the notion of eternal substance, however, the true notion of substance is included, which is to be independent of time and cause.
Another question is, how a substance is united with its qualities ? That a substance should have qualities, appears a matter of course, and to question it, shows a vast progress in metaphysical thinking. 41. though the Nyaya entered not expressly into the discussion of this sub- ject, it must have felt its weight, as they found it necessary to invent a contrivance for such a connexion. A substance is, according to them, united with its qualities by a relation, called intimate relation, which is something real, and is neither in substances, nor qualities, nor actions We do not intend here to analyze this notion any further (stating, how- ever, that the difficulty is not really removed by it,*) but we turn to a third point in the notion of substance. Substance, according to the Nyaya, is not only united with its qualities by the relation, just men- tioned, but all substances are united with the general notion of sub- stance, and single substances in the same way with the notion of their own class. This general notion is rather a common property; for it does exist, independent of the mind which may conceive it, in the substances (also in qualities and actions) themselves, and is even eternal in eternal substances, not eternal in transient substances. This notion exactly corresponds with that of the so-called realists among the scholastic philosophers, who maintained the reality of general notions. Duns Scotus, for instance, asserted, that general properties (notions) were not only in objects potentid, but वल and that generality was not only formed by the understanding, but that it existed previously to the mental conception per se as a reality, viz., the quiddity itself, which was
* For if it is necessary, that qualities require some link to unite them with sub- stances, it isalso necessary, that this link should be united with them by a similar link, and so on. The difficulty, as regards the connection of qualities, is briefly stated, thus. The existence of qualities is dependent upon the existence of the sub- stance, whose qualities they are, but not vice versa. Substance in accordance to its notion, is independent of qualities, . Substance therefore is something of itself, and also something on which qualities are dependent, and in this latter respect it is not substance, which is to be independent of qualities. That is to say, the notion of substance in this form is contradictory, and should be abandoned for a notion which
is consistent,
Introduction. vit
indifferent to general or individual existence. A cause, however, was required to remove this indifference, viz. another more extensive quiddity, closely united with the first, and with the principle of indivi- duity. (afterwards called haecceity.)*
In one point the Nydya went a step in advance of most of the anci- ent systems of philosophy, viz., in its assumption, that the special qualities of substances are effects ; for instance earth is the intimate (or material) cause of smell, the soul of knowledge, &८, They were no doubt urged to this assumption by the contradiction, which arises, if beside substance, a quality which is necessary and therefore belongs to the quale of the substance, is admitted. If quality is an effect of substance, its existence is evidently derived, and the contradiction re- moved. Although, however, this hypothesis is a step in advance, it 15 not the complete solution of the difficulty ; for here again the question will arise, how it is possible, that a substance can become a cause, that is, produce something, which is foreign to itself.
Substances, as before said, according to the Nyaya, are either eter- nal or non-eternal. Eternal are space, time, ether, soul, and the atoms of mind, earth, water, fire, and air. Non-eternal are all compounds, or the things which we actually perceive, and which must have a cause of their existence. Thus substances are divided into those which are with- out cause, and those which have a cause.
There are three causes ;—-1. The cause of intimate relation, or material cause, as yarn is the material cause of cloth ;—2. The proximate cause, or the actual union of the parts which are to form a compound ; —and 3. The instrumental cause, viz. the cause by which this union is effected. | ।
This is similar to the doctrine of Aristotle, who admitted four causes ; a material cause, a moving cause, a formal cause, and an end cause. The instrumental cause includes Arisotle’s formal, moving, and end "causes.
The notion of causality is certainly well considered, and infinitely su- perior to the notions which other Indian systems formed of it ; for there are already made some steps in advance towards the proper discussion of this notion, if a difference in causes is acknowledzed. In the enume- ration of causes—the cause of motion appears to have been omitted ; it is,
* Vid. Tennemann’s Geschichte der Philosophie, Vierte Aufl. p. 256.
vill Introduction.
however, contained in the notion of instrumental causality. All activity according to the Nydya is limited to motion, acts of the mind being... considered by them as qualities, and as all actions abide in substances, we must think every substance as a causeof motion (viz. the last cause). They did not, however, discuss, whether motion was necessary to all substances, or only to some or to one, that is to say, whether there is a primum mobile or not; they did not discuss the question, whether or not different motions require different causes; nor did they lastly enter into an explanation of the notion itself.* They appear in fact not to have been aware of the intrinsic difficulties of the idea of causality, which undoubtedly is one of the most difficult metaphysical notions.+ The contradictions in the notion of cause and effect appear with special force to apply to such causes, by which a change in the qualities of a substance is effected, as chemical, animal, and psychical effects. Such effects are, however, denied by the Nyaya. Material causes must be understood as only the substrata, or the materials for a new union, as for instance, the two halves from which a pot is produced, are the ma- terial cause of the pot. There are therefore no real changes, but only changes of the accidental form, which substances may assume in their connexion with others ; and there should not be changes at all we add. Every compound substance, according to the Nyaya, is ultimately pro- duced from simple substances. . Simple substances, however, are eternal, and all their qualities are also eternal. If this is the case, there is also
* The contradictions, which Zeno found in the idea of motion, are well known, and without fully acknowledging their weight, it is impossible to obtain a correct notion of it. Aristotle was well aware of this, and endeavoured to remove Zeno’s objections to this notion. How important it is, correctly to define this notion, is evident even from the influence, which it exercised on the Nydya, where motion is considered as an act, and even as the only act.
+ Vide Sext. Emp. Adv, mathem. in Ritter’s History of Philos. Vol. iv. p. 339. That cause could not be later than effect, is evident ; but also the effect cannot be later than the cause; for if so, the cause, being antecedent to the effect, would be without effect, and a cause without effect, is a contradiction. And if the effect would be consequent to the cause, it would be, when the cause is no more, therefore an effect without cause. Both therefore must be necessarily together. If this be con- ceded, then there is the difficulty, why the one more than the other is producing (or cause). These are only part of the difficulties, and without solving them, the objections made against causality, are quite just
Introduction. ix
no change of qualities in any compound substances, because by any con- nexion between them, different from an accidental relation, they would ~ assume changes, contradictory to the notion, under which they are con- -eeived. As the Nydya, however, admits an actual change in compound substances, in which qualities, not to be met with in the simple substan- ces, are produced, and moreover admits a compound, in which there is a comparatively firm connexion of the parts with each other, it has deviated from its notion of causality, and is hence guilty of the contradiction which it first endeavoured to escape. Notwithstanding these deficien- cies of the Ny4ya, we still maintain, that it approached nearer than any other Hindu system, to the true notion of causality, causality being, according to Pantheistic, not less than to skeptical idea, a product of habit in the association of our 14685. |
In passing from the general metaphysical (ontological) to more special investigations (comprehending natural philosophy and psycho- logy), we may first observe, that the same clearness obtains in the latter asin the former. Existence, or rather that which exists (ro dvrws dy, in its connexion with material and immaterial phenomena, is much more distinctly conceived than in other systems of the Hindus. We find in- deed the same material elements as in the latter; viz., earth, water, light, air, and ether, and also the same qualities ; but while in all others they are only generally described, here there is made an attempt to ex- plain the special phenomena as well as the sources of our perception of them, or in one word, we find here the basis of observation, and of the first lineaments of the consequent reflection upon the results of that ob- servation. We meet here also with the first remarks about space and time, and even with some correct notions of their nature, and although both of them are placed among the substances, we must not forget the intrinsic difficulties of this subject, which in our times only has been more satisfactorily investigated by Kant, Fichte, and Herbart. The error of considering space and time as substances, is a consequence of the notion the Nyaya had formed of substance, viz. as the substrate of qualities and actions, This idea would, indeed, have been correct, had the no- tion of existence been preserved. The Védanta certainly had a much more exact idea of existence, maintaining, that which exists (70 69705 dv) must be simply existent, without any attribute whatever, and should strictly not be even considered by a plurality of notions. The Védanta,
¢
x Introduction.
however, by denying the reality of phenomena, had nothing to explain, _while the Nydya, retaining the crude notions, given by observation, had no principles whereby to explain them. The most interesting point in this part of the system is the investigation into the nature of matter, an investigation which was indeed entered into by other Hindu systems, yet not with the same success. The Védanta, for instance, reduced the objects of the senses, or the things composed of the gross elements, to elements which are finer and imperceptible to the senses, undoubtedly for the same reasons as the Nyaya, viz. because the origin, the changes, and the destruction of the material things compelled the mind to fix the notion of existence upon some other natures, not affect- ed by those conditions. But according to the Véddnta, the simpler elements are only simple, because they are unmixed with others. As regards space, however, no reduction was made, and their view on this point is very like the doctrine of Anaxagoras, who also started from an original identity of the elements with space. The Véddnta indeed did not confine its thoughts to those elements, but proceeded to the suppo- sition of a substance, in which there is no difference whatever, but for what reason this supposition was here made, it would be difficult to give a satisfactory reply, and as regards the principal point, space filled out by matter, it was not even touched upon, The Nydya, on the other hand, has examined matter under this point of view, and arrived at the theory of atoms,* in the same way as Leucippus and Democritus. It proceeded even further. With Leucippus and Democritus atoms have some, though imperceptible, extent, and also different figures and mo-
नैः It is astonishing, that the Nyayaikas made the supposition of such a substance as the ether, which, like space and time, is pervading and infinite. It is not space itself, but a kind of matter, filling out space, and can therefore be distinguished from it merely by a less degree of density. If so, the consequence should have been, that it was also composed of parts, the last elements of which are atoms, Instead of this, ether is some thing analogous to space, by its being infinite, and yet | filling out an infinite space. In fact it appears, they assumed this notion of ether only historically, or as a part of the views on matter which had been formed pre. viously to them. The doctrine of the five elements (ether, air, fire, water and earth) is one of the most ancient hypotheses of Indian philosophy. It is taught already in the Upanishads, and probably more ancient even than the doctrine of the soul. Hence it passed over into the different systems, viz. the Védanta, Sdnkhya and Ny4ya, modified according to the different views they held of substance,
Introduction. xi
tions, while the Ny4ya held them to be absolute units of space, without any dimensions and motions, that is, mathematical points as regards _ space, They are eternal and unchangeable, and while they are without cause themselves, they are the cause of the material universe. They are imperceptible to the senses, and the knowledge of them is obtained by inference. |
The system of Democritus is throughout a crude materialism. The last elements of existence are with him atoms which have no qualities whatever beside form and motion. The soul itself is merely a com- pound of round atoms, and a deity is of course impossible. A theory
of atoms of such a kind is contradictory in its principle, and in its re-
sults leads to an annihilation of truth in general, The Nyaya is vastly ‘superior to Democritus’ theory ; for atoms are first conceived in their real notion as units of matter without any extent, and secondly the theory of atoms forms only a subordinate part of their researches.
The same clearness and to a certain degree comprehensiveness is met with in their psychological enquiries. The faculties of the soul and its relations to the material things and other objects of knowledge, are methodically described. ‘The Nydya draws a marked line between matter and spirit, by distinctly stating the notions, under which either is perceived, é
The soul has, according to the Nyaya, qualities, opposite to the quali- ties of the substances perceived by the senses, and is therefore distinct from these substances, that 13 to say, as regards special qualities; for as to qualities, ascribed to substances as far as they are substances, both must of course agree. Qualities of the soul are the emotions and desires, volition and aversion, etc. and knowledge. Knowledge is pro- duced by intellect, which is one of the qualities (faculties) of the soul. Intellect 1s again fourfold, itis perception, inference, analogy and verbal knowledge. Perception (viz. perception generally, as well of external as of internal objects), is the source from which all other knowledge flows, or rather, without objects of perception the other faculties of intellect have no materials to work upon. All knowledge, that is. per- ceived, is perceived through a medium, through an instrument, by which the soul is in-communion either with objects from without or from within itself. External objects are perceived through five external senses, these being in contact with the mind, while internal objects, and
c 2
Xi Introduction.
by them the soul, are only perceived through the mind. The doc- trine of the communication of the soul with external objects is very curious and interesting, not only because it is original, but because it shows a remarkable acuteness in overcoming difficulties, met with in every system, which considers substances not only as individual beings, but also as a common essence that exists, although dependent upon the individual substances. To perceive individual external substances, and their properties in common with others, it is necessary that the inter- course of the senses with the external objects should take place accord- ingly, that is to say, that individual substances should be perceived by the connexion of the senses with these individual substances, and the common properties by the connexion of the senses with these common properties. Substances are then perceived in their different rela- tions, viz. first, in the relation of this individual substance and this individual quality, or of this individual substance and this individual act; further, in the relation, which this individual substance has with its class (general essence) or with its generality; and lastly, in the relation, which this individual quality or this individual act of this individual substance has with its class or generality.
This, however, is not sufficient; for a full comprehension, there are required also general notions, corresponding with those relations. A tree for instance would not be perceived, without the general notion of a tree, by which a tree at any place and at any time is perceived. This general notion requires again a kind of special knowledge, by which the general notion of a tree is referred to a certain tree, This kind of knowledge, though corresponding with the relations of all substances, which have both general and special properties, and though (impli- citly) contained in every object of perception, still differs from the gene- ral properties of the things. It is a conception of the soul, produced by its own activity. This knowledge then is internal perception, that is to say, it is not produced by inference, or analogy, or verbal commu- nication, but it is immediate and complete, as all knowledge by percep- tion. Every perception of external objects then, according to this ex- position, is based upon two elements, an external and an internal, or as these expressions do not exactly represent their notions, an immediate and mediate, an objective and ideal knowledge. In the same way are the objects of the soul perceived, viz. its different qualities, as aversion,
[1 CI
cea gS eh, ५५
UT RS pee DART Np ona caer mere ire te eas
Introduction. Xiil
volition, &c. are called. Though the soul is the object of the mind, it is not directly perceived by it, but is inferred from its qualities. It is not necessary here to explain the other faculties of intellect, viz. ine ference, comparison, and verbal communication, as they are discussed in another part of this paper. We here only add, that they must be con- sidered as parts of the quality of knowledge, or, as we would express it, as modified operations of one and the same activity of the soul, |
The mind, by which all knowledge is perceived, is not a quality or faculty of the soul itself, but an independent substance, atomic in its nature.* Hence only a single perception or idea is at one time perceived by the soul |
The soul itself is eternal, and therefore so also are its qualities, we should say, also its knowledge, although this knowledge be not perceiv- ed by the soul itself. It is at the same time every where, not, however, as an infinite soul, as the universal soul of the Védanta, where all things constitute the pervading soul, be it even a piece of matter, though bound by ignorance to a state of apparent material existence, but in the same way as Space and time are connected with every thing. There is a general soul, and there are individual souls. The general soul has the same qualities with the individual souls, with the exception of aver- sion, pleasure, pain, merit and demerit, because these qualitiés would involve imperfections. The individual soul is subject to the law of transmigration, and happiness and misery are the consequences of its good or bad actions. It is, however, possible for the individual soul to emerge from the vicissitudes of worldly existence by the attainment of true knowedge. |
Here it is necessary to point out what place the notion of the general soul or the deity ([swara, the Ruler) holds in the system of the Nyaya.
The Védanta denies a personal deity. There is a supreme soul, but this soul is all in all, individual souls are emanations from it, as sparks from fire, and are essentially identical with it. Nature in its first elements as well as in its development depends upon it. The
* How is mind united with the soul? Not by any act of either; for they are independent of each other. They are united by something without them, viz. by the power of God, in the same way, as atoms are united with each other ; for these latter, although the material causes of compound substances, are not causes of their connexion,
अष Introduction.
‘Védanta in fact destroys the distinctions between God and nature; every distinction is delusion, and there is nothing but one ail-pervading, knowing and blissful being, and even such distinctions as of existence, knowledge, bliss, are not real distinctions, they are but contrivances to approach to the true idea of the One.—If there is nothing but existence, but knowledge, but truth, there should be no difference whatever, and least of all any delusion, on the contrary, there is with man almost nothing but delusion; only few approach the true notion of God, and but inadequately; in most men there is only difference found, and nature is altogether opposed to it. Nay, this 15 not only the case in the last emanation of this deity, but if we comprehend nature in its principle, where all differences of substance, quality, form, &c. dis- appear, if we comprehend it as dependent upon the soul, it is ignorance, that is to say, indiscrete matter, 1६ is non-existence, non-knowledge, &c. but this, Proteus-like being, of which it cannot be said, that it ex- ists, nor, that it does not exist, is to be placed upon the soul, to be under- stood by it. This is to say: in theory the Védanta acknowledges but one principle, the infinite soul, in fact, however, two, soul and non-soul, ignorance or matter.
With reference to God, the Sdénkhya is divided into two sects, the theistical and the atheistical.* |
* Col. M. ए. pp. 251-2. God, Yswara, the supreme ruler according to Patanjali, is a soul or spirit distinct from other souls, unaffected by the ills with which they are beset, unconcerned with good or bad deeds and their consequences, and with fancies or passing thoughts. In him is the utmost omniscience. He is the instructor of the earliest beings that have a beginning (the deities of mythology) himself in. finite, unlimited by time. | | | ` Kapila, on the other hand, denies an Yswara, ruler of the world by volition, alleging, that there is no proof of God’s existence, unperceived by the senses, not inferred from reasoning, nor yet revealed. He acknowledges, indeed, a being issu- ing from nature, who is intelligence absolute, source of all individual intelligences and origin of other existences successively evolved and developed. He expressly affirms, that the truth of such an [swara is demonstrated, the Creator of worlds, in such sense of creation; for ‘‘ the existence of effects,’’ he says, +“ is dependent upon consciousness, not upon Tswara,’’ and, ‘‘ allelse is from the great principle.”’ Yet, that being is finite, having a beginning and an end, dating from the grand de. velopment of the universe, to terminate with the consummation of all things. But an infinite being, creator and guider of the universe by volition, Kapila positively
denies. See also Wilson’s Sankhya Karika, pp. 166 to 168,
त Rie rede
1
_ Introduction. अष
Kapila denied altogether a deity; the कदा whom he admits, is only a finite being; for although he assumes a being, whose intelli- gence is absolute, yet this being issues from nature, and is again to terminate in nature. It is very much to be regretted, that of Patan- jali’s doctrine nothing as yet has been published. It is difficult to form an exact idea of his being from the words, quoted by Colebrooke. According to them he has some attributes of the deity ; he is of the utmost omniscience, infinite, unlimited by time; but how he ts con- nected with the creation and ruling of the universe, it is impossible to conceive. Jf his doctrine in other points agrees with the atheistical Sankhya, all the development of the world in its different forms is inde- pendent of him; for it is the necessity of nature, that certain emana- tions are issuing from it, and returning to it after certain periods. It would rather appear, that he is a kind of Epicurean deity, blissful in himself and unconcerned with the affairs of the world.
The Nydya is essentially theistical. According to them, God is per- sonal. He is not, as it expressly asserts, mere existence, mere know- ledge, mere bliss, but he is a substance, of which existence, &c. are attributes ; for it is impossible to think of existence, knowledge, &c., without referring them toa subject which exists, which has knowledge, © &८, He is not the supreme soul of the Védanta which is the whole universe, but distinguished as well from the world as from finite spirits. He is not a mere emanation from nature, as Kapila asserted, but alto- gether different from nature, and self-existent. Heis also not, as ap- pears to be Patanjali’s opinion, a merely omniscient being ; but he is of | infinite power, the Ruler of the universe, and nature could not exist in- dependent of a God, or could exist only without order, harmony and object. And this idea is not only a fortuitous addition to the system, but one of its chief springs; for all the substances in the world, with- out God, remain unconnected. There may be atoms, but they do not constitute a world, they are solitary, unconnected, without any apparent difference ; of themselves they have no action, produce no effects, and not even the simplest compound of two atoms can arise from them alone, much less a compound of a certain form and for certain objects, not the world in its unity, harmony, and infinite variety of forms. There may be souls, independent of a creator, but without conscience, without enjoyment, without development and without a final end, for
१४1 Introduction.
they are not united with mind, the instrument, by which they are con- nected with the world, among themselves and with the creator. Because this connexion exists, because there is form, because individual souls have conscience, therefore it is necessary to assume a God who by his Infinite power and knowledge is the author of this connexion, of the all-pervading harmony of the world. This argument for the existence of a deity is essentially teleological or based upon final causes in nature. The deity is the creator of the world as to its form, not as to its matter.
The Nydya approaches most closely of all Hindu systems the Chris- tian notion of God, as its deity is an infinite spirit and at the same time personal, as it is wholly distinct from matter, and the creator and ruler of the universe. |
It would be superfluous to point out the marked distinction, drawn here between body and soul. Though a higher development of philo- sophy may destroy the distinctions between soul and matter, that is, may recognise matter, or what is perceived as matter, as the same with the soul (as for instance, Leibnitz did), it 1s nevertheless certain, that no true knowledge of the soul is possible, without first drawing a most decided line of demarcation between the phenomena of matter and of the soul. In the Nydya there is even an approximation to the doctrine, that soul and matter are as to their principles one and the same, viz. in the theory of atoms, according to which atoms are the negation of space. From this notion we may draw the inference, which has not been drawn by the Nydya, it is true, but which would have been only a necessary consequence from the premises, that matter, being a compound of atoms, is only a phenomenon, as regards its extension through space. Where then is here shown the difference between the soul and the true substratum of matter? Let us see then, what is the soul? The soul is different from matter, as this last is perceived by the senses as extended through space. This distinction is true, but further to conclude, that the soul is also different from matter in its real nature, where matter is not extended, is certainly hasty, and does not follow from the premises. What then is the soul according to them? It is all-pervading, infinite, like ether, space and time. This answer, though far from satisfactory, shows, that they felt the difficulty in determining the notion of the soul, when their other notions had undergone a decided alteration.— The most peculiar notion in their psychological theory is the existence of
. Introduction. Xvi
of the mind independent of soul, although most intimately connected with it; for through the mind only the soul perceives, as well its own qualities, as the qualities of external substances. How could the Nyaya have made a supposition in which the contradiction is so evident? For it is easy to conclude, that if the mind is independent, its perception is also independent. If the mind perceives, this perception is not in the soul, and if this perception is in the soul, it is not perceived. The soul then has knowledge, which is not real knowledge, because not perceived, and the mind has no knowledge, though it perceives.’ - _ We may solve this difficulty at least in some way. The mind was first undoubtedly considered as an internal sense according to the ana- logy of external senses, in order that there be a unity of perception, and that, as the external objects are perceived through different media, the objects of the soul be perceived through an analogous internal medium, a supposition, which has also been made in modern (English) philosophy. So far the Nydya might have considered the mind as an internal sense, but they met with a difficulty, which was not felt in the same intensity by modern philosophers.. If knowledge be per- ceived by the soul through the medium of the mind (the internal sense), why is it not always present in the mind? why does it disappear. and give place to other objects of perception, ete.? Locke was surprised at the narrowness of the human mind, without being able to account. for it; the Nydya in endeavouring to account for it, invented an inde- pendent substance, the mind, which is an atom, and according to its atomic nature only able to represent or to perceive one object at one and the same time. | This, I think, is the solution of the difficulty, and though it is cer- tainly only an evasion, because its supposition creates greater difficulties than the former one, it still gives evidence of a spirit of enquiry in the school | In comparing the psychological theory of the Nyaya with more modern doctrines (with the exception of the latest period) we must admit, that in a metaphysical point of view there is no great difference between them. The same objections are to be made to either, the doctrine of faculties being involved in the same contradictions as that of qualities. In either case, if you are to explain, what the soul is, you have to state, what it is, independent of its qualitics or faculties, and D
Xvili Introduction.
also to enumerate the latter. Your explanation will thus point out'a quale, which is not a unity, but something defined by a variety of no- tions. This, however, is not the place to discuss the matter, and we wished only to remind the reader, that modern philosophy in this respect cannot boast to have advanced one single step beyond that of the Hindus, that is to say, in the metaphysic of the soul, although it would be absurd to deny, that modern psychology, as to the observation of psychical phenomena, has made rapid strides towards perfection. .
In passing over to the strictly logical enquiries of the Nydya, we have to premise, that we cannot view them with the same satisfaction, and although we may make ample allowance for the different forms of language, in which they are explained, we are compelled to confess, that they are neither exact nor complete |
The Ny4ya has treated the logical topics in the inverse order of that adopted by us, viz. first inference, then ideas, and lastly propositions. This order is followed, not in consequence of a different method of ar- rangement, but in consequence of the subjects being based upon different grounds, and flowing from different sources. Logic might undoubtedly be treated analytically and commence with the exposition of syllogisti- cal forms. Considering argument as a fact, we might analyse various arguments, and proceeding to their elements, that is to propositions, gradually arrive at ideas or notions. But the Nydya, far from following such an analytical course, holds inference to be a quality (or modification ofa quality), different from the quality of forming names and notions, and discusses inference before verbal knowledge, evidently with the purpose of showing, that the latter in some way depends upon the former. -
We, however, treat these doctrines in their common order, with no other intention than to make ourselves better understood.
_ Verbal knowledge is one of.the divisions of intellect. The first act
or the first condition of understanding words, is the forming of the
name!-A name is corresponding to a certain object, and this object is: connected with the name by the power of the name. A name which has
such a power, isa word. The clear and distinct knowledge of what is
implied in a word,-is produced by a third act, and is the meaning of a
word. This latter is in fact identical with idea or notion, as is evident
from the examples given, as for instance, a tree is a thing. which has
root, stem, branches, leaves; etc. |
Introduction. xix
« Here again is the order perverted, the name is certainly not the first operation, and the object to be named, the second, but just the reverse. There must be objects to be named, and though we may admit, that the clear idea of a subject often succeeds a name, still the object, of which the notion is formed, is the first, and we must assert, that what precedes the notion, also precedes the name.
The enquiry, how ideas are formed from a variety of similar objects, belongs to psychology, and however interesting this question otherwise may be, logic has nothing to do with the psychical process, by which ideas are produced. If this were the case, we might still have to wait for. a logic, asa psychological theory has not yet been established to general satisfaction, while logic as a science has been complete for more than two thousand years. By the considering first of the names and after- wards of the corresponding notions, the real character of a notion has been at least obscured. From the given examples we see, that a notion, instead of being defined by the genus, under which it is contained, and the specific difference, is explained by a genus, which is distant from it by anumber of intervening notions (for instance, genus of treething) and by a specific difference; which besides its own difference, enumerates properties which it partakes with others (for instance root, stem, leaves, etc.=specific difference) ~ The meaning of a word or idea, ought to have been considered in its connexion with other ideas, as made up by genus and differentia spe- cifica, and as excluded from them by their compatible, contrary, and contradictory opposition. Here, however, are genus and species raised to categories under the names of generality and particularity, being there the common properties of substances, qualities, and acts, while the opposition of ideas or terms is treated in the seventh category, that of negation. Negation is the category which arises, if the categories are mutually denied of each other. It is the mutual difference of the categories and therefore the same with logical opposition. Negation is again of four kinds, mutual negation, antecedent negation, (negation of a thing, that is to be,) emergent negation (destruction) and absolute negation. Of them antecedent and emergent negations are not logical, but metaphysical negations, viz. the relations which a thing may have with regard to its origin or cessation in time. , Mutual negation corresponds to contrary opposition (oppositio contraria) of terms. For instance:
D 2
Xx. Introduction.
black is the negation of white, of red, &c. and vicé vers4; here the one is not denied in an absolute, but in a relative manner. Absolute nega- tion* would correspond to contradictory opposition (oppositio contra- dictoria) as is evident from an allusion to it in the explanation of a nega- tive inference. Here it is said, that a notion is the negation of its abso- lute non-existence, for instance cloth is the negation of its absolute non-existence, non-cloth, or == Non—Non— A, that is to say, A is the negation of what is in contradictory opposition to A.
From this arrangement then did not only result an imperfect exposi- tion of the logical relations among ideas, but an important metaphysical error, by which logical relations of ideas are considered as real proper- ties of substances. | |
In finding the logical treatment of notions by no means satisfactory, we may at the same time observe, that there are many valuable remarks on some psychological and grammatical relations of ideas which we do not recollect to have found elsewhere. These we have given in a note to the text, where this subject is explained. ` A proposition to convey a distinct meaning, must, according to the Nyaya, have four qualities : |
1. Contiguity, which, according to some, is the uninterrupted succes- sion of the words pronounced in a sentence, so that for instance, the first word of it be not pronounced in the present moment, and the next half an hour afterwards, according to others, the arrangement of the words according to their grammatical connexion, for instance, that a preposition be placed together with the word which depends upon it and not with a word, to which it does not refer. |
2. Consistency, or the mutual agreement of the words, according to their sense, so that contradictory terms be not connected
3. Structure, or the grammatical (terminations) forms of the words, which correspond in their meanings (for instance, that the verb agrees with the subject in number and person.) -
* There is a difference of opinion in the Nydya with reference to absolute nega- tion, Some appear to conceive it merely as a negation of present existence, others as the negation of a contradictory notion. In this last sense Colebrooke understood it, (Mis. Essays, Vol. I. p. 288,) and this is also the interpretation of the Mimdnsa. (Wilson’s Sénkhya Karika, p. 19.) That the author of the Bhasha Paricchéda adopted also this sense, appears to me evident from the above explanation. ©
Introduction. Xxi
4. Intention, that is, the meaning which the speaker wishes to con- vey by a sentence. | 7 eae ee p =
There again the logical characteristics of a proposition have been omitted, as all those points, with the exception perhaps of consistency, belong to the grammatical structure of a sentence. -
The logical explanation of propositions, as a matter of course, passes over any grammatical form a proposition may assume; it treats only of the relation between two ideas, and its simple question is, whether two ideas can be connected or not. | ।
It is evident, that in this way neither quantity, nor modality of pro- positions could have been discovered. We might, however, dispense with them, as these forms are not strictly logical; but not even the division of propositions according to their quality has been made by the Nydya 4 fh my | `
The theory of ideas and propositions is the weakest point in the logic of the Nyaya; they are more successful in explaining the form of argu- ments; for though the theory of syllogism is far from exact and com- plete, we must admit, that they understood the general character of a
syllogism. ar 4 According to Gautama a complete syllogism contains five members. (Avayava = proposition) The proposition (pratijné, that which is
to be proved by the argument), 2. The reason, argument (hétu). 3. The instance (Uddharana, drishtanta). 4. The application (upa- naya). 5. The conclusion (nigamana), for instance : » This hill is fiery, . For it smokes, What smokes is fiery, as for instance, a culinary hearth. + This hill smokes, | 5, ` Therefore it is flery
The modern school of. the Nydya reduced the syllogism to three, and even to two members, and this last reduction appears to have been most generally adopted,* as it isin the Tarka Sangraha and Bhasha
भ < 4 14
क Colebrooke (Mis. Essays, Vol. I. 7, 292), adverted only to Gautama’s इद्त and not to a more modern work of the Nyaya, when he asserted, that the regu- lar syllogism of the Nyaya consisted of five members. The modern school of the Nydya (vide Dr. Ballantyne’s Lectures on the Tarka Sangraha, p. 31), declares the five membered form rhetorical in distinction from its logical form, which (ना tains only two members. Dr. Ballantyne has clearly pointed this out in his धल
Xxil ई Introduction.
Paricchéda. In this form the two premises, viz. major and minor pro- positions are condensed into one premise, of which we shall now give a description. `
That a syllogism be correct, two things are required. 1, a general proposition, in which.the subject (reason) is invariably connected with a predicate (conclusion), more comprehensive than the subject, and 2, a minor term, with which the subject of the general proposition is connected. That there is this double connexion of the minor term with the reason, and of the reason with the conclusion, is to be decid- ed by consideration, which is the intercourse between the minor term and the reason, as connected with the general predicate or the predi- cate of the conclusion. This consideration is only one, and therefore the form of the antecedent of the conclusion can only be one, or: there is only one premise, by which the minor term is expressed as deter- mined by the reason in its invariable connexion with the conclusion. - : For. instance: let a man from former observation know, that smoke is invariably connected with fire, as for instance on a culinary hearth ; tise on the Nydya system, and also in his Lectures on the Nyaya philosophy. He says, (Nydya system of philosophy, p. 5.)
_ Now, in this form of the syllogism (which we do not find alluded to in Mr. Colebrooke’s essay), there is neither more nor less than there is in the Aristotelic syllogism. The wonder would be if there had been. The first formal difference observable is, the wrapping up of the premises in one logical datum. The reason for preferring to regard these as two inseparable members of a single statement ap- pears to have been this, that it is only when simultaneously present to the mind, that the premises suggest the inference, and this simultaneousness of cognizance is secured by combining the two assertions in a period, or sentence, of which the whole becomes intelligible only when the last word in it has been uttered... ..1f we sepa. rate the two members of the original datum in the example above cited, we obtain the following : = । ।
- Whatever smokes, is fiery ; The hill smokes, Therefore the hill is fiery ;”’ and p. 9.. ‘*To return to our text-book. The author tells us, that a man, after having, to the satisfaction of his own mind, inferred the presence of fire from the perception of smoke, may wish to impart his conviction to another. In other words having ascertained the truth as a logician, he may wish as a rhetorician, to establish it to the satisfaction of somebody else. Here we step distinctly out of the province of logic, and enter that of rhetoric.”’
Introduction. XXiik
let him see afterwards an uninterrupted column of smoke rising from a hill, he will recollect the general proposition, that smoke is invariably connected with fire. Hence the knowldge arises: This hill is possessed of smoke, which is invariably connected with fire. This knowledge, this one act, by which there is a progress from one object to a third by a second, is consideration, from which the conclusion arises: This hill is fiery. — ` This is in its principal points the theory of the Nyaya of the form of the syllogism. It is essentially the same with that of Aristotle. The differences are two. The first is a difference in the form, or rather in expression, viz. that the two premises are combined into one. The ex- position is certainly not simple, for the different combination of the ideas, forming a syllogism, ought to be represented in their natural form, which is the connexion of two in a proposition, and the same principle ought to have been applied to the conclusion ; for if it is true that two premises must be combined into one, the conclusion also should not be stated in a separate sentence, but the whole syllogism. should form one sentence, for instance, in the example: This hill, de- termined by smoke, which is determined by fire, is determined by fire. Yet the difference is only apparent; for the Nyaya, as Aristotle, con- nects one notion with the other through a third with which the latter is connected, or excludes it by a third, from which the second is excluded.
‘The second difference is, that the Nydya wanted not only to give rules for the correctness of the logical operation in arguing, but to guard against false premises, and for this purpose the consideration ` was also to establish the truth of the major proposition by a reference to an instance, in which the truth of the preposition was exemplified. Their consideration was therefore not only directed to the logical opera- tion of arguing, but also to the truth which may result from it, and both the truth of the conclusion, and the correctness of the argument should be the result of one and the same operation, which of course is impossible. |
With the exposition of the form of syllogism the logical theory of the Nydya is nearly completed. Gautama divided inference into three kinds ; ], inference of an effect from a cause, as if rain is inferred from a collection of clouds; 2, inference of a cause from an effect, as if rain is concluded from an increase of the water in a river; and 3, inference from general notions, as if earth is inferred to be a substance from its
अद Introduction.
having the quality of smell. This division, it is hardly necessary to. remark, is not logical, as cause and effect are metaphysical notions and. have no relation whatever to the different forms of syllogism. The modern school of the Nydya has therefore not adopted this division, but acknowledges three kinds of syllogisms; which are: only affirma- tive inference, only negative inference, and inference, at the same time affirmative and negative. From the examples, given in illustration, it appears, that the latter includes two moods of the first and second figures, Barbara and Camestres ; Barbara being the type for all general affirmative conclusions, and Camestres for all general negative ones. Here, however, is their theory finished, and we find no trace of the different moods the syllogistical forms can enter into, ` It is a remarkable circumstance, that the general form of syllogism should have been found by the Hindus, and yet that they should not have discovered the different figures and moods, the diversities of which are the result of mere combination, We think, this deficiency was the consequence of two causes especially,—first, of their technical language, which although precise, is yet cumbrous and not comprehensive, and secondly, of their pious regard for every thing traditional, be it in political institutions, in religion, or in science. The Sutras, which are the foundations of their systems, have always remained text-books, and. any discovery that had been made in theory, did not prompt them to attempt a new exposition of science, but gave only occasion to a new. interpretation of the school ७ The Bhasha Paricchéda itself is a work of the modern Nydya. The author Viswandtha Panchanana Bhatta, the son of Vidy4nivdsa Bhatta, accompanied the text with a commentary under the title ^ Siddhanta Muktdvali” (the pearl-wreath of truth), and he is known also by his commentary to Gautama’s Sitras, which bears the title ‘“‘ Nyaya Siitra Vritti.”’ . According to the statement of the Pandits he lived about two hundred years ago. The Bhasha Paricchéda is a text-book in the’ schools of the Nydya in Bengal. There is no Pandit of any repute who does not know it well, and many know the whole of it by heart. And indeed it is admirably adapted for the purpose of introduction into the study of the Nydya philosophy. It is a succinct exposition of the principal topics of the whole system, and may easily be committed to memory. It is written in the well known Anustup metre. The style,
Introduction. XXV
however, is not poetical at all, but that of the most sober prose, and nowhere is the attempt made to combine the graces of imagination with philosophical method.
The course, followed in the work, is simple. The author gives first the leading ideas of the system, that is, the most comprehensive metaphysical notions, viz. the notions of substance, quality, action, ge- nerality, particularity, intimate relation and negation. He then enue. merates the various substances, qualities, actions, &c. and defines the properties common to all categories as well as those common to more or less of them. After this exposition the different substances in their relations to themselves, to other substances and to their qualities and actions are explained. In the same way the author discusses the qualities of substances, and his work is finished, when he has treated on the last quality, enumerated at the commencement of his treatise.
The commentary is in thought and language a very different com- position. - It is written with the object of supporting the views of the author and of the school in its controversy with other doctrines, and enters therefore frequently into intricate discussions in establishing the fundamental tenets or defending disputed points of the system, and makes use of the whole armory of the sometimes very abstruse technical language of the Nydya.
This commentary has again been commented upon by Mahddéva Bhatta, but I received a MS. of his work too late to make any other’ use of it than to compare it with the text.*
The Sanscrit text of the Bhasha Paricchéda was first printed in Ben- gali characters in 1821, with the addition of a Bengali translation of the text and of the commentary. The translation of the latter, however, is rather, a paraphrase, as the alterations are sometimes considerable.t
* The MS. isin the Library of the Sanscrit College of Calcutta, of which, however, I was for along time not aware, as it is not mentioned in the list of books in that Library, printed in the Sanscrit Catalogue of the Asiatic Society. It has two titles, "^ Mahadéva Bhatta-krita Muktavali Prak4sa ;’’ and the shorter one, ‘‘ Dinakarf (१४६. In his introduction, the author mentions also the name of his father, Balakrishna.
T The title is, ^ A system of Logic, written in Sunscrit, by the Venerable Sage Boodh, and explained in a Sunscrit commentary by the very learned Viswonath
Tarkalancar, translated into Bengalee by Kashee Nath Turkopunchanun. Cal- cutta, 1821,
E
XXXVI Introduction.
Another edition of the Sanscrit text together with the commentary, appeared in 1827, under the auspices of the Committee of Public In- struction. The text is correct, but not so the commentary. 1६ is full of mistakes, omissions and interpolations. The interpunctation is either faulty or entirely disregarded, and the numbers of the successive Slokas are not attached to the corresponding portions of the commentary, so that an easy reference of the one to the other is impossible.
The present edition has been carefully revised partly by comparison with Mahddéva Bhatta’s commentary, partly by a reference to the cor- rections in the copy of Jayandréyana Tarkapanchanana, the professor of Nydya in the Sanscrit College, which he had the kindness to lend me, and for which I offer my grateful acknowledgments, -
The notes which I have added to the translation, are chiefly given for the purpose to elucidate the principal points of the system of the Nyaya, in aceordance with the object of this work to contribute to a fair estimate of the merits of Hindu philosophy, and are therefore more copious in such parts as contain the distinguishing features of the
Nydya, for instance, the ontological portions, the doctrine of atoms, their notion of the deity, and their logical theory. They are less copious in portions which contain their explanation of the differences of matter ; for as natural science with the Hindus has hardly made its beginning, their explanation is without any value. I would, however, guard here against the misconstruction, that their failing to explain the phenomena of matter, affected also the correctness of the principles, by which they tried to explain them. Natural science with reference to those phenomena is quite distinct from the philosophical theory for the interpretation of them. Democritus’ explanation of natural phenomena may be entirely false, and still his theory of atoms may be correct, (although it is not in our opinion,) which is at least partly borne out by the fact, that in modern chemistry the theory of atoms has been adopt- ed, although no one would admit the application of it which Democritus — made for the explanation of the phenomena. The cause of this isa double one; first, philosophy is quite distinct from natural science, the latter being based upon observation and experiments, the former upon the relations which notions have among each other. Secondly, a phi- losophical system may have obtained the true principles for the ex- planation of intellectual and material phenomena, but at the same time
Introduction. XxXVIi
not have fully investigated the intermediate notions which may be necessary for explanation. A hasty application of these principles without due regard to such notions and to the results of natural science, is very apt to throw discredit upon the previous researches by which a system arrived at its principles, and also upon philosophy itself.
To mark the more the method of the philosophical discussion of the Nydya, I have generally preferred to give their interpretation in their own words, and therefore made large extracts from the commentary in as literal a translation as possible, which I hope, will be found also useful to the student of the Ny4ya in general, as facilitating the read- ing of the commentary and the understanding of the technical language of the Nyaya.
PRP PDN DRL णमी भी
TRANSLATION.
CONTENTS.
I.—Division of the categories "(1 ०.8.) 1. Enumeration of the categories, ०१०५००१५११०००००००.०.५.,, Lage Division of substance,.. @eeue@eueceaeveweaoeteaeeese @ ® ॐ ® eee @ eeeeoese et pe
: quali ty ११००५०० ०० ००००७००० ०००४ ०० ००.०१ ७०७०००१ ०१९ ००००
2.
3.
4. ——--————— ACHIOT, 2. cen. ०००००००० १० ०१११०१००.०० ०००१० ००००००० 5, Definition of generality (class), १०५१११०११० ०१०१००५० ०००५०००००. 6.
P ar ti ¢ u lari ty, se # ® @ # 9 ॐ @# ॐ ॐ # ® $ # @ ® @ $ @@ ॐ @ see 9 छ कन BF
7 | । D ivision of ‘negation # @e ee @ @ @ ॐ ॐ @ # च se OF se RCH SH # 9 @ क HOES BE OF
IIl.—Common and distinguishing characters of the categories (8 to 12.)
1, Common notion of the categories, १११००००१ १११११११५००.० ०... 2. Definition of cause, ॐ @ ॐ # # ॐ @ @ चै क ॐ # @ #@ ॐ @ @ ® र क ॐ @ @ # छ @ # ® @ ® ॐ ® ॐ @-@,# @ १ 3. Division of cause (into intimate, non-intimate and instrumental
cau 8 e s) ओ ee क # ॐ $ $ ® ® क $ ॐ ® ease ॐ % ॐ @ # ® ॐ क क ॐ Ce कक HAH क = # र @ @ ॐ ee 68 9 रः 1 0
4. Semblance of cause,.. oo oc ve cn ०००० ००००००००.०,००..०........ ns 10-~-12
III.—Substance (12 to 49.)
A. Substance in general. Definition of substance, <<.co ccsesc us west aces ne ve cecees os ee ‘Its division. into material and non-material substances, ........ Common and special qualities of the several substances, ००००००५
B. Special substances.
1. Barth, ०००००००० ce cece voce ०००००५० ce ne ne ese ee cece se ae eces
1, cwnd ob workin be oo o0 1१1 00: 6640.00.05 48-60 68
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12 १9. 13 14
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6 ° 8 0 ul pee @% ७ @9 estes SH 9 क acer esos @ 9 #9 @@ > @ 69 aese te कक ७७०१९०१४
17
` 2008 of its existence,.. .ecccecccccssesesscece secevececcee 17.~-25
MCS RACINE), -46:4a da sini cis 66-0868 Sus o's त eee ieee Division of intellect (one of its qualities) into apprehension and FECOMECHON) 6640 e590 44114041 44 +; a, Apprehension, (p. 25 to 49.) _ Four kinds of apprehension, perception, inference, comparison and WErbal KNOwled Pe, | ~siis vis ke Sw ks Sede 9.94
25
tb.
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2.
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Contents.
Perception (25 to 30.) Perception by common intercourse. Its division into six kinds,.. 25—26 Perception by transcendent intercourse. Its division into three Kinds, sececcccvevccscecccsce rece sees nesecssecccscese 28-=30 Inference (p. 30 to 40.) a. Regular syllogism, (p. 30 to 34.) Intercourse in inference,....00ceccccceccvecscccccccececees S0-—31
Definition of consideration,.. ०००००००१ १०१००१११०००००००००००००. 31
of the invariable connexion of the subject with the pre- dicate in a general proposition (Vyapti, major proposition), .. 31 of the minor term in a syllogism (Paksha),.... 00 cess 32 Of the: CONCHISION), 0 Santee ne cic ecneus 33 B. Fallacy (p. 34-40.)
Division of fallacy, ०१०१०१०० cece succes ceveccencsaset cosres 34
Going astray, ०१०००००० ००५१११०११०१०१५१०१००००००००००,.,..,.,.३4-5
Contradiction, ce coce so ce tene cece cscs cece veseessseccs cece 37
Tn COnclusiveness ss.onodcacee-06 Ge seeds 32---29
Equalization, ००००० cscs secs ००००००१० cece vee te te oe neces 39
१11 ni was cos Seussetesieueos 40
Comparison (p. 40.)
Nature of ८०१10 ११०० ००११००० ०१०० ७५ ००११०१००१००००००५००००५, 40
Verbal knowledge, (p. 41 to 48.)
Cause of verbal knowledge,.... cece ००००११०१११०५०५०५००००.... 41
Power of ६ पणात् ०००००१० ०००० ००००१०० ०००००००००००००००-......५--4. Implication. १०००५०१० ००११०१ ०००००१५ ०००००५००००००००००००,,,,,.45--46 Contiguity, ०१०००००० ००१०० ०००१०१०००१००००००००,०,०,,.,०.,,..५6-4 Consistency). .oovs vececvec ००१०७००० ०० ०००००००० ०००००००००००. 48 Construction, १००००००० cess cect ०० ०००००००० ०००००७० ००००००००० १९. Intention, . १११११००१ ०१०० ०५०००५००००००००००००००००००००००..* $0, Mind, (p. 49.)
Its description, १००००१०० ०१०० ०००१०१० ००१००१०११०५०००१०००००००. 1४6 atomic nature, ००१००००० ०००००७०० sence ००५०००००००००००..
ए € ¢ oll & Cc ४ 1 0 n 9 @न# @ $ @ # @ @ #@% # % # #@ woe te ® > 5 ® 5 # 5 $ 9 $ % # क teen @ > ee
1V.— Quality, (50 to 81.)
A.
B e 1. 2.
Quality in general, (p. 50 to 54.)
Nature of quality, ०५०००००० ०० ०००१ ०१०११०१०१७००००००००१००००००. 50 M a t £ i¢ 1 al प u ali t i £ 8 ।, @ # # क @ # eens @ & ® # @ @ #% ॐ ® # ® # @ ॐ ॐ = ® ® @ # # ad taut 9 1 oe et 9 2 52
53
Immaterial qualities, १०१०१११० १०११०००१०००१०००००००१००००००.. Special qualities, ११००००११ ११११ ११००५१००००००१०१८०१०११५११०००००. General qualitics,...cccserccccccs १० ०१०१०००१०००००००००.-,,..५5--5 Special qualities, (p. 54 to 81.)
¢ colour b ad oes aeeeseeeen @# # 9 @ @ Bese ee @@ eee #@ #@ क # @ @ ॐ @ कै @ meee
54
T a Ss t ©) क 9 @@ @@ > 9 *§ ४ @ € क # 99 ee = tease छक $ ®% ० ०० evar कक #@ @9 9 5 4 "द्य 9 9
Contents. 11
3. Smell, ०१०००१११ ५०००५००० १००००१० ०००००७५०००००७०००००१०००००००। 55 A. Touch, ११११०५० ०००० ५००००००० ००५००१०० ००१०००० sues case ssas sees 55 Qualities as effects, ...eesaevececccesccscescesseesecscescs 55 Opinion of the Vaiséshikas thereon, ११११११५०१०००१००००००००००.५५--59 Nydyaikas thereon, seessscccsseccveccsccces 59
5. Number, ०००००००० ०००००००० १००००००० ००००००००००००००००००.,०,५9०--6ा 6. Measure, ०५ ०००५०००१ ०००१०५१० ०००००००००१०००००००,,,,,००००,,.61-62 7. Separatedness, ११०० ०००१०१० १०१११०००१००००१००००००००००००००००००. 02 8, (०पात््०प, ०१०११ ०११११११०१०५०००००००००००००००००००००..०,०,०-603 9, Disjunction, ०१००००१७ ०१ ०१००१००१ ०००११०० ०००० sass sees ones sees 63 10. Posteriority,.. ०००००१०१ ०००१००० ०१००५०००१००००००११०१००१०००. 64 11. Priority, 2.00 ce ०००० ००१००००१ ००१०१०० ००००००५१०११०१०००००००००. ib.
12, Intellect, (p. 64 to 74.)
a. Wrong notion, (p. 64 to 66.)
Mistake, ०००१०१११ ११ ०१०००००० ०००१११११०१०००००००००००००००००. 64 Doubt, १०१००००० ०००००१० ००००००००००००००००००५००००००.००,०.,.64--6; Cause of doubt, Terr eT eT Ce CTR 1 65 Cause of wrong Notion, ००१०००११ ११०११००० ००००००००१११०१०००००. 66 Right Notion, (p. 66 to 74.)
Cause of right notion,.. os seccccce sens ०००५००५००००००.०.. ve ee VU—6/
a
Definition of right notion, ०१११११५० ००१०५०० ००१००००००००००००००. 67 Apprehension of a general proposition (Vydpti,).....+.see+s ,, 68-69 Specification, ०००००००० ०००१ ०००००००० ०००००००० ००००००००... 0-12 Division of inference into affirmative and negative. Nature of Negative inference; = 23 21
13. Happiness, ०००००००० ०००००००७ ०००००००७ ०००००००० ००००००००, 75 14. Unhappiness, ०१०००००० ०७०७०००० ०० ०००७ ०००७७०० ०० ०००००००० id. POs Desike, 45-4 < a6 6% ew sw ales wb6s-0 4449549 76 10.00 sc 6s5o:sis-wis ang 6 se 4 wee ose wae 68 ances wy Oe ob ae eiwre Mees tb,
] 7 4 E n १ £ a Vv 0 u ए ॐ ॐ # ४ # @ # @ # @ # @ ॐ @ #@ ॐ @ ® क ऊ @ ॐ क ® ॐ $ @@ # @ @ # ॐ # ^ ऊ ee @ क ee oe 7 7 =. 7 8
` ४, BCLIVITY, १५१०० ०००० ००००१०० sean cons ११५०११००००१५००००००.०५... 76 b. cessation from activity, ००००११०० ०१०० ५१०००५०० ०० ००००००००... 27 C. Vital endeavour, oo oe rece ००१०७०० ००५००१५१०११०००००० ०००००५०... the
TS. Gravity, sesccee se ele ewe 005s 00 e's 11 ib,
192 PlGidity:: 5-0 sis cose weinareese-eee eae Sh Sane oo uw ne Teme eeess १6.
20. Viscidity, 0.00 ०१०००००० ०००००००७ ०० 00 0000 cece ०००० theses ce es १९.
Ale. वा 2 553 9399 77—~78 2. Velocity, . 00 00 000s 000000 oe ०७०० ०००००००० sees scse es vesces 78 Dy. Plasticity): seca weiee ees tess 4५44449 16. 002 id.
22-23. Fate (merit and demerit,) ...ccceesccccconecesvee secs scsece 77
2 4 . $ oun १ 7 ०७०००७५ RH OHHH OHHH ER क9 ०99१५ SH ०क ५०१५०१9७ ०५०१०७००, 7 8 ~—§ l
NOLO OL LOLOL ALLL AD AL Of OLD OO,
DIVISION OF THE CATEGORIES OF THE - NYA’YA PHILOSOPHY.
SALUTATION TO GANE’SA.
1. To Krishna, radiant like the new cloud, the thief of the clothes of the milkmaids, to him, who is the seed of the tree of the world, be adoration. 3
2. There are seven categories,’ substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, intimate relation and negation.
1. Padartha is explained in verse 13, as that which is object of knowledge, the commentary adds object of proof, of nomination ; but as this applies to every idea, the definition is too wide, and ought to | have been restricted to the most general objects of knowledge.
I have followed Colebrooke in translating Paddrtha with category, although that term somewhat differs from the idea which Aristotle expresses by the same. According to him, categories are the most extensive classes of what is denoted by the simple word (the word in no connexion with another), Cat. 2. rav xara pndepiav ovpmoKiy Aeyo- 14/01 Exacrov 7०८ ovciay onpaiverx.7.A4. He enumerates ten, viz. essence (otcta), quantity (wécov), quality (कर), relation (zpds 71), the where (ov), the when (zoré), position (xetcfar), to be possessed of (éxewv), action (zrovetv), and passion (zdoyewv). ।
Ritter in his history of philosophy (English Trans]. Vol. III. p. 66) remarks on them: “If the categories had been put forward as an accurate and exhaustive division of the modes of being, it would be open to many objections, but Aristotle does not usually ascribe much importance to this enumeration of the most general notions, so that we may regard it as nothing more than an attempt to exhibit in a clear
B
2 Division of the Categories
light the signification of words taken absolutely in order to show, how truth and falsehood consist’ in the right or wrong combination of these elements.”
However, as most of Aristotle’s categories refer to classes of existence or to what is most nearly related to them, and as in modern philosophy, the term of category expresses almost universally this meaning, we may safely adopt it here, viz. as referring to the notions, which express the general forms of knowledge, or what is the same, the general modes of existence. It will be interesting to compare the categories of the Nyd4ya with those of Kant, with which they have a curious resemblance.
They are: ae | Quantity. ६. Unity. b. Multiplicity. ९. Totality.
2. Quality. 3. Relation. | |
a. Reality a. Inherence and subsistence (substantia and accidens). __b. Negation. b. Causality and dependence (cause and effect).
९, Limitation. c. Community (Mutual causality).
4. Modality.
a. Possibility (impossibility). b. Existence (non-existence). c. Necessity (accidentalness).
The categories may be divided, according to the commentary, into two classes: into categories of affirmation, and negation. It was, however, not necessary, expressly to introduce this division in the text; for, the seventh being the category of negation, it is self-evident, that the six preceding must be categories of negation. ~The number of seven cate- gories is adopted by the Vais¢shikas, and also acknowledged by the followers of the Nyaya, as established in the Bhashya.
Kandda acknowledged only the six first categories, excluding nega- tion. Gautama, the founder of the Nyaya, enumerates under the head of objects of proof (categories) soul, body, sense, object of sense, intellect, mind, activity, fault, condition of the soul after death (transmigration), retribution, pain, deliverance from pain. Two more categories, power and similarity, adopted in the Upamana Chintamani, are contained in the first six categories, and must therefore be rejected.
Of the Nydya Philosophy. 3 3-5. Substances’ are earth, water, light, air, ether, time,
ep
2. The definition of substance” is to be the substrate of qualities, and to have substantiality (v. ए, 24). To explain this more fully, itis said in the commentary to be the substrate of qualities either in the relation of intimate union (Samavaya Sambandha) or in the relation of antecedent negation (Prégabhéva) that is of future existence. The latter definition is given to obviate an objection which may be raised from the condition of substances at the time of their production, When substances are produced, they have according to the Nydya no qualities. If they have no qualities, they are no substances according to the definition, that sub- stances are the substrates of qualities. By the second definition, that they are substrates of qualities either in the relation of intimate union, or of future existence, this objection is removed
With regard to substantiality or the genus of substance the commen- tary remarks: If somebody (this is the statement of the Charvikas) would say : There is no proof that substantiality isa genus ; for it is not proved by perception, as melted butter or lack (according to your own admission) have no substantiality,—we contradict,because substantiality is proved by the necessity, that there should be some distinguishing attribute of the intimate cause of an effect, or some distinguishing at- tribute of the intimate cause of the connection and separation (between the parts composing a substance). This argument is founded on the supposition of the Ny4ya, that every cause must have some distinguishing attribute (कारणं यत् किचचिद्धग्मोवच्छिद्र) under which it is comprehended ; it is a cause, because for instance, it has the general attribute of earth, water, &c. Substance therefore, as the cause of qualities, for instance earth of smell, must be conceived by the distinguishing attribute of substantiality. The genus substantiality depends therefore not on per- ception, but on inference.
Some suppose, continues the commentary, darkness to be also a sub- stance ; for, they argue, it. is proved by perception, it has colour and ac- tion, and is neither earth nor any of the other substances. Its organ is the eye, at the time that it is without light. This argument is not valid ;
* Kandda gives the following definition of substance, Vid. Vaiséshika Satra. Ist
Adhyaya. 11th Sitra. क्रिवागुणवत् समवायिकारणमिति FATT |] Substance is the substrate of qualities and actions, and has intimate causality.
8 2
4 Division of the Categories
Space, soul and mind; qualities’ are colour, taste, smell, touch, number,. quantity, individuality, conjunction, and disjunction, priority, and posteriority, intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aver- sion, volition, gravity, fluidity viscidity, faculty, fate, (merit and demerit) and sound
6. There are five actions,* throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding and going.
7. Wandering about, evacuating, trickling, flaming upwards, moving crookedly, are included in going.
8. Generality’ is considered two-fold, extensive and non-
for, darkness being produced by the absence of light, it is unnecessary to assume the existence of another substance. The supposition of its colour arises from delusion, as does also the supposition, that it has action, viz., from the cessation of light. If darkness were a separate thing, and not included in the category of negation, as gold is included in light, an infinitenumber of substances, (viz. in accordance with an infinite number of negations) must be assumed,
3. The definition of quality,* which is given in verse 89, is: Quality is, whose substrate is substance, and which is without quality and action, that is to say, there is no quality of a quality, nor an action of an action, or the notion of quality would be changed to that of substance. The argument, by which it is proved, that quality in a class, is the same as that, which proves the same of substance.
4, Action,+ according to the Bengalee translation, is the special cate- gory, which in the relation of intimate union is present in a substance which has velocity, or the category, which after a duration of five mo- ments is subject to destruction, viz., at first, there is contact ; 2, Separa- tion; 3, Destruction of a former connection ; 4, A new connection ; 5, Cessation of the action.
5. Commentary.—Generality (or class) is intimate union of many
* Kandda’s definition of quality is द्रव्याश्रयी TWAT सुयागविभागेचचकारणफमन- GU दति गणएलच्णं।। A. 1. that is, quality is sited in substance, has quality and does not depend upon conjunction and separation without cause
+ एकद्रव्यसगणं संयागविभागष्वकारणएमनपं चमिति aaa || A. 1. action is, whose site is substance alone, which is without quality, and does not depend upon conjunction and separation without cause,
Of the Nydya Philosophy. ‘ 5
extensive. Existence, as including substances, qualities and actions, 18 called: extensive.
9, The class which differs from this is called non-exten- sive; substantiality and similar notions are extensive and non- extensive. |
10. By its including many things, it is extensive ; by its be- ing included in a more extensive class, it is non-extensive.
in something eternal, or is eternal and the intimate union of many. It is said, “in something eternal,” because intimate union of many exists also between things in contact. ^ Of many,’ because intimate union in something eternal exists also in such infinite quantas as the sky, “in in- timate union,’ because the existence of many in something eternal refers also to absolute negation. Consequently there is no generality or genus, where only one individual exists, or where there is no difference of individuality, or where there is confusion, or where there is a retrogress in infinitum, or where an idea is changed to its contrary, or where there is no relation. For instance, the sky forms no class on account of its individuality. The notions of a donkey and of an ass (in Sanscrit the terms : घटः and कलसः are selected, either of which means a jar) are no class. The notions of element and form are no class, because the value of these notions is confounded. Generality is no class, because, there is no place of support for it,(it would require a retrogress in infinitum ; for if there is a class of a class, or a notion of a notion, there must also be a class of the class of the class and so further) particularity is no class, because it would thus be changed to its contrary. (Particularity by be- coming generality would be the contrary of its notion.) Intimate union is no class, because it is not in the relation of intimate union (in the re- lation of intimate union are only substances, qualities and actions). According to their definition of class only substance, quality, and action, further the general notion of those three, which is reality, the notions of the substances, with the exception of sky, space and time, the notions of the different qualities and actions as well as the notions which are included in them, form generalities or classes. The other four categories are not classes, but as the Bengalee Translator calls them, Upadhis, titles, general characteristics,
6 Division of the Categories
The ultimate condition of eternal substances is called particu- Jarity.° 7
‘Il. The connexion of a substance with its componing parts, as of a jar, &c. with its two halves, &c.; further the connexion of substances with qualities and actions, and lastly the con- nexion of substances, qualities and actions with their respective
classes is called intimate relation.‘
6. Comm.—The ultimate condition of eternal substances is particu- larity.* The ultimate condition, viz., the condition, which remains ultimately, last after all (according to the Bengalee translation, the con- dition which remains until the general conflagration of the world), than which there is no further particularity, that is to say, the condition, abiding in one substance only; for in compound substances from a Jar down to the union of two atoms there is mutual difference, by means of © the difference of all their respective parts ; but the mutual difference of atoms is particularity ; this is a difference by itself, and a particularity further than this does therefore not exist.
7. Comm,—The relation, of parts with things possessed of parts, of generality with single objects, of qualities with things possess- ed of qualities, of actions with objects possessed of actions, is intimate relation. Intimate relation means constant relation. It is proved by the fact, that the intellect, when determined by qualities and action, is in the relation of what is determining and what is determined (predi- cate and subject) for it is a determined intellect, as the sentence: The man bears a stick, is the result of a determined intellect. Hence, since in this case neither the relation of contact nor any other relation is possible, intimate relation is proved. |
As the Bengalee translation expresses the meaning much more clearly, I have given it here instead of the explanation of the original. Intimate. relation, excluding distinctive relation, is constant relation of only one thing which regulates a condition. By the term ‘ constant” the relation of contact is excluded, by the term ^^ excluding distinctive rela- tion,” the relation of distinction, by the term “ which regulates a con-
सामान्यविशष दति बुद्धापेचचं || A. 1. Both, generality and particularity depend
on intellect. The commentator, Sankara Misra adds, «° generality is the intellect, which is found in many ; particularity, which is separated from others,”’
Of the Nydya Philosophy. 7
12, 13. Negation® is two-fold, universal negation and reci- procal negation. The first includes three kinds, antecedent
dition,’ the relation of identity, as for instance of the sky ; for the relation of identity (the relation, that a thing is to be comprehended under its own notion) is not regulating a condition, by the term “ of only one thing,” the notion of mutual negation. In the relation of contact, is for instance, a jar with the ground. The class of distinc- tion is three-fold, viz. as referring to time, space and place. Inthe distinctive relation of time and space are all things. -The distinctive relation of place is again two-fold, the distinctive relation of nega- tion, and the distinctive relation of identity (of a thing with itself) The distinctive relation of negation is the site of negation. In the dis- tinctive relation of identity is for instance the notion of the sky with the sky. In the relation of identity remains every thing with itself. In mutual relation is the notion of the jar with the ground. |
8. Comm.—Negation is the reciprocal negation of the six cate- gories, that is to say, negation arises from the six categories, being denied of each other. Negation is two-fold, universal negation and mutual negation. Universal negation is negation, different from mutual negation. Mutual negation is the negation of identity. Universal negation is of three kinds, antecedent, emergent, and absolute negation. Antecedent negation is a negation, which is afterwards removed, for instance, if it is said, in this half a jar is to be produced, there is a ne- gation of the jar, which is to be produced. Emergent negation or de- struction is a negation of what is produced, for instance, in the sentence, in these parts a jar is destroyed, there is a negation in the cause (the parts) subsequent to the production of the effect. Absolute negation 13 constant universal negation, for instance in the sentence, here is no jar. Here, this objection may be made: Ifa jar or any other thing is removed from a certain place, and again brought back to it, the no- tion of absolute negation cannot be applied ; for, absolute negation be- ing constant negation, the notion of absolute negation is not produced, when the jar is brought back. Hence they have assumed a fourth kind of negation, referring to the liability of a thing to be produced or de- stroyed, excluding absolute negation. For instance, in the notion: a black pot is not red, and a red not black, there is antecedent and
8 . Division of the Categories
negation, destruction and absolute negation. The common notion of all seven categories is object of knowledge,® and similar ideas. 14. The five first categories’® are positive, many and in the connection of intimate relation. The three first (substances, qualities, actions) have the attribute of existence ; qualities and the subsequent categories are without qualities and actions.
. 15. Class (generality), and the subsequent categories are considered to be without generality ; causality’ is a predicate of all substances which are not atoms (whose measure is not an atom).
emergent, but not absolute negation. The modern school, however, reject this view, because they deny, that a contradiction has been prov- ed; according to their opinion absolute negation is met with in emer- gent as well as in antecedent negation.
Negation is assumed as a distinct category ; for in denying it, an in- finite number of negations, corresponding to the things, whose negations they are, would be necessary. |
9. Object of knowledge, &c. viz. capable of being known, named, proved, &c. `
10. Comm.—The general notion (definition) of substances, qualities, actions, generalities and particalarities is multiplicity, positiveness and | connection by intimate relation. Multiplicity is also found in negation; . therefore the distinction of the five is: the state of position in many. It is said, ^^ which are in the connection of intimate relation,”’ and not, which have intimate relation, because otherwise the categories of ge- nerality and particularity would be excluded.
11. Comm.—Causality is an attribute of all substances, whose measure is not an atom (पारिमाण्यं means, whose measure is an atom.) Or: Atoms, considered as a measure, have no causality. A substance whose measure is an atom, cannot be the cause of any thing; for a measure commences things, which are included in its notion (as for instance the half of a jar 18 the measure, from which the jar is produced) but this 18 impossible in this instance ; for a measure produces a measure, ex- ceeding the measure, contained in its own notion (that is from a mea- ‘sure is produced something greater than itself) hence as the greater is
of the Nydya Philosophy. 9
16. The notion of the necessary previous existence of a thing, which has not the fault of superfluous causality,’* is causality.* |
17. Of this three kinds are specified, viz. causality of in- timate relation, of non-intimate relation (the connexion of the
produced, if the measure commences from the great, so from the infi- nitely small (the atom) would be produced something smaller (more anatom). This is impossible (hence the measure contained in the con- junction of two atoms, is not produced from the measure of an atom, but from number). For the same reason causality must be denied of substances which are infinite, further of any class, transcending the senses, and lastly of particularity. (The reason for this is clear; any thing infinite which can be exceeded, must have become finite ; there cannot be any thing which exceeds the senses more than another thing, both being thought under the same idea, viz. to exceed the senses. Particular are the distinctions of eternal things ; they cannot be dis- tinguished by any thing else, because they are the last distinctions.) 12. I give here a note of the Bengali translation. The category, which has not the fault of superfluous causality, and whose existence constantly precedes, is causality, or cause is, by the existence or non-
* The principal Sdtras of Kanda, referring to causality, are : कारणाभावात् काय्यामावः। 15६ ^ प्]. काय्थाभावात कारणाभावः ॥ Ist Adh. कारणपूव्वेकः काय्येगुणो दष्टः । Ist Adh. कारणमिति द्रे काय्येसमवायात्।। 10th Adh. कारणे समवायात् RAPT | (असमवाथिकारणानोति शेषः 11) \ 1009 Adh. THST कारणेकाथेसम वाया । 10th Adh. If there is no cause, there is no effect. If there is no effect, there is no cause. The quality of the effect depends upon the cause.
The cause, which refers to substance, is intimate cause, because substance is 10. timately related to effects, (viz. compound substances, qualities and actions.)
Action is a non-intimate cause, because they are intimately related to the cause (the intimate cause.)
In the same manner are qualities intimately related to substances ; therefore they are also non-intimate causes.
¢
10 Division of the Categories
eomponent parts), and instrumental causality is mentioned ४8 the third by the followers of the Nyaya philosophy.
18. That from which in its intimate relation an effect is pro- duced $ (for instance thread from which cloth is made,) is causa- lity of intimate relation; that which is proximate to this, (the conjunction of the threads) is the second cause, (of non-intimate relation), and as the third (instrumental causality) must be con- sidered what is different from either, (for instance the loom of the weaver.)
19. There are five classes of superfluous causality,’* viz.
existence of which the existence or non-existence of an effect is neces- sary. If there is no thread, there is no cloth ; if there 18 no conjunction of the two halves of a jar, there is no jar ; if there is no virtue, there is no happiness, &c. There are three kinds of causes, intimate, non- intimate and instrumental causes. Such things as, intimately united, (that is, such as are in the connection of intimate relation) produce an effect, are intimate causes. ‘Two atoms for instance are the cause of a bi-atomical compound, threads of cloth, the two halves of a jar. Non- intimate is a cause, which is proximate to an intimate cause, that is, which is connected with the intimate cause; for instance the conjunc- tion of two atoms is the proximate cause of the bi-atomical compound, the conjunction of threads of cloth, the conjunction of two halves of a jar. Instrumental is the cause, differing from either ; for instance, the instrumental cause of a jar is the stick, of cloth the loom, of a bi- atomical compound god. It must here also be borne in mind, that an effect may be destroyed either by the destruction of the intimate cause, or by that of the non-intimate cause, as a jar is destroyed by the destruction of the two halves, and a bi-atomical compound by that of the conjunction of the two atoms. The intimate, non-intimate and instrumental causes are called special causes ; God, the omniscience of God, desire, endeavour, time, space, antecedent nezation and fate (vir tue and vice) general causes,
13. A cause is called superfluous (अन्यथासिद्धः) if, without its co-oper- ation, the effect is produced in another way. Commentary. Faults of superfluous causality are: 1. The notion, under which the cause is pers
of the Nydya Philosophy. 11
lst.—The general idea (class), under which the former state of a cause is perceived ; 2nd, that the ewistence or non-existence of which can only be comprehended by the existence or non- existence of the cause ; 3rd, that of which the previous existence is applied to the effect, when its previous existence 18 already applied to another (effect)
20. Ath, that the éxistence of which is applied to the effect, because it necessarily precedes the existence of the producer of the effect ; and 5th, that which is superfluous beside the thing whose former existence 18 necessary
21,22. Of the first class is an example the notion, under which the stick (by which a jar is made) is perceived, of the second the form, &c. of the stick, of the third the ether, of the
ceived, as for instance the idea of a stick (ewe the class of a stick) by which (stick) for instance a jar is produced. 2. Such things as cannot be thought of themselves as causes of the existence or non-existence of an effect, but are causes of the existence or non-existence of an effect only by means of the real cause, as for instance the shape of a stick ; (for it cannot be said, that, if this or that shape of a stick is given, the effect, viz. the jar, is given, nor, if this or that shape of a stick is not given, the jar, is also not given.) 3. The application of a cause to an effect, if this cause has been already applied to another effect, for instance, if the ether should be considered as the cause of a jar. The ether could be only the cause of a jar by its being perceived under the notion of ether ; this, however, is the intimate cause of sound, and it is therefore first taken 28 the cause of sound, and secondly as the cause of the jar. 4. The ap- plication of a cause to an effect, by which (cause) the (actual) cause of an effect is produced ; for instance, if the father of the potter would be considered as the cause of the jar; for the potter only is the pro- ducer of the jar. 5. The application of any thing (as cause of an effect) which is not necessary to the production of the effect, as for instance the donkey, carrying the earth, &c., of which a jar 15 made. Of all the kinds of superfluous causality the last alone is necessary, as including the other kinds. | c 2
12 Division of the Categories
fourth the father of the potter, of the fifth the donkey, &c. Among those superfluous causes the last alone is necessary (because the others are included in it).
` 23. Intimate causality belongs to substances, non-intimate causality only to qualities and actions.”
24. Dependence’ 18 the attribute of every thing, save eter- nal substances. The property of all nine kinds of substances is: to have substantiality and qualities.
25. arth, water, light, air and mind are the sites of com- prehensive and non-comprehensive generality, form,’ action and velocity. © |
26. Time, ether, soul and space have the attributes of ubi- quity and infinity." Of the five elements, viz. earth and the subsequent four substances (water, light, air, and ether), are the first four the sites of touch.
27. The commencement of things takes place in the four first substances. The special qualities of ether and soul’® are: limitation to space, and momentary duration. 3
[णै
14. Intimate causality belongs to substances; non-intimate causality to qualities and actions, that is, intimate causality is the common attri- bute of substances, non-intimate causality that of qualities and actions.
15. Comm.—Dependence in the common attribute of all things ex-
भ भभ yor
cept eternal substances ; itis to be thought under the idea of intimate re- lation. Eternal things are only dependent on distinctive relation (vide p. 7) as for instance on the relation of time. Eternal substances are atoms, (viz. of air, fire, water, earth) ether, time, space and soul. The common
_ attribute of substances is, substantiality and substrate of qualities.
16. Form (awa) is, the measure of which is limited.
17. Infinity (परमं मदत) is, the measure of which exceeds every other measure.
18. Comm.—The special qualities of the ether and soul are: a state which does not pervade (is limited), and a state which has only momen- tary duration. (A state which does not pervade is such as is produced only in one part, and is not present in another. And a thing has momentary duration, if in the third moment after its production it is
of the Nydya Philosophy. 13
28. Earth, water and light, have the properties of colour,
fluidity and perceptibility by the senses ; earth and water have
gravity and taste ; the fluidity of earth and light is a derived one.
29. The soul and the elements have special (contrary) qua- lities; that which is considered the property of the one, is the opposite of the others. |
30. The qualities of the air are touch, number, quantity, in- dividuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, ve- locity and faculty. The same first eight qualities together with colour, fluidity and velocity are assigned to light.
31. Water is the site of 14 qualities, viz. of the eight, before mentioned, and further of velocity, gravity, fluidity, colour, savour and viscidity.
32, 33. Earth has the same qualities, with the exception of viscidity, and the addition of smell.—The 14 qualities of the soul are intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, num- ber, quantity, severalty, conjunction and disjunction, faculty, merit and demerit. The qualities of time and place are number, quantity, severalty, conjunction and disjunction. The same qua- lities together with sound belong to the ether.
34. Those five qualities, together with intellect, desire and volition are sited in God, the same five qualities, with priority and posteriority and velocity, in the mind.
destroyed.) The special quality of the ether is sound, which does not pervade: for it is produced in a small part only of the ether, and not found in a different portion. It has only momentary duration; this means, it is destroyed in the third moment, after it has commenced to exist. Because the respective special qualities of pervading substances are destroyed by the same qualities which are afterwards produced, therefore the first sound is destroyed by the second. The same is the case with knowledge, &c. ; for knowledge is produced in the soul, which is a pervading substance, within the limited space of the body, and it ig absent in any other part of space, for instance in the part belonging toa jar. In the same manner knowledge continues only for two moments, and pervading substances are therefore those whose special
14 Division of the Categories
9 The earth is the cause of smell (the intimate cause), and the site of the various colours. Savour is of six kinds (sweet, bitter, pungent, astringent, acid and saline), smell two-fold (fragrance and stench)
36, 37. It has three kinds of feel, hot, cold and temperate. It is twofold’ eternal and non-eternal; eternalas considered in its atoms, non-eternal as being composed of parts; this latter is threefold, organism, organ and object (inorganic matter).
38. Organisms are viviparous, oviparous, engendered in filth and vegetative; organ is the sense of smell; objects are all compound substances from the smallest, of two atoms, to the largest, Bramha’s egg
qualities are : existence that does not pervade, and momentary duration. The special qualities of earth, &c., are: existence which does pervade, and continuance for a longer time.
19. Comm.—Farth is two-fold, eternal and non-eternal, eternal in its atoms,* non-eternal, if different from atoms, viz. if consisting of two, three, &c. atoms. Earth, if non-eternal, is composed of parts.
If it 13 said: ‘ What evidence is there, that earth is composed of parts ; (viz. a part being already a compound of two, three, &c. atoms) for you obtain the same notion, if any earthly substance, as a jar, is thought to be composed of the totality of the single atoms, Under this supposition you need not fear, that the invisibility of each single atom implies the invisibility of a jar, &c., which consists of atoms because, although each single atom is invisible, yet the totality of them is visible, as from a certain distance the hairs of the head together are visible, although none of them alone is visible. Moreover we arrive at the idea for instance of one extended great jar, as we arrive at the idea of one great heap of rice | |
We reply: If one atom is no object of the senses, a totality of atoms is also beyond the perception of the senses. As to your example,
* सद् कारणवन्नित्यं |i 3. A. Kan. Sit. gat fagciaraw: 11 4. A | An atom is, what exists has no cause, and is without commencement and end an atom is contrary to what has a measure (अतःपरममदचात् अति दौघनलाञ।)
of the Nydya Philosophy. 15
39. Water has white colour; its taste, and feel, are sweet and cold; it has also viscidity, and its fluidity is innate.
40. As to its eternity and non-eternity the same holds zood as before ; its organisms are not born. Its organ 18 the tongue ; its objects are the sea, snow and similar substances.
41, Light is hot to the feel, its colour white, its fluidity not innate, but an effect from some cause ; eternity and non- eternity are attributed to it in the same way as to the earth.
42, 43. Organ is the eye, objects are fire, gold, &. The feel in the air is considered as natural; it is ¢emperate, neither hot nor cold; its motion is crooked ; its qualities are touch, &c.
we maintain, that a hair, although at a distance, is not beyond the perception of the senses, because it will be perceived, if brought nearer. Nor can you say, that from a totality of invisible atoms a totality of visible atoms is produced, on the ground, that it is not contradicted by perception ; for visible things are not produced from invisible things ; otherwise heat of the eye for instance would one or the other time become visible. If you say, that a quantity of invisible heat, contained for instance in very heated oil, may produce a visible burning, we object ; for the visible burning arises from the visible parts, con- tained therein. | |
You can also not maintain, that from the invisible compound of two atoms the production of a compound of three atoms (which is visible) is impossible ; for we do not say, that the visibility or invisibi- lity of a thing arises from its own nature but from its necessary causes, as greatness, manifest form, &c. A compound of three atoms for in- stance is visible on account of its greatness, but not a compound of two atoms, as it has no greatness. This, however, is according to your view, impossible, because there is no greatness in an atom.—As in this manner it is proved, that earthly substances as a jar, are composed of parts (a part, as above already reminded, is a compound of at least two atoms) so it is clear, that they are not eternal, in consequence of their produc- tion and destruction. And there is no difference between the mountain Méru, and a mustard seed, because in either there is the same composi- tion of parts after parts. Therefore it is necessary, that there should
16 Division of the Categories
Eternity and non-eternity are assigned to it as before to the other elements. Its organ is the skin, which extends over the whole body; objects are all substances, intermediate between the vital air and the great element.
44, 45. The distinguishing quality of the ether is sound, organ isthe ear. Though one, it has many titles. Time” is thought the producer of all that may be produced, and the support of the worlds; it is the cause of the knowledge of
be somewhere an end (in the division of parts). To say ; that the point, where the end is obtained, is not eternal, would be to admit the pro- duction of an effect from a thing which is not in the connection of intimate relation. Therefore this point is eternal. As the continual progress from one great thing to another still greater, finds its end in the assumption of the sky and other infinite substances, so there must also be ultimately a cessation of the progress from a small to a smaller thing. Thus the necessity of atoms is proved. There is certainly no end of the division, if one has arrived at the compound of three atoms, because a compound of three atoms as an object of the eye, has parts like a jar, &c.; for from the argument, that the parts of a compound of three atoms have parts on account of its size, like the half of a jar, it is evident, that such a compound has parts. Nor can you say, there is no necessity for this (for assuming parts of such a small compound as that of three atoms) because many things (atoms) are required to pro- duce a magnitude for so small things. This, however, does not prove the necessity of a continuation of parts after parts, because thereby a regress 18 infinitum would become necessary.
20. Comm.—Time, the producer of all productions, is the substrate of the world. This is proved by the perception of the “now.” If for instance the perception: here is now a jar, 13 given, there exists a union between the motion of the sun and the jar. This is not conjunction (vide p. 7) or any other relation (for conjunction is between the parts of two or more things,) but it is a relation of a different kind, which is produced by time.—That time is to be thought under the notion of a substrate, is evident from its being the cause of priority and posteriority. Time is the special (non-general) cause of the perception of priority
of the Nydya Philosophy. 17
priority and posteriority; though one”! it has many names as that of moment, &c. 46. Space is the cause of the notions of distance and proxi- mity ; it is one and eternal | 47. Though one, it obtains various designations, as east, west from the division of its attribute. The soul is governing” the
a hte Sh es and posteriority. Or if both definitions are combined: Time is the substrate of the special union, which is the non-intimate cause of priority and posteriority
21. Comm.—Although one, it has many names, viz. moment hour, day, &c., past, future and present time. Past is the time, whose destruc- tion is present, as yesterday ; future is the time, whose future existence 18. present, as to-morrow, and present is the time, whose future existence is destroyed and whose destruction is (to come to pass) future, as to-day. There will, after every future moment, be another moment, be- cause there will be always another action (the junction of which with other things produces the relation of time); this will be the case at the general conflagration, where also the terms of ‘‘ moment,” “ day,” &e. are applied 22, Comm. The soul is ruling the senses and the body.” —The class of soul is the class, by which the intimate cause of happiness, and unhappiness, &c. is comprehended (or : soul is the intimate cause of happiness and unhappiness, &c. and the substantiality of the soul is
. proved by its being the substrate of the qualities : happiness, unhappi-
ness, &c.) [swara (the ruler, God) is thought under the same notion (class) ; but since such causes as merit and demerit do not exist with regard to him, he is not subject to happiness or unhappiness ; for we do not admit the invariableness of the rule that, that which is a con- sequence from the nature of a thing, will necessarily exist.*
Others} say: The notion (class) by which the soult is thought, is not applicable to ['swara, as there is no proof for this ; yet hence it does not follow, that a tenth substance must be assumed, as the soul is dis-
* Or in other words, for though itis necessary, that when there is an effect, there is also a cause, yet it is not necessary, that, when there is a cause, there is invariably an effect.
¶ Probably the ancient Nydya is meant. t The individual soul.
D
18 Division of the Categories €
senses and the body ; for an organ (instrument) must possess ` its agent. त 2 48. There is no consciousness’ in the body, as is proved by its disappearance after death. If such were the case, how could recollection remain, when the senses are destroyed. |
tinguished from the other substances by the idea: to be subject of knowledge. ‘‘Is governing the senses,”” &c., because it successively produces the conscience of the senses and of the body. Although there is in the soul the perception: I know, Iam happy, &c., yet it cannot at first be proved against one who holds the contrary opinion, that the soul is something different from the body, ete. To prove this, the text says: ‘“‘for an instrument must possess its agent.’ As an instrument, for instance a knife, the instrument for cutting, has no effect without an agent, so also the eye and the other senses, which are instruments for knowledge, have no effect without an agent. For this reason an independent agent is assumed. | |
23. To show, that the body is not the agent, it is said in the text ६ ९ There is no consciousness in the body, as is proved by the disappear- ance of consciousness after death.” If it is maintained : ‘Conscience is knowledge, and this in your opinion is not present inthe soul which has obtained liberation. Why should it therefore not just as well be absent in a dead body, because, if life ceases, also knowledge ceases ?” We answer: this is impossible; for, if consciousness belonged to the body, there could in old age be no recollection of things, perceived in childhood, the body being subject to increase and decrease by acquiring and losing its particles.
Nor can it be said, ‘that by an impression, produced in a former body, an impression in the second body is produced,’ because this would oblige you to assume an infinite number of impressions. —F urther, if con- sciousness were inherent in the body, a child could not commence to take the milk from the breast of its mother ; for the cause of this action is the knowledge of what accomplishes the desire, and at that time there does not exist the recollection of any means, accomplishing the desire. According to my opinion the commencement of the action takes then place by the recollection of the causes of the desires, experienced in a former birth. Nor can it be objected : ^ Well, if this be true, let any body
of the Nydya Philosophy. 19
419. The mind is likewise not the site’ of consciousness, because then knowledge and other internal qualities would remain imperceptible. an.
recollect any thing else, experienced in a former birth ;’ for there is no- thing which calls it into recollection. In this instance there is no other means but to admit of fate for the individual soul. If this 18 the case, the body is without commencement, and also the soul. Hence the eternity of the soul also follows; for what is without beginning, cannot be destroyed. | |
‘Well, let us then transfer to the eyes and the other senses the notion of cause and agent with regard to knowledge; for otherwise no cause is possible.’ The answer is: “If such were the case, how could recollection remain, when the senses are destroyed.” If the eyes and other senses were destroyed, how could, by the absence of the eye, recol- lection remain, as the subject which perceives exists no more, and as it is quite unreasonable, that the same thing should be seen by one, and recollected by another sense, because perception and recollection must ‘depend on the same subject, as being cause and effect.
24. Comm.—‘ Let then consciousness not belong to the senses (ex- ternal) but be maintained for the eternal mind.’ The answer of the text is: ‘The mind is likewise not the site of consciousness, because then know- ledge and other infernal qualities would remain imperceptible; for as the mind is an atom, and as the cause of every perception is a certain greatness, no perception could take place, if knowledge, happiness, &c. -were placed in the eternal mind. How mind is an atom, will afterwards be explained. = । ह
If it is said, (by the Védantists): ‘The soul is knowledge ; for its consciousness is proved by its self-manifestation ; but knowledge of this or that object, happiness, &c. are special forms of it. And because ‘this (special form) has only the existence of a production (मावलात् ; I translated जन्यभावत्वात) its duration is momentary. Further, since the preceding knowledge is the cause of the consequent knowledge, and the former again the effect of a preceding, there is even in deep sleep ‘an uninterrupted chain of knowledge down to the time of universal de- ‘struction, as the smell of musk remains in cloth. And by the com- munication of the impressions, produced by prior and prior acts of
D 2
20 Division of the Categories
knowledge, with posterior and posterior acés of knowledge, recollection and similar acts are possible
We deny this; for if the object of recollection is the world, omni- science would be obtained (because knowledge isa product of self mani- festation) ; and if the object is something, there is no proof for the se- cond member of the alternative; for hence would also follow, that in . sound sleep knowledge were manifesting its object.
And if you say, ‘ that in this state (in the state of sound sleep) know- ledge remains, but without form,’ we object also; for you cannot prove, that knowledge manifests itself, as otherwise such things as a jar, &c. would also be possessed with knowledge. :
Nor can you say, ‘that this would answer your purpose;’ for it is impossible to reject the perception of a jar and similar things.
If you maintain, ‘that this is a special form of knowledge,’ we would ask, what is that form? Is it distinguished from knowledge, we agree with the assumption of something different from knowledge. Is it not distinguished from knowledge, then in accordance with the general notion of knowledge, a jar of blue colour would be the same with one of yellow colour, because by its own nature there is no distine- tion of knowledge.
If you pretend, ‘that any special property of knowledge, as yellow and blue colour, &c. must be abandoned,’ we object, because the con- trary notions of blue, yellow, &c. cannot be predicated of one and the same thing ; otherwise it would be difficult to connect any meaning with contrary ideas.
Nor is there any communication of desires, because the commu- nication of desires even between son and mother is impossible.
You can also not say, ‘that there is a rule for things, that are the causes, and others that are the effects of communication,’ because there js no communication of desires.
And if you define ‘communication to be the production in something else,” there is again a contradiction ; for there is no producer.
If you contend, ‘that it is produced by another knowledge,’ you must admit another knowledge of the same kind, and so on in infinitum.
If you think, ‘ there is but little contradiction in a momentary know- ledge,’ you cannot prove such a knowledge, and your assumption is complicated.
of the Nydya Philosophy. 21
- For the same reason consciousness in bodies of momentary duration is rejected, because it has the fault of complication and cannot be demonstrated; in the same manner the production of the fruit from the seed and from collateral causes is evident, so that there is no need of assuming a special form of making, &९,
‘Let the assumption of a momentary knowledge be complicated, yet you must grant, that the soul is eternal knowledge, which cannot be destroyed ; for the Sruti says: Lo, this is the soul, true knowledge, the infinite Bramha.’ 7 |
We object also to this, because such a knowledge is evidently without object, and because it cannot be proved, that knowledge has no object ; in this case it would not have even itself as an object.
Therefore, it has been proved, that the soul is different from knowledge, and that it is eternal. | True knowledge, that is the supreme Bramha, is not found in indivi- dual souls, because they are clearly distinguished from it by knowledge and ignorance, happiness and unhappiness and similar qualities, and in consequence the difference of I'swara is established. Otherwise servi- tude and liberation were names without meaning.
If it be objected: ‘The same text of the Véda which explains the difference of !'swara, brings also forward his identity by his indifference ; for it says: ^ Let us strive for the state of indifference, therefore all is placed upon the soul,”’ and also: “In the state of liberation ignorance is annihilated.”
We deny this, because, the difference being eternal (constant) its annihilation is impossible. Admitted even,that the difference is destroyed, a dualism is for this very reason established, and it cannot bé said, that duality is destroyed. And as it is well said, that to Bramha in his state without qualities, and therefore without the quality of existence, existence is yet attributed, so it is also well said, that although there ig no duality, still there are two possessed of duality. =: । If you say, ‘that the absence of unreality which is the place of iden- ity, is bhere meant with existence,’ we say likewise, that the absence of | identity which is the state of two possessed of duality, is meant with duality.
Although every unit is comprehended by the notion of unity,
+ ध 4.3 still -one 18 not both, as it is said : smell is no attribute of earth and w
ater,
~ --- ~ ---*~ -~--*-~ ~
22 Division of the Categories
which is clear to every body. As regards the passage of the Sruti, establishing the indifference at that time (the time of liberation), it es- tablishes in fact an equality by the removal of unhappiness, &c., as it may be said, that this Purdhita by great prosperity has become a King. In this sense it is said in the Sruti: ^^ He who is without sin, obtains the supreme state,’ meaning equality
God is not the soul which is knowledge and happiness, but the sub- strate of knowledge. In such a sentence as: ^ Bramha is eternal know- ledge and happiness,” the term ‘knowledge’? means the substrate of
knowledge, by the authority ofa passage like this: “‘ He who knows all, is
omniscient ;”” hence happiness means also a person who is happy....... Hence is also the doctrine of the Sdnkhyas refuted, which is as follows.* Nature, (Prakriti) is the agent ; the soul (Purusha) remains
* To understand more clearly the argument of the Nyaya against the Sankhya, I shall briefly state the principles of this doctrine. According to the Sankhya there are two kinds of substances which are the substrates of all phenomena, nature and soul. Nature (Prakriti) is one and undistinct in its original state, which is incom- prebensible to the senses. As such it is Mila Prakriti, nature as the root of all things. It is productive, and in its productions various. Naturein its state as production is Vikriti, changed, or derived nature. The first production is intellect (Buddhi) or the great one, Mahat, which as a production of nature has no consciousness. —The soul (Parusha) is manifold, or there are many souls. The soul, as contrary to nae
ture, is not active, but it is conscious, Accordingly it has no activity in the pro- duction of ideas, which are given to the soul by intellect, and the opinion, as if the
soul were an agent, is a mere delusion.
‘The following quotation from Prof, Wilson’s Sankhya Kérika will still more elucidate the subject (p. 16.) ॥ ; ss. LII.—Nature, the root (of all) is no production. Seven principles, the great or intellectual one, &c., are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (unproductive). Soul is neither a production nor productive. _ ;
Bhashya. Mila (the root) prakriti (nature) 13 pradhana (chief) from its being the root of seven principles which are productions and productive; such nature is the root. ‘* No production.” It isnot produced from another....‘* Seven principles,’ —Mahat and the rest, from its being the great (mahat) element; this is intellect
(Buddhi).
०५५, The seven principles are 1. intellect; 2. egotism 3—7, the five subtile rudi-
ments. These seven are productions and productive, in this manner. Intellect is
produced from the chief one (nature) that again produces egotism, whence it is
‘productive (prakriti), Egotism as derived from intellect, is a production; but as it gives origin to the five subtile elements, it is productive. The subtile rudiment
of the Nydya Philosophy. 23
without stain (that is untouched, neither active nor suffering) as a lotus- leaf by water; but it is conscious. It is without causality, because. there is no difference between cause and effect (cause and effect are identical) and hence with the destruction of the effect, that which is like the effect, would also be destroyed. This idea (that the soul is’ conscious) ig necessary, because the perception of consciousness which is found in intellect, would be otherwise impossible. Intellect is a modification of nature. Intellect is also called greatness and the inter- nal organ. Under the condition, that it (intellect) exists or not exists, the soul is subject to transmigration or liberation. Its modification has the form of knowledge through the channel of the senses. If it (this modification of knowledge) is in connection with external things, as with a jar, &c., the perception of agency takes place in the soul, and the perception of consciousness in the intellect, on the ground, that the difference is perceived. For instance if it is said: ‘ By me this is to be performed ;”’ the first member of the sentence, ^ by me,’’ means the per- ception of the soul, which is without reality, because it is the reflection of consciousness (in the intellect) by the clearness of the intellect, as the reflection of the face in a looking-glass (is without reality by the clearness of the looking-glass). The second member: ^^ this’’ means the perception of the object, which by its being modified through the channel of the senses, has reality (truth) as the unclearness, produced by breathing upon a looking-glass. The third member: ‘Is to be performed” refers to the performance of business. Hence is intellect possessed of three parts. The connection of the soul (Ptrusha) with knowledge, which is a modification of intellect, is called untrue, as is the percep-
of sound is derived from egotism, and is therefore a production, but as causing the production of ether, it is productive. The subtile element of such as generated from egotism, is a production, as giving origin to air, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of smell is derived from egotism, and therefore a production; it gives origin to earth, and is therefore productive. The subtile rudiment of form is a pro- duction from egotism; as generating light, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of flavour, as derived from egotism, is a production; it is productive, as giving origin to water. In this manner the great principle and the rest are productions and pro- ductive. Sixteen are productions; that is, the five organs of perception, the five organs of action, with mind, making the eleventh, and the five elements: these form a class of sixteen which are productions, the term vikara being the same as vikriti. Soul is neither a production nor productive.
24 | Division of the Categories
' The site’ of merit and demerit is perceptible® by its being united with distinguishing qualities.
tion of the face in an unclear looking-glass. What has been said about knowledge, &c., is also true with regard to happiness and unhappiness, desire and aversion, endeavour, merit and demerit, because they are evidently identical as being effects of intellect ; but intellect is not pos- sessed of consciousness, because it is a modification.
` This doctrine of the Sdnkhya is refuted on the ground, that consci- ousness is dependent on the same substrate, as action, fate and enjoy- ment, because there is no proof, that there is another substrate, different from this. |
If you say, ‘that from such a sentence as: I, who am conscious, am acting, an error of the part of consciousness is possible in consequence of the modification of intellect,’ we reply by asking, whether this is not also possible on the part of the agent. Otherwise, if intellect is eternal, there is no liberation, or, if it is not eternal, there is no transmigration.
If you further contend, ‘there is no consciousness of intellect, because
it is an effect of unconscious nature, as effect and cause are identical,’ we protest, because this has not been shown; there being no proof, that the agent is a production; for from the text, that it is without passion, that it has no birth, it follows, that it is without beginning, and as such it is also without end, as it is unreasonable, that it should be destroyed. Of what use is therefore the assumption of nature (Prakriti) and similar notions ? _ Nor can you say, ‘that our opinion does not agree with the passage of the Bhagavadgita saying: “ by the qualities of nature are everywhere actions done ; the soul, blinded by pride, fancies: I am the agent ;” for its real meaning is: by ‘“‘nature’s,”’ fate’s, “ qualities,”’ the qualities, produced by fate, viz. by desire, etc., Tam agent. If this is the case, the intention of the Bhagavadgita is attained by the words: He, who believes the soul to be the sole agent, is liberated.
25.—* The site,” &c., viz. the soul is the site. If the body were the site of them (merit and demerit, &c.), the consequences of the works, done in a former body, could not be experienced by a later body.
26.— ‘It is perceptible by its being united with distinguishing qualities.’’ The soul becomes perceptible by its being united with its respective special qualities, and not in another way by such an observa- tion; I know, I do.
of the Nydya Philosophy. 25
50. It can be deduced from activity” and similar pheno- mena, as the charioteer from the motion of the carriage. It is the site (substrate) of egoity, and perceptible only through the mind
51. It is pervading, and the site of intellect and other qualities. Intellect is two-fold, apprehension and remembrance. Apprehension includes four sorts, viz. |
52. Perception, inference, comparison and verbal know- ledge. Perception” comprehends six kinds, in accordance with the six organs of perception.
53. The object of the nose is smell and the notion of
27.- ०, “ It can be deduced from activity, &c.’? That the soul isin another body, is inferred from activity, ete. Activity means here exertion. As it has been mentioned before, that knowledge, desire, endeavour, &c. do not exist in the body, and further as exertion implies endeavour, it follows that there is a soul which has endeavour, on the ground that there is exertion. | 28.—Comm. Perception is the knowledge (apprehension) which is produced by the senses, and the cause of evidence from perception are the senses. Inference is the apprehension, produced by the know-~ ledge of a general proposition (Vyapti) and inferential proof is the ap- prehension, produced by the knowledge of a general proposition, which | is the cause of the conclusion. Comparison is the knowledge, pro- duced by similarity, and proof by comparison is the knowledge of si- milarity, which is the cause of comparison. Verbal knowledge is the apprehension, produced by the knowledge of words, and proof by verbal knowledge is the knowledge of words, which is the cause of the former. 29.—&c., means the notion of good and bad smell.
| * Similarly says Kanéda: प्राणापाननिमेषान््ेषजीवनमनागतीन्द्रियान्तरविकाराः | सुखदुःखेच्छ दरेषप्रयलाखात्म ना लिङ्गनि ।। ऽध. 4th Adh. The vital airs, which go upwards and downwards, the closing and opening of the eyes, life, the actions of the mind, and the modifications of the other senses, happiness and unhappiness, desire and aversion, and endeavour are proofs of the soul.
E
26 Division of the Categories
smell, etc.” Thus the object of the tongue is savour,’ and sound that of the ear. , 54-55, Object of the eye is proportionate form. Sub- stances of such kind (of perceptible greatness) individuality, number, conjunction and disjunction, priority, posteriority, vis- cidity, fluidity, quantity, action, class, and the relations which are appropriate to the respective objects are perceived by the eye through the contact of light with proportionate form.
56. Substances, perceptible of touch, are objects of the skin; the objects of the eye, with the exception of colour, are also objects of the skin. : |
57. In the perception of substances is the union of the skin with the mind the cause of knowledge. Through the mind are perceptible: pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, intellect and voli- tion. । |
58. A knowledge which is without determination, is beyond the perception of the senses.” Proportionate greatness is the cause as regards the perception of the six classes ; organs (in- struments) are the different senses. |
30.—Further, sweetness, &c. _ 31.—Sound, articulate and non-articulate, &e. | |
32—Proportionate means fit to be perceived. The same propor- tionate greatness must be admitted also with regard to the objects of the other senses.
3.—Comm. ^ A knowledge which is without determination, is
beyond the perception of the senses,’’ If (for a man who has not the knowledge of a jar) the contact of the eye etc. (with the jar) has taken place, the determined knowledge: This is a jar, viz. determined by the general notion (class) of a jar, does not exist, because there was not before the knowledge of that, which is determining, viz. the general knowledge of a jar, &c.; for the cause of a determined knowledge is ano- ther which is determining. For instance at first is produced a know- ledge, not determined by the two parts,—that which is to be determin- ed, and that which is determining,—as a jar and the general notion (class) of the jar. Such a knowledge is without determination, and no object of perception ; for from perception it is evident that I know
‘of the Nydya Philosophy. 9
59. The connexion of the senses with their objects is called intercourse ; this is also six-fold. 1. The perception of things takes place by contact. | 60. 2. The perception of what is in intimate relation with the things, by intimate relation with that which is in contact
61. 3. The perception of what is in intimate relation with the last mentioned relation, (viz. intimate relation with that which isin contact,) by the corresponding intimate relation, (in- timate relation of that which is intimately related with that which is in contact.) 4. The perception of sound, by intimate relation. 5. The perception of what is intimately related with : sound, by the intimate union with that which is intimately relat- ed, and 6. The perception of every negation by particularity.* `
62. If it takes place, it is perceived, at the place where it happens to be. Intimate relation is perceived by particularity 68. Transcendent intercourse” is three-fold according to its division into intercourse whose character” is general,*® or
the jar. In this perception is knowledge the determination of the soul the jar that of knowledge, and the general notion of jar the determina- tion of the jar. The determination which is in the determination, is call- ed the general notion of determination. The knowledge containing the general notion of determination, is the cause of the knowledge deter- mined by determination. ` For instancein the knowledge without de- termination of a jar is the general notion of a jar not determining, Therefore when there is an undetermined knowledge of a jar, there 18 not such a knowledge, as: I know the jar under the general notion of the jar, (that is to say, not such a determined knowledge, by which the soulis determined by knowledge, knowledge by the jar, and the jar by the general notion of the jar.)
34.—Comm. “ Transcendent intercourse.”’ Perception is two-fold, common and transcendent. The intercourse of common perception is of six kinds, which have just been explained. The intercourse of trans- cendent perception is three-fold. ~ 35.—Comm., If in this definition the term “ character’? denotes its
# See note to v. 11.
E 2 |
28 Division of the Categories
whose character is knowledge, or which is produced by Yoga.
nature (its identity with itself) the meaning is, that the intercourse is of a. general nature, and this must be understood as the determination of a de- terminable knowledge which 15 in connection with any of the senses. For instance, let smoke be in contact with the eye. Here is smoke the deter- minable knowledge, and the general notion (class) of smoke, which (gene- ral notion) forms the intercourse, is a knowledge, whose object is every smoke whatsoever. Ifit is then said, that such a knowledge is in con- tact with a sense, the consequence would be, that, if a cloud of dust by mistake were apprehended under the notion of smoke, there could not arise a knowledge, whose object is every smoke whatsoever, as in this case with the general notion (class) of smoke no connection of the senses could take place. According to my (the author’s) opinion, however, the cloud of dust is in contact with the eye ; the knowledge to be deter- mined is smoke, and the general notion of smoke, which is here the de- termination, the intercourse. Its contact with the senseis the common one, which takes place on the part of the external sense. On the part of the mind, however, the intercourse is merely general, and determining the knowledge. Hence if by words any kind of perception of ® Pisdcha,* &c. has been obtained, the apprehension of all Pisdchas is produced. Theterm “general” means here rather the state of similar things, and this is sometimes constant, as the general notion of smoke, &c. some- times not constant, as a jar, &c. For instance a jar is perceived either im contact with the ground, or in intimate relation with its half. Hence _arises afterwards the knowledge of all such things, as a jar, either in contact with the ground, or in intimate relation with their halves, This must be so understood, that the intercourse of similar things (of things included in the same notion) depends on the same rela- tion, under which the generality itselfis comprehended. On the other hand where after the destruction of this jar, &c. arecollection arises of a thing like this jar, there could not, by the intercourse of a general character, take place the perception of all things like this jar, because the generality would at that time be not present. Moreover, suppose the knowledge of a jar to be determined by the contact with any sense. Here does not exist even the next day a contact with the eye, yet there arises a knowledge of similar things, because there 18 a generality which
* A kind of goblins.
of the Nydya Philosophy. 29
64. The intercourse of things, comprehended ina notion, is called general knowledge. It is required a thing which mani- fests this or that property produced by this or that sense.
65. The intercourse of any thing, of which there 1s a knowledge, is called the intercourse, whose character is know- ledge’*.—The intercourse, produced by Yoga, is of two kinds,
determines the knowledge of similar things. Therefore the ^ know- ledge” of ^^ generality” is the intercourse, and not “ generality.’ With this view it is said in the text:
36.—Comm. Intercourse, ^< whose character is general.’ The term ‘character’ means object, and the sense is ; Intercourse is a knowledge whose object is general.
«‹ But where without the contact of the eye, &c. the knowledge of the common state of similar things (generality) exists, should there not be 8 perception through the eye of all jars, &c. {` € 3
7.—-Comm. To remove this objection, the text says: ‘ It is required somethmg which manifest this or that property, produced by this or that sense |
The meaning of this is: When by an external sense through an intercourse of a general character knowledge is to be produced, there is required an object of knowledge, to be produced by one or the other sense, of this or the other generality, with reference to a thing whose generality it is. This object is the contact (ora similar relation) of the light, further the contact of the eye, &c. Hence such a knowledge is not produced by the eye for instance, when it is dark.
But if the intercourse whose character is knowledge, is an intercourse, whose nature is knowledge, and if the intercourse whose character is general, is defined in the same way, what difference then is between them?
38.—Comm. To show this, itis said in the text: “The intercourse of any thing, of which there is a knowledge, is called the intercourse whose character is knowledge.”
Namely ‘an intercourse whose character is general, produces a knowledge of the things upon which it depends; but an intercourse whose character is knowledge, is intercourse of the knowledge with that object to which it refers, (which is comprehended by it.) The mean-
30 Division of the Categories
that which belongs to the Yogi who is perfect, and that which. belongs to the Yogi, who strives after perfection. 66. The intercourse of the former is a constant manifestation, that of the latter takes place by the assistance of meditation.*° The intercourse, as regards inference, is consideration,”’ the (instrumental) cause the knowledge of a subject, invariably con-
ing of this is: A perception does not become manifest without inter- course. First without an intercourse whose character is general, how could there exist by the mere notion (class) of smoke and fire, an ap- prehension of every smoke and fire whatsoever? For this reason an in- tercourse whose character is general, is necessary. The objection, ‘that it does not matter, whether there is an apprehensionof every smoke and fire whatsoever,’ is not valid ; for with the visible smoke the connection of fire is indeed perceived, but no other kind of smoke is included therein, and therefore a doubt, whether smoke is invariably connected with fire or not, could in this case not arise. According to my opinion, however the doubt, whether smoke, in whatever place or time, is to be predicated of fire or not, takes place through the intercourse of general character, by which every smoke whatsoever is comprehénded - The objection, ‘ that on the supposition of an intercourse of general character man would be omniscient, because in the notion of all objects of knowledge every single object of knowledge is included,’ is also unte- nable ; for although all objects of knowledge may be known by this notion, yet, there is no omniscience, because the differences of all ob- jects are not known
Secondly, if no intercourse whose character is knowledge, were assum- ed, how could there be in the knowledge : “ sandalwood is fragrant,” also the perception of a thing, which is fragrant? Be knowledge of fragrant things granted through the intercourse whose character is general, but the notion of fragrancy is only possible by an intercourse whose cha- racter is knowledge.
39.—Comm. “ Intercourse, produced by Yoga,” that 15, a special virtue, produced by the practice of Yoga, (the union of the soul with God by means of abstract contemplation,) in accordance with the evi- dence of the Sruti, the Puranas and other authorities.
of the Nydya Philosophy. | 31
nected with a predicate in a general proposition. (The know- ledge of the Vyapti.) | a
67. Thereason which is actually known, is not the cause ; 1n this case. there would be no inference, if the reason had for in- stance not yet arrived, or had been destroyed
68. Consideration is the knowledge that a subject in its invariable connection with a predicate is united with the place of conclusion (Paksha, subject of the conclusion).
The invariable connection of a subject with a predicate in a general proposition (Vy4pti) is called the non-connexion of the reason (middle term) with any thing different from the subject of the conclusion, (Paksha, minor term.)
40.— Comm. Manifestation means the perception of all things, medi- tation is the thinking of the mind, which is separated from all objects. 41.—Comm. “ The intercourse as regards inference is consideration.” The special cause (instrumental cause) of an inference is the know- ledge of the invariable connection of the subject with the predicate in a general proposition, (@Ifwata,*) and consideration is the intercourse. For instance, let a man who from the smoke ona hearth, etc. has become aware of the invariable connection of smoke with fire, see afterwards any where on a mountain an uninterrupted line of smoke. He will then re-
` >* व्याञ्चिः (Vy4pti). It is difficult to find an adequate word for this term in English. It means literally, pervading inherence, the inherent and essential presence of any one thing or property in another, (see Wilson’s Dict.) but itis used in the Nyaya and other philosophical systems to denote the logical relation of one notion to ano- ther in a proposition of such a kind, that under circumstances an inference may be. drawn from it; or: it is the relation of the subject to the predicate, and vice versa, as the major proposition of a syllogism. The subject of such a proposition is the व्याप्यः the notion, which is pervaded by another (by the predicate) that is to say, which is only a part of the predicate, which is less extensive than the latter, or included in it. The subject is therefore invariably connected with the predicate, and if the former is thought, also the latter is thought. The predicate is the व्यापक, the pervading notion ; it has a greater extent than the subject,and the lat- ter is only a part of it. It is, therefore, not invariably connected with it, and if the predicate is thought, the subject is not necessarily thought with it. The Vyapti is, accordingly, only understood, if the relation of the two notions, to be connected together, on either partis understood. Further, the Vyaptiis a proposition, from
-
32 Division of the Categories
69. Or the perception of the identity of the reason with the conclusion (predicate of) which is not connected with anything incompatible with the subject of the conclu- sion. Subject (of conclusion, minor term,) is the certainty of the conclusion where the intention to conclude is not absent.
collect the general proposition, according to which smoke is invariably connected with fire. Hence arises the knowledge, this (mountain) is possessed with smoke which is invariably connected with fire. This (the knowledge, that any subject is connected by the middle term with a general predicate, or the knowledge of the two premises) is considera- tion. Hence arises the knowledge, this mountain is fiery, which is an inference. The ancients held, that smoke, when actually perceived, _ together with the notion, that it is mvariably connected with fire, is the special cause of a conclusion. Thisis denied, in the text; for if the reason (लिङ्गं, sign) were the special cause of the conclusion, then inference could not take place, if the reason (sign) had not yet arrived, or had been destroyed, because then the reason, the pretended special cause of a conclusion, were not present.
which an inference can be derived, that is to say, it must be a general proposition, fit to form the major proposition of a syllogism. The names of Vyapya, Vydpaka are only used with reference to the general proposition ; if a third term (the minor term) is connected with them, they obtain other names, viz., the Vyapya (middle
term) the name of तुः, reason, argument, or fas, sign, and the Vyapaka (major term) the name of साध्य, conclusion, predicate of the conclusion. The minor term
(the subject of the conclusion) is called TY: place (minor term, subject of the conclusion), viz. the place, to be connected by means of the middle term with the major term, or predicate of the conclusion.——If these names in their literal accepta- tion appear at first curious to a European student and totally deviating from those, used in the logical terminology of the west, it must be borne in mind, that their literal sense does not in the least affect their value as logical terms, and also, that the European names for the same notions are equally figurative, and the names for instance of subordination, co-ordination, subject, predicate, conclusion, &c., but | very imperfectly express the logical relation to which they refer. In fact most of these relations are in all languages taken from relations of space, as almost all terms which are of an abstract nature. As the literal translation of Vyapti, Vyapya, &c. might easily lead to false views, I have preferred to give their equivalents in the terminology accepted in Europe. |
क "क ००
of the Nydya Philosophy. 33
“0,.—From the knowledge, that with such a place the reason (middle term) is connected, inference is the consequence.
See ga ee ae
42.—Comm. ‘ Consideration is the knowledge, that a subject in a general proposition (the reason, the middle term) is united with the subject of conclusion,” (terminus minor.) |
The knowledge of the determination of the reason (middle term) which is determined by a general predicate, (major term) in connec- tion with the place (minor term) is the special cause of a conclusion. This can be comprehended in a double manner, either, it is the know- ledge, that the subject of the general proposition (the middle term) 18 connected with the place (subject of conclusion, minor term) or, it is the knowledge, that the place (subject of conclusion) is possessed of the subject of the general proposition (middleterm.) Accordingly the conclusion takes place either from the knowledge, that the subject of the general proposition (middle term) is connected with the place (subject, minor term) from which follows that the conclusion (predicate of the conclusion, major term) is connected with the place, (minor term,) or it takes place from the knowledge, that the place (minor term) is possessed of the subject of the general proposition (middle term) from which follows, that the place (minor term) is possessed of the conclusion (major term.)
Some think: ‘ Also from a two-fold consideration ensues the infer-
ence, that the place, (subject) is possessed of the conclusion (predicate
of.) There is (according to them) no necessity for the knowledge, that the mountain is possessed with smoke, which is invariably con- nected with fire. First there is the perception, that the mountain smokes ; further the recollection arises, that smoke is the subject, with which fire is invariably connected. In this case inference evidently takes place from those two acts of knowledge. A knowledge of something (of the Paksha, the minor term) determined by a notion, which is again determined by the predicate (by a notion, determined by the Vyapti,) can never be the cause, but there takes place the cause by the knowledge, that the place is determined by the general notion of the subject (middle term, for instance a mountain determined by
_ the general notion of smoke) because this is necessary, and because the
assumption of a knowledge, determined by-what is determined (by the general proposition, by the Vydpti), has the fault of complication.’ F
34 ` Division of the Categories
71.—There are five semblances of a reason, which are called going astray, contradiction, inconclusiveness, equalization and absurdity
72.—The fault of going astray is again three-fold, that which is too general, that which is not general enough and non-ex- clusive
We deny this ; for even-if there is no knowledge of the general no- tion (the class) of the middle term (vyapya, for instance the general notion of fire) the inference takes place from the knowledge, that there is a subject (of conclusion, Paksha) determined by something (middle term) with which fire for. instance ig invariably connected. And this assumption is also more simple ; for the cause takes place by the know- ledge, that there is a determination of the subject (of conclusion, Paksha) determined by the predicate of the general proposition (deter- mined by the Vyapti)
Moreover according to your opinion from the knowledge: ‘The
mountain is smoking,” the inference (the mountain is fiery) should fol- low, because there is a knowledge, that the subject of the conclusion (Paksha) is determined by the general notion (class) of smoke, which in this case is the general notion (class) of the middle term (सएष) but this of course will not be granted by any one. = ' . And if you further say, ‘the cause is the knowledge that the subject (of conclusion, Paksha) is determined by the general notion of the middle term (vydpya) when perceived together with the predicate of the general proposition’ (Vyapti) the consequence would be, that an inference would ensue, if Chaitra perceived a subject as invariably connected with a predicate in a general proposition, and Maitra the general notion (attribute, class) in connexion with the subject (of conclusion) |
If you lastly assume, § that the perception of the place, determined by a general notion, by A, in conjunction with the perception of the middle term in its invariable connexion with the major term (the middle term, determined by the Vy4pti,) by the same A, is the cause of the conclusion, made by this A,’ there would appear an infinite series of causes for the same effect.
According to my opinion, the knowledge of the attribute (middle
of the Nydya Philosophy. 35
“3 -Jt is too’ general,” if applied to the subject (of con- clusion) and to an opposite one; not general enough,” if ex- cluded from either. 7
term) of the subject (of conclusion) as determined by the predicate (major term) with which it is invariably connected, takes place through intimate relation, and produces the conclusion by the same relation. In this case an infinite series of causes is avoided. On the contrary, if it is said, that the knowledge of the middle term as invariably connected with a predicate in a general proposition (with the major term, as the Vyapti) and also the knowledge of the general notion (attribute, mid- die term) of the subject (of conclusion, minor term, Paksha) are causes, independent of each other, there would be a two-fold state of the cause of the same effect, and a conclusion would follow from the sen- tences: “There is smoke, which is invariably connected with fire,” and : “The mountain is fiery.’ If this is correct, we may say, that if there is a double knowledge, there must be also a determined knowledge, and here at the end of the discussion, where its result is given, a complica- tion 18 no fault. ` (This ison the whole an excellent exposition of the logical rela- tion of the cause of the conclusion. It is here lucidly explained, in what manner the three notions of a syllogism are in relation to each other, and also, that the cause of the conclusion is not the middle term, as separated from the major term, but only in its connexiori with it: As this is sometimes not attended to, itis not superfluous to attach importance to it. At the same time it is true, that the logi- cal form of a syllogism does not consist of one premise, and the conclu- sion, but of two premises with the conclusion; for if one reflects as to the form, given by our author, viz. the minor term in connexion with the middle term, which is itself determined by the major term, it is evident, that there are two connexions, viz. of the minor term with the middle, and of this with the major. That is to say, there are two pro- positions or two premises.)
43.—Comm.—Too general is a reason, which abides as well in the subject of the conclusion as in an opposite one. (Subject of the con- clusion is, where the major term abides, for instance, if fire is the major, smoke the middle, a mountain or a hearth is the subject or the minor,
F 2
36 | Division of the Categories
74.—Non-exclusive,” when no other - subject (of the conclu-
&e. A subject, opposite to the conclusion, is where it does not abide, for instance, in the example above given, a tank is a subject, opposite to the major term.) ` | |
That is to say, the reason is too general, when it abides also in a subject, where the major term is not found. For instance, let a hearth be the subject (minor term), smoke the major term, and fire the reason, the conclusion would be: the hearth smokes, because it is fiery, which would be false, because the reason is too general ; for fire (the reason) is also connected with other subjects, where there is no smoke, for instance, with an iron ball. |
(We would not acknowledge this as a logical fallacy, which takes place, when the conclusion does not follow from the premises, but as a fallacy extra dictionem, where the matter of the premises is wrong ; for the conclusion follows here from the premises. In this instance the major proposition is wrong, which is: where there is fire there is smoke. The conclusion, however, is quite right as well in form ag in matter, and the example is therefore not judiciously selected. The fault would, however, be apparent, if iron ball for instance had been taken for the minor term.
As the Nydya knows only the two first figures of syllogism, and of them only the two moods Barbara and Camestres,* we may say, that the fal- lacy has arisen by the major proposition being special instead of general.)
44,.—Comm.—Non-general is the reason, which has no similar sub- jects of conclusion for the major term} (that is where the major term has only one subject, or where no similar instances can be adduced for the reason.) (Thus says the commentary in explanation of the text.
* In Barbara, itis hardly necessary to say, there are all three propositions general affirmatives, in Camestres the first a general affirmative, the second a general nega- tive and the third a general negative.
+ This is much more clearly stated in the Tarka Sangraha. I quote the passage in Dr. Ballentyne’s translation (Lectures on the Nydya philosophy, p. 41.) ‘* The pretended reason, which applies neither to similar instances nor dissimilar ones, is one devoid of community.’ As, when one says: ‘‘ Sound is eternal, for it has the nature of sound.’’ Now the nature of sound resides in sound alone, and is no- thing else, whether eternal or uneternal.
of the Nydya Philosophy. 37
sion) is possible. A reason, which does not abide in the subject e e = t 4 ^ (of conclusion) is called contradictory.” | -75,—Three kinds of inconclusiveness are enumerated, viz. in-
=-= The latter, however, is here much clearer than the former, because the question is not, whether the major is immediately found in the minor but whether it is found there by the means of another term ; in the first case there would be no necessity for an argument. The example given in the commentary is: Sound is not eternal, because belonging to the class of sound. Here is, according to it, no similar instance, in which the reason (the class of sound) and by it the major is found, as the class of sound abides only in sound, and no where else. We should reject this argument at once, as having only two terms; but the Nydya is ` obliged to look out for some other appliance, because class is something different from the objects comprehended by it.)
45.—Comm.—Non-exclusive, is a reason, where the major term is the negation of absolute negation (where the major term may be pre- dicated of any other notion). Hereby a general negative is impossible, and a conclusion therefore cannot take place.
(The Bengalee translation gives the following explanation:
५८ 4. reason, for which there is only an affirmative, is non-exclusive, that is to say, a reason, whose subject does not exclude any thing, for instance all, &c. Let all be the subject, (mimor term) object of proof _the major, and fit to be named the reason. This argument is non-ex- clusive ; for here cannot be given a similar instance with regard to the subject (minor term) asit can be given in the argument: “The mountain is fiery, because it smokes ;” for here is a similar instance on the part of the subject a hearth, &c. According to the opinion of the modern school a non-exclusive reason takes place, where the major admits of only an affirmative (that is to say, where the major is not excluded from any other notion) for instance in the argument: ‘a jar is an object of proof, because it can be named.’’)
(We would not consider either of these conclusions faulty in form, be_ cause the middle term is properly connected with either of the extremes. A reason then goes astray, to. state it briefly, if the reason is too wide, further if it does not refer to similar instances, and lastly, if it does not refer to dissimilar ones.) .
38 Division of the Categories conclusiveness on the part of the subject, inconclusiveness front the nature of the reason, and inconclusiveness from limitation. 76.— Where there is a jewel hill, for instance, subject of the conclusion, there is inconclusiveness on the part of the sub- ject.*° Inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason* takes place, for instance, if the substantiality of a tank be inferred from its: having the quality of smoke. 77.-—Inconclusiveness from limitation** would take place, for
46.—Comm.— A contradictory reason is one which does not abide in the subject of conclusion,’ (minor term) that is to say, a reason, whose negation is the major term (a reason which is the contrary notion of the
‘ major term). Be cow the subject, the notion (class) of cow the major,
and the notion of horse the middle term. Here the reason, the notion of horse, excludes the major, the notion of cow, and therefore does not admit of an inference.
(Here the fault again is not in the reasoning, but the major premise is wrong; it is therefore a fallacy extra dictionem.)
47,—Comm.—1. Inconclusiveness on the part of the subject is there, where the notion of the subject (the minor term) is impossible. For instance, if it should be inferred, that a golden hill is fiery, the conclusion could not take place, because there is no such thing as a golden hill.
(Here also is the conclusion not wrong, the fault lies in the minor. premise, where the subject is a notion, not given by experience; and the fallacy is therefore one extra dictionem.) |
48,.—Comm,—z2. Inconclusiveness. from the nature of the reason (middle term) takes place, if the reason is not found in the subject, with which a connexion was supposed (if the reason and the subject exclude each other). Let it for instance be argued that a tank isa thing, because:it smokes. Tank (or water in the tank) and smoke are contrary notions, and smoke cannot therefore be predicated of a tank. - ` (Here again lies the fault in the minor premise. We observe, that the. second kind of inconclusiveness does not correspond to the first. In the first the minor term was contradictory, and we should therefore have expected, that in the second the reason would have becn contra- dictory.) |
of the Nydya Philosophy. 39
instance, if fire should be inferred from blue smoke, Equaliza- tion,*’ is called a consideration from contradictory reasons.
49.—Comm.—3. Inconclusiveness from limitation (on the part of the invariable connexion with the predicate). This can be two-fold, on the part of the subject, and on the part of the predicate. |
a. First on the part of the predicate. This takes place, if the pre- dicate is a contradictory notion. For instance if the inference were made, that the mountain has a golden fire, the notion of a golden fire (major term) is contradictory.
(Here the major premise is wrong.)
6. Secondly, on the part of the reason. (This takes place, if the reason is contradictory, for instance, if the argument were the moun- tain is fiery from golden smoke. The fault is here again in the major premise.)
Others say, that this kind takes place, if the terms are too narrow, as if it should be inferred that the mountain is fiery, because it has blue smoke.
(This division of inconclusiveness is evidently faulty ; for the first kind is inconclusive, because the minor term is contradictory, the second, because the middle and minor terms exclude each other. In the third kind two divisions are mixed, in the first of which, both the reason and the major term, are considered as contradictory, in the second the reason and major term are limited in their application by an addition which they ought not to have (in the example the addition-of blue). ` There are accordingly three different divisions confounded. The first proceeds from contradiction in each of the terms. In this would be included the first member of the author’s division, and a and 6 of the third, by which it is complete. The second division proceeds from the contradiction of two of the terms; of this only one part has been given in the second member, viz. where the reason and the minor term ex- elude each other. Of thetwo other members of this division, the first, where the minor and major terms are. contradictory, has not been touched upon, and the second, where the reason and the major term are contradictory, has been given in another place, viz. under the head of contradictory reason. The third division procceds from limitation,
40 Division of the Categories
78.—Absurdity® is called the error of stating a subject in which there is not the conclusion; as if, for instance, smell would be inferred to be a quality of a jar, because it was ac- cidentally perceived at the time of its production.
79.—If a rustic first sees a Gayal (species of ox), &c. his similar knowledge of cows, &c. is the instrument 0 form his notion of a Gayal.
80.—The recollection of the meaning of a sentence which had been previously pronounced, is called the intercourse zn the comparison. The result of comparison is the knowledge of the force of the word ^ Gayal” and similar expressions.
that is to say, where, instead of the notion in its whole extent, only a _part of it is connected with the other two notions (in the examples blue smoke, blue fire).
50.—Comm.—* An equalised reason is the consideration of opposite reasons.”
An equalised reason takes place, if at the time of the considera- tion of a reason, invariably connected with the absence of the conclu- sion (major term) the consideration of a reason occurs with which the conclusion is invariably connected; as for instance, if at the time of consideration of water, &c. which is invariably connected with the absence of fire, there is a consideration of smoke invariably connected with fire.
51.—Comm.—* Absurdity is, if a subject is without the conclusion (which is assigned to it.) |
Absurdity takes place, if the conclusion does not abide in the subject (minor term) for instance, if at the time of the production of a jar the jar is taken as the subject (minor term) and smell as the conclusion,
* The Tarka Sangraha (B. I. p. 42.) explains this : a counterbalanced reason is that along with which there exists another reason which establishes the non-exis- tence of what is to be proved. As if one should argue, «^ Sound is eternal, because it is audible,’’ as the nature of sound is (by both parties admitted 0 be} it might be argued with equal force on the other side, that ‘* Sound is not eternal, because it is a product, as a jar is.’”
है
of the Nydya Philosophy. 41
81.—The knowledge of words is the special cause. The knowledge of the meanings of words, is here the intercourse, and the result is verbal knowledge. The knowledge of the power™ of words assists in this act. Bn there is an absurdity, because at the time of production there is no smell in a jar, &c. for all things are at that time without smell
52.—Comm.—* The knowledge of words* is the special cause ; the knowledge of the meanings of the words is here the intercourse and the result is verbal knowledge.” | ।
The cause of verbal knowledge is not a word, when actually heard ; for though there be no word spoken, yet there may be verbal know- ledge, for instance, if one who has made a vow not to speak, writes down a Sloka.
53.—Comm.— The knowledge of the meanings of the words is here the intercourse.’ Intercourse is the recollection of the meanings of the words, produced by the words. Otherwise a person who had a knowledge of words, (who heard words) would have verbal knowledge, if he had obtained the meanings of words by perception or any other evidence. (That is to say, if he heard words, the meanings of which were given to him by perception, inference, etc.; for instance, if he heard the word “ tree,’’ while at the same time the meaning of it were conveyed to him by his actually seeing a tree. There would be two kinds of knowledge, independent of each other, and not verbal knowledge which is produced by words alone.) Here it must also be understood, that the effects of words are produced by special relation (efa:) otherwise the effect of the word ‘jar’ for instance, would be the recollection of ether by intimate relation, and there would be accordingly verbal knowledge of the ether.
Special relation is of two kinds, implication (ellipsis) and power.
The knowledge of the power of a word is necessary ; for unless the power of a word is previously apprehended, there cannot be verbal knowledge from recollection, which depends upon that relation (power
* A word is a sound which has a power, as for instance, the power of the sound ८ man’’ refers to an animal which has hands, feet, &c. The meaning of a word is the object to which it refers, for instance, the meaning ofthe word *' tree’’ is a thing, which has a trunk, branches, leaves, &c. G
42 Division of the Categories
of a word) although there may exist a knowledge of the words (the words may be heard). The recollection of the meaning of the know- ledge of a word takes place according to the rule of the knowledge of any object which is in relation |
Power is the connexion of the meaning of a word with the same word. That by such or such a sound such or such a meaning is un- derstood, depends upon the will of God. In names, which are at pre- sent given, there is also a power, because the rule: ‘ Let the father on the eleventh day (after the birth of a child) give a name to the child,” depends on the will of God. Ina sign, however, given at present, there is no power. Such is the opinion of some, but the modern school (of the Nyayaikas) maintain, that the will of God is not the power, but merely will (of man.) Hence is also power in a sign, which may be given at present. |
The apprehension of power depends upon grammar, comparison, dictionary, the instruction of persons worthy of confidence, actual intercourse, the supplying of the sentence, substitution, and the con- nexion with well-known words.
a. The apprehension of the -root, of the inflective base, the deriva- tive affixes, &c. of a word is produced by grammar; it does. not take place, whenever there is an obstacle, as there is, if, according to the statement of the grammarians, the power of the grammatical termina- tions (that is of the verbs and nouns) refers tothe agent. In the sentence: ‘‘Chaittra cooks’ the termination in ^^ cooks”’ is inseparably connected with the agent ‘‘ Chaittra.”’
This connexion, we maintain, does in this case not arise, in conse- quence of its complication ; but in the action (cooks) the power is pro- duced, because this assumption 13 simple,* for it is manifest, that the action is a determination of Chaittra. .. .. =.
६. The power which takes place by comparison, has been before described.
e. In the same manner power is also apprehended by the diction- ary ; if there is, however, any obstacle, it is not apprehended. Thus according to the dictionaries, the adjective terms of ^^ णापर, &e. have power with reference to blue colour and to.a thing which has
* According to the grammarians it must be said: ‘‘ Chaittra, not separated from
-what is determined by the action referring to cooking,’’ while the Nydyaikas say ; ५ Chaittra, determined by the action, referring to cooking.”
of the Nydéya Philosophy. | 43
blue colour; but it is more simple to say, that this term by its power refers to the quality of blue, and by implication to a thing which has blue colour.* :
d. Or the power is derived from the word of a person, worthy of confidence, if for instance it is said, that the word ‘‘ Pika’ (a black cuckoo) is the same as ^° Kokila,” the power of the word ‘ Pika’’ is apprehended | न.
९. Or from actual intercourse. If for instance the master who is 8& grown up person, orders his servant who is also a grown up person, to bring the jar, and the jar is brought by the latter, a boy who attends to this, hence observes that the action of bringing a jar is connected with those words. If he further hears: ‘Take away the jar,’’ “ bring the cow,” he understands the power of the term: ‘‘jar,’”? &., to be brought or to be taken away, with reference to a jar, &c. in connexion with an action. | ।
Some say: ‘ Under this supposition there is no verbal knowledge in the sentence: ‘ There isa blue jar on the ground ;”’ for the power of a jar, &c. 18 apprehended by a jar, as connected with an action, and the power of any termination of a verb refers to the understanding of an action, but in this case there is no connexion of such a kind, and therefore no verbal knowledge ?” |
We do not agree, because, although it is at first necessary for brevity’s sake to admit a power with reference to a jar, as determined by action, it is right to omit it afterwards... .. ..
J. Or from supplying the sentence. (This takes place, if in a sen- tence a word has a special meaning, while from other sentences it is known, that the meaning is more general.)
g- Or from. substitution. Substitution means the definition of the sense of a word by another word of the same sense ; thus, if for the word belligerous ‘ warlike” is substituted, the power refers to the word “ warlike.’’+
A. Or fromthe connexion with well-known words, for instance in the sentence: ^^ In this mango tree the Pika sweetly sings,”’ the power of the word ^ Pika” is apprehended in this manner.
* Ifa word has several meanings, there is a separate power for each of them. ` ¶ In the original the examples are: “‘ghata:’? and‘ kalasa,’”’ either of which means a jar.
a2
44 Division of the Categories
Some (the Mimdnsikas) maintain: ‘The power of a word refers to the class (notion) and not to the individual, because in the latter case it would go astray, and require assumptions without end. And on the first supposition there is also a knowledge of the individual, because without individuals the knowledge of a class is impossible.’
` We deny this, because without assuming a power, the apprehension of an individual does not take place.
Nor does implication (ellipsis) refer to an individual ; for an indivi- dual may be apprehended, although there is no want of apprehension of the literal meaning of a word (an implication is dependent on the circumstance, that a word cannot be comprehended in its literal sense.)
Nor need there be any fear, that by assuming a power, referring to an individual, the fault of an infinite number of hypotheses is com- mitted ; for we assume one and the same power for all individuals.
Nor is there (by the assumption, that power refers to the individual) a want of extension; for this extension is effected by the class of cow for instance (when a cow is the individual)
Moreover, if the power is apprehended for instance in cow, possessed of power, the force refers to an individual. If on the contrary the power is apprehended for instance in the class of cow, then there would be a recollection of the meaning of a word, determined by the class of cow, and a verbal knowledge would be impossible, because the knowledge of the power by the same determination would be the cause of the recol- lection of the meaning of a word and of verbal knowledge. Moreover, if the power refers to the class of cow, we must declare, that the class of the class of cow is the determination of what is possessed of the power. But the class of cow, which is not in intimate relation to any thing that is not cow, is in intimate relation to all cows. Hence your assumption of a determination of the notion of any thing, possessed of power, is complicated, because this notion does not refer to individual cows ; therefore in order to comprehend this or that individual, posses- sed of this or that class, it is necessary to assume a power, which is founded on individuals, determined by class and form. ` `
A word, possessed of power, is either Yaugika, or Ridha, or Yoga- ridha, or Yaugika-rddha
1. <A word is Yaugika, if its meaning is understood by the mean- ing of its parts; for instance in the word “ giver’ (in Sanscrit. the ex-
of the Nydya Philosophy. 45
82,—-Implication," is the relation of a word which has power, and it takes place when the intention of the speaker is not understood by the literal meaning of a word. The cause of understanding a sentence is contiguity, consistency, coustruc- tion and intention. |
ample is Pachaka, cook) the १००८ giv (e) expresses the action give, and the termination “ er” refers tothe agent. And the whole expresses thé meanings of the parts, viz. an agent with reference to the action“ give.” 2, Ridha is a word, which, independent of the power of its parts, is only understood by the power of the whole; as for instance ‘ go” (cow, for ० go” is derived from *‘ gam,” to go, which does not express . the meaning of go,) “ghata:” (jar) ete. | ६4 3. Yogarddha is a word, which, beside the power of its parts, ex- presses a different meaning as a whole, for instance ** Pankaja’’ (from << Panka,”? mud, and “ja,” born) for the word “ Pankaja” means by the power of its parts ‘an agent, born in mud” (which includes any thing, produced in such a manner) but by its power as a whole a “ waterlily” (that is only one of the things, born in mud)... 6. -- _ 9 4. Yaugika-rédha is a word, which is anderstood either by the mean- ing of its parts, or by Rudha, for instance Udbhid. The power of the word ^ ud” refers to upwards, the power of the root “bhid’” to cutting. Therefore by its Yaugika power it refers to tree, and by its power of Ridha it refers to any germ, produced from corn. o = : ` 54.—Comm.—" Implication is the relation of a word, which has power, and it takes place, when the intention of the speaker is not understood by the literal sense of a word.” a For instance, let the sentence be given : ^^ Ghosha dwells on the Gan- ९६.” If in this case, with reference to the literal meaning of < Ganga,” viz. the current, either the connexion of Ghosha, or the intention of the speaker is not obtained, the meaning of ‘ bank” is understood by implication. This implication is the relation of a word which has power. Here, from the knowledge of the connexion of the literal meaning of the current with the bank, a recollection of the bank is produced, and hence the meaning of the sentence is understood. Moreover if the want of connexion alone were the cause of implica- tion, there would be no implication in the sentence: ‘ Let the staffs
46 | Division of the Categories
83.—Contiguity,” is called the proximity of words.
enter,’ because there is no want of connexion with reference to the en- tering of the staffs. Therefore, because here the entrance of the staffs has no reference to the intention of the speaker, which is the taking of food, the implication refers to the bearers of staffs. In the same manner, in the sentence: ‘ Protect the ghee from the crows” the word “crow” has an implication to any thing which may injure the ghee, because the intention of the speaker refers to the preservation of the ghee generally. In the same manner, if it is said: ‘“‘ The umbrella- bearers are proceeding ;” the word ^ umbrella-bearers” implies -the merchants of a caravan. |
This latter is called the implication which does not lose its own meaning (Ajahatsérthé Lakshana, which keeps its own meaning, beside that which it obtains from implication) because by the term ^^ merchants of a caravan’’ the bearers of umbrellas as well as those without um- brellas are understood. |
Moreover, if the want of sense in the connexion alone were the cause of implication, sometimes the word ^ Ganga” would imply : «५ bank,’’ sometimes the word : ^^ Ghosha,”’ “ fish,’ &c. and there would be accordingly no rule. This, however, must be understood: if the connexion of the meaning of a word, possessed of power, is appre- hended by the notion of bank, bank must be apprehended by the no- tion of bank ; if, on the other hand, it is apprehended by the notion of the bank of the Ganga, it must be recollected by that notion: There- fore there is no implication in the general notion of an implication, be- cause the general notion is understood without implication. Likewise, there is no power in the general notion of what has power, because any word is able to remind of the meaning of its general notion.
But if there is an implication by the successive connexion of a word, possessed of power, it is called an implied implication, as for instance in the word ‘“* Dwirépha’’ (literally, that which has two wings, figurative, ‘‘ black bee’’) the connexion of : “ two-winged,”’ refers to ^ Bhramara”’ (black bee) that of ^ Bhramara” to black bee; this is an implied implication... .. .. a
55.—Comm.—Contiguity means proximity, viz. the uninterrupted succession of two or more words which have a connexion among each
of the Nydya Philosophy. 47
other. Therefore there is no verbal knowledge in the words: ^ The by inhabited was Dévadatta volcano ;” but if by a mistake in the proximity no mistake in the verbal understanding is the consequence, it does not matter.
‘But in the sentence : ‘ With umbrella, earrings and clothes adorned is Dévadatta,’”? the recollection of the second word destroys the recol- lection of the first ; accordingly, as there is an interruption, a recollec- tion of the second word is impossible.’ `
We do not grant this, as by the impressions of each word until the last an uninterrupted recollection of all objects is possible ; for as by several kinds of intercourse one and the same perception arises, so also one and the same recollection arises by several impressions, and the knowledge of the last letter together with the impressions of all words brings all to recollection. How could otherwise exist the recollection of any word that has many letters ?
Moreover ; some say, that, as in a field all pigeons are caught in the same net, so by the recollection of all the meanings of words does take place the verbal knowledge of all meanings of words, which is correspond- ing to the knowledge of the connexion depending upon the object and verb. Others say : if connected with all such words, as are construed, consistent and contiguous, verbal knowledge of all the words (included in the sentence) takes place ; for, they say, after the meaning of the single sentences has been understood, the meaning of the great sentence will be comprehended by the recollection of the meanings of the words. Hence the assumption of a total impression of a word, manifesting all the letters, has been refuted, because by the apprehension of the last letter, together with the impressions of all the preceding letters which (appre- . hension) manifests the word, the word is apprehended. This must be understood, if it is said: ‘*the door,’’ the meaning of the word is obtained by the knowledge of the word “ close,” but not by the know- ledge of the meaning of such 2618 -28 closing, &c., because the actual presence of the meaning of a word, which is produced by a word, is the cause of verbal knowledge. Moreover, as:‘the words denoting action and object, are mutually connected, it is impossible, that there is verbal knowledge without.a word, denoting a verb. In the same manner, if it is said: ‘ Of the flowers,”’ it is necessary to assume: “he is desirous,” because without this the preposition ‘ of”? could not be applied.
48 - Division of the Categories
Consistency is the mutual correspondence of the meanings of the words. |
84.—Construction,” is the selection of such terminations, without which the meaning of a sentence is unintelligible. In- tention,”’ is based on the wish of the speaker.
7
56.—Comm.—Consistency is the connexion of the meaning of one word with that of another. Accordingly there is no verbal knowledge in such sentences as: ‘He sprinkles with fire,’’ because there is no meaning init. If it is objected, ‘ that previously to the verbal knowledge there is nowhere a knowledge of this consistency, because there is not before a meaning of the sentence,’ we reply : there 1s a knowledge of consistency which is sometimes doubtful, sometimes certain, if there is 2 recollection of the meanings of the different words. The modern school, however, says, that the knowledge of consistency is no reason of verbal knowledge. If it is said: ‘‘ He sprinkles with fire,’’ there is no verbal knowledge, because the inconsistency, which is that fire cannot be an instrument in the action of sprinkling, is certainly an obstacle. Because the certainty of its absence is an obstacle only in a know- ledge, which is not produced by common intercourse or by special defects, therefore it is proved, that it is an obstacle with reference to verbal knowledge—although it is not proved, that by the late appear- ance of consistency verbal knowledge is late.
57.— Comm.—Construction is the connexion of one word with ano- ther, without which the former has no sense. The case, denoting agent, has no connexion without the case, referring to action, and with this the former is construed. In fact, however, the proximity of the cases denoting agent and action, is included in contiguity. Moreover, with reference to the objective case, for mstance of jar, the cause is the knowledge of the termination of the second case. Therefore there is no meaning in such sentences as: ‘‘ The jar is the accusative case,” «५ {0 bring is an action.”’
58.—Comm.—Intention is the wish of the speaker. Suppose, inten- tion were not a cause of verbal knowledge, and such a sentence as: ‘Bring the Saindhava’ (meaning horse and salt) were pronounced, there would sometimes the meaning of “horse,” and sometimes the meaning of “salt,” be obtained. It cannot be said, that the circum-
of the Nydya Philosophy. 49
- 85.—'The instrument® in the perception of happiness ‘and other internal qualities is the mind. The atomic nature of the mind is inferred from the fact that several objects of know- ledge are not perceived by it at one and the same time. 2 stances, &c. by which the intention is apprehended, are the cause of verbal knowledge, because they are not included in the definition. And if it ig said, ‘ that they are included as being the cause of the knowledge of the intention,’ it is simple to say, that the knowledge of the in- tention is the cause. In this manner, God is assumed for the knowledge of the intention with reference to the Védas. It must not be said, ‘ that the knowledge of the intention of the teacher is here the cause,’ because at the commencement of the creation there is no teacher. Nor must it be said: ‘ there is no general conflagration (destruction of the world,) how can therefore be acommencement of creation?’ for a general conflagra- tion is proved by the Sastra. In the same manner is in the sentence of a parrot the knowledge of the intention of God the cause, but in a vile sentence of the parrot the knowledge of the intention of the speaker.
Others say: If there is a word which has different meanings, the knowledge of the intention is sometimes the cause ; moreover, in the sentence of a parrot is also verbal understanding withont the know- ledge of the intention, and with reference to the Védas the meaning is apprehended by the discussions, which are purified by the eternal
Mimansa.
59.—Comm.—Iatellect was divided into two kinds; viz. appre- hension and remembrance (vid. verse 51.) The nature of apprehension has been explained. Remembrance will not be explained, because it is easy to be understood; for the cause of itis a former apprehen- sion. Some say, ‘ the class (notion) of apprehension is not causality, but the class (notion) of knowledge ;* otherwise there would be no remem- brance after a remembrance, because the former impression would be destroyed by the remembrance of the common notion. According to
my opinion, however, there is by this remembrance through a new im- pression a new remembrance produced.’ This we cannot grant; where after the remembrance of a perception in its totality the remembrance of ` * That is to say, apprehension is not the cause of remembrance, but knowledge in general.
+H
50 | Division of the Categories
86.—Qualities™ abide in substances, and are without qualities © and actions.
the single objects (constituting a totality) as of cloth, jar, &c. is produc- ed, but so that there is no remembrance of all the objects, there it must be said, that, as the impression of every single remembrance is not de- stroyed, time, or disease, or the last remembrance is the cause of the destruction of the impression. Accordingly, it cannot be said, ‘that a gradual remembrance is impossible,’ nor, ‘that by repeated remembrance, a stronger impression is impossible ;’ for the word ^ strong’’ means here what suddenly recallsto mind. It also cannot be said, ‘that the cause is knowledge, as there is no alternative ;’ for if the special attribute is assigned, there is no going astray ; but knowledge has the fault of su- perfluous causality, as it 18 a general attribute. How could otherwise a stick be the cause ofa jar by being turned round, and not as well by its being a substance or having colour? Nor must it be said: ‘ There is an apprehension, that the intermediate remembrance will go astray, because the impression is destroyed ;’ for by objecting to assuming an infinite number of impressions and by assuming the destruction of the impres- sion of the last remembrance, a going astray cannot be apprehended. =
60.—Comm.—The existence of mind is proved by the following in- ference: The perception of happiness, &c. takes place by an instru- ment, because the perception is a production, as for instance is the perception by the eye. This instrument is the mind. It cannot be said ‘that the perceptions of unhappiness, &c. are produced by other instruments,’ because the necessity of only one instrument as cause for all similar perceptions is evident from its simplicity. Thus the mind is proved as being the substrate of contact, which is the non-intimate eause of unhappiness, &c.
61.—Comm.— The atomie nature of the mind is proved from the fact, that several objects of knowledge are not ‘perceived by it at one and the same time.”
It is clear from apprehension (perception) that various objects of perception, for instance, objects of the eye, of taste, &c. are not at one and the same time produced; for although there may exist an inter- eourse of the several senses with these objects, yet knowledge is pro- duced by only one sense, because the mind is in contact with only one
of the Nydya Philosophy. 51
Material qualities” are colour, taste, feel, and smell, priority and posteriority, अ sense, and it is not produced (at that time) by any other sense, as the mind is not in contact with it. Therefore if the mind were to be comprehended by the notion of a pervading substance, it should be connected with every thing; hence (as this is not the case) it fol- lows, that the mindis not pervading. It must not be said, ‘ that the knowledge of the mind is late (successive) because at that time the special fate (merit or demerit) which reminds of knowledge, is ` also late ;’ for, if this were the case, there would be no necessity for as- suming such instruments of knowledge as the eye, &c. :
Nor must it be said: ‘ How can the narrowness of the mind be re- conciled with the fact, that at one and the same time a knowledge from different senses exists, for instance at the time when one eats a large cake ;’ for the mind is some thing very subtle, and is therefore rapidly in contact with various senses, so that different kinds of know- ledge may arise in the same imperceptible succession, as the hundred 168४१९8 of a lotus are pierced; it isa mere delusion, if several kinds of knowledge appear at the same time.
Nor must it be said, ‘that both (the atomic and pervading nature of the mind) is reconciled under the assumption, that the nature of the ‘ind may contract or expand,’ because the assumption of many parts subject to destruction, &c. is complicated, and on the other hand, the assumption of a mind without parts is simple.
62.—Comm.—* Qualities abide in substances, and are without quali- ties and actions.
If it is asked, what proof is there for a separate class of quality? The answer is: The causality, found in what is possessed of gene- rality, different from that (generality) referring to substances and actions,* is determined by some atiribute, because causality for a thing which 18 ` 0६ determined by some attribute, is impossible ; but neither the class of colour, &c. nor the class of existence is this determination, because in the first case it would not comprehend enough (all other quali-
* To understand this, it must be recollected, that generality (class) abides in sub- stances, qualities and actions; the generality therefore, different from the class of substance and action, must be that of quality.
पर
52 Division of the Categories
. 87, 88.—Fluidity, gravity, viscidity and velocity.—Merit and demerit, memory, sound, intellect and others of similar nature are called immaterial qualities by philosophers.** Number, quantity, separatedness, conjunction and disjunction are con- sidered qualities of either class.
— 89.—Conjunction and disjunction, the different numbers from two upwards, separatedness found in two things or more, are qualities which abide not in one and the same thing.
ties being excluded) and in the second it would comprehend too much, ‘(viz., also substances and actions.) Therefore it is contained in the 24 (qualities) and is the class of quality.
‘It abides in substances.’ Although it is not its definition: to be dependent on substance, because it would be too wide, as including also action and class, yet it is right to say: it is what is possessed of the class different from existence which class is the determination extending as far as substantiality, because the class of quality is the determination, extending as far as substantiality, and quality is what is possessed of this determination. The classes of action and substance are not determina- tions, extending as far as substantiality, because substantiality and action ‘do not abide in the sky, &c. and the class of the class of substance, and ‘the class of generality (class) are no real classes. - |
< Without qualities.’ Although action, generality, &c. are also without qualities, yet it must be understood as the absence of qualities, found in the category which is possessed of generality and different
‘from action; for class and the subsequent three categories have no ge- nerality (class) ; action is not different from action, and substance is ‘not without qualities. Therefore this definition is not too wide.
4 Without actions” is only said to describe it, not to define it, be- cause it would otherwise be too wide, the ether being also without action.
63.— Material substances are: earth, water, light, air and mind (material according to the Nyaya is that the measure of which has a
` [ध and for this reason, mind which is an atom, is included in it.) 64.—Immaterial qualities are: merit and demerit, memory, sound, intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, and endeavour (volj- tion). Immaterial substances are; the sky, time, space and soul.
of the Nydya Philosophy. 53
90.—All the remaining qualities® abide only in one thing. Special qualities” are : intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aver- sion, endeavour, touch, viscidity, original fluidity,
9]1.—Fate, memory and sound: General qualities are: number, quantity, separatedness, conjunction and disjunction, priority and posteriority, derived fluidity. ha
92. 93.—Gravity and velocity. Number, quantity, separa- tedness, conjunction, and disjunction, priority and poste- riority, fluidity and viscidity are perceived by two senses.
Sound, colour, taste, smell and touch, are respectively per- ceived by one of the external senses.
94.—Gravity, fate and memory, transcend the perception of the senses. The special qualities of the pervading substances” are not produced by the qualities of any cause.”
65.—Comm.—The remaining qualities are: colour, taste, touch, measure which is an unit, separatedness, found only in one individual, priority, posteriority, intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, endeavour, gravity, viscidity, faculty, fate (merit and demerit) and sound. = `
66.—The special qualities of the earth are: colour, taste, smell and feel; of the water: colour, taste, feel, viscidity and natural fluidity ; of the light: colour and feel; of the air: feel; of the sky: sound ; of the soul: intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, merit, demerit and memory
67.—Comm.—By two senses, viz. by the eye and the skin.
68.—Comm.—Qualities of the pervading substances are: intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, endeavour, merit, demerit, memory, and sound.
69.—Comm.—‘* They are not produced by the qualities of any cause.” Colour, smell, &c. depend upon the quality of the cause (for instance the colour, taste, smell and feel of a jar depend upon the same qualities of the two halves, of which it is formed) the same cannot ‘be: admitted with regard to intellect, &c. because there is no cause of the soul, the ether, &c.
84 . Division of the Categories
9०. 96.—Natural colour, taste, smell, feel, likewise fluidity, viscidity, velocity, gravity, unity, separatedness found in indi- viduals, quantity and elasticity are produced from the quali- ties of causes. Conjunction, disjunction and velocity are — effected by actions.
97.—Colour, taste, smell, touch, quantity, unity, separa- tedness found in individuals, viscidity and sound are non-inti- mate causes, =
98.—Special qualities of the soul have only instrumental causality. Hot feel, gravity, velocity, fluidity, conjunction and disjunction and the other qualities denoting two extremes, are of two fold causality.
99,—-The special qualities of pervading substances, as well as conjunction and disjunction and other qualities denoting two extremes,* are limited.
100.—Colour is perceived by the eye, it manifests substances, qualities and classes, it is the cause of the perception of the eye, and is white, &c., according to the variety of colours.
101.—It is eternal in the atoms of water and light,” in all other substances it has a cause. Taste is perceived by the tongue ; 1t 18 varlous, as sweet, bitter etc.
SS ———————— र रयणििषौयणणामफणणणणरणषया 1
(The special qualities of the soul are only instrumental causes ; for intellect, &c. is not the non-intimate cause of any thing; but the knowledge of what is possible by action is the instrumental cause of the desire of action.)
69.—Comm.—Viz. the instrumental and non-intimate causes.
70.—Comm.—“ Colour is eternal in the atoms of water and light,” because it is there from their nature, non-eternal in the atoms of earth, as by the process of cooking another colour is produced.
* The second distich of this verse inthe former edition has been omitted, the whole context showing that it is an interpolation. The same has been done with the first distich of verse 68, for the same reason, so that the present edition con- tains one verse less than the former
of the Nydya Philosophy. | 55
102.—Its instrument (organ) is the tongue ; as regards eterni- ty, &c. it is like colour." Smell is perceived by the nose, it is the cause of perception through the nose.
103.—There are two kinds of smell, good and bad.”
Feel is perceived by the skin, it is the cause of perception through the skin.
104.—It is threefold, tepid, cold and warm. Hardness and similar qualities are in the earth; with regard to its eternity, the same holds good as above.”
105.—These™ qualities as abiding in earth, are produced by cooking, while this is not the case as regards the other ele- ments. The change produced by cooking takes place according to the opinion of the Vaiséshikas” in the single atoms. ~~~
71.—Comm.—Taste is eternal in the atoms of water, all other taste is non-eternal. |
72.-Comm.——Smell is non-eternal (because it abides alone in earth, and in the atoms of earth another smell is produced by the process of cooking.) | ` 73.--@007.- 16 feel of earth and air is temperate, of water cold, and of light hot... Feel is eternal in the atoms of water, light and air, non-eternal in the atoms of earth, (for the same reason as before.)
74,.—Comm.—These, viz. colour, taste, smell and feel. As abiding in earth, they are produced by a cause, because by the union with fire, the colour, taste, smell and feel of earth are changed ; not so as abid- ing in water, &c. for although water, &c. bea hundred times boiled, yet no change of its colour, &c. takes place. ‘Fhe smell and heat of water, on the other hand, are artificial, because they are present or absent by the presence or absence of artificial means, like the cold feel of air and earth. |
75.—Comm.—The Vaiséshikas say, that as to earth the change by the process of cooking takes place in the atoms. Their view is, as follows, As long as the parts are retained in the compound, no change by the process of cooking is possible ; but when by the union of fire the com- pound substances have been destroyed, that change takes place in the
56 | Division of the Categories
atoms which have become independent ofeach other. And again by the union of the atoms which have been changed by the process of cooking, a production 1s effected from the compound of two, three, &c. atoms again to a compound of many parts; for by the extraordinary velocity of heat the transition from the destruction of one compound to the production of another is sudden. Then from the destruction of a compound of two atoms by a new production a compound, possessed of shape, &c. is formed in a few moments. |
For the instruction of the student an explanation of this topic is here given.
The Sutra of the Vaiséshikas is as follows: ‘ Action isa cause which is independent of conjunction and disjunction :”’ which means, that its consequent state is independent of its antecedent state ; otherwise, as the action.also produces the consequent conjunction, there would be the fault of too wide a definition, because the action would depend upon the destruction of the antecedent conjunction.
If here a disjunction, produced by disjunction, is not acknowledged, nine moments are required. If it is acknowledged, the disjunction, depending upon something produces disjunction ; bué if the cause is something independent, action takes place. If there is a disjunction produced by disjunction, as depending upon the time, which is de- termined by the destruction of the conjunction, forming the first ele- ments of a compound substance commencing perceptible substances (for which a compound of three atoms is required) ten moments are neces- sary. If further the disjunction produced by disjunction depends upon the time or upon part (of a compound) either of which is determined by the destruction of a substance, eleven moments are necessary.
1. Nine moments.
From the conjunction of fire there takes place action in the atom, hence disjunction from another atom, hence the destruction of the con- junction, forming the first elements of a compound substance (which consists of three atoms,) hence 1. the destruction of the compound of two atoms, hence 2. the destruction of the quality of blue, &c. in the atom, hence 3, the production of the quality of red, &c., hence 4. the action in accordance with the production of the first elements of things, hence 5. disjunction, hence 6. destruction of the former conjunc- tion, hence 7. the conjunction, by which the first elements of a com-
of the Nydya Philosophy. 57.
pound are formed, hence 8. the production of a compound of two atoms, and hence’9. the production of the quality of red, &c. |
If it is objected, ‘ that in the moment, when the quality of blue is de- stroyed, or in the moment, when the quality of red is produced, there is in the atom the action, in accordance with the production of the first elements of a compound substance ;? we deny this, because in an atom, previous to the destruction of the action which takes place in an atom that is united with fire, and also previous to the production of a quality, there is no other action with regard to the atom possible; for we hold the principle, that in a thing where there is an action, no other action is possible, and also, that in a substance without quality an action, in accordance with production of the first elements of substances, cannot take place. : ४ * ।
Nor can in an atom at the same time that the quality of blue, &c. is removed, the quality of red be produced, because the destruction of the antecedent is the cause of the consequent colour, etc.
2. Ten moments. They take place, if by disjunction, depending upon a time, determined by the destruction of the conjunction, form- ing the first elements of a compound substance, another disjunction 18 effected. 4 . अ,
From the conjunction of fire there takes place action in the atom, which is the element of a compound of .two atoms, hence disjunction, hence the destruction of the conjunction, by which the first elements of a compound are formed, hence 1. the destruction of the compound of two atoms and the disjunction, produced by disjunction, hence 2. the destruc- tion of the quality of blue and the destruction of the former conj unction, hence 3. the production of the quality of red and the consequent conjunc- tion, hence 4. the destruction of the action, produced by the conjunction* _of the fire, with regard to the atom, hence 5. the action, in accordance with the production of the first elements of a compound substance, like the conjunction of fate with the soul, hence 6. disjunction, hence 7. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 8. the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance, hence 9. the production of
a compound of two atoms, and hence 10. the production of the quality of red, &c. ४
3. Eleven moments,
* Nodanam means a conjunction, by which no sound is produced. See ४, 119.- I
58 Division of the Categories
_From the conjunction of fire there takes place action in the atom, hence disjunction, hence the destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance, hence 1. the destruction of a compound of two atoms, hence 2. disjunction, produced by disjunc- tion, depending upon a time determined by the destruction of a com- pound of two atoms, hence 3. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 4. the consequent conjunction, hence 5. the destruction of the action with reference to the atom, hence 6. the action, forming the first elements of 2 compound substance, like the conjunction of fate with the soul, hence 7. disjunction, hence 8. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 9. the conjunction forming the first elements of a compound substance, hence 10. the compound of two atoms, hence 11. the production of the quality of red. One and the same conjunction of fire destroys not the dlue colour and produces the red colour, as the intermediate sound destroys the preceding and produces the subsequent sound; for one and the same fire continues not for the whole time. Moreover, if the cause of the production were also the cause of destruction, then, if by the destruction of the colour &c. the fire were also destroyed, the atom would remain for a long time without colour. If on the other hand, the cause of destruction were also the cause of production, then, if at the production of the red colour the fire (the cause of the production) were destroyed, there could not be produced the red colour.
If in this manner the action is considered in another atom, the quality is produced in five and more moments.
In five moments. The action takes place in one atom, hence dis- junction, hence destruction of the conjunction, forming the first ele- ments of a compound substance, and action in another atom, hence de- struction of the compound of two atoms, and disjunction, produced by action in another atom. This is onetime. Hence destruction of blue, &८, and from the disjunction the destruction of the former conjunction. This is the second time. Hence the production of the red, and the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound. This is the third time. Hence the production of the compound of two atoms, which is the fourth time, and hence the production of the red, which is the fifth time.—If one considers the destruction of the substance at the same time with the action in another atom, then the production of
of the Nydya Philosophy. 59
106.—While the Naiydyikas affirm,”* that change is effected also in two or more atoms. The cause as regards the operation of counting, is called number.”
107.—Eternal unity is attributed to eternal substances, transient unity to transient substances."" Numbers from two upwards to an indefinite number are produced by comprehend- ing intellect, the quality takes place in six moments. In this manner. By the action in one atom disjunction takes place in another atom, hence destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound, hence destruction of the compound of two atoms, and action in another atom, hence destruction of the blue and disjunction, produced by action in another atom, hence production of the red, and destruction of the former conjunction in another atom, hence conjunction in another atom, hence production of the compound of two atoms, then production of the red. In the same manner seven moments are required, if one at the time of the destruction of the blue considers the action in another atom, and eight moments, if one considers the production of the red at the same time with the action in another atom.
76.—Comm.—** While the Naiyayikas affirm.” It is the opinion of the Naiydyikas, that also in compounds, viz. in compounds of two, three, &c. atoms, change by the process of cooking takes place. Their view is this, As compound substances have pores, the minute parts of fire enter into the inside, and therefore change by the process of cooking is possible, although the parts be retained in the compound. The opinion of Vaiséshikas is complicated, as it assumes the destruction of an infinite number of parts. If this is the case, the recognition: “ this is that jar,”’ is consistent ; but where there is no recognition, there we can admit a destruction of the compound.
77.—Comm.— The cause as regards the operation of counting, is called number.” The cause, viz., the non-intimate cause.
78.—Comm.—* Eternal unity is attributed to eternal substances, transient to transient substances.’ Eternal substances are the atoms of material substances, further time, space and soul, transient substances for instance a jar, &c.
12
60 | Division of the Categories
108.—And they are collectively apprehended in their depen- dance upon more than one object.” The comprehending intellect being destroyed, those numbers are also destroyed.”
79.—Comm.—* Numbers from two upwards to an indefinite number are produced by comprehending intellect, and they are collectively apprehended in their dependance upon more than one object.”
Numbers from two upwards, depending upon the addition of one to one, are produced by comprehending intellect.
Although the relation, indicating the class of two, three, &c. abides for instance in each of two, three, &c. jars &c. yet as there 18 not a knowledge, that one is two, and further as there is the knowledge, that one is not two, it must be assumed a relation, indicating the collective apprehension of two, three, &c. which depends upon more-than one object
80.—Comm,.—“ The comprehending intellect being destroyed, those numbers, (from two upwards) are also destroyed.” First there is the comprehending intellect, then the production of the class of two, &c. then the determining knowledge, viz. the determination of the class of | class of two, then the perception determined by the class of two. If the comprehending intellect is destroyed, also the class of two is destroyed | | |
Although no other knowledge does continue for three moments, because the special qualities of the respective pervading substances are destroyed by the qualities succeeding to them,* yet it must be assumed, that the comprehending intellect continues for three moments; other- wise the comprehending intellect would be destroyed at the time of determination, and thereby also the class of two, three, &c.; for there would be no perception of the class of two, because no object were present, and only when it is present, a knowledge is produced by the eye, &c. Therefore it must be assumed, that the perception of the class of two destroys the comprehending intellect
It must not be asked, ‘how by the destruction of the comprehending intellect the class of two, &c. is destroyed,’ because at another time there is no perception of the class of two; for it is clear, that the
` # For instance a sound by another, which follows it, or a perception, thought, etc. by a succeeding one.
of the Nydya Philosophy. 61
109.—Comprehending intellect is called the intellect which refers to many unities." Quantity is the cause of the opera- tion of measuring.”
110.—Point (atom of space) length, thickness, breadth, are the differences of quantity; in transient things it is tran- sient, in eternal things eternal.”
a
comprehending intellect is the cause of those numbers, and its de- struction destroys also them. Therefore the class of two, produced by the comprehending intellect of A, is comprehended by the same A.
Nor must it be said, “that the comprehending intellect is the cause of the perception of the class of two,” &c., because it is right for brevity’s sake to assign it as the cause of the class of two, &c.
The comprehending intellect of the Yogis refers to compounds of two atoms, &c. which transcend the perception of the senses. The comprehending intellect of God (Iswara) or of the Yogis abiding in the mundane egg, refers to the atoms at the time of the creation of the world. | ।
81.—Comm.— Comprehending intellect is called the intellect which refers to many unities.”’ 3
This is the intellect, which apprehends, that this is one, this is one, &e. It must be understood, that, where there is a knowledge of undefined unities, there is produced the number, referring to many, different from two, three, &c. as where there is a forest, an army, &c. This is the opinion of Kandali-kéara. The Acharyas, however, think, that the class of many, is the class of three, &c. Therefore the class of many includes the class of three, &c. Although the class of three, -&c. is included in an army, yet the class of the class of three, etc. 18 not apprehended, because this would be wrong. If this is the case, the notion is possible, that this army is greater than that, because if the class of many were without number, there could not exist the notion of ‘a comparative and superlative degree.
82.—Comm.—* Quantity is the cause of the operation of measuring,” viz. the non-intimate cause.
83.— In transient things it is transient,’’ viz. in-a compound of two atoms, &c. ^" In eternal things it is eternal,”’ viz. 13 the sky, &८.
62 Division of the Categories
111.—Transient quantity is produced from number, measure, and heaps. Quantity found in two and more atoms arises from number ३०
112.—As met with in a jar and similar extended things it arises from measure; the conjunction of so called loose things, itisa heap. By this (conjunction)
1]3.—Measure is produced in such things for instance as cotton. If the place, upon which it (the measure) depends, is destroyed, it is also destroyed. Separatedness which is like number” is the cause of the knowledge of separate things.
114.—It cannot be said, that it is included in mutual nega- tion; for it is not the same to say, “ this is different from that,” and, ^^ this is not that.”
115.—Conjunction is called the obtaining of two things un- obtained before. It is threefold, the first kind is produced from the action of one of two;
84.—Comm.— Quantity found in two and more atoms.” The mea- sure of one atom is not the cause with regard to the measure of a compound of two atoms, nor a compound of two atoms the cause with regard to the measure of a compound of three atoms, because a mea- sure produces a measure which is greater than its own kind.* But the measure of a compound of two atoms is not greater than one atom, and the measure of a compound of three atoms has nothing of its own kind ; therefore the non-intimate cause of a compound of two atoms is the number of two in an atom, and of a compound of three atoms the number of three in a compound of two atoms.
85.—Comm.—‘‘ Separatedness which like number,” viz. the non- intimate cause of the knowledge of separatedness is separatedness. It is like number in its relation to eternal and transient things ; viz. as the class of unity is eternal in eternal things, and transient in transient things, as transient unity is produced in the second moment after the production of the thing upon which it depends, and is destroyed, when this is destroyed, so the same must be understood with regard to separatedness of two, three, &c.
* Vid. p. 8.
। 0) 445; ५ A é , < : a “ae.
of the Nydya Philosophy. 63
--116.—The second from the united action of both, the third from conjunction. Of the first is an instance that of the falcon and the rock
117.—Of the second, the fighting of two rams; of the third the conjunction of the tree and the jar which is produced by the conjunction of the tree with one half of the jar.
118.—The conjunction which is effected by action is again two-fold, the one effected by violent, the other by soft motion ; the first is the cause of sound.
119.—The second is not the cause of sound. Disjunction comprehends also three kinds. The one is produced by the action of one, the second by the action of two,
120.—The third by disjunction. This latter is again of two kinds ; the one arises by the disjunction of the cause only, the other by the disjunction of the cause and non-cause.”® |
86.—Comm.—With regard to the two first kinds of disjunction, the same examples are to be understood as with regard to the two first kinds of conjunction. The third is again two-fold, viz. as produced either by the disjunction of the cause, or by the disjunction of the cause and non-cause
Where there is an action with regard to one half of a jar, there ensues a disjunction of the two halves, hence the destruction of the con- junction forming the jar, hence destruction of the jar, hence by the action, which consists in the disjunction of the half, the disjunction of the half of the jar from the other part of space, hence a destruction of the conjunction with the other part of space, hence the conjunction with another part of space, hence the destruction of the action.......
Where by an action of the hand, a separation of the tree and the hand takes place, there arises the belief that the tree is also separated from the body. Here in the separation of the body from the tree is the action of the hand not the cause, because they are not at one and the same place. Again there is no action in the body, as the action of a compound is regulated by the actions of each of its parts; there- fore is here produced by the disjunction of cause* and non-cause also a disjunction of effect and non-effect.
* Cause, as it appears, is here the tree.
64 | Division of the Categories
12].—Posteriority and priority are two-fold with regard to time, or to space, and are only applicable to material bodies.
]22.—Posteriority of place (distance) is perceived from a greater space intervening between the conjunction of the sun, priority (nearness) by the perception of less space.
123.—The non-intimate cause of them is conjunction of space which is the substrate of them.* Posteriority with regard to time is produced by the knowledge of the anterior existence of the revolutions of the sun,
124.—Priority (recent time) from the knowledge of what succeeded the former. The non-intimate cause of them is the conjunction of things which are in time.
125.—If the comprehending intellect were destroyed, pos- teriority and priority would also be destroyed. Intellect has been previously nearly explained |
126.—What is left, will now be explained. Knowledge is two-fold, wrong notion and right notion. | 127.—A knowledge, which manifests something where this something is not present, is a wrong notion.” Of this there are two kinds, mistake and doubt. `
128.—The former is the certain knowledge of a thing where such a thing is not present, as for instance, the notion of the soul in the body, or yellow colour in a shell.
129.—Doubt™ is a knowledge in question, whether for in-
87.—Comm.—If a knowledge, which manifests something, is trans- ferred to something else, and represents itself at the same time as certain, it is error; for instance, if the knowledge of the soul in such sentences as: ९९ ¶ am reddish,” &c., is transferred to the body, or yel- low colour to a shell.
88.—-Comm.—-Doubt is a knowledge, determined by the contradic- tory absence or presence (of a predicate) in one and the same subject.
* Their substrate is: near or far with regard to space.
of the Nydya Philosophy. 65
stance a thing is a man or a trunk. A knowledge which does not manifest something, where this something is not present, but, which manifests this something alone, is certitude.
130.—The apprehension of absence and presence in one and the same object is doubt. The cause of doubt is the knowledge of a general attribute, &c.”
I
(The Bengalee Translation explains this as follows: A doubt is a knowledge such as this: .Is this a man or a trunk ? This kind of doubt is called a doubt of four extremes (चातुष्कौटिक,) because there are four extremes, viz. the notions of a man and non-man, and the notions of trunk and non-trunk. The contradictory notions of presence and ab- sence are called extremes. If it is questioned, whether the mountain is fiery or not fiery, the doubt is, whether one of the two extremes fiery or not fiery abides in the mountain.) | |
89.—Comm.—There are three causes of doubt. |
1. Cause of doubt is the knowledge of a general attribute which is found in two extremes, for instance the notion of height, found in trunk and non-trunk, as if it is doubted, whether this is a trunk or not a trunk. |
2. Cause of doubt is a non-general (special) attribute. (Non- general is a predicate, whichis not found in the subject of the two extremes ;) for instance, if the notion of sound, which is separated from the notions of eternal and non-eternal, (that is the notion of sound is not the general notion, under which eternal and non-eternal are com- prehended) is conceived in sound, the doubt arises, whether sound 1s eternal or non-eternal.
3. Cause of doubt is contradiction (of two extremes,) bué not the contradiction, referring to the mere sound alone, because a knowledge of a general predicate of sound is the cause of certitude only ; for in- stance, if it is said: Sound is eternal, sound is not eternal, but the knowledge of the two extremes, which is produced by sound. The doubt takes place by the mind. |
In the same way, if there is a doubt, that a knowledge is proved, there is also a doubt with regard to the object of the knowledge.
In the same way, if there is a doubt with regard to a subject in its
K
66 Division of the Categories
131.—Defect” produces wrong notion, excellence right no- tion. There are different kinds of defects as bile, distance, &c.
132.—Excellence as regards perception is the intercourse of a sense with what is determinable, determined by its deter- mination. Excellence as regards inference
invariable connexion with a predicate, there is also a doubt with regard to the predicate. But the cause of doubt is the knowledge of a sub- ject, determined by an attribute, or the intercourse of a sense with such a subject. ` ` हि व, ४
90.—Comm.—Defect is the cause of wrong notion, and excellence of right notion. Defects as for instance, bile, &c. are only of a con- tingent nature; for their causality is established by the argument from a general affirmative and a general negative (Anwaya and Vya- tiréka; if the defect is there, the notion is wrong, if the defect is not there, the notion is not wrong). That excellence is the cause of right notion, on the other hand, is established by simple inference ; for right notion is produced by a cause, different from the general cause of knowledge, because it is a knowledge that is produced, as wrong notion is. It cannot be said, ‘that the absence of defects is the cause.’ In the sentence, “ the shell is yellow,” bile is the defect ; from this the right notion of shell is not obtained, because there is no authority to ascribe it more to the one member of the alternative than to the other, and it is right to assume a causality from one excellence in preference to a causality from the absence of numerous defects. | `. Nor द्वा 11 be said: ‘ Let excellence even be granted, there is no per- ception of white colour in a shell, as bile is an obstacle to it; therefore the causality of the absence of defects,.as for instance of bile, is necessary. Of what use is then the assumption of a causality of excellence ? for in this case the causality of excellence is proved by the argument of a general affirmative and negative. In the same way it is well said, that the absence of excellence is the cause of error.
What are those defects? ^ Bile,’ &c. Sometimes bile is a defect, when a yellow colour is mistaken for a white one (as in jaundice) sometimes distance, for instance if the moon, sun, &c. by their distance are mistaken for small bodies. :
of the Nydya Philosophy. 67
133.—Is the consideration connected with the place (subject of conclusion) which is determined by the conclusion. Ex- cellence, as regards comparison, is the knowledge of similar objects, derived from words possessed of power.
134,—Excellence as regards verbal knowledge is the right notion of consistency or of the intention. Right notion 18 a knowledge without error. |
135.—Or right notion is a knowledge which is of such a kind and accordingly predicated. A knowledge which is unde- termined, is neither right notion nor error ; ¢
136.—For that which is without determination and determi- nability is not comprehended under any relation. Right notion is not perceived by itself, but by the concurrence of doubt
i ig ee eT
91.—Comm.—‘ Right knowledge is a knowledge without error. As here the objection might be made, that,—if at the perception of silver and tin, both, silver and tin, are considered as silver,—also on the
| part of the silver a wrong notion is produced, because that knowledge is not free from error, a second definition is given: ‘ Right notion 1s a knowledge which is of such a kind, and accordingly predicated.” Here it must be understood, that, under which relation the right notion 1s perceived, under the same relation must be perceived that which 18 determined, and also the determination. Hence it is not against this definition, if a jar, &c. is comprehended by the same conjunction as the two halves of which it is composed, If this is the case, any thing ‘without determination is no right notion, as there is no general notion, by which it is determined. A notion which is undetermined, is neither true, nor false. | । 2 92.—Comm.— Right notion is not perceived by itself, but by the concurrence of doubt.’ | Namely, the Mimansakas say, that right notion is comprehended by itself. According to the Gurus* a knowledge is a right notion by its
* Col. Misc. Essays, Vol. I. p. 298. Next to him (Bhatta Kumérilaswami) is a ‘writer usually cited under the title of Guru, more rarely under the designation of Prabhakara. His work I had no opportunity of examining with a view to the present
ए 2
}
68. Iivision of the Categories
137.—The cause of the apprehension of a general proposition 18 the non-apprehension of what goes astray and the apprehen-
own manifestation. (Bengalee Tr. They state the object of knowledge, for instance of a jar, to be three-fold, viz. the jar, the soul, and the knowledge of a jar &c. in connexion with that which is to be proved, because by the means of object of the knowledge, for instance of a jar, first the jar, further the soul, and lastly, the knowledge of the jar
in connexion with that which is to be proved, form one and the game
knowledge, which may be pronounced in the sentence: “I know the jar,” which means, I have a knowledge, which manifests a jar, &c.)
According to the opinion of the Bhattas* knowledge is beyond the senses; the notion (class) of knowledge, produced by that knowledge (which is beyond the senses) is perceptible ; by this (notion) knowledge is inferred (B. T. According to the Bhattas knowledge, without determination as well as with determination, is beyond the senses ; but after the knowledge of a jar there arises the notion of what is known with reference to the jar, &c. then the notion of what is known, viz. by me the jar is known, is perceived, and lastly, “I havea knowledge of ajar,” &c. determined by the notion of a jar, &c.)
According to the opinion of the Murdrimisras knowledge is obtained
by reflection (B, T. the Murdrimisras say, that after the knowledge
essay, and he is known to me chiefly from reference and quotations ; as in Mddhava’s summary, where his opinions are perpetually contrasted with Kumérilas, and in the text and commentary of Sastra-dipika, where his positions are canvassed with those of numerous other writers, | |
* Jd, p. 297, The annotations (Vartika to the Commentary of the Sitras of the Mimansa, by Sabaraswamf) are by Bhatta Kumarilaswami, who is the great authority of the Mimansaka school, in which he is emphatically designated by his title, Bhatta, equivalent to Doctor. He frequently expounds and corrects Sabara’s gloss, often delivers a different interpretation, &c.,.... Id. 298. Kuméarila Bhatta figures greatly in the traditionary religious history of India, He was predecessor of Sankara Acharya, and equally rigid in maintaining the orthodox faith against heretics, who reject the authority of the Védas. He is considered to have been the chief antagonist of the sect of Buddha, and to have instigated an exterminating persecution of that heresy ..,.. The age of Kumirila, anterior to Sankara, and corresponding with the period of the persecution of the Bauddhas, goes back to an antiquity of much more than a thousand year,
of the Nydya Philosophy. 69
sion of what does not go astray ; sometimes doubt is removed by discussion.” (2 of ajar, &c. there is the reflection, I know the jar, by this there is & knowledge, manifesting the knowledge of a jar, &९.)
According to the opinion of all of them this or the other knowledge is right notion by a knowledge, manifesting this or the other knowledge ; for knowledge is to be ascertained by its object; therefore the object is to be known by the knowledge of knowledge. This opinion 1s blamed in the text: “ Right notion is not perceived by itself,’ &c. If right notion of knowledge were comprehended by itself, there would be no doubt with regard to knowledge, produced by practice; for if in this case knowledge is known, also its right notion (evidence) is known ; hence how could doubt exist? On the other hand, if knowledge is not known, then, in the absence of the knowledge of something determined by an attribute, how can doubt arise ? Therefore right knowledge is an object of inference ; for instance: This knowledge is right notion, because it is produced by the agreement of those who discuss onit. That, which is not of such a kind, is not of such a kind, as wrong notion. For instance: This knowledge, the general notion of earth, is right notion, because the notion of knowledge, representing the general notion of earth, is found in that which has smell. In the same manner this knowledge of water is right notion, because the general notion of knowledge, representing the general notion of water, is found in that which has viscidity.
. ` 93.—Comm.— The cause of the apprehension of a general propo- sition (Vyapti, the invariable connexion of a subject with a predicate) is the non-apprehension of what goes astray, and the apprehension of what does not go astray ; sometimes a doubt is removed by discussion.”
The invariable connexion of a subject with a predicate (Vyapti) has been before explained, but not the means of its apprehension. This is now done in the text, viz. ‘The cause,” &c. Ist, The non-apprehen- sion of what goes astray* is the cause, since, if this apprehension takes place, the general proposition (Vydpti) cannot be apprehended. The apprehension of what does not go astray (of similar instances) is the
* Vyabhichara: a reason goes astray, if it is connected with any subject, where the conclusion (major term) cannot abide. Sahachara ; a reason does not go astray, if it has similar instances, in which the conclusion abides.
70 Division of the Categories
` 188.—Specification is an attribute which is contained in the conclusion, but not in the reason.” Its chief points will now be explained. |
cause, as proved by the argument from a general affirmative and a ge- neral negative (Anwaya Vyatiréka, if there are similar instances, there is also the general proposition ; if there are no similar instances, there 18 no general proposition). Repetition (the repetition of similar instances) is no cause, since, although there be not an apprehension of what goes astray, yet the general proposition (Vy4pti) is sometimes at once appre- hended. Sometimes, however, repetition is required to remove a doubt with reference to what goes astray. Where by repetition the doubt does not disappear, discussion is required to guard against the con- trary supposition. For instance, if there is a doubt, whether smoke be not also found with something, where there is no fire, this doubt is removed by the consideration, that fire and smoke are in the relation of cause and effect. If this mountain is without fire, it must also be without smoke, because an effect is not without its cause. If it is sometimes without cause, 1४ 18 an effect without cause. In this case - doubt arises, which is to be removed from its obstacle, in such @ man- ner: Lf an effect is without cause, fire is not the invariable means to produce smoke, or food to satisfy hunger. Where doubt does not of itself arise, there discussion is not necessary. With this view it is said in the text: ‘‘ Sometimes doubt is removed by discussion.’’*
94,—Comm.— Specification is an attribute, which is contained in its conclusion, (major term) but not in its reason.” |
‘If this definition is correct, then in the inference: ‘‘ This man is black, because he is the son of Mittra,” the notion of the origin of black colour by her eating bad vegetables, would be no specification, because
* The Bengalee Translator says in illustration of this: For instance if hearth is the subject (minor term), smoke the conclusion (major term), and fire the reason (middle term), then is wet fuel the specification with regard to the faulty reason, viz. fire, because it is the condition of smoke, but not of fire; for where there is smoke, there is necessarily also wet fuel; but where there is fire, there is not (ne- cessarily) wet fuel, as for instance a fiery iron-ball ; on the other hand, if there is a faultless reason, for instance, if mountain is the subject, fire the conclusion, and
amoke the reason, there is no specification, because the attribute, which is a condi- tion of the conclusion, is also a condition of the reason.
of the Nydya Philosophy. 71
139.—All admissible specifications abide in the same place with the conclusion. Those, which abide in the same place with the reason, go astray with regard to the conclusion.
it is not contained in the conclusion ; (black) for blackness is also found Ina jar, &९.
Further: In the inference : ^^ Air is perceptible’’ because it is the site of touch, the notion of proportionate greatness, would be no specifica- tion, because perception takes place also with regard to the soul, &c. where there is no greatness.
° Nor would the notion of existence (माव लं,) be a specification in the
- inference: “Destruction is transient from its being a production,”
because the notion of something transient is also in antecedent negation, and here, without any doubt, is not existence.’
We deny this; for the meaning is, that the specification, which is a condition of the conclusion, as determined by this or that attribute, is not a condition of the reason, as determined by the same attribute ; thus for instance the notion of a production by bad vegetables is the condition of the blackness, which is determined by the notion of son of Mittra. In the same manner is proportionate greatness the condition of the perception, determined by the notion of external things. Thus in the inference: ^ Destruction is transient from its being a produc- tion,” is the notion of existence the condition of the conclusion, as de- termined by the notion of production. |
In a faultless reason, there is no such attribute, viz. something, be- Ing a condition of a determined conclusion (major term), while it is not 8 condition of the reason under the same determination. But in a reason which goes astray, one of the two at least takes place, either that the place of the specification, which is also the place of the con- clusion (major term) is the condition of the conclusion and the non- condition of the reason, or that the place, where there is not the specifica- tion, which is also the place, determining the absence of the conclusion, is the condition of the conclusion, and the non-condition of the reason.
95.—Comm.—“ Specification 1s necessary to judge, where a reason goes astray.”? That is to say, the assumption of specification is neces- sary to infer, that the conclusion goes astray, which takes place by the
72 Division of the Categories
140.—Specification is necessary to judge, where a reason goes astray.” It 18 the opinion of the Vaiséshikas that verbal
specification going astray. Therefore, where there is a specification which is the condition of a conclusion without any further addition, there by the going astray of the specification which has no further addition, may be concluded also the going astray of the conclusion. For instance, where it is concluded that something smokes, from fire, there fire (as the reason of smoke) goes astray with regard to smoke, because wet fuel goes astray ; for, if the more comprehensive notion goes astray, it is necessary that also the more narrow notion goes astray. But where the specification is of such a kind, as to be a condition of the conclusion (major term) as determined by any attribute (addition) how insignificant soever, there the inference, that the conclusion goes astray, follows from the going astray of the specification in a subject, determined by such an attribute (addition,) for instance, if it is infer- red, that this person is black, because he is the son of Mittré, the notion ; ८० 8 son of Mittra’? goes astray with regard to blackness, because with regard to the son of Mittra, goes astray the specification of a product of bad vegetables.
96.—Comm.—‘ Verbal knowledge and comparison are not different kinds of proof.”
According to the opinion of the Vaiséshikas there are only two kinds of knowledge, viz. perception and inference, verbal knowledge and com- parison being included in the latter ; for such sentences as: ‘‘ Drive the cow away by the stick,” or Védaic sentences, depend upon the know- ledge of the connexion of the meanings of the words, which are re- collected by the object the speaker has in view, because all the words, which form a sentence, have intention, consistency, &c., as in the sentence: ‘ Bring the jar,’ &c.—Or: These meanings of words are mu- tually connected, because the words have consistency, &c., like similar meanings of words. The same is the case with regard to comparison. When a Gayal has been perceived, the word Gayal is the cause of the power with reference to what is determined by the notion of Gayal, because the old have attached this meaning to it, no other kind of proof being admitted, as the word of cow is the cause of the power with
" of the Nydya Philosophy. 7 63
knowledge and comparison, as included in inference, are not different kinds of proof. 3 141.—This is not correct, as, independent of inference, verbal knowledge and comparison are intelligible. | 142.—The connexion of the subject with the predicate is two-fold,” one positive and the other negative; the first has been explained, the other will now be explained.
reference to what is determined by the notion of cow. Or: The word Gayal is the cause of the power with reference to what is determined by the notion of Gayal on the ground, that trustworthy people have attached this meaning to it. By this inference the cause of the power with reference to what is determined by the notion of Gayal is evident, viz. because there is a connexion of a general proposition with a minor term. | |
This opinion is blamed in the text ix the words: र This is not cor- rect ;” for without the knowledge of a general proposition (of the Vyapti) an understanding is possible from the mere words. There is no proof, that after the hearing of words a general proposition is always neces- sary. Moreover, if it is assumed, that a general proposition (Vy4pti) is always required with reference to the understanding of words, why then is it not admitted, that it is necessary to assume a verbal knowledge with reference to the understanding of an inference ?
97.—Comm.— The connexion of the subject with the predicate is twofold.”
Namely, there are three kinds of inference, viz. only affirmative, only negative, and affirmative and negative at the same time.
I. The only affirmative kind takes place, when there are no dissi- milar instances with regard to the conclusion (major term, that is to Say, when the major term is not excluded from any other notion) for instance, if it is argued, that something is an object of knowledge, because it can be named ; for here is a dissimilar instance impossible, as every thing is an object of knowledge.
If it is said, र that the only affirmative kind is impossible, because it is
Separated from all other notions’ (that is to say, such a notion is sepa-
rated from all other notions, and cannot therefore be connected with
all.) We deny this; for what is separated, 1s common to all, and this is H
74 - Division of the Categortes
` 143.—The necessity of the absence of the conclusion where there is an absence of the reason, is the second.”
merely affirmative. Moreover, the mere affirmation is the notion of a thing which is no object of actual absolute negation, and this is proved in the negation of the ether,* &c. (that is to say, as it cannot be proved, that ether, space, &c. are not found any where, so it cannot be proved with regard to such notions as knowledge, &c.)
2. Merely negative inference takes place, when there exist no similar subjects (of conclusion) for instance in the inference: Earth is distinguished from all the other elements, because it is possessed of smell ;+ for in this case there is no similar instance, viz. no instance with which the conclusion is connected, because it was before excluded from the other elements.
3. Affirmative and negative inference take place, when there exist similar and dissimilar instances (of the conclusion or major term) for instance: This is fiery, because it smokes. In this case there are similar instances, as a hearth, &c., and dissimilar instances, as a lake, &c.
98.—Comm.—The cause of the negative conclusion is the knowledge
— of a general negative proposition. (Vyatirékavydpti). For this reason
the text defines the notion ofa general negative proposition: ^ A general negative is the necessity of the absence of the reason, where there is an absence of the conclusion’ (major term) that is to say, a general nega- tive 18 the absence of the reason, which (absence) is included in the absence of the conclusion (major term). Here it must be understood, by what connexion, at what place, and by what notion the more ex- tensive notion is comprehended, by the same connexion and notion is also the absence to be determined. From this knowledge it follows : by what connexion and notion the more comprehensive notion is compre- hended, by the same connexion and notion is also the absence to be deter- mined. Accordingly, where the absence of smell expresses the notion of the other elements by distinctive relation, &c. (see p. 7.) there
* Pratiyogi is that of which there is a negation (it is the contradictory opposi- tion to its own negation) for instance a jar is the Pratiyogi of the negation of a jar. Apratiyogi is a thing, of which there is no negation, as for instance space, which is every where, and of which it cannot anywhere be said, there is no space.
+ Here is earth the minor term, the conclusion the distinction from what is different from earth, and the reason smell.
of the Nydya Philosophy. 79
144.—Presumption* is not considered as another proof, ४९ ` cause it is included in negative inference. Happiness, the object of desire of all worlds, is produced by virtue.
145.—Unhappiness the effect of vice, is abhorred by all con- scious beings. The desire of happiness and of freedom from unhappiness arises from the knowledge of either.”
146.—There is a desire of obtaining the means for those ends (avoiding misery and gaining happiness) if there is knowledge
follows the absolute negation of the notion of the other elements by the negation of the negation of smell ; but where the more extensive notion of the other elements is comprehended by the relation of identity, there also is the negation of the other elements expressed by the relation of identity. This is reciprocal negation. And lastly, when by the relation of conjunction for instance the more extensive notion of fire with regard to smoke is comprehended, there the negation of smoke, determined by the relation of conjunction, in a tank also follows from the negation of fire, determined by the relation of conjunction. Here is the cause of the apprehension of the general negative proposition the knowledge of what agrees with a general negative. Others say: ‘‘ By means of the negative the general affirmative is understood, but the knowledge of the general negative proposition, is not the cause. Where by means of the general negative the general proposition is understood, there it 18 called a negative inference. The necessity of the conclusion (major term, here the difference from the other elements) is first. evident from single things, as a jar, ‘&c. and afterwards it is established for the notion of earth” &c.
99.—Comm.—“ The desire of freedom from unhappiness and of obtaining happiness arises from the knowledge of either
Desire is threefold, viz. the desire whose object is the last end (summum bonum, which is not the means to accomplish another ob- ject,) the desire whose object is a means (for something else) and the desire of action |
1, The desire whose olject is the last end. The last end (फल) 18 ` * Vid. Col. M. E. Vt. p. 303. Presumption (arth4patti, one of the five modes of proof of the Mimdnsakas) is deduction of a matter from that which could not else be. It is assumption of a thing not itself perceived, but necessarily implied by another which is seen + heard, or proven.
| H 2
76 Division of the Categories
of these means, The wish to act is the desire determined by what may be accomplished by action.
147.—The cause of this is the knowledge of what may be accomplished by acts and what may accomplish the object of a desire. The knowledge, that something is the cause of an object which is strongly abhorred, is an obstacle.’
148.—According to others the cause of the wish to act is the knowledge of what does not produce that abhorrence. The cause of aversion is the knowledge of what accomplishes things that are abhorred. Endeavour is of three kinds according to philosophers, viz. activity, cessation from activity and vital endeavour.
| {49,—The wish to act, the knowledge of what may be ac-
happiness and freedom from unhappiness. The cause of the desire of the last end is the knowledge of the same; therefore it is of itself the object of man; for it follows from the definition, that any thing, which, when known, is desired by its own nature, is the object of man, and its full meaning is, that it is the object ofa desire, not dependent upon another desire.
2. The desire whose object* is a means (for something else.) The cause of this is the knowledge of what accomplishes an object of desire.
3. The desire of action is the desire, whose object is an effect to be accomplished by action, which (desire) is determined by the notion of what may be accomplished by action. This depends upon an apprehension such as this: I shall accomplish cooking by action. The cause of the desire of action is the knowledge, that an object may be
obtained by action, and the knowledge, that the object of desire may
be obtained. Therefore there is no desire of action with reference to rain, because it cannot be obtained by action.
100.—Comm.—‘ The knowledge, that something is the cause of an object which is strongly abhorred, is an obstacle.”
* The object of a desire, independent of any other desire, is the last object ; this is happiness and deliverance from unhappiness ; for both are not desired for the sake of any thing else, but for their own sake. An object of a desire, depending upon another desire, is a secondary object ; such are for instance, the fruition of love, eating, the removal of the unhappiness of another, the refraining from desires, &c. .
of the Nydya Philosophy. 77 `
complished by acts and what accomplishes such or such a desire, and the perception of the material causes produce activity.
150.—Cessation from activity rises from aversion produced एए ^ the knowledge of what accomplishes abhorred objects.
151.—Vital endeavour is constant,’ it transcends the per- ception of the senses’” ;
152.—It is the cause of the flux and reflux of the vital airs in the body. Gravity abides in earth and water, it is imper- ceptible to the senses $
153.—It is transient in what is transient, and eternal in what is eternal. It is the non-intimate cause of the action which is called falling.
154,—Fluidity is twofold, innate and derived from a cause ; the first abides in water, the second in earth and light ;
155.—In the atoms of water it is eternal, in every other thing transient. Derived fluidity is produced in clarified butter and similar substances when heated by the union with fire.
156.—Fluidity is the cause of trickling and instrumental cause in acollection (heap). Viscidity abides in water; it is eternal in atoms, non-eternal in a compound.
For instance, there is no desire of action with regard to honey, mixed with poison, because the strong aversion is an obstacle.
(Material or intimate causes are those substances by means of which a desire is accomplished ; for instance the material causes of a sacrifice are: the presence of ghee, wood, rice, &c.)
101.—Comm.—* Is constant १? which means, it lasts as long as life does. |
102.—Comm.—** It transcends the perception of the senses ; for the flux and reflux of the vital airs, when stronger than usually, is accom- plished by endeavour, for instance a stronger inspiration (this is evident from perception). If this is the case, then from the inference, that the flux of the vital airs is accomplished by endeavour (for there must be a cause of it) and further from the inadmissibility of an endeavour that is perceived (for in the ordinary function of respiration, &c. it is not perceived) it follows, that the flux of vital airs is accomplished by an
78 Division of the Categories
157.—By the abundance of this (viscidity) in oil combus- tion is favoured. There are three kinds of faculty, viz. velocity, elasticity and memory.
158.—Velocity abides only in bodies, and is twofold, either produced by action or by velocity.’ to some only found in earth, according to others in the four first elements.
Klasticity is according
159.—It is imperceptible to the senses, and is sometimes the cause of vibratory motion.’ The faculty which has the name of memory, is found only in sentient beings; it is impercepti- ble to the senses. 3
160.—Its cause is certitude without inattention." Memory is called also the cause of remembrance and of recognition.
endeavour, which transcends the perception of the senses. This is vital endeavour.
103.—Comm.—‘* It is twofold, either produced by action, or by velocity.” Velocity in an arrow arises from action produced by con- junction without noise, (vid. v. 118,) hence from the destruction of a former action arises another action. In the same manner all the subsequent actions must be considered. And without velocity, since one action is an obstacle to another, the destruction of a former action, and the production of a subsequent one were impossible. Where velocity is effected by velocity, for instance, where the velocity in a jar is effected by the velocity of its half, there is velocity, produced by velocity.
104.—Comm.—Elasticity 1s proved for instance by the fact, that a branch which is attracted, returns to its former position, when released. The opinion of some, that elasticity abides in the four first elements, is not supported by any evidence.
105.—Comm.—*‘ Its cause is certitude without inattention.” If it is said : ‘Is certitude, different from inattention, rather not the cause of remembrance? And if this is the case, let us say, that knowledge in general is the cause of memory.’
We object; for as there is no authority of assuming an alternative, it is evident, that certitude, different from inattention, is the cause of memory. Moreover, with reference to inattention, the assumption of
of the Nydya Philosophy. 79
161.—Fate is twofold, merit and demerit. Merit is the means by which heaven, &c. is obtained.’ It is a practice of ablutions in the Gang4, &c. and of sacrifices, &c.
162.—It is thought perishable by the contact with the water of the Karmands4.* . Demerit is the cause of hell, &c. and is produced by blamable works. |
163.—It may be destroyed by expiations, &c. Both qualities abide in living creatures.'"' They are produced by desire and
108
destroyed likewise by knowledge.
memory is complicated (superfluous) and hence it is proved, that cer- titude, different from inattention, is the cause of memory. |
The proof of this is given in the words: ‘It is called the cause of remembrance and recognition.’’ That is to say, memory produces re- membrance and recognition ; therefore memory is assumed, for it is impossible, that a former perception produces, without intercourse, re- membrance, because a cause is impossible, if it is not in respective in- tercourse with either of the two (remembrance or recognition.) Nor can it be said, ‘that, as memory, determined by the category of identity, is the cause of recognition, remembrance is obtained, because recognition is produced by memory ;’ for there is no cause for this. _
106.—Comm.— Merit is the means by which heaven, &c. is ob- tained.” | -
That is to say, it is the means of obtaining the happiness of heaven and all other happiness, and of bodies fit to enjoy the happiness of heaven.
107.—Comm.— In living creatures,” because merit and demerit cannot be assigned to God
108.—Comm,—‘ They are produced by desire, and destroyed like- wise by knowledge
By desire,’ that is to say, if good or bad acts are done by one who has perfect knowledge, they are of no effect. ‘ Likewise by know- ledge.’’ ‘* Likewise” is said to indicate enjoyment.
‘But how (it may be objected) can the knowledge of truth destroy merit and demerit? for this (the destruction of merit and demerit)
* The name of asmall river, which separates the territory of Benares, Kasi, from Bihar.—Vid. Lassen’s Ind. Alterth. Vol. I. p. 130.
80 Division of the Categories
164.—There are two kinds of sound, inarticulate-and arti- culate; the first is produced by a drum, &c. and the latter, as ka and other letters, by the contact of the throat with the palate. |
165,—Every sound abides in the ether, but it is perceived, when it 18 produced in the दवा." Some say, its production takes place like a succession of waves.
would be contrary to the passage (of the Yoga-sdstra): ‘ An action, of which the effect is not experienced (which has not produced its due consequence in the soul of the agent, viz. happiness, if a good action, and unhappiness, if a bad one) does not perish even in a hundred crores of Kalpas.”’ If this is the case, then the destruction of merit and demerté takes place in this manner, that a person who knows the truth, experiences the consequences of all Ais works at once by all his bodies.’ (viz. all the bodies which he is to assume in future births.)
There, however, ‘‘ to experience the consequences of works,” is only given as an example of the various ways, in which works are destroyed according to the Védas. How could otherwise works be destroyed by expiations? &c. It is said (in the Bhagavadgita.) ‘ The fire of know- ledge consumes all works.” And in the Sruti: ‘ All his works perish, when the general and individual souls are known.” | If it is said: ‘In this case there cannot exist for him who knows > truth, the state of the body, nor happiness, unhappiness, &c. as by knowledge all works are destroyed,’ we object ; for only the works dif- ferent from those which are commenced, are destroyed ; for only the work which is the cause of the enjoyment of this or that body, has been commenced.
109.—Comm.——“ Every sound abides in the ether, but it is perceived, when it is produced in the ear.” |
Abiding in the ether, means, that the ether is its intimate cause. As a sound, when distant, is not perceived, it is said, ‘in the ear.” As it may be doubted, how a sound, produced in the space determined by a drum, &c., is produced in the ear, it is said: ^^ Its production takes place like a succession of waves,” its sound produces another, determined by a space, external to the first, and the second produces again a third, and so on. In this manner it is perceived, when it is gradually | produced in the ear.
of the Nydya Philosophy. 81
166.—According to others, like the bud of the Kadamba plant.” From the knowledge,'” that the letter ka is pro- duced, and that it is destroyed, non-eternity of sound would follow.
167.—The knowledge, that this ka is that ka, depends upon the perception of general knowledge.'"* * This is the medicine,” such and other sentences depend upon general knowledge.
110.—Comm.— Like the bud of the Kadamba plant.’’ In this manner: From the first sound ten sounds are produced in the ten di- visions of space. Hence ten other sounds are produced. As this assumption is complicated, it 18 said in the text: ‘according to some.” |
111.—Comm.— From the knowledge,”’ &c. To remove the objec- tion, that sound is not produced, because it is eternal, it is said: < From the knowledge,” &c.
112.—Comm.—If it be objected: ‘The eternity of sound follows from the fact, that this letter ka is recognised as that letter ka,’ the text gives the answer: The knowledge, that this ka is that ka, depends upon community of class,’ &c. Here 18 the object of recognition, the community of class of this and that object, but not the identity of this and that individual; because it is contrary to the knowledge which has been mentioned. If this is the case, there cannot be a mistake with regard to those two perceptions (viz. sound is not eternal, and this is that sound). ।
Sl.
594.
N.
Line
B.
CORRECTIONS AND EMENDATIONS.
for in read of.
for with read to.
for with read to.
Sor faculties read modifications.
jor drishtanta read drishtanta.
for negation read affirmation.
for समन read समव
for individuality read separatedness.
for priority and posteriority read posteriority and priority for volition read endeavour
for सं योगविभागे read सं यागविभागेष्व
for with read to.
for with read to.
for after earth add and mind.
for मदत read ATA
for individuality read separatedness.
for priority, posteriority read posteriority, priority.
for volition read endeavour.
for volition read endeavour
for priority and posteriority read posteriority and priority. for is read in
for priority and posteriority read posteriority and priority. for priority and posteriority read posteriority and priority. for लान read लात्
for such read touch.
for individuality read separatedness.
for priority, posteriority read posteriority, priority.
for with read to. |
for Mimansikas read Mimdnsakas.
for priority and posteriority read posteriority and priority. for ditto read | ता.
jor ditto ` read ditto.
for ditto read ditto.
for natural read innate.
The translation counts one verse more than the original, as
the invocation, forming the first verse of the former, has not been taken into the text of the latter.
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3
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भाषा दरव्यं गुणस्तथा कम्मं AAT सविशेषकं।
सिद्धा० लात् tay नास्िकादिरतग्न्येषु जन्मान्तरीयम- क्गलजन्यदुरि त्वषः सखतः सिद्धू विघ्नात्यन्ताभावेा वा- स्तीति न व्यभिचार cars: ॥ संसारेति | संसार् एव मीरु टक्तस्तस्य वीजाय । एतेन Lat प्रमाणमपि द्र्भितं भवति । तयादि। यथा घटादिकार्यं wea तया चरित्यद्धुरादिकमपि। न च तत् कटलमस्मदा- दीनां सम्भवतीत्यतस्तत्कलट वेने ्रसिद्धिः 1 न च शरीराजन्यलेन क्तेजन्यलसाधकेन सत्मतिपक्त दति वाच्यं | ्रप्रयाजकलात् | ममतु कर्टलेन काय्यैलेन ` कायकारणएभाव एव WARM । दयावाभूमी जन- ` यन्देव एक Be विश्वस कत्ता भवनस्य गोप्ता इत्या- दय आगमा AIT AAT: | पद्ायानामद्शमाद | FY गणा इत्यादि । सप्त- मस्याभावतलकथनादेव षणां भावयं प्राप्तं तेन भावतेन षयगृपन्यासेा न कतः । | एते च पदाथा वेशेपिकम्र- सिद्धा नैयायिकानामष्यविरद्धाः । म्रतिपादि तञ्चेवमेव भाव्ये, अत एव उपमानचिन्तामणेा सप्तपद्ा्थभिन्न- तया धक्तिसादृखयेारतिरिक्रपदार्थलमा शङ्कितं । नन कथमेत एव पदाथाः शक्तिसाद्श्यादीनामणतिरिक्र- पदायैलात् | तथादि। मण्वादिसमवदितेन वद्धिना दादा न जन्यते तच्छून्येन तु जन्यते । तत्र मण्छादिना
४
Wo समवायस्तथाऽभावः पदाथाः सप्त कीज्िताः॥ ९॥ | frees मर्द्योमकाला fave feat मनः।
fagre वक दादानुक्रूला afadnga उत्तेजकेन मण्याद्यप- सरणेन च जन्यत दति कल्प्यते | एवं सादु श्यमप्यति- fom: पदार्थः! तद्धि न षट॒पदार्थैष्वन्त्भवति सामान्ये ऽपि सत्वात्। यथया गेलं नित्यं तया अश्वलमपीति सादृश्यप्रतीतेः | नाभावे | स्वेन प्रतीयमानला- दितिचेत्। न । मणाद्यभावविशिषटवद्यादेदादादिकां प्रति खातब्येण मणभावादेरेव वा दतुलकल्पनेन सा- Aza चननन्तशक्तितत्प्रा गभावध्व॑सकस्यनानेचित्यात्। न चोात्तेजके सति मणिप्रतिबन्धकसद्धावेऽपि कथं दाद दति वाच्यं । उन्तेजकाभावविशिष्टमणिसामान्याभावसख देतुलात् | साट्श्यमपि न पद्ाथोन्तरं किन्त तद्धि- . जले सति तद्धतश्योाधम्मेवल्लं । यथा wafuaa सति चेनद्धगताहादकलादिमच्चं मखे चन्द्रश TN- fafa a ul द्रव्याणि fausa 1 faafafa । एतानि नव द्र व्याणि इत्यथैः । ननु gaara किं मानं। नदि तच प्रत्यकं प्रमाणं धुतजतुग्रश्टतिषु दइव्यलाग्रदादिति चेत् । न। का्यसमवायिकारणएतावच्छेद्कतया संयो- गस्य विभागस्य वा समवायिकारणएतावच्छेदकतया तस्विद्धिरिति ॥ ननु दशमं द्व्यन्तमः कुत नोक्तं ।
भवाः
५
ZANE ऽथ गुणा रूपं रसो गन्धस्ततः परं ॥ २॥ शः संख्या परिमितिः एथक्तच्च ततः परं ।
संयोगख विभागश्च परत्व्चापरत्वकं ॥ ₹॥ `
fagte
बुद्धिः सुखं द्;खमिच्छा SA यल्नो RT | द्रवत्वं STANT शब्द एव च ॥ ४॥ STAIN ततेोऽवक्तेपनमाकुच्चनं तथा | प्रसारणच्च गमनं कम्याण्येतानि पच्च च ॥ ५॥ भ्रमणं रेचनं स्यन्द नोंज्वलनमेव च।
तद्ध प्रत्यच्चेण गद्यते । तस्य च रूपवक्लात् कम्मवत्चा च द्र यलं । तच्च गन्धद्जटून्यलात् न एथिवो। नीलरूपवक््वा च न जलादिकं | तत्मत्यचे चालेकनिरपेक्तं Va: कारणं दरति चेत् ।न। च्रावश्यकतेजाऽभावेनापपत्तो द्र यान्तर- कल्पनाया श्रन्याखवात् | रूपवत्ताम्रतीतिस्तु भ्रमरूपा | कर्मव्लमरतोतिरपि ्रलोकापसारलपाधिकी भान्ति रेव । तमसेाऽतिरिक्रतरेऽनन्तावयवादि कल्यनागरवच्च स्यात् | ata यथा तेजख्यन्तभीवस्तया वच्यते ॥ गणान् विभजते । श्रय गृणा दूति । एते गृणाश्चतु- वविंशतिसह्यकाः कणादेन कण्ठतखशब्देन च faa: | तच गणल्वादिकजातिसिद्धिरये वच्छते WRU NEN कम्माणि विभजते, उत्छेपणएमिति । कम्मंलजातिस्त प्रत्यत्तसिद्धा | एवम॒त्छेपणएलादि कमपि । नन्वत्र भ्रम-
Hale
सिद्धा०
R नी्यग्ामनमप्यच गमनादेव MAT | ६ ॥ सामान्यं दिविधं प्रोक्त परच्चापरमेव च। द्रव्यादिचिकव्र्तिसतु सत्ता परतयोच्यते ॥ ७॥ परमिन्ना च या जाति; सेवापरतयेच्यते |
णादिकमपि पञ्चकम्माधिकतया gar नोाक्तमत ATE | भ्रमणमित्यादि ॥५॥६॥ |
सामान्यं निरूपयति । सामान्यमिति । aware fama सत्यनेकसमवेतलं | अ्नेकसमवेतलं संयागादी- नामष्यस्यत oat नित्यत्वे सतीति । नित्यले सति समवेतलं गगणपरिमाणादीनामप्वस्यत उक्तं । श्रने-
केति । नित्यवे सत्यनेकदटरत्तिलमत्यन्ताभावे saat
ठत्तिलसामान्यं विहाय समवेतत्वमि्युक्तं । एकमा च- व्यक्तित्तिस्तु न जातिः । तथाचोक्तं । व्यक्त रभेद स्तु खलं शङ्करो ऽयानवस्ितिः। रूपदानिरसम्बन्धा जाति- वाधकसङ्गदः ॥ एकव्यक्तिकलादाकाश्लं न जातिः |
तुल्यव्यक्तिकलात् ved waa न जातिदयं । सङ्गी-
tala, भूतलं मत्तं न जातिः । अनवस्याभयात् सा- arma न जातिः । विशेषस्य arawaurayg रूप- हानिः स्यादता विशेषत्वं न जातिः समवायसम्ब- न्धाभावात् समवाया न जातिः ॥ द्रव्यादीति |
परलं भ्रधिकदशत्तिलं | श्रपरलं श्रल्पद् शत्तिलं ।
भाता
ॐ
द्रव्यत्वादिकजातिस्तु परापरतयेव्यते॥ ८॥ व्यापकत्वात् परापि स्याद्याप्यत्वादपरापि च। अन्तो नित्यदरव्यत््निरव्वंशेषः परिकीर्तितः ॥ < ॥
घटादीनां कपालादे) द्रव्येषु गुएकर्म्रणेः।
सिद्धा०
सकलजात्यपेत्तयाऽधिकदेशत्तिलात् सत्तायाः परल ।
एतद्दोधनायेव द्रव्यादिचिकदत्तिरिल्युक्तं । तदपेकया
चान्यासां जातीनामपरलं । परभिन्ना सत्ताभिना
व्यापकलादिति॥७॥८॥ प्रथिवीलाद्यपेचया वयापकलादधिकटे श्डृत्तिात द्रवयलारेः UTA | BAIA व्यायलात अल्यदेश-
` दन्तिलाच द वयलखयापस्व | तयाच धम्मद्यसमाव-
शादुभयमविरद्धं ॥
विशेषं निरूपयति । अन्त्य द्ति। अन्ते अवसाने qd इत्यन्तः | यद् पेया fara arate: | एक- माचटृत्तिरिति फलिताथः । घटादीनां gare न्तानां तत्तद वयवभेदात् परस्परं भेदः | परमाण्टनां परस्परभेदको विशेष wai सतुखत Ua asm | तेन aa विश्ेषान्तरापेत्ता नास्तीति भावः॥<॥
समवायं द् शयति! चटादीनामिति । श्रवयवाव- यविनेजतिवयक्योर्गुणगणिनेो;क्रियाक्रियावते निंत्यद्र- व्यविगेषयाश्च यः सम्बन्धः स समवायः | समवायलं
टः ..
भाषा० तेषु जातेश्च सम्बन्धः समवायः प्रकीत्तितः॥ १०॥ अभावस्तु हिधा संसगेन्योन्याभावमेद्तः।
सिद्धा ° नित्यसम्बन्धलं । तच प्रमाणन्त् गृणक्रियादि विशष्टव्- द्विविशेषणविशेव्यसम्बन्धविषया विशि्बुद्धिलात् दण्डी परुष दति विशिष्टवद्धिवत् इत्यनुमानं । तच संया- गादिवाधात् सुमवायसिद्धिः। न च खरूपसम्बन्धेन सिद्धसाधनं अ्रथोान्तरं वा ¦ अनन्तखरूपाणं सम्बन्ध- लरकल्यने गारवात् । लाघवादेकममवायसिद्धिः। न च समवाचस्येकल्े वाये खपवत्तावृद्धिप्रसङ्गः । तत्र रूपसमवायसन्ेऽपि रूपाभावात् । न चेवं श्रभावस्य वेशिष्छं सम्बन्धान्तरं सिध्येदिति वाच्यं । तस्य नित्यले भूतले घटानयनानन्तरमपि घटाभावबुद्धप्रसङ्गात् | चटाभावसम्बन्धेस्य ad स्वात् तस्य नित्यलात् | अन्यया देशान्तरोऽपि तत्मरतोतिनं स्यात् । वैशिष्छस्पर च तत्र सत्वात् | मम तु मते घटे पाकरक्रतादशायां श्वामरूपस्य नष्टवान्न तद्न्ताबुद्धिः । वैशिष्छस्यानित्यले लनन्तवैशिष्छकल्पने तवैव गेारव। Tay तत्तत्का- लीनतन्तद्भूतलादिकं तत्तद् भावानां सम्बन्धः ॥ Lo tt sara विभजते । श्रभावस्िति । surat द्या दिषरकान्योन्याभावलं | संसगंति | संसमाभावान्योन्या- भावभेदादित्यर्थः ॥ अन्योन्याभावसैकविधलात्तदि-
८
भाषा० प्रागभावस्तथा ष्वंरऽप्यत्यन्ताभाव एव च ॥ १९॥
सिद्धा ° भागाभावात् संसगाभावं विभजते । प्रागभाव दूति । संसमाभावलं श्न्योान्याभावभिन्नाभावलं | अन्यान्या भावलं तादा व्यसम्बन्धावदिन्नप्रतियागिताकाभावलं । विनाश्यभावलं प्रागभावलं | जन्याभावलतं wad | नि- त्यसंसगौभावलं चअत्यन्ताभावलं। यत्र तु भूतलादौ चटादिकमपसारितं पुनरानीतच्च तच घटकालख सम्नन्धाघटकतया श्रत्यन्ताभावस्य नित्यवेऽपि az- काले न घरात्यन्ताभावबृद्धिः | तच उत्पादविनाश- we चतुयाऽयमभाव दति केचित् 1 अच ष्वंष- प्रागभावयारधिकरणे नात्यन्ताभाव दति प्राचोन- मतं | श्यामघटे रक्ता नास्तीति रक्रघटे श्यामा ना- सीति Wry प्रागभावं ष्वंसञ्चावगादतेन तु तदल्य- न्ताभावं | नव्यास्तु aa विरोधे मानाभावात् war- दिकालावच्छेदेनाष्यत्यन्ताभावेा aaa दति wre: नन्वस्तु चरभावानामधिकरणत्मकलं लाघवादिति Va न । अनन्ताधिकरणात्मकतल्कल्यनामपेच्छातिरिक्रक- MATA एव सघीयस्लात् | एवञ्च श्राधारापेयभा- वेाऽणुपपद्यते । एवञ्च तत्त च्छन्द्गन्धरसाद्यभावानां म्रत्यत्त्मुपपद्यते। श्रन्यथा तत्तद धिकरणणनां तत्त- दिद्धियाणामग्राह्यलादप्रत्यचलं स्यात् । एतेन ज्ञान-
Cc
१०
भाषा० एवं वेविष्यमापन्नः संसर्गाभाव इष्यते |
सिद्धा
सप्रानामपि A TASHA AA ॥ १९॥ द्रव्यादयः पच्च भावा अनेके समवायिनः |
विशेषकालविभशषाद्यात्मकलमत्यन्ताभावस्येति war)
श्रप्रत्यचलापत्तेः॥ ९९ ॥
ददनों पदाथानां सामयं वेधमयेच्च वक्त प्रक्रमः । सप्तानामित्यादि। समाना WaT येषां ते सचम्माण- Wat भावः साधम्यं | समाने wal इति फलितार्थः । एवं विरुद्धा wat येषां ते विधम्माएस्तेषां भावे auagq| विरुद्धा धम्मं दति फलिताथः। Haat ज्ञान्- विषयता । सा च सर्व्वत्रैवास्ति ‡ईरादिज्ञानवि- षयतायाः केवलान्यिलात् । एवं अ्रभिधेयवप्रमेय- त्वादिकं बेोध्यं॥ ९२ Nl
caf | द्व्य् .एकम्प॑सामान्यविशेषाणणं साधम्य मनेकेलं *भावतं समवायिवलञ्च । quand अभावे sufe auraaaa सति भाववं पञ्चानां साधम | त्याच अनेकभावटत्तिपदाथविभाजकेपाधिमन् फ- faara: | तेन घटादौ प्रत्येकं arate: । सम- afad समवायसम्बन्धेन सम्बस्िलंन तु समवायवच्वं । सामान्यादावभावात्। तथाच समवेतटत्तिपद्ायविभा-
जकोापाधिमच्चं फलिताथं, 1 तेन नित्यद्र येषु ararfa:
* स्यपव्वेमद्रित[सिदं। N ॐ
९९
भाषा० सन्तावन्तस्लयस्त्वाद्या गुणादिनिगणक्रियः ॥ ९३॥ सामान्यपरिदोनासतु सव्वं जात्याद् या माः |
सिद्धा ° सत्तावन्त इति द्भव्यगृणकम्म्णां सत्तावत्रमित्यथः । गणादिरिति। यद्यपि गेणक्रियाश्रून्यलमा द्चणे घरा- दावतिव्याप्रं करियाश्ून्यवच्च गगणाद् वतिव्याप्तं तथापिं गणएवद् ठन्तिघम्भेवच्चं RAITT MI थैविभाजकोपा- fran तदथः । न दि घटलादिकं ae वा गृणव- दटत्ति aaazeta वा किन्तु गृणलादिकं । तथा
| ्राकाशवादिकन्त् न पद्ाथविभाजकोापाधिः*॥९२॥ सामान्येति | सामान्यानधिकरणलं सामान्यादोना- faa: ॥ पारिमाण्डच्येति । पारिमाण्डल्यं ्रणप- रिमाणं। कारणलं तद्धिन्रानामित्यथंः । च्रणएपरि- ard ag कस्यापि कारणं। तद्धि खाश्रयारयद्रय- परि माणारम्भकं भवेत् । तच्च न सम्भवति । परिमा- UY खसमानजातीयोाक्कष्टपरि माणएजनकलात् । मद- द्ारश्येस्य मदन्तर तवत् | च्रणजन्यस्याणतर प्रसङ्गा च | ud परममदत्परिमाणं श्रतीद्धियसामान्यं faite
~
* यद्रा गृणटत्तिले सति कम्मटत्तिले सति वा सत्तायायजातिष्एन्याभा- यत्वं विवलितं | गणकम्म्णारव्याक्निवारणाय सन्ना वययति । anfry भेद्गभ! निवेशिता Taya A दाषः । द्र्गणशन्यतरत्वमाद्ाय तचेवा व्याद्चिवारणाय जातीति। अभावेऽतिव्याक्चिवारणायभावलमिति। aq agi संत्नायाप्यजातिद्रयतं तच्छन्यत्वं पञ्चानासस्त्यंव | परव्वगद्विनाःप्येष पाटः प्र्छतानपयागिलवात् पस्कान्तरालिखिताचाधामद्रितः।
भाषा
१९ पारिमाण्डल्यभिन्नानां कारणएत्वमदादतं ॥ १४॥ अन्थथारसिद्धि्न्यस्य नियता ूव्ववन्तिता |
कारणत्व भवेत्तख चेविध्य परिकीत्तितं ॥ १५॥ समवायिकारणत्न ज्ञेयमथाप्यसमवायिदेतुल्वं । `
एवं न्यायनयद्चेलतोयमुक्तौ निमित्तदेतुत्वं ॥ ९९ ॥
fagte
सेति are इदमपि afin विषयस्य न का- रणएलं । ज्ञायमानसामान्यं न प्रत्यासत्तिः | ज्ञायमानं fay नानमितिकारणं इत्यभिप्रायेण मानसम्रत्यक्े श्रद्ममदत्वस्य कारणएत्रात मदत्परिमाणं काला- देवौध्यं तस्यापि न कारणएल्रमित्याचाखाणणमाशय इत्यन्ये । तन्न । ज्ञानातिरिक्ते प्रति कारण्ताचा एव श्राचार्थरुक्ततवा ॥ ९४ ॥ |
ननु कारणव्वं किंमत ate अन्येति । तस्व कारणलस्य ॥ ९५ ॥
aa समवायिकारणे | श्रासन्नं प्रत्यासन्नं कारणं दितीयमसमवायिकारणमित्यथः । अच यद्यपि तु- रौोतन्तसयागानां परासमवायिकारणलं स्यात् एवं वेगादीनामपि अभिचाताद्यसमवायिकारणलं स्यात
एवं ज्ञानादि कमिच्छाद्यसषमवायिकारणं सयात तथापि
पटासमवायिकारणलचणे तुरीतमसंयेगभिनवं Sz तरीतन्तुसंयागस्ु तुरीपटसंयोगं प्रत्यसमवायिकारणं भवत्येव । एवं वेगादिकं वेगस्यन्दाद्यसमवायिकारणं
भवाः
सिद्धा
१ यत् समवेतं काय्यं भवति Ta समवायिजनक तत्
TAH जनकं दितीयमाभ्यां परं SRF स्यात् ॥९७॥ येन सद THA: कारणमाद्ाय वा यस्य |
भवल्येवेति तत्तत्काययासमवायिकारणलच्णे तन्तददि-
भिन्रलं न देयं! श्रात्मविशेषगृणानान्त् कुचाप्यसम-
वायिकारणएलं नास्ति । तेन afsad सामान्यलक्तणे देयमेव । wa समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नं दिविध का- ओकार्थप्रत्यासत्या काररीकार्थप्रत्यासत्या च । Arey
यथा घटादिकं प्रति कपाल्संयोगादिकं। तच
कार्येण घटेन सद कारणस कपालसंयोागस्य एक- सिन् कपाले अ्त्यासत्तिरस्ि। दितीयं यथा घर रूपं ग्रति कपालरूपमषमवायिकार्णं। aa घटरूपं मरति कारणं चट: । तेन सड कपालरूपस्य एकस्मिन् कपाले प्रत्यासन्तिरस्ति 1 तथा च कचित् समवायसम्बन्धेन कवित् सखसमवायिसमवायसव्बन्धेनेति फलितार्थः । TITY काय काययकारणेका्यान्यतरप्रत्यासत्या का- रणं स्ञानादिभिन्नमसमवायिकारणमिति सामान्यल- QW पय्यवसन्नं | आभ्यां समवाचिकारणासमवायिका- रणाभ्यां भिन्नं कारणं ठतीयं निमित्तकारणएमित्यर्थः।।
-९६॥९७॥
द्दानोमन्यथामिद्धलमेव कियतां पदाथानां त- aie येन सरेत्यादिना। यत्काय प्रति कारणस्य
He
सिद्धा०
१४
अन्ये प्रति पूव्वभावे ज्ञाते यत् पूव्वभावविन्ञानं ॥१८॥ जनकं प्रति पव्ववन्नितामपरिज्ञायं न यस्य wea |
qaafiat येन रूपेण wea तत्का प्रति तद्रप- मन्ययासिद्धसमिति भावः | यथया घरं प्रति cwa- मिति ॥ दितीयमन्यथासिद्धमादइ कारणमिति | यस सखातच्येएटन्वयव्यतिरेकोा न स्तः किन्तु खकार ण-
= ~ TA त् # मादायेव अन्वयव्यतिरेक tad तदन्यथासिद्धं। यथा
SWE | दतीयमाद। अन्ये प्रतोति। aa प्रति qaafid wea यस्य यत्का प्रति पूववैवत्तिलं Tea तस्य तत्काय्यं प्रत्यन्यथासिद्धलं। यथा घरा- दिकं प्रत्याकाशस्य | आकाशस्य fe घटादिकं प्रति MATA कारणत खात् | Batwa शब्द समवायि- कारणलं। अतः शब्दं प्रति जनकलं गरदीवैव घटादिकं ग्रति जनकलवं ग्राद्यमतस्तरन्यथासिद्धं। we
aqua कान्यथासिद्धिरिति Ya पञ्चमोति were ।
अरथाकाशस्य शब्दं प्रति sana किमवक्ेदकभिति चेत् कवलादिकं विशेषपदाथा afa es i चतु्मन्ययासिद्धमा द | जनकं प्रतीति। यत्का- aaa प्रति पुल्ववत्तिलं welds यस यत्काय प्रति पत्ववर्तित्वं श्यते तस्य तत्काव्यं प्रत्यन्ययासिद्धलं । यथा कूलालपितुघंटं प्रति। तस कुलालप्रिटत्तेन
भाषा
९५
अतिरिक्तमथापि यद्गवेन्नियतावग्यकपृव्यभाविनः॥९९॥ एते पच्चान्यथासिद्धा दण्डत्वादिकमादिमं।
धादौ दण्डख्पादि दितीयमपि दशितं ॥ ve tt ठतोयन्त् भवेद्योम कुलालजनकोऽपरः |
सिद्धा
घरं ula जनकल्वेऽन्यथासिद्धिः। कुलाललेन जनकत्वं विष्टापत्तिः । कुलालमा चस्य घटं प्रति जनकत्वात् ॥ पञ्चममन्ययासिद्धमाद । अतिरिक्तमिति॥ मियताव- प्यकपूल्वभा विनः । च्रवश्यक्ुप्तनियतपू्वैवत्तिन एव का- य्यसम्भवे तद्धिन्नमन्ययासिद्धमित्यर्थः | श्रत एव प्रव्यक्त aed कारणमनेकद्र् यवत्तमन्ययासिद्धं | तच fe ACMA Ai | तेनानेकद्र यवत्वमन्यथासिद्धं। न च वैपरीत्ये fa विनिगमकमिति वाच्यं । मदच्चल- जातेः कारणएतावच्छेदकत्वे लाघवात् ॥ ९९. ॥ राखभादिरिति। यद्वर य्न परति रासभस्य नियप- पू्यैवत्तिल मस्ति तत्रापि घटजातीयं प्रति सिद्धकारण- भावैट्ःण्डादिभिरेव agai सम्भवे रासभोाऽन्यथा- सिद्ध इति भावः॥ एतेखिति । way पञ्च खन्यया- सिद्धेषु मध्ये पञ्चमेाऽन्ययासिद्ध arava: । तेनेव परेषां चरितायंल्रात् | तथा fe दण्डादिभिरवभ्य- कुप्तनियतपृत्वेवत्तिभिरेव का य्य॑सम्भवे द ण्डत्वादिकम- न्ययासिद्ध। न च वैपरीत्ये fa विनिगमकमिति
१९
भाषा TA रासभादिः स्यादेतेष्वावश्यकस्त्वसे ॥ २९। समवायिकारणत्वं द्रव्यस्येनेति विज्यं | TERRA ज्ेयमथाप्यसमवायिदेतलं ॥ २६ अन्यच नित्यद्रव्येभ्य आथितत्रभिदचयते। रत्यादीनां नवानान्तु दरव्यलगुणएयोगिता ॥ २३ ॥
श्द्धि० वाच्यं । दण्डत्वस्य कारणले दण्डघरितपरम्परायाः सम्बन्धलकस्यने गोरवात् | एवमन्येषामप्यनेन चरि- ता्थलसम्भवात् ॥ २० ॥ २९ ॥ | समवायिकारणत्वमिति । गणकश्धति । च्रसमवा- यिकारणएलं गणकम्मभिन्नानां Feel नतु गणकम: ara दत्यचापि तात्पये | अथवा श्रसमवायिका- रणदटठत्तिसन्ताभिन्नजातिमच्वं acd तेन ज्ञानादी- नामपि अरसमवायिकारणत्विरद्ेऽपि न कतिः॥२२॥ अन्यचेति । नित्यद्रवयाणि परमााकाशादौोनि ` विदायाञ्चितलं साधमयमित्यथः । श्राभितलन्तु खम- ` वायसम्बन्धेन afaad । विग्रेषणतया नित्यानामपि कालादौ त्तेः । कालिकसम्बन्धान्यसम्बन्धेन तेषा- aafaafafa परमार्थः । तेन समवायाभभावयेाः समवायेनादृत्तावपि न चतिः॥ इदानीं द्रवयदधेव fa- ष्य साधम्यं वक्तमारभते। चित्यादीनामिति ॥२३॥
* aifgaqeifater |
१०
भाषा सितिजलं तथा तजः पवनो मन एव च।
सिद्धा
परापरत्वमूत्ततक्रियावेगाश्रया अमी ॥ २४॥ कालखात्मदिशणं Tana परमं मचत्।
ज्ितिजंलमिति । एयिव्यप्रैजावाथुमनसां परला- पर त्ववत््वं मूत्त लं क्रियावत्त्वं Faw” साधम्य | नच यच घटादौ परत्मपरत्वं वा नात्पन्नंतवाव्या्चि-
रिति avai परत्वादिसमानाधिकरणद्रयलव्याप्य-
जातिमत्वख विवक्ितलात् । मृत्तैलं अरपरृषटपरिमा- णएवत्वं | तदच तेषामेव गगणादिपरि माणस्य कुता<पय- पङृष्टलाभावात् Yaad Aa * Fae कम्मसमाना- धिकरणटद्रव्यलव्याप्यजातिमचं वेगवदुत्तिद्र यलव्याप्य- जातिमचञ्च बोध्यं॥ २४॥
कालेति । कालाकाशात्मदिशां सर्व्व॑गतत्वं सर्वम् Waa परममदचञ्च | waaead जाति- विश्रेषोाऽपकषोाना्रयपरिमाणएत्वं ati faanetfa प्रथिव्प्रेजावाय्वाकाशानां was | तच वदिरिद्धिय- ग्राह्यविशेषगृणवत््वं | रच ग्राद्यलं लकिकम्रत्यच्खसख्- पयोाग्यलं ae | तेन ज्ञाता घट दत्यादिप्रत्यत्ते ज्ञा- नसखाप्युपनीतभानविषयत्रात् तदति च्रात्मनि नाति-
प्रसङ्गः 1 न वा प्रत्यत्ताविषयरूपादिमति परमाणवा-
| qua द्रितभिदं।
र् ट
भाषा त्तित्यादिपच्च भूतानि चत्वारि खशवन्ति दि ॥ २५ ॥ द्रव्यारम्मश्वतुषुं ARAN ।
सिद्धा ° द्ावव्यात्तिः । तस्यापि खरूपयोाग्यलात् मदत्वलचण- कारणान्तरासनधिानाच न ATG | अथवा श्रात्मा- त्ति विशेषगणएवच्वं ad ॥ चलारीति । एथिवयरेजा- avanti स्प शर॑व्वं ॥ २५ ॥ zara दति | एयिव्यप्रेजवायषु चतुषु द्रवखा- Tana | न च दइवयानारमके घटाद्ावव्यास्धिः | द्र यसमवायिकारणटन्िद्र यलव्याष्यजातिमच्स्य वि- वक्षितलात् ॥ श्राकाग्रशरीरिणामिति। आकाश्रात्म- नामव्याप्यटत्तिचणिकविगेषग् एव्वं ॥ च्रकाशस् वि- शेषगणः शब्दः | स चाव्याप्यडत्तिः। वदा किञि- दवदशेदेन शब्दं उत्पद्यते तदन्यावेदेन तदभावसखापि सत्वात् । त्षणिकलञ्चं दतीयच्तणएटत्तिष्वंसमप्रतिया- fad । योग्यविभुविशेषगणानां खो त्तर वत्तिगुणनाश्य- लात् प्रथमश्ब्दस्य दितौयश्ब्दन नाशः ।॥ एवं ज्ञा- नादीनामपि। ज्ञानादिकं fe श्रात्मनि विभा शरी- रादयवकदनेत्प द्यते घटाद्यवरेदेन ATTA | एव ज्ञानादिकमपि च्षणदयावस्यायि i दत्यच्चाव्या्य- टेत्ति विशेष गृणवत्वं णि कविेषगुणवत्व ञ्चा यः एथि- AST रूपादि विगेषगृणेऽस्तीत्यतेाऽव्याप्यटत्ति रिव्यु |
९८
भाषा° अव्याप्यव्त्तिः कणिका toga इष्यते ॥ २६॥ ख्पद्रव्यतवप्र्यक्षयोगि स्यात् प्रथमचिकं |
fagte एयिव्यादावव्या्यदत्तिसंयेागादिर स्तोत्यते विशेषगृण Taal न च रूपादीनामपि कदाचित् दतीयक्तणे नाशसम्भवात् चणिकविशेषगणएवच्वं चित्याद्ावतिवयाप्न- fafa वाच्यं चतुःचणटत्तिजन्याटृत्तिजातिमदिशेष- awaae विवक्तितलात्। श्रपेच्चाबुद्धिः wag ति- ति । क्षण्चतुष्टयन्त् किंमपि ज्ञानादिकं न तिष्ठति । रूपलादि कन्तु णच तुष्टयस्थायिन्यपि खूपादौ aa दरति gare: | ईखरज्ञानस्य चतुःचणटत्तिलाज् जन्ये- त्युक्तं | चद्याकाशजीवात्मनोाः साधम्य तदा जन्येति म देयं देषलादिकमाद्ाय लक्षणसमन्वयात् परम- महत्वस्य तादृश्गृणलाचच | waded दविलादीना- मपि नाशाभ्युपगमाद् ददिलादौीनामपि तथालात् तदा- रणाय विशेषेति चिचण्टत्यटृन्तिलं वा वाच्यं । देष- लादिकमाद्ायात्मनि लक्षणसमन्वयात् ॥ VE ॥ खूपेति । परथिद्यप्रेजषां रूपव द्र यतवल्वं प्रत्यच- विषयलञ्चेत्यथंः । न च चच्रादीनां भजंनकपालस्य- वद्धेरुप्रणख रूपवच्वे किं मानमिति वाच्यं । aarfa तेजस््ेन रूपानुमानात् | एवं वाखानीतष्यिवीजल- तेजेाभागानामपि एयिवोलादिना रूपानुमानं बाधं।
१ © भाषा गुरुणो दे रसवती दयोरनेमित्तिको ZA ॥ २७ ॥ आत्मने BATTS FTA TA TA | यदुक्तं यस्य साधम्गयं वेधम्म्भितरस्य तत् SE It
सिद्धा om च पराद द्रतसुवसारिभिन्ने तेजसि च xaa- वक््वमव्याप्तमिति वाच्यं । द्रवल्वदुत्तिद्धव्यलव्याष्य- जातिमच्वस्य विवङ्ितवात् । चुततेलप्र्टतिषु एथि- वीषु जलेषु Ragatrer तेजसि च द्र वत्वसच्वात् | तत्र च एयथिवीलादि मच्वात्तद्ादाय सव्व लच्तषण- समन्वयः | न च प्रत्यच्विषयलं परमाएवादावव्याप्नं श्रतिव्याप्तच्च रूपाद्ाविति वाच्यं । चाच्तुषप्रत्यक्तवि- षय दटृत्तिद्र् व्यलव्या्यजाति मल्लस्य विवक्तितलात् 1 aT त्मन्यतिव्यास्भिवारणाय चाचुषेति ) गुरुणी दति । गरू त्वन्तं Taare एरयिवोजलयेरित्यथेः । न च च्राणे- न्द्रियादीनां वाखानीतपाथिंवादिभागानाञ्च रसा- दिमच्च fa मानमिति वाच्यं तचापि एथिवीला- दिना तदनुमानात्) दयोारिति थिवीतेजशरि- त्यर्थः! न च नैमिन्तिकद्र् वल्लवं घटादौ FST चाव्याप्तमिति वाच्यं मिन्तिकद््वलसमानाधिंकरण- दरव्यलव्याप्यजातिमचस्य विवकितलात् ॥ २७ ॥ प्रत्मान दति । प्रथिव्यक्नेजोावाय्वाकाशात्मनां विशेषगणवत्वमित्यथेः । यदुक्रमिति | ज्ञेयलादिकं fa-
RR
भाषा खादयो TTT मरूते गुणाः | अटो सादये रपं दरगे वेगश्च तेजसि ॥ २९ ॥ UNITAS वेगश्च गुर्त्वच्च TAH |
रूपं रसस्तथा SAT वारिण्ेते चतुदश ॥ Be I
aes गन्धयुताः तितावेते चतु दं | बुद्यादिषरकं संख्यादिपच्चकर भावना तथा ॥ ₹९॥ VACA गुणा रते आत्मनः स्युश्चतुर्दश | Velie पच्चकं कालदि शेः शब्दश्च ते च खे ॥ २९॥ संख्याद् यः पच्च वुद्धिरिच्छा यल्लाऽपि SAC । परापरत्वसह्याद्याः पच्च वेगश्च मानसे ॥ 88 1 तच ज्तितिर्गन्धदेतुनानारूपवतो मता |
मिद्धा० दाय द्रति वेध्यं । तत्त॒न कयापि वेधग्बयं । केवला- न्वयितल्वात् | ते च सद्याद्यः पञ्च खे STAT WRI
RE ॥ २०।२९।।३२॥ BM aurmayen निरूप्य सम्प्रति प्रत्येकं एयथिवया- दिकं निरूपयति । aa क्ितिरिव्यादिना । गन्धदेत्- रिति घन्धसमवायिकारणमित्ययंः। यद्यपि गन्धव- ward लकणमुचितं तथापि एयिवीवजाते प्रमाण- पन्यासाय कारणत्वमुषन्यस्तं । तथाहि एयिवीलं हि गन्धसमवायिकारणतावकेर कतया सिभ्यति । अन्यया
ra भाषा० षद्धिधस्तु THATS गन्धस्तु दिविधो मतः ॥ BB I
सिद्धा गन्धलावद्धिन्नस्याकस्िकलत्वापत्तेः 1 न च पाषाणादौ गन्धाभावाद्गन्धवत्वमव्याप्तमिति वाच्यं । तचापि गन्ध- सत्वात् । च्रनुपलयिस्ठु श्रनुत्क रलेनाय्युपपद्यते। कथय- aaa तद्धस्मनि गन्ध उपलभ्यते । भस्मना डदि पाषा- एष्वंसजन्यलात् | पाषाणापाद्ानोापादेयलं सिध्यति । age aay तत्तदुपाद्ानेपादेयमिति व्याैः। FLAAA खण्डपटे मद्ापरध्वंसजन्ये | tary पाषाणएपरमाणा; प्रथिवोलात्तज्जनन्यस्य पाषाणस्यापि पथिवीलं i तथाच तस्यापि गन्धव्वे बाघकाभावः॥ नानारूपेति । प्ररक्तनीलादिभेदेन नानाजातीयं रूपं परथिव्यामेव ada नतु WAIST । तच RASA स- चात् \ एथिव्यान्त॒ एकस्िन्ेपि धर्भ्रिंणि पाकवशेन नानारूपसम्भवात् | न च यत नानारूपं नात्पननं तचा- व्यात्चिः | रूपद्रयवदुत्निद्र् यलव्याप्यजातिमच्वस्य रूप- नाशवदन्तिद्र्वयलव्यायजातिमच्स्य वा वाच्यात् | वैशेषिकनये एथिवीपरमार रूपनाशस्य रूपान्तरस्य च wala | न्यायनये घटादावपि तत्सत्ता ल्ञचणसम- न्वयः nafs इति । मधुरकडुकषायादिभेदेन यः वद्धिधो रसः स एथियामेव जले च मधुर एव रसः | अचापि पूव्वेवद्रसद्बयवदन्निद्र ्लब्याप्यजातिमत्तं Ta
RB भाषा० WRAY विन्नये दयनुष्णाशतेतपाकजः | नित्याऽनित्या च सा देधा नित्या सखाद् णुलक्षणा ॥२५॥
सिद्धा ° नाशवद्धत्तिव्याप्यजातिमचं वा लक्तषणार्थीऽवसेयः | गन्धख्िति ॥ दिविध दति । वस्तस्ितिमाच॑ न तु दि- fauna लचणं | दिविधस्य quata । दै विष्यच्च सोरभासैरभमेदेन TTS BB सशंदति। तस्याः परथिवयाः अननश्नाशीतस्पशवचचं वायोरपि aaa tea पाकज दति | इत्यञ्च एटथि- व्याः स्परऽनुश्राश्नीततान्ञापना्थं तदुक्तं । वस्हुतस्त पाकजस्पशेवत्वमात्नं was । श्रधिकस्य वेयय्यात् । य- द्यपि पाकजस्प पटादौ नास्ति तयापि पाकजस्प्- वदरत्तिद्र् यलव्याप्यजातिमन्वमथा बोध्यः ॥ नित्येति । सा एथिवो दिविधो नित्या अनित्या चेत्यर्थः । च्रण- aI परमाणलच्षणा wad नित्या। तदन्या पर- माएभिन्ना एयिवी इ णुकादि रूपा सब्वाऽपयनित्येत्यथः। सैव अनित्या एथिव्येव अवयववतीत्यथः | नन् च्रवय- विनि किं मानं। परमाणपञ्नेरषोपपत्तेः। नचपर- ` माणनामतीद्धियलाद् घटादेः म्रत्यक्तं न स्यादिति वाच्यं | एकस्य परमाणेर प्रत्यत्ततवेऽपि तत्समूदख ्रत्य- चलात्। यथया एकस कंशस्य दू रऽप्रत्य तते तत्सम् दस्य Wades । न च एकः सयृलो मदान् घट दति बुद्धे
भत
सिद्धा°
९४ अनित्या तु तदन्या स्यात् सेवावयवयेगिनी |
रनुपपन्तिरिति वाच्यं | एका मदान् धान्यराशिरिति- aqua: | मैवं । परमाणरतीद्धि यत्वेन तत्समूद- स्यापि प्रत्यक्तायेग्यलात् | दूरखकंशस्तु aaa: | सन्निधाने त्येव प्रत्यक्त्वात् | न च तद्गनीं AT परमाएपज्ञात् दृ श्वपर माणएपृज्नस्यात्यनलात् न WE- aa विराध दति वाच्यं! अदृश्यस्य दृश्वानुपाद्ान- लात् । अन्यथा चचुरप्नादिसन्ततेा कदाचिद AT सङ्गात् । न चातितत्ततेलादौ कथयमद्श्वद् दनसन्तते- दग्यद दनोत्पत्तिरिति वाच्यं । तच तदन्तःपातिभि- कुःश्यद नावयवः WAT दनोत्पन्तेरपगमात् | न चाद श्षद्मणकन कथं चसरणार्त्पत्तिरिति वाच्यं । यता न वयं दृश्थवमद् श्यत्वं वा कस्यचित् खभावाद् चच््दे OC क el क तथाच चसरेणाग्मदत्वात् WAT नतु इणकादेस्तद- भावात् । न दि तन्मतेऽपीदं सम्भवति परमाण मद- त्वाभावात् te चावयपिसिद्ध तेषामुत्पाद् विनाश्याः ग्रत्यचत्वादनित्यलं तेषां चावयवावयवधाराया ्रन- न्ते मेरुसषेपयारपि साग्यप्रसङ्गः । चतः क्चिदि- Wa वाच्यः। यच च विभ्रामस्तसखानित्यले वसमवेत- भावकाय्यात्प्तिप्रसङ्गः स्यात् | अतस्तख ad मद-
५
भाषा सा च चिधा भवेद द इ द्दियं विषयस्तथा ॥ २६ ॥ योनिजादिभवेदद cies TUT |
सिद्धा° त्यरिमाणएतारतम्यस्य गगणणदै विश्रान्तवभिवाणप- रिमाणतारतम्यस्यापि कचिददिश्रान्तवमस्तीति तख परमाणलसिद्धिः। न च चसरेणावेव विश्रामेाऽस्िति वाच्य॑। BATT: सावयवश्वाचषद्र्यलाद् घटवदित्य- नुमानेन तदवयवसिद्धौ चसरेणरवयवाः सावयवा मदद वयव्नात् कपालवदित्यनुमानेन तद् वयवसिद्धिः न चेदमम्रयेजकं। अपरम दत्वं मरति श्रनेकद्र् वयवत्वस्छ भ्रयेजकलात्। न चेवं करमेए तद वयवघारापि सिध्ये दिति वाच्यं । अनवस्थाभयेन तर् रिद्धः। सा च fafa, सा काय्थेरूपा wfaat चिविधा शरीरेन्धियविषयमे- दादित्यथः ze i | तच देदस॒दादरति। योनिजादीति। योनिजमयो- निजच्चेत्यथंः । याजिजमपि जरायुजमण्डज च | जरा युजं मानषादीनां | च्रष्डजं खादीनां । येनिजं सेदजेा- ्विदादिकं। खेदजाः छमिदशाद्याः। उद्धिदस्तरुग- स्माद्याः। नारकिणं शरीरमपि च्रयोनिजं। न चमानु- षादिशरोराणं पाथिवले fa मानमिति aren गन्घा- femmes प्रमाणएलात्। न च क्तेद उश्रादरुपलम्भादाष्य- लादिकमपि स्यादिति वाच्यं तथासति नखललषएथिवी-
E
९९ भाषाः विषये इणकादिश्च ब्रह्माण्डान्त उदाहतः ॥ २७ ॥
सिद्धा ० लादिनासद्धरप्रसङ्गात्। नच तद्िंजललादिकमेवास्तु न तु पाथिवलमिति वाच्य) क्तेदादीनां विनाशेऽपि शरोरत्वेन म्रत्यभिज्ञानात्) गन्धाद्युपलम्भेञ्च एथिवोल- सिद्धेः । एतेन पार्थिवादि शरीरें जलादौनां निमिन्त- लमाचं बोध्यं] शरौरत्वन्तु न जातिः एथिवीलादिनि ayaa किन्तु चेष्टा्यत्वं । ठकादीनामपि चेष्टास- aaa: नच उक्तषादीनां wate किं मानसमिति वाच्यं । आध्यात्मिकवायुसम्बन्धस्य प्रमाणलात् | तचैव किं मानमिति चेत्। भग्रच्तसंरोदणादिना तदनुमा- नात्। यदि waret शरौरव्यवदारोः न भवति तदा- नयावयविलेन विग्षणोयं। नच यच शरीरोचष्टान जाता aaratfatefa वाच्यं ।! एतादश प्रमाणाभा-
` वात् । च्रथवा चेष्टावद्न्यावयविमाच्टत्तिद्र् Vay जातिम्वं तत्* मानुषलतच्ेचत्रजाति मादाय लक्षणएसम- न्वयः। न च नुसिंदणरीरे कथ लचणएसमन्वयः | aa भिंदलस्येकव्यक्तिटत्तितया जातिलाभावात् । जलो- यतैजसशरौरटन्तितिया देवलस्यापि जातिलाभावा- दिति वाच्यं । कल्यभेदन नसिंदशरौरस्य नानालेन नुसिदलजात्या लचणएममन्वयात् | दद्धियमिति | घा-
* च्छन्तावयविमाचचेष्टावद् [नतज्ाति मनं बाध्य ॥
९७ भाषा० वर्णः Wal CTU TS ASMA |
सिद्धा ° णेद्धियं पा्थिंवभित्यथैः | पा्थिवलवं कथमिति चेत् cat atid पार्थिवं रूपादिषु मध्ये गन्धलेव यञ्जक- त्वात् कुङ्कुमगन्धादिव्यज्नकघ॒तवत्। न च दृष्टान्ते ख- कौयरूपादिव्यच्लकलाद् सिद्धिरिति वाच्यं। परकीय- चूपाद्यव्यज्ञकलख तद थंलात्। न च नवश्रावगन्धव्य- शकजलेनानैकान्तमिति वाच्यं । तख शक्नरसाभियख- कलात्! यद्वा परकीयेति न देयं वायुपनोतसुरभि- भागस्य दृ्टान्तलसम्भवात्। न च घ्राणेदधियसननिकर्षसय गन्धमाचव्यच्जकत्ात्तच व्यभिचार दति वाच्यं | द्रव्यते सति दति विश्षणात् nn विषय दति) उपभोागखधनं विषयः | aida हि कार्यजातं Searels | चत् का यद्दृष्टाधीनं AAU साक्तात् परम्परया वा जनयत्येव । न fe वीजप्रथजनार््ां निना कलत्ति- दुत्यत्तिरस्ति । तेन इयणकादि ब्रह्माण्डं स्वमेव विष- या भवति । श्रीरेदन्िययोाविंषयवेऽपि भ्रकारान्तरोप- न्यासः श््यवबृद्धिषैण्याथैः ॥ २७ ॥ | जलं निरूपयति। at: Ra इति । सेहसमवायि- कारणतावच्छेदकतया जलं जातिः सिध्यति । यद्यपि सलेत्व॑नित्यानित्यदटत्तितया न काय्यतावच्छेदकं तयापि जन्यसतेदतवं तथा बध्यं, Ay परमार Tad
Ve We VIA द्रवतवन्तु सांसिद्धिकमुद्ादतं ॥ इट i.
रिद्धा०न स्ात्। तच जन्यलेहाभावात् | नित्यस्य सखरूपयोग्धते फलावश्यम्भा वनियमादिति चेत्। न। जन्यसेदजनकता- वदद कतया जन्यजललजातेः fest तद वच्छिनिजन- कतावच्छेदकतया जलवजातिसिद्धः ॥ श॒क्घरूःपवत्वमेव
द शेयितुसुक्तं । ad: wa दति । वस्तुस्यितिमाच॑न त्
` शक्तरूपवत्वं लक्षणं । अथवा नेमित्तिकद्रवलवद ठन्ति- quay hax aaa aT aT aA त्रभाखर शुक्तेत- ररूपासमानाधिकरणएरूपवदुन्तिद्र VAI STIS - fans तदथैः॥ रसस्यशाविति | जलस्य मधुर एव wal शीत एव सपशः | तिक्राठत्ति मधुर टनत्तिद्र व्यल-
, साक्ताद्या्यजातिमच्वं ॥ ननु शक्तरूपवक्चमेवेति कुतः कालिन्दीजलाद नीसेापलमेरिति चेत्। न । नीलज- नकतावटेदिकायाः ष्यिवोलजातेर भावात् जले नी- लरूपासम्वात् | कालिन्दोजले नीलप्रतीतिः ara यपाधिके | अत एव वियति विक्तेपे घवलिमोा पलमधेः। aq जलमाधुयं fa मानं। न fe प्रत्यक्तेण काऽपि रसस्तचानुभूयते। न च नारिकंलजलादो माधुयमुप- लभ्यत एवेति वाच्यं | तसखाअ्यापाधिकलात् | अन्यथा जम्नीररसाद्ावस्त्ादुपलब्धेर ्तादिम्लमपि स्यादिति चेत्) न । दरोतक्यादिभच्वणएस्य TALIA PRATT |
९९ भाषा० नित्यतादि प्रथमवत् किन्त देदमयेनिजं |
fagre a च दरीतक्यामेव जलेाष्एसंयागाद्र्सान्तरोत्प्ति- रिति वाच्य॑। कल्पनागारवात् 1 एथिवीवस्यान्तादिज- नकतावच्छेदकलाच | जले नान्तादिकं जम्बीररसादौ तु श्राञ्रयोपाधिकौ तया प्रतीतिः। एवं जन्यणोत- सखश्जनकतावच्छेदकं जलत्वं जन्यजललं वा वेध्ये । चृष्टचन्दनादा तु शेव्योपलसिखचन्द नान्तव्व्॑तिभरीतत- रसलिलस्य तेजः संयो गाज्नले च्रष्णप्रतीतिरौपाधिकी (er । तत्र पाकासम्भवात्॥ क्तेदस्तचेति । धृतादा- वपि तद्न्तरववन्तिजलस्यैव Ger) जलस्य सेदसमवा- यिकारणलात् | तेन जल एव सेद दति मन्तव्यं ॥ द्वल्मिति। सासिद्धिकद्रवललं जातिविशेषः प्रत्यच- सिद्धः। तद वचि न्नजनकतावच्छदकमपि तदेवेतिभावः। तैलादावपि जलस्य द्र वलं लेदप्रकण च ददनान्क्र- wfafa वच्यति ॥ २८॥ प्रथमवदिति। sfuar दवेत्यथः। तथाडि awa दिविधं नित्यमनित्यच्च। परमाणरूपं नित्यं । इण- कादिकं सव्वमनित्यं च्रवयवसमवेतञ्च | अनित्यमपि चिविधं णरीरेद्धियविषयमेदात् i किन्तु एथिवीतोा या विशेषस्तमाद। किन्विति i अयोानिजमिति श्रया- निजमवेत्य्थः । जलीयं शरीरमयोनिजं वरूणलाके
०
भाषा° इन्दियं रसनं सिन्भुददिमादिर्विषये मतः॥ ३८९ ॥ ` सश उष्एसेजससतु UT ATA |
सिद्धा ° प्रसिद्धमिति । इद्धियं रसनं जलीयमित्यथंः । तथादि रसनं जलोयं गन्धाद्यव्यञ्ञकल्े सति रसव्यञ्ञकलात् | शक्तरसाभि यञ्जकोादकवत् रसनसन्निकपे व्यभिचार वारणाय द्रव्यं देयं । विषयं द शयति सिन्धुदिमा- दिरिति) सिन्धः wax: | fea तुषारः । च्रादिपद्ात् सरित् काषारकरकादिः सववा याद्यः। नच fea- करकयेः कठिनात् पाथिवलमिति वाच्यं । उश्मणा विलौनस्य तस जलवस्य प्रत्यच्सिद्धलात्। यद्रयं यद्रू व्यध्व षजन्यमिति व्या्रेजैलापादानेनापादरेयलसिद्धेः । अदृ ्टविशेषे णेवाद्र्वलविरोधात् करकादीनां काटि- न्यप्रत्ययस्य भरान्तलात् ॥ ३९ ॥ तेजा निरूपयति । खश उष्ण दत्यादिना। उष्एलं स्परशनिष्टो जातिविशेषः म्रत्य्तसिद्धं। इत्यञ्च जन्याष्ण- स्शंसमवायिकारणएतावच्छेद कं ane जातिविशेषः 1 तख UAVs त जललरेवान्सन्धेयं । न चा- quad चन््धरकिरणएणदावव्याप्रमिति वाच्यं। तचापि श्राष्णस्य ward | far तदन्तः पातिजलसखभरैनाभिभ- वादयदः | एवं ctafacurar पाथिवस््ैनाभिभ- वाचवच्चरादा चानुद्भूतवाद्ग्रदः ॥ रूपमित्यादि |
९९
~ । 4 ¢ wale नेमित्तिकं द्वत्वन्तु नित्यतादि च पृव्वेवत् ॥ ४०॥ इन्ियं नयनं वङ्किखिणादिविषये मतः।
. सिद्धा ण Sarat मरकतकिरणएणादा च पाथिंवरूपेणाभिभवात् WHATS: ॥ ननु तद्रपायद्े धरिणाऽपि weaved न स्यादिति ala अन्यदीयरूपेणापि धरि ग्रदसमभ- वात् wees पित्तपोतिन्ना | ae शक्तं नाभिग्तं किन्त तदीयं शक्ञलमभिग्धतमित्यन्ये । नेभित्तिक- fafa, सुवणौदि रूपे तेजसि तत्छलात् । न च नै- मित्तिकद्रवल्रव्चं न wad द् दनाद्ावव्या्रेच॑तादा- वतिव्ाप्रेखेति वाद्यं । एयिव्यदत्तिनेमित्तिकद्र वत- वदृत्तिजातिमन्लसखय विवक्ितवात् ॥ पूषव्वेवदि ति । जल- waaay: । तथा दि तद्दिविधं नित्यमनित्यञ्च 1 fra परमाणरूपं। तदन्यद निन्य ्चवयवि। तच fear शरीर द्ियविषयमेदात्। शरोर मयेानिजमेवेत्यथैः। तच खय्य॑- साकादा प्रसिद्धं ४०॥ aa at विशेषस्तमाद इद्ियमिति । weed परकीयखशाद्यव्यञ्नकलते सति WRT RATA भ्रदीपवत् । प्रदीपस्य सखीयस्पशव्यज्ञकलाद्ाद्यं पर- कोखेति। घटादेः सीवरूपव्यज्ञकलात् व्यभि चारावा- रणाय fadra परकोयेति। waar मभाया दृष्टा न्तलसश्मवात् परकौयदयं न दें । चचुः सन्निकपं व्भि-
<i “ | 0 kan भाषा० अपाकजोऽनृष्णाशेनः खशसतु पवनं मतः॥ ४१॥
सिद्धा° चारवारणयद्रवयलं देयं) विषयं दशयति। व्धीति। ननु gate तेजषलते किं मौनमिति चेत् । न । ` सुवे तेजसं असति प्रतिबन्धके अत्यन्तानलसंयोगे ऽप्यनच्छिद्यमानद्र वलात् यन्नैवं wad यथा थिवी । न चा प्रयोजकं प्रथिवीद्र वत्स्य जन्यजलद्रवत्स्य wid येागनाश्चलात् ॥ नन् पीतिमगृरुलाश्रयस् पाथिवस्यापि तदानीं Radars व्यभिचार इति चेत्। न। जलमध्यस्थ- ANGI ATRIA | BIT T पीतिमगरुला- खयस्य श्रत्यन्ताञचिसंयागेऽपि रूपापराटृत्तिद शनात् त- त्रतिबन्धकविजातीयं cara कल्यते । तथादि च्रभ्चि- संयोगे पीतिमगृरुलाञ्रयः विजातीयरूपप्रतिबन्धक- द्रवद्र वयसंयक्तः । अत्य न्ताद्चि संय गेऽपि पू्वैरूपविजा- तीयरूपानधिकरणएपाधिंवलात् जलमध्यस्यपीतपरटवत् तस्य च एथिवीजलभिन्नस्य तेजस्वनियमात् ॥ वायुं निरूपयति i अपाकज इति । अनुष्णाशीतस्प्शंस्य घ्रथिव्यामपि स्चादुक्तं surat दति | अपाकजस्प- ve जलादावपि waren अनृल्णाशोत sha तेन वायवीय विजातीयस्यभे दशितः। तज्जनकता वच्छे कं वायुवमिति भावः ॥ ४९ ॥
भाषा?
सिद्धा
RR
तिय्येग्गमनवानेष ज्ञेयः ख शदिलिङ्गकः, ूर्व्ववन्निल्यतायुक्तं Seana त्वगिन्दियं ॥ ४९ प्ाणादिसतु मदावायुपय्धन्ता विषये मतः |
एष वायुः स्यशादिलिङ्गकः | arate स्स्ंशन्द- तिकम्पेरनमीयते । विजातीयस्पभैन विलक्षणएशब्देन दणादीनां श्त्या शखादीनां कम्पेन च वायोरन॒मा- मात् | यया च वायोानं प्रत्य तथाग्रे वच्छते ॥ as वदिति ॥ वायुद्धिविधे निव्योऽनित्यञ्च । परमाणद्ूपे
नित्यस्तदन्योऽनित्यः waaay । साऽपि विविधः शरौ-
रेद्धियविषयभेदात्। aa शरीरमयोनिजं पिशचा- दीनां । परन्तु जलौ यतेजसवायवीयशरी राणां पार्थिंव- भागेपष्टम्मादुपभोागसाधनवं जलादीनां प्राधान्या simaafata ॥ wa या fataware | देदवया- पीति 1 शरीरव्यापकं सशग्रादकमिद्धियं लक् तच्च वायवीयं | रूपादिषु मध्ये Giles व्यञ्ञकलत्वात् ॥ ४२॥
श्रङ्गसद्गिखसलिलगैत्यव्यञ्ञकव्यजनवा तवद् विषयं cH यति । प्राणादिरिति। यद्यपि afar वायुश्चतुविवंधः aa चतुथी विधा प्राणादिरिव्युक्रमाकरे तयापि ag पाद् च चेविध्यमुक्तं । प्राणस्लेक एव दादि नानास्था- नवशान््रखनिगमादिनानाक्रियावशाच नानाषञ्ज्ा लभत दति ॥
ब्र
३४ भाषा आकाशस्य त् विज्ञेयः शब्दे वेशेषिके गुणएः॥ ४२॥ इनिदियन्तु भवेत् ओचमेकः सन्न्युपाधितः।
सिद्धा० श्राकाशं निरूपयति) आ्राकाशस्येति। आकाशकाल- दिशामेकैकव्यक्तिलाद् श्राकाश्रलादिकंन जातिः किन्त च्राकाशलं शब्दा ख यलं | वेशेषिक इतिकथनन्त॒ fait- षगणन्तरव्यवच्छेदाय । एतेन प्रमाणमपि दस्त । तथा दि । शब्दे गृणचगरंदणायेोग्धवदिरि द्धि यग्राद्य- जातिमच्ात् Wiad | Weel द्रव्यसमवेता TATA सं- यागवदट् दत्यनमाने शब्दस्य द्र व्समवेतत्वे fag शब्दा न स्यशंवद्धिेषगणः। च्रभ्निसंयो गाखमवायिकारणएकला- भावे सति च्रकारणएगुणपूव्वंक प्रत्य चलत् सुखवत्! पा- कजसरूपादटा व्यभिचारवारणाय सत्यन्तं wearer व्यभिचारवारणायकारणगुणएपुत्वैकेति | जलपरमाण- रूपादौ सयभिचारवारणाय प्रत्यक्तेति। शब्दा नदिका- लमनोगृणो विशेषगुणएलात् | नात्मविशेषगणः | वदि- रिद्धियग्राद्यलाद् रूपवत्। इत्थच्च शब्दाधिकरणं नव- ara गमणनामकं सिष्यतीति। न च वाख्वयवेषु खच्छणब्द्क्रमेण WAT कारणगृणपूत्वकः शब्द उत्याद्य- तामिति वाच्यं । श्रयावद्रयभाविलेन वायुविशेषगुएला- भावात्) तच शरोरस्य विषयख चाभावात् ॥ ४३॥ sha दशयति, दद्धियमिति।नन्वाकाशं लाघवा-
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भाषा० जन्यानां जनकः काला जगतमाखयो मतः ॥ ४४॥ परापरत्वधोदेतुः AUS: स्यादुपाधितः। fagre देकं fag Hrs परूषमेदेन भिरं कथमाकाशं स्यादत ATS 1 एकः सन्नपोत्यादि । चाकाश एक एव सन्नपि उपाघेः कणंगव्कुल्ादेभेदाद्धिनं मओ चात्मकं भवती- व्यर्थः ॥ | | कालं निरूपयति i जन्यानाभिति ॥ तच प्रमाणं दश्यितुमाद। जगतामिति तथाडि ददानीं घर इत्यादिप्रतीतिः खय्॑परिस्यन्दादिकं यदि विषयीक- tifa तदा सर्य॑परिस्यन्दादिना घटादेः सम्बन्धा वाच्यः स चसंयोगादिन संभवतोति काल एव तत्सब्बन्धघ- रकः कर्प्यते ॥ ४४ ॥ way तस्याश्रयलमपि सम्यक् प्रमाणान्तरं दशं यति ! परापरलेति | परल्ापरववुद्धेरमाधारणं नि- भित्तं काल एव | परलापरलयोारसमवायिकारणएसं- योागाश्रयोा लाघवादतिरिक्रः कसयत इति भावः ॥ नन्वेकस्य कालस्य सिद्धा चणएदिनमासवषादिसमयमेदो न स्यादत are कणादिरिति। कालस्ेकाऽपि उपा- धिभेदात् चणादिव्यवद्ारविषयः। उपाधिस्तु खजन्य- विभागम्रागभावावच्छिनं कर्मं पूत्वेसंयागानवच्छिन- विभागे वा पु्व॑संयोगनाशावच्छिनन उन्तरसंयोगप्राग- भावा वा उनत्तरसंयोागावच्छिनं कम्म वा, न चेात्तर-
भवाः
सिद्ध To
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टू रान्तिकादि ीदेतुरेका नित्या दिगुच्यते ॥ ४५॥ उपाधिभेद्ादेकापि प्राच्यादिव्यपदेशभाक् | संया गानन्तर चणवव्यदहारो न स्यादिति वाच्यं। कम्मा- न्तरसत्वादिति | मददाप्रलये क्षणादि यवद्ारो यद्यपि तदनायत्या ध्वंसेनापपादनीयः। दिनादिव्यवद्ारस्ु AMAIUAS Tafa ॥
दिशं निरूपयति । दूरान्तिकेति । eee afar aay देशिकं परत्मपरलं वेध्यं | तदुद्धेरसाधारणं वीजं दिगेव । दैशिकपरलापरत्येारसमवायिकारण- सयागाश्रयतया दिक् सिध्यतोति भावः॥ ४१ ॥
नन्वेकैव दिग् यदि तदा प्राचतीप्रतीच्यादिव्यव- दारः कथमुपपद्यतामित्यत Be । उपाधोति | यत्ट- रुषस्य उदयगिरिसन्निदिता यादिक् खा तख प्राची उदयगिरिव्यवदिता च प्रतीची । एवं तत्पुरषीयखमे- रुसन्निदिता दिगदीचौ agafeat लवाचौ। सन्बेषा-
मेव वषाणां मेरुरुत्तरतः खित दति निचमात्॥
रात्मानं निरूपयति । आल्मेद्धियेति। ्रात्मव- जातस्त खुखदुःखादिसमवायिकारणतावच्छेदकतया सिध्यति । ईशरेऽपि सा जातिरस्येव । अदृष्टादिरूप- कारणाभावाच न Gag. argu: | नित्यस्य खरू- पयोग्थस्य फलावश्यन्भाव दूति नियमस्याप्रयोजकलात् ॥ परे Mat षा जातिनास्येव प्रमाणाभावात् | न च
भ(वा.ः
fagte
३२० आत्मद्धियाद्यधिष्ठाता करणं दि VERT ॥ ४९ ॥ शरोरस्य न चेतन्यं शतेषु व्यभिचारतः |
न्न A
दणमद्रव्यवापत्तिञ्जानवच्ेन विभजनादिति acta i दद्धियादीति 1 इद्धियाणणं शरीरस्य च परम्परया सेतन्यसम्पादर् कः । यद्यप्यात्यनि अदं जाने ay सखुखो- त्यादि प्रत्यविषयल्मस्येव तथापि विप्रतिपन्नं प्रति
yaaa wa शरीरादिभिन्नस्त्मतोतिगाचर दति
प्रतिपादयितुं न शक्यत इत्यतः प्रमाणं दश्यति।
करणमिति | कुटारादीनां हिदादिकरणानां at
TAAL फलानुपधानं दृष्टं! एवं चक्रादीनां ज्ञान- करणानां फलापधानमपि कन्तारमन्तरण नापपद्यत दत्यतिरिक्रः कन्त कल्यते ॥ ४६॥
ननु शरीरस्यैव कन्तुवमस्तु त्रत BIE 1 WT खेति ॥ नन् Raa ज्ञानादि कमेव | मुक्तात्मनां वन्त दव ग्टतशरीराणामपि तद्भवे का त्ततिः प्राण- भावेन ज्ञानाभावस्य सिद्धेरिति चेत्! a भरी- रस्य चैतन्ये are विलोकितस्य wat समरणानप- पत्तेः | श्रोराणामवयवेापचयापचयेरत्पादरविनाश- भालिलात् ॥ न च पूत्वशरीरोत्यन्नसंस्कतारेण दिती-
audit संस्कार उपपद्यत इति वाच्यं । अनन्तसं-
खारकल्यने ACA | एवं शरीरस चेतन्ये बालकस्य
3G wine तथालच्वेदिनद्ियाणणमुपघाने कथं सूतिः ॥ ४७॥ मनोऽपि न तथा ज्ञानाद्यनध्यक्तं तद् भवेत्।
सिद्धा ° स्तनपानादौ म्रटत्तिनं स्यात् | दृष्टसाघनतान्ञानस्य तद्धेत लात् | तदानीमिष्टसाधनतास्मारकाभावात् | मन्मते जन्म्रान्तरानश्वतेष्टसाधनलतस्य aA सर- णादेव Wala न च जन्द्रान्तरानुभृतमन्यदपि सरय्ये- तामिति वाच्यं । उद्ाधकाभावात्) च्रच्र वनायत्या जीवनादुष्टमेवादाघकं HVA | इत्यञ्च संसारस्याना- दितया आ्रात्मनोाऽपि अनादिलसिद्ध अनादिभावस्य नाशासम्भवात् नित्यलं सिद्धयतीति ara ॥ नन् चक्रा- दीनां ज्ञानादौ करणववं कर्टवच्चास्तु विरोधे साध- काभावादत AY । तथालमिति। चैतन्यमित्यर्थः | उपघाते नाशे सति च्रथाक्तरादीनामेव । कथमिति | Yat TINT साचात् रतानां चच्तषोाऽभावे स्मरणं न स्यात्। अनुभवितुरभावात् अन्यदूष्टख अन्येन AT- णासम्भवात् । ` च्रनुभवस्मरणयोाः सामानाधिकरण्येन कायकारणभावादिति भावः ॥ ४७॥ ननु चक्तरादीनां चैतन्यं माऽस्तु मनसस नि- त्यस्य चैतन्यं स्यादत are । मने ऽपीति ॥ न तथा, न चेतनं । ज्ञानादीति । मनसेाऽणलत्वात् । WaT च महत्वस्य tga | मनमि ज्ञानसखादि मचे aq
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€ € भ म न, ~\ भाषा० धम्मराधम्माखयाऽध्यक्ता विशषगुणयोगतः ॥ ४८ ॥
सिद्धा ° प्रत्यक्तानुपपत्तेरित्यथः | यथा मनसेाऽणलं तथा व- च्छते ॥ नन्वस्तु वित्तानमेव श्रात्मा तख खतः प्रका- शरूपला च् चेतनत्वं ज्ञानसुखादिकन्त॒ तस्येवाकारवि- wa: । तस्यापि भावलादेव wierd पृव्वपूत्वं विज्ञा-
नात्र विज्ञाने Sagara | सुषुप्तावपि आआालयविन्ञा- नधारा निरावा्व गमदवासनाया वसन दव qs पृव्वैविज्ञानजनितसंस्काराणएमुत्तरोत्रविन्ञाने सङ्ा- न्तवान्नानुपपत्तिः सरणाद्रिति चेत्। न । तस जग- faraa साव्वेज्ञापत्तेः। यत्किञ्चिदिषयले विनिगमना- भावः ॥ सुषुप्तावपि विषयावभासप्रसङ्गः | तदानीं निराकारा चित्सन्ततिरनृवत्तत दति चेत् । न। तख खप्रकाशले प्रमाणाभावात् | अन्यया घटादीनामपि ज्ञानलापत्तिः ॥ न चेष्टापन्तिविन्ञानव्यतिरिक्तवस्तुने ऽभावादिति वाच्यं | घरादेरनग्धयमानस्यापलपितु- AMAT श्राकारविशेष एवायं विन्ञानस्छेति चेत्। किमयमाकारोाऽतिरिच्यते विन्नानात्) afe समायातं विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तेन | नातिरिच्यते चेत् af समूलाल- aa नीलाकारोाऽपि पौताकारः Ural खरूपता fa- ्ञानस्ाविगरेषात् ॥ च्पादरूपे waren afa Waal नीलत्वादीनां विर्द्धूानामेकस्मिन्नऽसमा-
Bo
सिद्धा° aura दतरथा विरोध्येव दुरुपपन्नवात्।॥ न चवास- नासङ्कुमः रुम्मवति । मादपृच्यारपि वासनासद्धमप्रस- ङ्गात्॥नचडउपादानोापादेचभावोानिवामकद्तिवाच्यं। वासनायाः सद्कुमासम्भवात् i उन्तरस्मिनुत्पन्तिरेव स- ga दति चेत्। न तदुत्पाद्काभावात्। उत्तरविज्ञा- नसेवेात्पादरकले तद्ानन्त्यप्रसङ्गः। चणिकविज्ञानेऽति- श्रयविशेषः कल्प्यत दति चेत्। न । मानाभावात्) कल्प- नाज्ोरवाच | एतेन क्षणिकशरीरय्येव चैतन्यमपि प्र- त्युक्तं । गारवादतिग्रये मानाभावाच। वीजाद्ावपि सद- कारिसमवधानादेवापपत्तेः । कुव्वदरुपलाकल्यना च ॥ Ag ate चणएिकविज्ञाने गेरवान्नित्यविज्ञानमेवात्मा- faarstl at | अररे AAAS सद्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं बरह्मेत्या- अरदिश्रुतेरिति चेत्। न तस्य सविषयलासमवस्य दर्भि- तत्वात्। निविवंषयस्य sare मानाभावात्) सविषयल- स्या्न्भवात्\ अते Bata नित्य च्राद्धेति fag i सत्यं ज्ञानमिति ब्रह्मपरं जीवेषु नापयुज्यते ज्ञानाज्ञा- नसुखिलद्ःखिलादिभिर्जीवानां मेदसिद्धा सुतरामी- AMAT! अन्यया वन्धमाचानुपपत्तेः। येऽपोश्रभे- दबेएधको az: साऽपि तदभेदेन तदीयं ufaute- यन् सेति अभेदभावने च यतितव्यमिति acta | श्रत एव सव्व एव aaa समपिताः श्रुयन्ते | ate दशायामज्ञाननिद्टतती अभेदो जायत इत्यपि न।
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fagte भेदस्य नित्यलेन नाशायोगात् । भेदनाशेऽपि व्यक्तिदयं स्थास्यत्येव न च दिवमपि नश्यतीति aren तच fre aa ब्रह्मणि सत्यलाभावेऽपि सत्यसखरूपं तदि तिवद् feararasta इयात्मको ताविति । सुवचत्वान् मिथ्या- त्वाभावेाऽधिकरणात्मकः ॥ तच सत्यत्वमिति चेद् एक - त्वाभावे व्यक्तिद्यात्मको दिवमण्ुच्यतां प्रत्येकमेकले ऽपि एथिवीजलयोानं गन्ध दरतिवदुभयं नेकमित्यस्य सर्व्यजनसिद्धवात् । योऽपि तद्ानौममेदप्रतिपादक श्रागमः साऽपि निदुःखलादिना are प्रतिपाद यति। सम्पद्ाधिक्ये पुरोदितेऽयं राजा sea दूतिवत् । चरत एव निरच्ेनः परमं साम्यमुपेतीति श्रूयते ॥ ईश्वरो न ज्ञानसुखात्मा किन्त ज्ञानाद्याञ्रयः। नित्यं विज्ञान- मानन्दं ब्रह्म दत्यादौ विज्ञानपदेन ज्ञानाञ्रय War: | यः way दृत्यनुरोधात् | च्रानन्द इत्यस्यापि अआन- न्दवदित्यरथैः । अरभश्रादिलान्मलर्थीयाचूमत्ययात् | अ्र- न्यथा पलिङ्गतलापन्तेः । शआ्रानन्दोाऽपि दुःखाभाव उप- चय्यते। भाराद्यपगमे सुखी सं टेत्तेाऽदमितिवद् दुःखा- भावेन सुखिलप्रत्ययात् । भ्रस्त वा तसिन्नानन्दो न त्वसावानन्द्भित्य च मलर्थ चप्रत्ययविरोधात् | आनन्दं agar विद्यान्न बिभेति कद्ा चनेत्यतर भेदस्य सखष्टवा- च्चेति सङ्खपः॥ | एतेन प्रतिः की पुरषः पृष्करपला शवनि-
G
सिद्धा
By
लंपः fay चेतनः 1 ataarqwareigra arel- नाश aTeaaqaat नाशः afeqarrud तस्य । सुद्धिगतचेतन्याभिमानान्यथाऽनुपपत््या तत्कल्यनं । बु- fea vac: प्रथमः परिणामः | सेव मदत्तत्वमन्तः- करणमण्यु्यते | तत्सत्वासच्लाभ्यां पुरुषस्य संसा-
az “~ रापवगा। war एषेद्धियप्रणलिकया ufcwfasir-
नरूपा | घटादिना सम्बन्धः पुरुषे कटलाभिमानो बद्धा रेतन्याभिमानञख्च । भेदायदात् | ममेदं कन्त व्यमिति मदंशः पुरुषोपरागो ag: खच्छतया चेत- नप्रतिबिम्नाद तालिका दपंणस्येव मृखापरागः | दद- मिति बिषयेपराग दद्धियप्रणल्लिकया परिणतिभमे- दस्ताल्िकोा निश्वासाभिदतदपंणस्येव मलिनिमा । ` कर्तव्यमिति व्ापारावेशः। तेना ्चयवती बुद्धिः तत्- परिणामेन ज्ञानेन पुरूषस्या तालिकः सम्बन्धो द् पेण- मलिग्नेव मखस्यापलचिरुच्यते | ज्ञानादिवत् सुखदुः- Gwar रपि बुद्धेरेव कुतिसामा- नाधिकरण्छेन प्रतीतेः । न च afgaaat परिणाभि- ल्ादिति साद्यमतमपास्तं ॥
छत्यद्ष्टमागानामिव चैतन्यस्यापि सामानाधिक- रणधप्रतीतेसतद्धिन्ने मानाभावात्। चेतनोाऽदं करोमीति प्रतीतेबृद्धिपरिणाभिलात्॥ चैतन्यांरे भम दूति चेत् छ- ait किं नेयते | श्रन्यथा बुद्धेनित्यवे मा क्ताभावेाऽनि-
५२
WH प्रवच्याद्यनुमेयोऽयं CAMA सारथिः ।
सिद्धा wa तत्पूत्वंमसंसारापत्तिः ॥ च्रचेतनायाः wat: कार्याद् व॒द्धेर चेतन्यं काय्यकारण्यास्तादाव्यादिति चेत् । न। अभिदधे: । कन्तु्जन्यले मानाभावात् वीतराग- जन्मादशंनादनादिलं | अ्ननादेनौाशासम्भवान्नित्यलं | | तत् fa प्रत्यादिकल्यनेन ॥ न च
wan: क्रियमाणानि गणेःकम्मणि qm: |
weRtaasia कन्तादमिति मन्यते ॥ saa विरोध दति वाच्यं, प्रतेरदृष्टस्य । गणेर- दुटजन्येगेणेः द च्छादिभिः। airs कन्तदमेव । TU ATUATA ॥ wad सति कन्तारमात्मानं केवलन्त् यः । दत्यादि वदता भगवता प्रकरोकुताऽयम्परिष्टादाश्य दरति aya ॥ |
WATERS दात | श्रात्मेत्यनुषच्यते। WHITE ARTHAS SETUTHARAUUT देदान्तरेण भोगानुप- पत्तेः ॥ विशेषगृणयोगत दरति । योग्यविेषगणसम्ब- न्धेनात्मनः wad भवति न AAT । we जाने अद ङरामि दत्यादिप्रतीतेः॥ ४२८ ii
प्रहनत्तीति | अयमात्मा परदेहादो प्रटत्यादिना ऽनुमीयते । ्रदत्तिरन्न चेष्टा ज्ञानेच्छाप्रयन्नादीनां
भकः
४४
प्रदङ्कारस्याथयाऽयं HATA गोचरः ॥ ४८ ॥ ` विभुतद्यादिगुणएवान् afer दिविधा मता |
“अनुभूतिः तिश्च स्यादनुभूनिश्वतुव्विधा ॥ ५०॥
सिद्धा
प्र्यक्तमप्यनुमितिस्तथापभितिशब्दजे ।
ZS अ्भावसख्योक्तप्रायवात् | चेष्टाया यन्नसाध्यवात् | चेष्टया प्रयन्नवानात्माप्यनुमीयत दृति भावः ॥ तच
दृषन्तमाद । रथेति 1 यद्यपि रथयकम्मचेष्टा न भ- वति तथापि तेन कर्णा सारथि्चथाऽनुमीयते तथा
चेष्टात्मकेन कर्म॑णा परात्मापोति भावः ॥ अददा र- स्येति ! अदडःारोऽदमिति प्रत्ययः तस्याख्या विषय sata शरौरादिरिति॥ मन दति) मनोाभिन्नेद्धि- यजन्पप्रत्यत्ताविषया मानसप्रत्यचविषयसेत्यथः | रूपा-
द्यभावेनेद्दरियान्तरायोग्यलात् ॥ ४९ ॥
विभुरिति । विभुलं परममदनत्तं तच्च पुव्वाक्तमपि
स्यषटार्थमुक्तं बुद्यादीति । वुद्धि सुखदुः खेच्छादि चतदं-
भगणः Yara वेदितव्या 1 अत्रैव प्रसङ्गादुद्धेः कति- पयप्रपञ्चं द शयति । बुद्धिस्िति॥। दै विध्य व्युत्पादयति । श्नुग्धतिरिति। अरनुश्तिखतुविधेति। एतामाञ्चत- But करणानि प्रत्यचानुमानापमानशब्दाः WATTT- नोति aaratfa वेदितव्यानि wwe tl
प्रत्यक्तमिति । दद्धियजन्ये ज्ञानं प्रत्य । यद्यपि
६५ भाषा० प्राणजादिप्रमेदेन प्रयतं षड़्धं मतं ॥ ५९॥
सिद्धा ° मनोरूपेद्ियजन्यं सर्व्वमेव ज्ञानं तथापि दद्धियलेन रूपेण chart यच न्नाने कारणवतं तत्मत्यत्त- fafa faafad । Sata न way इद्ियाथं सनिकघत्यन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसाया- त्मकं प्रत्यचमिति खत तथेवाक्तलात् | Wa वा ज्ञाना- करणएकं Bla प्रत्यत । ददं WaT ईश्वर प्रत्यच्तसाधारणं दत्यनुमित व्या्षिन्नानस्य उपमित सादृश्यन्नानख WITT पद्न्नानस्य स्मरणेऽनुभवस्य च Cary तच तत्रातिव्याश्चिः॥ परामश्जन्यं ज्ञानमनुमितिः। यथपि परामग्रप्रत्यचादिकं परामशंजन्यं तथापि मरामभ्जन्यं देतविषयकं यज््नानं तदेवानितिः। न च काद् चित्क- देठुविषयकान॒मितावव्धा्तिरिति वाच्यं । तादृशन्नान- टत्यनुभवत्व्याप्यजातिमच्चस्य विवचितलात् । यवा व्या्धिन्ञानकरणएकं ज्ञानमनृभितिः | एवं सादृ श्यज्ञान- करणएकं ज्ञानमुपमितिः।पदज्ञानकरणएकं ज्ञानं शाब्द बोधः | वस्तुता यत्कि्िद्नुमितिवक्तिमादाय तद्म facia सति यत्किचचित्प्रत्यच्तवयक्तिमादाय तद त्तिजातिमल्लं नुमितिलं । एवं यत्किचित्प्रत्य्तादि- मादाय तद्यक्तिदटत्तिले सति यक्किचचिदनुमितिव्यक्नि- मादाय तद् ठत्तिजातिमक्वै प्रत्यचलादिकं वाच्यमिति
४६ भाषा प्राणस्य गाचरो गन्धो गन्धल्ादिरपि सुतः | तथा रसे रसन्ञायासतथा शब्दाऽपि च अतेः ॥ ५२९॥ उद्भूतरूपं नयनस्य गोचरो द्रव्याणि Fale HTS विभागसंयेगपरापरत्वसलेचद्र वत्व परिमाणयु त ।॥५३॥ क्रियां जातिं योग्धत््तिं समवायच् तादशं |
सिद्धा ° घ्राणएजादीति | BTUs रासनं चाषं स्पाशेनं Bs मानसमिति षद्धिघं wad a चेश्वर प्रत्य्तस्याविभज- ना्यूनलं | wea निरूपणोयलात् उक्तद्ध ता- नुसारात् UAW Ue त्राणएस्येति । गाचर इति WT दत्यथंः। गन्धला- दिरिति ।्रादिपद्ात् खुरभिलासुरभिवपरिग्रहः | mare प्रत्यचलात्तदु त्िजातिरपि wear । गन्धाश्रय- . ग्रदणे तु घ्राणस्य न सामथ्यमिति बेध्यं॥ तथा रष ` इति। रसल्वादिसदित इत्यथः, गन्धा Tay उद्भूतो बोध्यः । तथा शब्दत्वादि सदितः ॥ ५२ ॥ उद्भूतरूपमिति | यीभ्रो प्नादावनृद्तरूपमिति न agi Was | तदन्त उद्भूतरूपवन्ति ॥ ५२ ॥ योग्येति | एयक्तादिकमपि येोग्दत्तितया are । तादृशं येाग्यट़त्तिमित्ययंः ॥ चक्तयाग्यलमेव कथं त~ दाद । VTA | श्रालेकसंयोग उद्धूतरूपञ्च Wes qa प्रति कारणं । तन्न xaerad प्रति तयोः
४७
भाषा Dells WY संयोगादालेकोद्रतरूपयोः ॥ YY उद्भूतसशवट् दरव्यं गोचरः साऽपि Was: |
सिद्धा० समवायसम्बन्धेन कारणएलं । द्रव्थसमवेतमप्रत्यक्तं प्रति सखा्रयसमवायसम्बन्धेन द्रव्यसमवेतसमवेतस्य SANZ: Wad खाञ्जयसमवेतसमवायसम्बन्भेनेति।॥ ५४॥ उद्भू तस्य श्वद् TS गेचरस्वचो गाचरः। साऽपि उद्धतस्पश1ऽपि Diarfeafea ॥ रूपान्यदिति t रूप- भिन्नं रूपलादिभिन्नञ्च waar यद् योग्ये तत् लगि- द्विवस्यापि are तया च ए्यक्तादि स्यादयो ये चच्- ग्राह्या गणा उक्ता एवं क्रिया एवं जातये योग्यद- तयश्च ते aa ग्राद्या इति। warty लभिद्धियजन्ये ऽपि रूपं द्रव्यप्रत्यचे कारणं | तथा च वद्िरिद्धियजन्य- द्र व्यप्रत्यक्ते रूपं कारणमिति । नवीनास्तु वदि द्र ayaa रूपं न कारणं प्रमाणाभावात् fara चाचुषम्रत्यचे रूपं Maas UMA अ्नन्वयव्यतिरेकात् i afe- रिद्धियजन्यद्र वयप्रत्यत्तमाचे किं कारणएमिति चेत् । न। किञ्चिदात्मात्तिशनब्दभिन्नविशेषगणएवच्वं वा प्रयोजक मस्तु 1 रूपस्य कारणत्वे लाघवमिति चेत्।न। वायेोस्ल- गिद्धि येणा ग्रदणए प्रसङ्गात् ॥ दष्टा प्तिरिति चेत् । स्पशं एव लाघवात् कारणमस्तु । प्रभाया श्रप्रत्यच्तते विष्टापत्ति- रित्येव किंन स्यात्| तस्नात् प्रभां पश्यामीतिवद् वायुं
भाषाः
सिद्धा०
धट
खपान्यच्चन्तषा योग्यं रूपमचापि कारणं ॥ ५५॥ द्रव्याध्यक्ते वच योगा मनसा ज्ञानकारणं।
स्पृशामीति प्रत्ययसय स्वाद् वायोरपि wars भवत्येव। वदि टद्र यम्रत्यक्तमाचे तु न QI a aT Wi tad वायुप्रभयोरेकलं गद्यत एव क्रचित् दितादिकमपि कचित् सद्यापरिमाणाद्यग्रदा दोषादित्याः ॥ ५५॥
त्रचा यागे मनसा ज्ञानकारणमिति। aaa: eat गा ज्ञानसामान्ये कारण्मित्ययैः। किं तन्न प्रमाणं सुषु- faara at त्यक्ता परौततिवन्तेमानेन मनसा ज्ञाना- जननमिति॥ ननु सुषुप्तिकाले कि ज्ञानं भविय्यति त्रन्- WTSI स्मरणएरूपं वा । नाद्यः। च्रनुभवसामग्यभावात्। तथा दि। चातृषादि मत्ये चक्षुरादिना सड मनःसंयोा- गस्य VGA | तदभावादेव न चाचृषादिप्रत्यक्तं ज्ञा- नादेरभावादेव न मानसप्रत्यक्तं ज्ञानाद्यभावेनात्मनोा ऽपि ्रत्यत्तमिति व्याश्धिज्ञानाभावान् ara fafa: arg श्यन्ञानाभावात् नापमितिः | पदनज्ञानाभावात् न शा- ब्दयोाध Cia | ्रनुभवसामग्यभावान् नानुभवः। उद्दाध- काभावाचन WCU मवं सुषुर्तिप्राक्षालेात्पनेच्छादि- व्यक्ते स्तत्सम्बन्धेनात्मनख म्रत्य्प्रसङ्गार् तद्तीद्धि यत मानाभावात् सुषुभ्िप्राक्घाले निव्विकल्पकमेव जायत दव्यचापि प्रमाणाभावात् BY HAAS व्मनःसंयोा-
भवाः
मिद्धा०
४८
HAI Ta दुःखमिच्छा देषा मतिः छतिः॥ ५६॥ ज्ञानं यन्नि्विकल्याख्यं तदतोद्धियमिष्यते। `
गख यदि कारणत्व तदा रासनचानुषादिप्रत्य्तकाले स्पाशेनप्रत्यक्तं स्यात् । विषयवक्मंयेगसख दयन: संया- गस्य च सत्वात् | परस्यरप्रतिबन्धादकमपिवान सखा-
दिति। aa केचित् erage लङ्मनोयोागस्यदेतुते
fag चाच्चषादिसामय्याः खाशनादिप्रतिबन्धकलमन्- भवानुरोधात् कसयत इति । अन्ये तु सुपुष्यनुरोाधात् Wanda ज्ञानदेतुतवं wy चाच्पादिप्रत्यच्- काले लद्यनःसंये गाभावाननस्पा्भ॑नपरव्य्तमिति वदन्ति॥ wired सुखं दुःखमिच्छादेषोा मतिः कतिरिति। मनेजन्यप्र्विषय cae: मतिज्ञानं ata: waa: ।
wa सुखत्रादि कमपि मनायाद्यं । एवमात्मापि मनो-
arg: | किन्तु मनोामाचख गोचर Tata TAM
लाद् Wa नोक्तः ॥ ५६ ॥
ज्ञानं यत्निष्विकल्यास्यं तदतीद्धियमिग्यत दति । चच्ुःसंयोागाद्यनन्तरं घट इत्याकार घटादि विशिष्ठ ज्ञानं न सम्भवति । पूर्वे विशेषणस्य wearer भावात् | विशिष्टबुद्धौ विगषणन्नानस्य कारणएलात् । तया च प्रयमनता घटचट वयेवैभिष्छानवगादि ज्ञानं जायते तदेव निविकल्यकात्मकं त्च न ward | तथा
H
Yo भाषा० AT SEY हेतुरिन्ियं करणं मतं ॥ ५७॥
सिद्धा fe विषयानवगाददिक्नानस प्रत्यच्चंन भवति) चरमं जामामोति प्रत्यचात्। तचरात्मनि भानं प्रकारौभूय भासते! ज्ञाने USAMA ASS BW प्रकारः सएव विशे- षणभित्युच्यते । विशेषणे यद्दिशेषणं तदिभेषणताव- च्छेद कमित्युच्यते | विशेषएतावच्छेदकप्रकारकं ज्ञानं विशिष्टवेशिश्चज्ञानकारणं। निर्व्विकल्यके च घटल्ादिकं न प्रकारः | तेन घरलादिदिशिष्टवटादिवैशिष्छभानं ata न समवति। *जात्यतिरिक्रपद्ाथेन्ञानस्य किञचि- द्मभेमरकारकल्नियमात् ॥ aed षड्डधे देतुरिति । इव्यप्रत्यत्ते aye समवायसम्बन्धेन कारणं। द्रव्यसमवेतानां जातिगृएक- aul yard खाञ्रयसमवायसम्बन्धेन कारणं | दवय - समवेतसमवेतानां गृणत्वकन्मेलरूपतादीनां परत्यक खाश्रयसमवेतसमवायसम्बन्ेन कारणमिति ॥ दद्धि यमिति । चअरचापि षद्धिध इत्यनुषज्यते, दद्धियलन्त् न जातिः। ष्थिवीलादिना साङ्धस्थे्रसङ्गात् । किन्त शब्देतरोद्धूतविशेषगृणानाञ्न यले सति न्ञानकारणएम- मःसंयेागाश्रयलं च्रात्मादिवारणाच सत्यन्तं। उद्ूतविशे- षगृणस्य शब्दस्य श्रते सत्वात् । शब्दे तरति fag wa
* चयरलाद्प्रकारकं षटादिविशििक्तानं न सम्भवति! इति gery ize: पाडठाऽनाकरः।
Yr भाषा० विषयेद्ियसम्बन्धो व्यापारः सोऽपि षद्धिधः।
fagre रूपादेखच्चेषि सत्वात् | उद्भुतेति उद्भूतलं न जातिः प्रक्तलादिना सङ्करात् ॥ न च प्रणुक्तवादि याप्यं नानै- वेज्गुतलमिति वाच्यं उद्भूतरूपवादिना चात्तषादौ जनकतानुपपत्तेः । किन्तु ष्टक्तलारिव्यायमनुञ्जुतलं नाना तद्भावक्रूटञ्चोद्भुतलं | तच्च संयेागाद्ावपि। तथा a WAC RATT: संयोगादिखक्तरादेरस्ता fa- शेषेति । कालादिवारणाय विशेव्यद लं टद्धियावयव- विषयसंयोगखापि प्राचां मते प्रत्यक्तजनकलात्।टृद्ि- यावयववारणाय कालादौ रूपाभावम्रत्यत्ते सन्निकर्ष ` घटकतया कारणीभूत्चचुःमंयोगाद्याश्रयसख काला- देख वारणाय मनःपदं ज्ञानकरणएमित्यपि तदार- णाय कारणमिति) चरसाधघारणं कारणं ATT | असा- WITUA BIT Wyo ie विषयेद्ियसम्बन्धे व्यापारः साऽपि sige cia | व्यापारः सन्निकषंः॥ षद्धिघं सन्निकषंमुदादरणद्यारा दर्भयति) द्र यग्रद दति! द्रव्यप्रत्यच्तमिद्धियसंयेोगजन्यं। दरव्यखमवेतम्रव्य्तं इद्धि यसंयुक्रसमवायजन्यं । एवमये ऽपि॥ बस्तुतस्त द्रवयचाचृषं प्रति WATT: ATTA द्र यसमवेत चाषं प्रति चक्तःसंयुक्तसमवायः। दर् व्यस- मवेतसमवेतचाचुषं प्रति. संयुक्रखमवेतसमवायः। एवम-
५६ भाषा द्रव्ययदसत् संयोगात् संयुक्तसमवायतः ॥ ५८ ॥ `
fagre न्यचापि विशििखेव कार्यकारणभावः । परन्तु परमा- नीले Tad एयिवीपर माणे एथिवीलच्च wrt कथं न Wea | aa परम्परया BRATS मदत्वसम्बन्धस्य च faqaaara । तथा fe area जातिरेकौव घटनीले परमाणनीले च वर्त॑ते। तथा च ` मदत्वसम्बन्धा घटनीलमाद्ाय Ta | रूपसम्बन्धस- भयमाद्ायेव aud | एवं एथिवोवे घटादिकमाद्ाय AMAIA वाध्यः । एवं वायो तदौवखश्दरौ च VATA AGIA स्यात् | तस्मादुद्ूतरूपावच्छिनि- मदत्वावच्छिनचच्ःसंयुक्रसमवायस्य द्र यसमवेतचा चष- WAS तादृ शचच्ःसंय॒क्तसमवेतसमवायस्य द्र व्यसमवेत- समवेतचाक्तषे ATTA वाच्यं TTY परमाणनो- लाद न नीललादियदः । care dare
` मद्त्वावच्छिन्नवाभावात्॥ एवं वाखादौ न सच्चादि- चाक्षं । तच Weary रूपावच्छिनलाभावात् | एवं यत्र घटस्य AMAR SATA HHT ATP TIA वाद्या वच्छेदेन तच घर प्रत्यत्ताभावादालाकसंयागाव- faa चक्तःसंयेगे विशेषणं देयं ॥ -एतं द्रयस्णाभन- Wad ARIAT: कारणं | द्र्व्यसमवेतस्पाशनम्रत्यके त्वक् संयुक्तसमवायः । द्रव्यसमवेतसंमवेतस्पाश्नमपरत्यच्च
भाषा
सिद्धा”
48
द्रव्येषु समवेनानां शब्दस्य समवायतः ॥५८ ॥ तदू त्तीनां समवेतसमवायेन तु TE | त्वक् संयुक्रसमवेतसमवायः कारणं | च्रचापि aeara- च्छितिवं उद्भूतस्शावच्छिन्िवञ्च yaaa Srey nwa गन्धप्रत्यकवे घ्राणएसंयुक्तसमवायः | गन्धसमवेतस्य घ्राण- Was प्राएसंयुक्रसमवेतसमवायः कारणं । एवं Tange रसनासंयुक्तसमवायः | रसस मवेतस्य रासन- WAS रसनासंयुक्रसमवेतसमवायः कारणएं। WATS ग्रो जावच्छिन्नषमवायः। शब्द समवेतश्रावणप्रत्यत्ते ओ- चावदङिश्नसमवेतसमवायः कारणं ।। अच सव्वेच प्रत्यकं ait बाध्यं । वच्छमाणमलैाकिकं wad दन्दरिय- संया गादिक विनापि भवति॥ एवमात्मनः प्रत्यन्ते मनः- संयोगः ।त्रात्मसमवेतमानसप्रत्यत्ते मनःसं युक्रसमवायः। ओआत्मसमवेतसमवेतमानसप्रत्यत्ते मनःसंयुक्तममवेतस- मवायः कारणं । श्रभावप्रत्यक्ते समवायमप्रत्यत्ते च इद्धि यसम्बन्धविषरेषणता रेत्; ॥ `
वेशषिकमते तु न समवायः yaa: | अच यद्यपि विशेषणता नानाविधा aut fz WATT घटामावः संयक्तविशेषणतया Wed । स्यादौ रूपाद्यभावः मंयुक्तसमवेतविगरेषणएतया । GATATST रूपाद्यभाव संयक्तसमवेतसमवेतविशेषणएतया | शब्दाभाव: कवल-
५४
भाषा विशेषणतया तद्र द भावानां TST भवत् ॥ ९०॥ यदि स्यादुपलभ्येतेत्येवं यच प्रसज्यते |
सिद्धा ° ओ्रचावच्छिनिविगेषण्तया । कारो खत्ा्यभावः ओचावच्छिन्नममवेतविशेषणएतया । एवं कल्वावद्िन्ना- भावे खलाभावादिकं विशेषणविणेषणतया | एवं घटा- भावादौ पटाद्यभावः संयुक्रविशेषणविशेषणतया | एवमन्यदप्यद्धं। तयापि विशरेषएतात्रूपेरैकेव सा गण्यते geet षाढा सन्िकषं दृति प्राचां प्रवादा वान्ये तेति ॥ ys ५८ ॥ eeu यदि स्यादुपलभ्येतेति । च्रभावम्रत्यक्े योग्यानु- पलसिः कारणं । तथादि भूतलादौ घटादिज्ञाने जाते घरटाभावादिकं न ज्ञायते तेनाभावेापलम्मे प्रतियेोग्छपलम्भाभावः कारणं । तच्रापि योग्यता्यपे- चिता। साच प्रतियागिसत्वप्रसञ्जनग्रसज्जितप्रतिया- गिकलरूपा। तदर्थश्च प्रतियोगिना are: सल्लप्रसत्या प्रसज्न्जित उपलम्भरूपः प्रतियोागो यस्य स उपलम्भा- भावाऽभावमप्रत्यक्ते देतु: । तथा दि! यच्रालाकसंयोागा- दिकं वत्तते तच यद्य घटः स्वात् afe उपलभ्येत दरत्यापादरयितुं शक्यते, तच घटाभावादिप्रत्यक्तं भवति sat तु नापादयितुं शक्यत दति । तेन चराभा- वादेरन्धकारे चाचृषप्रत्यक्लं न स्यान प्रत्य्तन्तु भवल्येव।
भात्ता०
सिद्धा०
५५.
yard समवायस्य विशेषणतया भवेत् ॥ ९१ ॥ अलोाकिकः सन्निकार्षस्तिविधः परिकीर्तितः|
श्रालाकसंयागं विनापि स्पाशनप्रत्यचस्यापादयितुं शक्यत्वात्। Wales ATA तदभावस्तु न प्रत्यच्तः। तच गरुलादिप्रत्यच्चस्यापादयितुमश्क्यलात् | वाये GUTTA: | पाषाणे सोरभामावः। ws तिक्ताभावः। STS शब्दाभावः। च्रात्मनि सुखाभावः। एवमादय- सत्तदिद्धियैगदयन्ते। तन्तम्मत्यचस्यापादयितुं ण्कय-
लात् । संसगाभावम्रत्यक्ते प्रतियागिने योग्यता श्रन्या-
न्याभावप्रत्यक्ते लधिकरणयेाग्यताऽपे्तिता । aaa स्मादौ पिशाचादिभेदाऽपि चच्षा द्यत एव ॥६९॥ wad सीकिकाल्लीकिकमेदेन दिविचं । तच ले किकप्रत्यक्ते षोढा सनिकषौ विता; | अलाकिक सनिकषानिदानों वदति, ्रलाकिक ofa व्यापारः सननिकषैः | सामान्यलचएेति | सामान्यं wad यस्या इत्यथः | aa लक्षणएपदेन यदि खरूपमव्यते तदा सामान्यखरूपं प्रत्यासत्तिरित्यथा लभ्यते । तद्ेन्दि- यसम्बद्धविगेव्यकन्नाने Wat वेध्यं 1 तथा fy aa दद्धियसंय॒क्ता धुमादिस्तदिशेव्यकं ya cia ज्ञानं जातं | तच ज्ञाने धूमलं प्रकारः | धूमलेन सन्निकषेण धूम tad रूपं सकलधूमविषयकं जानं जायते ।
५९
भाषा सामान्यलक्षणा ज्ञानलक्षणा यगजस्तथा ॥ ९९ ॥ ¦ आसत्तिराश्रयाणन्तु सामान्यन्ञानमिष्यते ।
fagie wa यदि ददधियसम्बद्धमित्येवाच्यते तदा धृली- पटले धूमवभ्नमानन्तरं सकलधूमपिषयकं ज्ञानं न स्यात् । तत्र धूमलेन सद इद्धि यसम्बन्धाभावात्। मन्मते g इद्दियमम्बद्धं धूलोपरलं तदिशेव्यकधूम दति ज्ञानं। तच प्रकारीभूतं धूमलं म्रत्यासतन्तिः ॥ द्द्धियसम्बन्धो afar याद्यः। Tey वदिरिद्धियस्थले।मानसस्थले त॒ ज्ञानप्रकारौभृतसामान्यमाचं प्रत्यासत्तिः । wa: शब्दादिना यत्किञ्चित् पिशचादुपखितै मानसः रुक- लपिशाचादिवेाध उपपद्यते। परन्त् समानानां भावः सामान्यं । तच कचिनित्यं धुमलादि कचिचानित्यं घ- रादि । यत्रैका धटः संयागेन भूतले समवायेन कपाले श्ञातस्तदनन्तरं सव्वेषामेव ageaat भूतलादीनां — कपालादोनां वा ज्ञानं भव्रति। was बोध्यं सामान्यं येन सम्बन्धेन ज्ञायते तेन सम्बन्पेन अधिकरणानां प्र- त्यासन्तिः । किन्त॒ यच तह्टनाशानन्तरं तहटवतः स्मरणं जातं तच सामान्यलचणया wayt तहटवतां भानं नस्यात् | सामान्यख तद्ानीमभावात्। ६२॥ fay दद््ियसम्बद्धुविभेव्यकं घट दति ज्ञानं | तच परदिने इन्द्रियसम्बन्धं विनापि arewara-
ys Wile तदिद्धियजतदग्मनोधसामग्यपेच्छते ॥ ६२ ॥
सिद्धा ° अ्रकारीभूतसामान्यस्य सत्वात् तादृशज्ञानं कुतान जा- ` चते । तस्मात् सामान्यज्ञानं म्रत्यासत्तिनं तु सामान्यमि- त्याह ्रासन्तिरिव्यादि॥ separ प्रत्या सत्तिरित्यर्थः।
तथा च सामान्यलचणेत्य ज लक्षणशब्दस्य विषयाऽयंः
तेन सामान्धविषयकं ज्ञानं म्रत्यासन्तिरित्यथौ लभ्यते ॥
नन् चक्तःसंयागादि कं विनापि. सामान्यज्ञानं यच वन्तेते
तच खकलघटादीरनां चाक्तृषादि प्रत्यकं सादत ATS । तदिद्ियज ofa ॥ ware: यदा वदिरिद्धियेण सा- मान्यलच्षणया ज्ञानं जननीयं तदा यत्किञचिद्धूभ्भिणि तत्सामान्यस्य तदि द्द यजन्यज्ञानसामय्मो श्रपेचिता |
साच सामगो चचतुःसंयोागालाकसंयोगादिकं। तेनान- कारादो चक्षुरादिना ATT WAT न जायते॥ ६३॥
ननु ज्ञानलक्तणा प्रत्यासत्तियदि ज्ञानरूपा सामा- न्यलच्तणापि ज्ञानरूपा ALT तयोभदो नस्यादत BTR विषयी यख तस्येव व्यापारो ज्ञानलकणा इति, षामा- न्यलच्चणा प्रत्यासत्तिदिं तदाश्रयस्य ज्ञानं जनयति | ज्ञानल्तणएम्रत्यासत्तिस्त यदधिषयकं ज्ञानं तस्टेव प्र- त्यासन्तिरिति । अ्रचायमर्थः । wera सन्निकपै विना
भानं न सम्भवति। तथा च सामान्यलकचर्णा विना धूम-
त्वेन सकलधूमानां वद्िलेन सकलवक्धीनाञ्च भानं
i
४८
भाषा० विषयो यस्य तरेव व्यापारो ज्ञानलक्षणा | ` ` योगजो दिविधेः प्रोक्ता युक्तयु्ञानभेदतः॥ ९४ ॥
सिद्धा० कथं भवतु तदथं सामान्यलच्एण खीक्रियेत॥ न च सक-
लवद्धिधूमभानाभावे का चतिरिति वाचं WaT
वद्छिसम्बन्धस्य शदौतलात् । अन्यधुमस्य चान॒पयित-
argat afearat न वेति संश्यानुपपत्तिः। मन्ते तु
सामान्यखच्चण्या . सकलधूमेपखिता कालान्तरीय-
देणन्तरीवधूमे वद्धि्याप्यलसन्देहः सम्भवति ॥ न च
सामान्यलक्तणाखीकारे म्मेयतेन स्कलमप्रमेये ज्ञाते
सार्व्ज्ञापत्तिरिति वाच्यं | प्रमेयलेन सुकलप्रमेये ज्ञा-
तेऽपि विशिख सकलपदार्थानामन्नातलेन ata RTT
वात् ॥ एवं ज्ञानलक्षणया श्रखीकारे सुरभिचन्दन-
मिति ज्ञाने सीरभस्य भानं कथं सात् । यद्यपि सा-
मान्यलचणएयापि सारभभानं सम्भवति तयापि सैर-
भलस भानं ज्ञानलक्तणया | एवं यत्र धूमवेन धूलीप-
रलं ज्ञातं AA धृलौोपर TAA व्यवसाये भानं ज्ञान- ` MIVA ॥ ae 4 |
. येएगजेा दिविध द्रति! योगाभ्यासजनिते धम्मवि-
शेषः श्रुतिपुराणादिभ्रमाणएक Tae: | युक्रयुल्ञानभेदत
` इति 1 युक्तयुज्ञानरूपये गिदैविष्याद्ध्॑स्यापि दैविध्य-
fafa भावः ॥ ६४ ॥
भता०
पल
युक्तस्य AAA भानं PTT THAT | व्यापारस्तु परामशः करणं STATA ॥ ९५॥
` अनुमायां ज्ञायमानं लिङ्गन्तु करणं न दि। `
सिद्धा०
य॒क्रस्य waat भानमिति 1 यागाग्यासवश्नरतमा- नखः समाधिसमासादितविविधसिद्धियुक्रदत्यु चते ।
` ्रयमेव विशिष्टये गवच्वाद् वियुक्त इत्युच्यते सरव्वदेति।
चिन्तासदकारिणं विनेत्ययेः । भानं सव्वैविषया्णां Was | BATT Slat विषयव्यादत्तमानसः। चिन्ता ध्यानं मनसस्तदेकागरीकरणं | तत् सहकारात् स्थूलख- च्डाव्यवडितविप्रङुष्टानथान् प्रत्यचीकरोतीत्यथैः ॥ अनुभितिं ययुत्पादयति ॥ व्यापारस्िति । चअरन्-
मारयां अनुमित anf करणं । परामश वया-
पारः। तथाहि येन पुरुषेण मदानसादेा धूमे ae व्या्ि्टंदीता पञ्चात् ख एव परुषः कचित् पर्वतादौ अविच्छिनिधूमां धूमलेखां पण्डति तदनन्तर धूमे
वद्किव्याय waded atfracd भवति । तसाच
वदङ्छिव्या्यधूमवानयमिति ज्ञानं भवति स एव परा- at द्रत्युच्यते। तदनन्तरं पव्वेताऽयं वल्धिमानिति ज्ञान
जायते । तदेवानुभितिः। wa प्राचीनास्तु array ज्ञायमानं घूमादिकमनुमितिकरणं । तदूषयति ज्ञाय-
मानमिति ॥
भाः
+
अनागतादिलिङ्गेन न स्याद्नुमितिस्तद्। ॥ ६९ ॥
व्याप्तस्य पक्रत्नित्धोः परामशं उच्यते । `
सिद्धा
लिङ्गस्यानुमित्यकरणएले यक्रिमाद ॥ श्रनागता-
दीति । यद्यनुभिते लिङ्गं करणं सात् तदा च्रना-.
गतेन विनष्टेन वा लिङ्गेन अनुमितिनं स्यात् । अन्- मितिकरणस्य faye तदानी मभावात् ॥६५॥ een
व्याप्तस्य पच्चधक्रलधोरिति | व्या्तिविशिष्टस्य yu ae वैशिष्यावगादिज्ञानमनुमितिजनकं । तच्च व्याप्यः
पके दति ज्ञानं। परा व्याप्यवानिति ज्ञानं वा। wate
तिस्तु पचते ara दति न्ञानात् पक्ते साध्यं दत्याका- रिका। परे व्याप्यवानिति ज्ञानात् we: साध्यवानि- त्याकारिका ॥ दिविधादपि परामभ्रात् we: साध्य वानित्येवानुमितिरित्यन्ये | ननु वद्धिवयाष्वधूमवान् gaa दति ज्ञानं विनापि यत्र पव्रतो धूमवानिति vad तता धूमे वद्िव्या्य दूति सरणं भवति |
aa ज्ञानदयादनुभितिद्शेनात् । व्याप्तिविशिष्टवेभि-
श्यावगादििक्ञानं wea न कारणं किन्त व्याप्यताव- च्छेद कप्रकारकपक्धम्मतान्ञानलेन कारणलं- आवश्य कलात् । विथिष्टवैभिश्चन्ञानकस्यने गारवाचेति चेन्न + व्याप्यतावच्छेदका ज्ञानेऽपि वह्धिवया्यवानिति ज्ञाना दनुमिन्युत्पन्तेः | लाघवाच व्यातिप्रकारकपचध््रता-
६९
भाषा व्या्निः साध्यवदन्यसिन्नसम्बन्ध उदातः ॥ ९७ ॥ `
सिद्धा° ज्ञानलेनैव कारणएलं | किञ्च धूमवान् waa दति ज्ञा-
नादनुमित्यापत्तिः । वयाणयतावच्छेदकीग्तधूमलप्रका- रकपक्तधम्मतान्नानस्य GATT ॥ न च तदानीं द्य- माणव्यायतावच्छेदकप्रकारकपक्चधर््ताज्ञानस्य इत् त्वमिति वाच्यं । चेचस्य व्याश्चिग्रदे मैचस्य प्तधम्भ॑ता- ज्ञानादनुभितिः स्यादिति 1 यदि त॒ तत्पुरूषौयग्र- द्य माणएव्या्यतावच्छेद कम्रकारकतत्पुरुषीयपच्चधम्मता- ज्ञानं तत्पुरुषीयानुमिते देठरुच्यते तद् च्रनन्तका- य्कारणभावः ॥ WHA त॒ समवायेन वाभ्भिप्रकारक- Wasa समवायेनानुमितिं जनयतीत्यय ना- नन्तकार्ययकारणभावः। यदि तु वयाश्चिप्रकारकं ज्ञानं पच्धर्म॑ताज्ञानञ्च खतन्लं कारणएमिल्युच्यते तदा का- य्थकारणभावद्वयं वद्िव्याघे धूम ज्रालाकवान् waa दूति ज्ञानादष्यनमितिः खादिति दत्यन्च यच ज्ञान इयं तचापि विशिष्टज्ञानं कल्पनीयं । फलमखगारव- स्यादाषलात ofa i |
व्याप्यो नाम व्याष्याञ्जयः aa का व्यात्तिरित्यत आर )) व्यािरिति। areata | वद्किमान् घूमा- दित्यारो साध्या af: साध्यवान् मदानसादिः।तद्- न्यो जलद्दादिः। तद ठत्तिलं धूमेति लक्तएसमन्वयः
^
Wee अथवा देतुमन्निष्ठविरदाप्रतियेगिना |
सिद्धा ° धूमवान् वङेरित्यादो सोध्यवदन्यसिन्नरयःपिण्डादो afsaaratfaatfa: | wa येन सम्बन्धेन साध्यं तेनेव ` सम्बन्धेन साध्यवान् ATS: | अन्यथा समवायसम्बन्धेन ` वद्किमान् वहे रवयवस्तदन्या aerate: aa धूमस्य विद्यमानलाद्व्या्तिगप्रसङ्गात् | साध्यवदन्यश्च साध्यव- ` त्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकभेदवान् ara: i तेन यत्- किचचिद्न्िमान् महदानसादिः तद्धिने पव्वैतादै धूमख ` सत्वेऽपि न ofa: येन सम्नन्धेन देतु स्तेन सम्बन्धेन साध्य- वदन्यादत्तिलं बध्यं । तेन साध्यवदन्यस्मिन् धूमावयवे धूमस्य समवायसम्बन्धेन सत्वेऽपि न चतिः | साध्यवद् aha साध्यवद् न्यटृत्तिवलावच्छ्न्नाभावः | तेन धूमवान् वन्हेरित्यच साथ्यवदन्यद्धदादिदटन्तिवाभा- वेऽपि नातिव्यार्षिः 1 अच यद्यपि द्रवयं गणकन्मान्य- त्वविशिष्टसच्वादित्यारोा विशिष्टिसन्तायाः सत्ताया क्यात् साध्यवदन्यस्मिन् wage नास्तोति तथापि इदेतुतावच्छद्करूपेणाटृत्तिलं वाच्यं | दतुता- वच्छेदकं तादूशटत्तितानवच्छेदकमिति फलितायैः | नन केवलान्वयिज्ञेयलादो ary साध्यवद्न्याप्रसिद्ध- arzarfa: ॥ ६७ ॥ | | किञ्च सत्तावान् जातेरित्यारो साध्यवदन्यस्मिन्
a
दर भाषा साध्येन हेतोरोकाधिकरण्यं व्या्निरुच्यते ॥ ६८ ॥
सिद्धा० सामान्यादौ ₹रेतुतावच्छेदकसम्बन्ेन समवायेन टत्त- रप्रसिद्धवादव्या्धिश्चात are ॥ aaa देतुमन्निष्ठेति। देतुमति fret टत्तियस्य स तया । विरडाऽभावः | तथा च देलधिकरणटत्तियोाऽभावः तद प्रतियोगिना साध्येन VE Sar: सामानाधिकरण्यं arf: । यद्यपि वङ्किमान् धूमादित्यादौ देलधिकरणपव्वेतादि ठत्य- `
` भावम्रतियोगिलं तत्तदद्यादेरस्तीत्यया्िः ॥ न च समानाधिकरणवद्किघूमयोारेव atfaftia वाच्यं । ` तदकेरप्यभयाभावसत्वादेकसत्चेऽपि दयं नास्तीति प्र- तीतेः । गुणवान् द्रव्यलादित्यादवव्याेञ्च । तथापि
` साध्यतावच्छेदकं प्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकं तदवच्छित्ि- . सामानाधिकरण्यं व्या्तिरिति वाच्यं ननु रूपलवा- पजातिमान् षथिवीवादित्यादो | साभ्यतावच्छेदक- रूपलव्या्यजातयस्तासा श्टक्लादिखरूपाणां नोल घ- ` टादिदत्यभावप्रतियोागितावच्छेदकत्वमस्तीत्यव्याक्षिरि- ति चेन्न । तच परम्परया. रूपवव्याप्यजातिमत्लस्येव
` साध्यतावच्छेद्कलात् । नदि तादृ शधम्भावच्छिनाभावः क्रापि sfuarafe । रूपवव्याप्यजातिमान् नास्तोति agra: | साध्यादिभेदेन व्याप्रेभदात् | ATS शस्यले
| साध्यतावच्छेद्कतावच्छेदकं भरतिचोगितावच्छदकता-
सिद्धा ° नवच्छेद्कमित्येव लच्षणएघरकमित्यपिवदन्ति । एवं दण्ड्यादे साध्ये परम्परासम्बद्धं दण्डलादिकमेव साध्य तावच्छेदकं प्रतियागितानवच्छदकमिति वाच्यं । दव- भिकरणञ्च दतुतावदछेदकविगिष्टाधिकरणं वाच्यं । तेन द्यं गणकम्मान्यवविशिष्टसललादित्याद weet करणगृुणएादिनिष्ठाभावम्रतिवागिलेऽपि दइव्यवस्य ना- व्याक्षिः। देतुतावष्टेद कसम्बन्धेन देतधिकरणं बाध्यं । तेन समवायेन धृमाधिकरणतद वयवनिष्ठाभावप्रतियागि- त्वेऽपि वद्धे नव्याः । श्रभावञ्च प्रतियोभिव्यधिकरणा बाध्यः । तेन कपिसंयोगी एतदत्तलादित्यादो मूलाव- केदेनैव रएतदृ्तटक्तिकपिसंयोागाभावमप्रतियेोगिलेऽपि संयेागस्य aati: न च प्रतिय गिव्यधिकरणलं म्रति- योाग्धनधिकरण त्ति । तदा तथेवाव्या्धिः । प्रतिया- गिनः कपिसंयोगस्यानधिकरणगणादे वत्तते याऽभा- वस्तस्यैव मूलावक्छेदेन सत्वात् | यदि मतियेाग्यधिकर- wafad तदा संयागिस्ादित्यादावतियास्भिः । सत््वाधिकरणे गणादा यः संयोगाभावस्त्य प्रतियोा- ग्यधिकरणद्रव्यदटस्तिलादिति वाच्यं । रे्धिकरणे प्रतियेग्यनधिकरणएदत्तिलविश्िष्टस्य विवितलात् | सखप्रतियोग्यनधिकरणीभूतदेतवधिकरणटत्यभाव दरति निष्कर्षः । प्रतियेग्यनधिकरणं ख प्रतिय गितावच्छ- दकसम्बन्धेन प्रतियागितावच्छरकावहिन्नानधिकरणं
९५ सिद्धा वाध्यं। तेन विशष्टिसन्नावान् जातेरित्यादे जाव्यधिक- रणगणाद विशष्टसत्ताभावम्रतियोगिसमानाधिकर- एलेऽपि न क्तिः । एवं साध्यतावद्छेद् कसम्बन्ेन प्रति- योग्यनधिकरणएवं बोध्यं । तन ज्ञानवान् द्रयलादि- त्यादै द्रवयलाधिकरणघरादेरविषयतासम्बन्धेन ज्ञाना- धिकरणल्वेऽपि न ततिः । इत्यञ्च वदङ्धिमान् धुमादि- त्यादौ धूमाधिकरणे समवायेन वद्धिषिर दसच्ेऽपि न ततिः॥ ननु प्रतिवोगितावकछेद कावर्िन्नस्य यस्य कस्य- fia तत्सामान्यस्य वा च्रनधिकरणएलं । यत् किञ्चित्- ` अरतिधागितावरेदकावक्िननस्य वानधिकरुणत्मुक्तं । आदये कपिसंयोगी एतदुचलादित्याद्ाववया्धिः । कपि- संयोगाभावस्य fe प्रतियोगितावकदकावदधिन्न car- दत्तिरपि कपिसंयागेा भवति तदनधिकरणए्च aa दरति । fade प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणाभावाप्रसिद्धिः। wR पूव्व्॑षणत्तिलवििष्टखभावात्मकम्र- तियागिखमानाधिकरएलात् ॥ न च वल्छिमान् घुमा- दित्यादौ चराभावादः पूव्व्॑तणटत्तिलविशिष्टखभा- वात्मकप्रतियाग्यधिकरणलवं यद्यपि पव्वतादेस्तथापि ` साश्यतावक्ेदकसग्बन्धेन तत्प्रतियेग्यनधिकरणटन्ति- anata कथयमप्रसिद्धिरिति वाच्यं। घराभावेयो ` वह्यभावस्तस्य घटाभावात्मकतया चटाभावख वह्ि- रपि प्रतिधामी तद्धिकरणच्च पव्वेतारौति क्रमेण
K
९९
सिद्धा ° प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणस्याप्रसिद्धलात् । यदि च घटा- भावादौ वद्यभावादिर्भिन्न दद्युच्यते तथापि धूमा- भाववान् वद्यभावादिव्याद्ावच्धार्धिः। तत्र साध्यताव- Seaway: खरूपसम्बन्धः | तेन सम्बन्धेन सव्व॑सेवा- भावस्य च पुवव॑त्तणटत्तिवविशिष्टखभावात्मकम्रतियो- ग्धभिकरणल्वं देलधिकरणएस्येति । दतीये तु कपिसं- योगाभाववान् श्रात्मलादित्यादावव्या्िः। तचात्म- इत्तिकपिसंयागाभावामावः कपिसंयो गस्तस्य च गण- त्वात् तक्मतियोागितावष्ेदकं गुणएखामान्याभावलमपि . तदवद्धित्नानधिकरणत्वं ₹ेत्धिकरणस्यात्मन दूति | ` मैवं यादूशम्रतियोागितावकछेदकावकिम्नानधिकर्णलं देतुमतस्तादृ शप्रतियोागितानवक्तेदकलस्य विवक्ित- त्वात् ॥ नन् काला घटवान् कालपरिमाणाद् दत्य- चाव्या्चिः | म्रतियेगिव्यधिकरणाभावाप्रसिदधेईन- धिकरणस्य महाकालस्य जगद्ाधारतया wayra- भावानां साध्यतावकेदकसम्बन्ेन कालिकविगेषणतया ्रतियोाग्यधिकरणएत्वात् iowa कचित् महाकालभे- दविशिष्टघटाभावस्तच प्रतियेगिव्यधिकरण्मदाका- लस्य घटाधारवच्वेऽपि मदाकालभेदविशिष्टचटाना- ` धारात् | मदाकाले मद्ाकालमेदाभावात्॥ वस्तु- ag प्रतियागितावद्धेद्कसम्बन्धेन मअतियाग्यनधिकर- णोग्रतरेलधिकरणटत्यभावग्रतियोगितासामान्ये यत्-
go |
सिद्धा ° मम्बन्धावदधिन्नलयद्धम्बावङिम्नलेभयाभावसेन सम्ब wa तद्धम्मोावङिन्नस्य तच देतुव्यापकलत्वं बाध्यं व्याप- कसामानाधिकरण्यश्च wth) यत्सम्बन्धः साध्यता- वक्तेद कसम्बन्धः | VEN: साध्यतावकेदकः। तच यदि यद्धग्भावङ्िन्नलाभावमा चमिन्युच्यते तदा समवायेन ar वद्यभावस्तस्य प्रतियोगितावदेद कसम्बन्धः समवा- यस्तेन प्रतियोग्यनधिकरणपव्वेतादि दत्तिः स एव तत्- प्रतियोगितावद्धेदकञ्च वद्ितरमित्यव्याभिः स्यात् । यदि च यत्सम्बन्धावङिन्नलाभावमा मुच्यते तदा तादू- शस्य संयोगेन घटाभावस्य प्रतियेगितायां संयोागस- म्बन्धावदधिन्नलसत्वादव्या्तिः स्यादत उभयमुपात्तं। इत्यञ्च काला घटवान् कालपरिमाणादित्यादौ संया- गसम्बन्धेन या घराभावस्तत्प्रतियागिनोा घटस्यानधि- करणे मद्ाकाले वत्त॑मानः सएव संयागेन घटाभाव- स्तस्य प्रतियोगितायां कालिकसम्बन्धावच्छिश्नवघरला- वच्छिन्नलाभयाभावसच्वान्नाव्यातिः। धूमवान् वङ्धेरि- त्याद्ावतिव्या्तिवारणाय सामान्पपद्मृपात्तं । मनु प्रमेयवदङ्िमान् धूमादित्यादौ भ्रमे यवद्धितावच्छिन्न- aanfeg | गरुधर्स्यानवच्छेदकलादिति चेत्) न। कम्बु्रोवादिमान् नास्तोति प्रतीत्या कष्ुग्रोवादि मल्वा- वच्छिन्नप्रतियोागिताविषयीकरणेन गुर धम््॑स्याष्ययष्ेद -
कत्रसखीकारादिति VHA ues
भाषाः
सिद्धा
ट ` सिषाधयिषया प्रुल्यसिदियच न विद्यते ।
पक्तटृत्तिलमित्यच wad किं acre सिषाध- यिषया yen सिद्धिरित्यादि। सिषाघधयिषाविर्द-
विशिष्टायाः सिद्धेरभावः waar तद्वान् 94 दरत्यर्थः। सिषाधयिषामाचं न पक्ता । विनापि सिषाधयिषां घनगजितेन मेघानुमानात् सिद्धो सत्यामपि सिषाध-
यिषाित्वेऽनृमितिभवत्येव । अतः सिषाधयिषाविरदह-
विशि्टलं सिद्धौ fated) तथा च यच सिद्धिनास्ति
` " तच सिषाघयिषायां सत्यामसत्यामपि पक्षता! यचच सिषाघचयिषाऽस्ि तच सिद्धो सत्यामसत्यामपि पक्तता। aa च सिद्धिरस्ति सिषाधयिषा च नासि aa न
पचता | सिषाधयिषाविर दविशिष्टसिद्धः सत्वात् ॥ ननु ४ $ aa परामशनन्तरं सिद्धिस्ततः सिषाधयिषा तच
, सिषाघयिषाकाले परामश्नाशन्नान्मितिः | यच सिद्धिपरामशंसिषाधयिषाः क्रमेण भवन्ति aa सिषाध- यिषाकाले सिद्धेनोाशात् प्रतिबन्धकाभावादेवानुमितिः।
aa सिषाधयिषासिद्धिपरामशाः सन्ति तच पराम- vata सिषाघधयिक्षिव नास्ति | एवमन्यचापि सिद्धि-
काले परामश्रंकालेन सिषाधयिषा ॥ योग्यविरभूविशेषग्- “`. णानां यैगपद्यनिषेधात् कथं सिषाधयिषाविरदविशि-
टलं सिद्धेविंभेषणमिति चेत् । न । यत्र afearaya-
Re भाषा० स् पक्तस्तच वृत्तित्वज्ञानादनुमितिभवेत् 1 ९८ ॥
सिद्धा ° वान पव्वैता वद्छिमानित्यनमितिः। सुखसाघनमिति | Wad सरणं at) aa: सिषाघयिषा | तच पक्ततासम्प- wa सिषाघधयिषाविरदविशिष्टवविशेषणस्यावश्यकला- दिति । wae ara arewareufaqrufaqrd fafgea यलिङ्गकानुभितिस्ताद्श्सिषाधयिषाविर- ` खविशिष्टसिद्धभा वस्तलिङ्गकान॒भितेा पक्तता । तेन सि- द्धिपरामशंसत्वेऽपि यत्किञिन्न्नानं जायतामितीच्छा- यामपि नानुभितिः। वद्किव्या्यधूमवान् पन्वैतो वद्ि- मानिति प्रत्यत्तसच््े प्रत्यक्तादिभिन्नं वद्धिन्नानं जाय- तामितीच्छायान्त् भवत्येव 1 एवं धूमपराम्स्त् आलोकेन वद्किमन्भिनेमौतीदायामपि नानुमितिः। सिषाधयिषाविर्दकाले argufetgaa नानुमिति- स्तादूशो सिद्धिविभिव्य तत्तदनुमितिप्रतिबन्धिका व क्रव्या | तेन VARA पाषाणमया वद्धिमानिति ज्ञानसच्चेऽप्यनूमितेनं विरोधः परन्तु पक्ततावच्छेदक- मामानाधिकरण्छेन साध्यसिद्धावपि तदवकेदेनानमि- तिद शनात्, पक्ततावच्छदकावकद्नानमितिं aia पच- तावद््दकावकदन सिद्धिरेव प्रतिबन्धिका । पकच्तताव- कद कसामानाधिकररण्येनानुमितिं प्रति ठ सिद्धमा विरोधि) दृदन्त॒ बोध्ये । श्रयं परुषो न वेति संश- यानन्तरं यत्र परुषत्व्या्करादिमानयं दति ज्ञानं
Yo’
भाषा अनेकान्तो विर्दशवाप्यसिद्धः प्रतिपक्सितः | fagre तच्रासत्यामनमिनत्सः यां waa vad भवति न a- नुमितिरतेाऽन्मित्सा विर दविशिष्टसमानविषयकप्रत्यत्त- सामय कामिनीजिन्नाखादिवत् खातच्छेण प्रतिब- सिका 1 एवं परामशानन्तरं विनापि प्रत्यचेच्छां प्तादि प्रत्यक्तान॒त्पत्तः | प्रत्यचेच्छाविरदविशिष्टानु- | मितिसामगो भिन्रविषयकप्रत्यचे प्रतिबस्िका nec प्रसङ्गसङ्गत्या देलाभासान् विभजते। अनेकान्त इत्यादि । तल्लच्तणएन्ते यदिषयवेन ज्ञानस्यानुभितिवि- रोाधिलं ad auf वभिचारादिविषयकल्ेन ज्ञा- नस्यानुमितिविरोधिलात् ते दोषाः 1 यद्धिषयकलञ्च यादृ श्विशिषटविषयकल्वं बाध्यं । तेन वाधभ्चमस्यानुमि- तिविरोधिलेऽपि aa पव्वेता वद्यभाववानिति fafa स्याप्रसिद्धलान्न देत॒दोषाः। न च वद्यभावव्या्पा- षाणएमयलवान् पव्वेत द्रति परामर्शकासे वङ्िव्याप्य- ` धमस्याभाखलं न स्यात् तच वद्युभावव्या्वान् पच्च दरति विगिष्टखाप्रसिद्धलादिति वाच्यं । दृष्टापन्तेः। अन्यथा | वाधम्रमखाष्यनित्यरषलापन्तेः | तस्मात् तच वद्यभा- वव्याप्यपाषाणएमयल्वान् दति परामभकाले वङ्किव्याप्य- धूमस्य नाभासलं भ्रमादनुमितिमप्रतिवन्धमाचरं। LIT ` नदुष्टदति। ray साध्याभाववदर्तिदेलादिकं दोषः “ASUS Rar येन केनापि सम्बन्धेनेति नव्याः) परेतु
OR
भाषाः कालात्ययोापदिष्टञच देत्वाभासास TAA ॥ ७०॥ आद्यः साधारणस्तु स्यात् स्याद साधारणा AT |
सिद्धा ° यददिषयकलेन ज्ञानस्यानुभितिविरोधिलं तदत्वं देला- भासलं सत््रतिपके विरोधिव्याध्यादिकमेव तथा तदं देते जञोनरूपसम्बन्धेन ॥ न चेवं वहिमान् धूमादित्यादौ वाघभरमे पके साध्याभावविषयकल्ेनानुमितिविरोधि- त्वाज्ज्ञानरूपसम्बन्धेन तद्ल्लस्थापि सत्वात् सद्धतारपि वाधितलापत्तिरिति वाच्यं । तच ज्ञानस्य सम्बन्धला- कल्यनात् | wa सत्मतिपक्तित इति व्यवहारेण तत्- कल्पनात्। तच वाधितव्यवद्ाराभावादित्याङ्कः। च्र- नुभितिविरोधिवञ्च आअनुमितितत्कारणान्यतर विरो- ` fas तेन एकदत व्यभिचा रये देलन्तरेणानुभि्यु- त्पत्तेरदभावाद्यनवगादिलाश्च व्यभिचारन्नानस्यान्- भितिविरोधिलाभावेऽपि न afaftfa aga: या- दृशत्तसाध्यदेतेा यावन्त दोाषास्तावदन्यान्यत्वं तच देत्वाभासलं | पञ्चकथनन्त् तत्सम्भवस्लाभिप्रायेण | एवं साघधारण्वाद्यन्यतमलं अ्रनेकान्तिकलं ॥ ७० ॥ ATE: साधारण Talis | साधारणः साध्यवदन्य- afaea: । तेन च व्यात्षिग्रहप्रतिबन्धः क्रियते) श्रसा- धारणः साध्यासमानाधिकरणेा Va: | तेन साध्यसा- मानाधिकरण्यग्रदः प्रतिबध्यते यथा शब्दा नित्यः शब्दलादित्यादौ चासाधारण्यं | शन्दाऽनित्यः weeat-
me भाषा० तथेवानुपसंदारो चिधानेकान्तिको भवेत् ॥ ७१ ॥
सिद्धा° दित्यादौ श्रसाधारणयभ्रमः। we तु सपत्तादटृन्तिर- साधारणः | सपक्तश्च निशित साध्यवान्! cere शब्दा ऽनित्यः शब्दलादित्याद्रौ va यदा साथ्यनिखयस्तद्ा नासाधारण्यं तच देत॒निख्यादिति वदन्ति ॥ अन्- aera च अत्यन्ताभावाग्रतियागिसाध्यकादिः। तेन च व्यतिरेकव्याञ्चिग्रदप्रतिवन्धः क्रियते ॥ विरुद्धस्तु साथ्यव्यापकौग्ताभावग्रतियागी | अयञ्च साध्याभाव- गरहसामगोवेन प्रतिबन्धकः ॥ सत्प्रतिपक्ते तु प्रतिदेत्- साध्याभावसाधकः। रचत देतुरवेति विशेषः। सा- ध्याभावसाधक एव साध्यसाघकल्वेन उपन्यस्त दत्य श- क्रिविशेषापस्थापकलाच विशेषः । सत्मतिपक्तः साध्या- भावव्या्वान् पत्तः | अरण्रदीताप्रामाण्यकसाध्यव्याप्यव- स्वेना पस्थितिकालीनसाध्याभावव्याप्यवच्ेनोापस्थितिवि - षयस्तया Ta । च च. परस्पराभावव्याप्यवन्ता- ज्ञानात् परस्परानुमितिप्रतिबन्धः we wa कचित् यथा घटाभावव्यायवत्ताज्ञाने विद्यमानेऽपि घट चक्तः- dat षति चघटवन्ताज्ञानं जायते। यथा च सत्यपि पौतल्वाभावव्याप्यशङ्कनत्वन्तान्ञाने. पित्तादिदोषे पीतः owe दति धीजायतें wa काटि दयव्याप्यवत्ताद्शने कोारिद्टवप्रत्यत्तरूपः संशये भवति तया सत््रतिपक्तस्यले संश्यरूपानुमितिमेवल्येव यच । चैककोाटिव्याप्यद्रनं
= सिद्धा ° तच्ाधिकवलतया दितीयकोाटिभानप्रतिनन्धान्न सं- श्यः। फलबलेन चाधिकसमवलभावः कस्यत इति घद्न्ति। तनन । तद् भावव्याणवत्तान्ञाने सति तदुपनी- तभानविगेषशाब्दमोधादेरन्दयात्। लाकिकसन्निक- षाजन्यदोषविश्ेषाजन्यन्ञानमातरे तस्य प्रतिबन्धकता, लाघवात्। न ्पनीतभानविभेषे शाब्दबोधे च एयक्- प्रतिबन्धकता ! गार वात्। तथाच प्रतिबन्धकस्वात् क- थमनमितिः। न दि लाकिकसन्निकर्षस्यले प्रत्यत्तभिव सतप्रतिपत्तस्यले संश्यानुमितिः प्रामाणिकी येनान्- मितिभिन्नलेनापि विगरेषणोयं । यच काटिदयव्याप्यव- ATH तज्रोभयचाप्रामाण्यन्ञानात् संशया नान्यया ऽग दीताग्रामाण्यकस्येव विरोधिज्ञानस्य ग्रतिबन्धक- लादिति॥ आञ्रयासिद्याद्यन्यतमलमसिद्धलवं । आ्रआश्रयासिद्धि GG पक्ततावच्छेद्कस्ाभावः | यच च काञ्चनमयः waa वद्किमानिति स्ते तच gaat न काञ्चन- मय द्रति ज्ञाने विद्यमाने काञ्चनमयपव्वेते परा- मशप्रतिवन्धः फलं ॥ | सखरूपासिद्धिसठु we व्यायताभिमतस्याभावः। SF च दा Ra घूमादित्यादौा we व्यप्यला- भिमतस्य देतारभावे ज्ञाते प्ते साध्यव्या्रेतुमन्ता- ज्ञानरूपपराम्रप्रतिबन्धः फलं ॥ |
L
fagte
७४
साध्यासिद्धिरपि वयायलासिद्धिः । सा च. साध्ये
शाथ्यतावच्छेदकाभावः; त्या च काञ्चनमयवद्धिमा-
नित्यादौ साध्ये साथ्यतावच्छंदकाभावे- ज्ञाते साध्य
` तावच्छेदकविषिष्टवाध्वव्याष्यवन्तान्नानरूपपरामभेग्र- ` तिबन्धः फलं 1 | :
एवं Sat देतुतावच्छेद कामावः साधनाप्रसिद्धिः।
अयथा चं काञ्चनमयधुमादित्यादोा हेतु तावच्छंदकवि-
शिष्ट दताज्ञानाभावात् तत्तद्धे तकब्याधिज्ञानाद रभा- वः फलं । एवं वद्धिमान नीलधमादित्यषदर waar
नीलधुमलं देतु तानवच्छेद् कमिति araarfatyfr-
त्यपि वदन्ति ५
वाधस्तु We साध्यामावादिः। एतस्यानुमितिप्र- तिवन्धः we । तद्धम्बिकतदभावनिखंयोा लेकिंकसनि- कषोाजन्यदे षविभ्रेषाजन्यतद्धम्बिकतज्ज्नानमातचे fatr- Wha ag aa संशयसाधारणं पत्त साथ्यसंख्टवन्ञा- नमनमितिकारणं । तदिरोधितया वाधसत्मतिपच्त- यादलाभासवमिति यक्त. । एथिव्यामितरमेद war- दु शानुभित्यनापत्तेः । पूर्व पत्ते साध्यमंषटवन्चाना- भावात् । रप्रसिद्धसाष्यकानमित्यपलापापत्तेः | सा- ष्यसंशयं विनानुमि्ुत्पत्तेख ॥ एवं साध्याभावन्नानं प्रमालन्ञानमपि न प्रतिबन्धकं \ प्रमाणाभावाद् गी- Tavs | Bayar सत्मरतिपक्ताद्ावपि. तद्भावव्याप्यक-
OF भाषा० यः Waa विपत्ते च भवेत VNU | 1
सिद्धा ° ्ताज्ञाने प्रमालपिषयकवेन प्रतिबन्धकतापत्तः। किन्त भ्रमल्न्नानानास्कन्दितिा वाधादिबद्धः प्रतिवन्धकता। तच भ्रमलशङ्धाविघटने प्रामाण्यज्ञानं क्चिदुपयज्यते॥ न च वाधस्थले पत्ते देतुमच्े व्यभिचारः w ₹ेल- भावे खरूपासिद्धिरेव रेष दति वाच्यं । वाधज्ञान-
_ व्यभिचारन्ञानादेभदात्, किञ्च यदा परामभौनन्तरं वाघवद्धिस्तत्र यभिचारन्नानादेरकिञ्चित्करलार् वा- धस्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्धकलं वा च्यं । एवं यत्रो त्यत्तिचण- वच्छिन्ने घाद गमव्याप्यषटयिवो ज्ञानं त area प्रतिबन्धकलं वाच्यं ।॥ नच घटे गन्धवच्वात् कथं वाध दूति वाच्यं । पक्ततावच्छदकदेश्रकालावच्छदनान्भिते- रनभवसिद्धलात् * दति वाधतद्याप्यभिना ये ये इतला- भासास्तद्व्याप्या च्रपि तन्मध्य एवान्तमेवन्ति। अन्यया देलाभासाधिक्यप्रसङ्गार् वाघव्याप्यसव्मतिपक्ता भिन्न एव । खतन्तेच्छेन म॒निना एथगृपादानात् । स्रतिप- aay न प्रतिबन्धक दरति प्रकटितेाऽथः॥ ७९ ॥ यः; सपक्ते fare च भवेत् साधारणस्ठु सद्ति।षप- चविपक्तटत्तिः साधारण त्यथः सपः साध्यवान् । विपक्वः साध्याभावकान् विरुद्धवारणाय सपक्चटत्तिव-
क्द्रति दिनकरोसम्मतः पाठः ॥ सत्प्रतिपच्ततद्यापयभिप्ने या ये दन्वाभाषव्याप्यः स तन्म््य एवान्तमेवति | Kas पूव्वेपादेऽषरोतः ॥
७६ भाषा यस्तभयस्मादट् व्याव्त्तः स चासाधरणा मतः ॥ ७९॥ तथ॑वानुपसंदारो कवलान्वयिपक्तकः। यः साध्यवति safer स विरद उद्ाहतः ॥७३॥
सिद्धा सक्तं । वस्त॒ता विपत्तटत्तिलमेव वाच्यं | विरुद्धस्य साधा- रणेऽपि दूषकतावीजसख भिन्नतया तस्य पाथक्यात् ॥ यसछभयस्माद् BSA: स चासाधारणा Aa That सपक्तविपच्षव्याटत्त Tas: सपक्तः साध्यवत्तया निखि- तः। fara: साथ्य्न्यतया निखितः। षब्दो नित्यः णब्द- लादित्यादौ यद् श्ब्देऽनित्य लसन्दे दस्तदा BITE वि- quay yaaa तट्ाटत्तञ्च शब्द वमिति तदा तद्साधारणं। यदा तु शब्दे नित्यलनिखयस्तदा नासा- धरणः | TTA प्राचां मतेन। नवीनमतं पूर्वमुक्तं ॥७२॥ कंवलान्वयिपत्तक इति). कंवलानवयिधम्मावच्छिनि- प्तक tay । सव्वमभिधेयं प्रमेयतादि त्यादौ सबब स्येव vata सामानाधिकरणग्रदस्लान्तराभावा- कानुमितिः। Cer न सम्यक्। पर्चैकदेशे घटवदचा- रग्रदेऽपि क्षतेरभावात् | WY वा सदचाराग्रदस्ताव- तापि ्रन्ञानरूपासिद्भिरेव न तु देवाभासत्वं तस्य तयापि केवलान्वयिसाध्यकल्वै त्वमिद्यक्तं ॥ यः are वतोति । एवकारेण साथ्यवच्वावच्छेदेन देलभावे बोा- पितः । तथा च साध्यव्यापकीभृताभावप्रतियागिनं ACY | ७२॥
भाषाः
सिद्धा
७9७
Samara स्यात् खरूपासिदिरप्यथ | व्याप्यतवासिद्विरपरा स्वाद सिष्धिरतस्तिधा ॥ ७४॥ पक्तासिदियच पत्ता भवेन्मणिमयो गिरिः।
इद् द्रवयं धूमवत््वाद् चासिद्धिरथापरा ॥ ७५॥ व्याणत्वारिद्िरपरा नोलधूमादिके भवेत् | विरद्रयोाः परामश Sat सत्प्रतिपत्तिता ॥ OE ॥ QUA यच VATA वाध STTSA | उत्यन्निकालीनघटे गन्धादि यच साध्यते ॥ ७७॥
=afafe विभजते । श्रा्रयासिद्धिरित्यादि esi पक्तासिद्धिरिति | आश्रयादिद्धिरित्यथः। नील- ` धूमादिक दरति, नीलधृमलं गुरुतया न इतुतावच्छे- दकं । समानाधिकरणएव्या्यतावकच्छदकधम्भान्तराध-
टितस्यैव व्याप्तावच्छेद्कलात् | धूमग्रागभावलसङ्ग-
हाय समानाधिकरणेति॥ oy ul
| विर्द्धयारिति। कपिसंयेागतद्भावयाप्यवत्वपरा- मेऽपि न anfaufaaaaa wa faagarfcfa 1 तथा च सखसाध्यविरुद्धसाध्याभावव्याप्यवन्तापरामभे- कालोनसाध्यव्याषयवत्तापरामर्शविषय TAM i ७६ ॥
aan दति । wa: पत्ततावच्छद्कविशि्ट Tae । तेन घटे गन्धसत््ेऽपि न कतिः । एवं मूलाव- च्छिन्ने टकः कपिसंयेगीत्यचापि Fra pool
भवाः
Oa
TAMU प्रथमतः पश्यता गवयादिकं |
सादश्यधोगवादीनां या ख्यात् सा करणं मतं ॥७८॥
वाक्याथस्यातिदे शस्य समृतिव्यापार उच्यते | गवयादिपदानान्त॒ शक्तिधोरुपमाफलं ॥ ७९ ॥
URRY करणं दारं तच पदाथंघोः
सिद्धा
उपमितिं यत्पाद यति । यामीणस्येति । यचावश्य- केन कंनचिद् WMG wa TEI गवयपद्- वाच्य दति पश्चाच ग्रामीणेन क्चिदरण्ये गवयो Tz: तच गोासाद्श्यन्ञानं यत् तद् उपभितिकरणं oc I
तदनन्तरं गेासदूशो गवयपदवाच्य दत्यतिरशवा- कयायस्मरणं जायते तदेव व्यापारः) तदनन्तरं तच गवयो गवयपदवाच्य दति ज्ञानं जायते तदुपमितिः। न त्वयं गवयपदवाच्य दृत्युपमितिः। गवयान्तर शक्ति- TRTUTARTHTA ।॥ ७९ ॥
शाब्द्बाधप्रकार दशंयति। पर्ज्ञानन्तिति।नतु ज्ञायमानं पदं करणं । पदाभावेऽपि मीनिकश्चाकादौ ्ान्दबेधात् | पदाथधीरिति । पद् जन्यपदाथैसमरषं व्यापारः, अन्यया पदज्नानवतः प्रत्यक्षादिना पदाथाप- `
स्थितावपि शाब्दवोाधापत्तेः। तत्रापि * sar wad मेध्ये, अन्यथा घटादिपदात् समवायसम्बन्धेन श्राका-
जयोक
* पदतन्यापद्थपस्थितावपोति दिनकरव्याखा॥ ,.
भाषा० META: फलं तच शक्तिधोः सदकारिणी ॥ ८०॥ fagre ward जायते, श्ाकाशस्यापि शाब्दवाधापत्तेः। aia: शक्तिलत्षणएान्यतरः सम्बन्धः । waa शक्तिन्ञानस्याप- यागः । qed शक्तिग्रहाभावे पद् ज्ञानेऽपि तत्सम्बन्धेन स्मरणानुपपत्तेः | पदज्ञानस्य सम्नन्धिज्ञानविधयाऽये- WITHA शक्ति पदेन सद पदार्थस्य सम्बन्धः। सा चा- सखाच्छन्दादयमथौ बोद्धव्य द्तीञखरेच्छारूपा। आधु निके नान्नि शक्तिरस्त्येव । एकाद णेऽनि पिता नाम Gags दूतीश्वरेच्छायाः सत्वात् । च्राधुनिकं तु सद्धेते न शक्तिरिति सम्प्रदायः ॥ नवयास्तु ईरेच्छन शक्तिः किन्लिच्छैव । तेन आ्राधुनिकसद्धतेऽपि शक्तिरस्तीति वदन्ति शक्तिग्रदख व्याकरणादितः) तथा fei शक्तियदं व्याकरणापमानकोाषाप्तवाकङ्ावदारतश्। वाक्यस्य ओेषादिटतेवदन्ति सान्निष्यतःसिद्धपदस्य sew धातुप्ररुतिप्रत्ययादीनां श्क्तिग्रदा याकणएणंद्वति। कचित् त सति वाधके त्यज्यतेऽपि | यथा वेयाकरणै- राख्यातस्य कन्तेरि शक्तिरुच्यते, Ya: पचतीत्यादौ कन्तुखे चस्याभेदान्वयः । ततर भगोरवान्न जन्यते किन्त छते शक्तिग्रह लाघवात्) Bfagqarer प्रकारीभूय भासखते॥ न च कत्तुरनभिधानाच् चेचादिपदानन्तर aaa सादिति वाच्यं। कटंसद्यानभिधानखय तच aaa | सद्याभिधानयोगस् : कम्मलाष्यनवर्द्धः
Go
सिद्धा ° प्रथमान्तपदापस्थाप्यः कर्डलादोत्यस्य विशेषणलतात्य- य्य विषयलमथः | तेन चेच दव गच्छतीत्यादौ न चेते agra: | aa कम्मादो न विशेषणत्वतात्पय्थं तद्ा- रणाय प्रथमान्तेति | चदा धावथातिरिक्ताविगरेष- एलं प्रयथमदलार्थः। तेन चैच द्व गच्छतीत्यच चेचा- देवीरणं | साकं पचतीत्यादौ स्ताकादेवीरणाय च दितीयदलं। aa दितीयान्तापस्थाप्यत्वादारणं | एवं व्यापारोऽपि न aftr. गोरवात् ॥ रथे गच्छतीत्यादौ खव्यापारे श्राग्रयवे वा लचणा ॥ जानातीत्यादौा त॒ wwe Tage प्रतिय गिवे निरूढ लक्षण ॥ उपमानाद्यया शक्निग्रदस्तथाक्तं ॥ । एवं केषादपि afm: । सति बाधके कचित् त्यज्यते यथया नीलादिपद्ानां नीलद्ूपादरौ नीला- दिषिश्टि च शक्रिः are व्युत्पादिता तथापि लाघ- वान् नीलादौ शक्तिः नीलादि विशिष्टे लचणेति। एवमाप्तवाक्यादपि। चथा कोकिलः पिकपदवाच्य द्त्यादिशब्दात् पिकादिशक्तियदः॥ | एवं यवदारादपि। यथा प्रयोजकदद्धेन घट मानसे- OA । AHA HATA घट श्रानीतः। तद्वधाय UAB बाला घरानयनरूपं कायं घटमानयेतिशब्द- प्रयोज्यमवधारयति | ततश्च घटमपसारय गामानय दत्यादो श्रावापेद्रापान्यां घटादिपदानां काय्याजित-
८
सिद्धा घटादौ शक्तिं ceria द्रव्यञ्च भूतले नौला घट Tat त दिश्ब्दान्न weedy: | घटादिपदानां areirfaa- |
घटादिवोधे सामथ्यैवधारण्णत्। कार्यतां भ्रति च लिङादीनां सामथ्यात् तदभावान्न शब्दबेाघदृत्यपि कंचित्। तन प्रयमतः काय्यैज्ितघरादौ शत्यवधार- णोऽपि लाघवेन पञ्चात् तस्य परित्यागेोचित्यात्। अत एव चेच एत्रसते जातः कन्या ते wet जाता इत्यादा मखप्रसादमुखमालिन्याभ्यां खुखदुःखेऽनुमाय तत्- कारणत्वेन परिगेषाच्छाब्दबाधं fatty तद्धेतुतया तं शव्दमवधारयति । तथा च व्यभिचारात् काय्यौचिते न शक्तिः) a aaa a पश्चेत्यादिश्ब्दान्तरमध्यादायं। मानाभावात् | चेच पुचस्ते जाते aware तद- भाएवाच । दत्थच्च लाघवादन्ितघरेऽपि शक्तिं त्यक्ता घटपदस्य azarae शक्तिमवधारयति॥ .
एवं वाक्यशेषादपि शक्तेयरदरः | यथा यवमंयञ्चरू्- वतीत्यच waza दीघंप्कविशिष्टे राणां प्रयोगः Het च म्तेच्छानां। तच दि यथाऽन्या च्राषधयेो ar- यन्ते aaa मोदमाना दवेात्तिष्टन्ति॥
वसन्ते सर्व्वसस्यानां जायते Gamay
मादमानाश्च तिष्ठन्ति यवा; कछिशिशालिनः ॥ दति वाक्यरेषाद् Says शक्तिनिं्णीयते। कद्र तु afaaata प्रयोगः । नानाशक्तिकल्पने, भारवात् ।
M
sas
सिद्धा दरिपदादोा तु विनिगमकाभावान्नानाशक्रिकल्यनं ॥ एवं विवरणादपि शक्त्रदः | विवरणन्त॒ तत्समानाय- पदान्तरेण तदथकथनं | यथा घटोऽस्तीत्यस्य कल- शाऽस्तीत्यनेन विवरणाद् घटपदस्य कलशे शक्तिग्रदः। एवं पचतीत्यस्य पाकं करोतीत्यनेन विवरणदाख्या- तस्य Tans कल्यते ॥ एवं प्रसिद्धपदसान्निष्यादपि शक्रिग्रदः। यथा दू सदकारतरो मधुरं पिको रोतीत्यादौ faqs श्कतिग्रद दति ॥ तच जातावेव शक्तिनं तु व्यक्ती व्यभिचारादान- ware | afa विना च जातिभानस्यासमभवाद्ाक्तेरपि भानमिति केचित् । तन्न । शक्तिं विना वक्रिभानानु- पपत्तेः । न च व्यक्ता लक्तणा । श्नु पपन्तिप्रतिसन्धानं विनापि व्यक्तिबेधात् । न च व्यक्तिशक्रावानन्यं। सक- लव्यक्तावेकस्या एव WH: खीकारात्। न चाननुगमः। गेलादेरेवानुगमकलात् 1 किञ्च an शक्येति शक्ति- ग्रहा यदि तदा व्यक्ती शक्तिः। यदि तु गावं णक्य- fafa शक्रिगरदस्दा गालप्रकारकपदाथस्मरणं शाब्द नेधखनस्यात्। समानप्रकारलेन शक्तिज्ञानस्य पदा- UAT शाब्दबोधं प्रति च देतुलात् ॥ किञ्च ara यदि शक्रस्तदा गेलत्वं शक्यतावच्छेरकं are | गा- वन्त॒ गवेतरासमवेतले सति सकलगा खमवेतलं । तथा च
=~
सिद्धा ° tramtat शक्यतावच्छंद केऽनप्रवेशात् तवेव नरव) त- समात् तत्तव्नात्यारृतिविभिष्टतन्तद्राक्तिबे धानुपपत्या कर्यमाना शक्रिजेत्यारुतिविशिष्टव्यक् fared fan शक्तं uw कविद्ोगिकं कचिद्रढं कवचिदयागरूटं कतियोगिकरूटं। यचावयवायं एव बध्यते तद्यागगिकं। यथया पाचकादिपद्।। यचावयवशक्तिनेरपक्ेण समृदायशक्रिमाच्रेए बुध्यते तद्रढं। यथा गेएपदघटादिपर, यच तु अ्रवयवशक्तिषिषये समुदायश्क्रिरथसि त- Graed । यया पड्जादिपदं i तया fe पद्कजपदम- वयवश्षत्ना पद्धजनिकर्टरूपमथं बाधयति । समदाय- शत्या च पदमलेन रूपण oy बेशधयति ॥ न च केवला- वयवशत्या Has wart: स्यादिति वाच्यं i रूडिज्ञानस्य छेवलयेगिका्ज्नानप्रतिवन्धकल्वादिति wees: a वस्तुतस्तु समुद्ायग्र्वोपस्ि तपदरोऽवयवायपङ्गज- निकतुरन्वये भवति ¦ सान्निध्यात् ॥ यच equa वाधः प्रतिसन्धौयते तत्र लकच्ण्या कुमदादेवधः, यचतुकमुदवेन रूपेणबोधेन तात्पयय॑ज्ञानं पद्मलख च वाधस्तचावयवशक्तिमःतरेण निव्वद THATS: ॥ यत्र त् स्यलपद्मादाववयवा्थवधस्तच समदाय- शत्या च पद्मलेन रूपेण बाधः | यदि तु सखखपङ्जं ` बिजातीयमेव तदा लचणेव ॥ ..
ATATo
८४
` लक्तणा शक्यसम्बन्धसतात्यथयनुपपत्तितः। __ fagre ।
यचावयवा्यरूव्यययोः; सखातवच्येण वेधसो गिक- “acl यथेद्धिदादिपदं | तच fe ऊद्धभेदनकन्ता तरुग््ादिरपि बुध्यते यागविशेषाऽपीति॥ ८° ॥
लच्णा शक्यसम्बन्ध इत्यादि। गङ्गायां are Tater गङ्गापदस्य शक्यां प्रवादरूपे घोषस्वान्वयःनुपपत्ति- स्तान्पय्नुपपन्तिव्वा यच प्रतिसन्धीयते तच Way तीरस्य बाधः सा च.शक्यसम्बन्धः। तथा दि प्रवा- दरूपशक्याथमम्बन्धस्य तीरे एही तवात् तीरस्य स्मरणं!
, ततः शाब्दबोधः! परन्तु यद्यन्वयप्नुपपत्निरुचण-
वीजं स्यात्तदा यष्टीः प्रवेशयेत्य च WIT न स्यात्, यष्टिषु प्रवेणान्वयस्यानुपपत्तेरभावात् | तेन यष्टिप्रवेशे भाजनतान्ग्थानपपत्या यष्टिधरे लक्षणा । एवं काके- म्ये दधि रच्छत्ममित्यादेए काकपदस्य दध्युपघातके लक्षणा | waar दधिरक्तायास्तात्पस्धविषयतात् ॥ एवं afaar यान्तीव्यारौ इवचिपददधेकसाथ्वाद्िलेन लक्षणा | दयमेवाजदत्साया लच्णेत्य्यते | एकसाथ वादिलेन रूपेण इचितदन्ययोबाधात् ।। यदि चानु- पपत्तिलंच्षणावीजं स्यात् तदा काचिद्धङ्गापदस तीरे कचिद्वोषपदस् Hier wadfa नियमा नखात्,
. ददन्त् बोध्यं शक्यायसम्बन्धो यदि array रूपेण
ग्रदहीतस्तद्ा तोरवेन तोरबेाधः। यदि तु W"RTAIT-
८ ay
सिद्धा° लेन रूपेण गरदीतस्तदा Aad रूपेण सरणं | श्रत एवं
लच्यता वच्छेदकं न WANT | तत्मकारक्बोाधस्य तच लक्षणां विनाष्युपपत्तेः । परन्त् एवंक्रमेण शक्यतावच्छ- द केऽपि शक्तिनं स्यात् | तत्मकारकणशनब्दा्स्मरणं प्रति तत्पद् स्य सामथ्यमित्येस्य सुवचलादिति विभावनीयं ॥
यच तु शक्यार्थस्य खाश्चयपद्वाच्यत्रूपा लक्षणा सालक्तितलक्षणेत्यव्यते। यथा दिरेफादिपदे रेफदय- सम्बन्धा Watas ज्ञायते BAITS च सम्बन्धा भ्रमरे ज्ञायते। तच लकितलच्णएा । किन्त लात्तणिकं पदं नानभावकं | लाच्चणिकाथसखख शाब्दबेषे.तु पदा- न्तरं कारणं | शक्रिलच्षणान्यतरसम्बसेनेतरपदा्था- न्वितखश्क्या्थंशानब्दबाधं अरति पदानां सामथ्ावधा- रणादिति प्राञ्चः ॥ नवोनास्त॒ तदष्यनुभावकमेव । पदाशपस्धितिस्ठ दारं । अन्यया तुखयुत्वा शक्तस्यापि पद्स्याननभावकल्वापत्तेरित्याङ्ः । *वाक्ये तु शक्तेर- भावाच्छक्यसम्बन्धरूपा लचणाऽपि नासि । यच गभी- रायां नद्यां घोष waa तच नदीपदस्य नदीतीर लक्षणा | गभोरापदार्यस् नद्या सदहाभेदेनान्यः । कचिदे करे णन्वयस् सीरृतलात् । यदि तत्रैकदेशान्व-
येऽपि न सखीक्रियते तदा नदीपद्ख गभोरनदोतीर
लच्तणा गभीरापदं तात्पय्याग्रादकं |
* नवोन मते्ेखनं विद्धत्सस्मतत aise aya मप्यत्रादतं |
द, eas न
र 14 1 1414
सिद्धा°
Tt
` apareraad 1 aa fe बिचगपदादैा ata देशन्वयः खोक्रियते तदा गोपदस्य गाखाभिनि लसणा । गवि fearizraa: | यदि वेकदेशान्वया न स्वोक्रियते तदा गेापद स्य विचगाखामिनि want feared तात्प्थैयादकं ॥
एवमारूढवानरो त्त TAA वानरपदे वानरा- सोदणकर्मणि लक्षणा । श्रारूटपद च्च तात्पगरादकं । एवमन्यचापि ॥ |
तत्पुरुषे तु पूव्वंपदे लक्षणा | तथाहि राजपुरुषा- faut राजपदार्थैन परुषादिपदा्थ॑स्य साच्तान्ान- यः। निपातातिरिक्रनामाथयोभंदेनान्यनेधस्याय्य्-
त्पन्नलात्। अन्यथा राजा पुरुष दृत्यचापि तथानय-
बधः स्यात् पटो न घर इत्यादौ घरपटाभ्यां नजः सानादेवान्तयान् निपातातिरिक्रेति। नौला घट द्रव्यारोा नामाथयारमेदसम्नन्धेनान्वयाद्धेदेनेति॥ नं
च राजपुरुष इत्यादौ लुप्तविभक्तः सरणं करप्यमिति
वाच्यं | श्रतविभक्तेरपि तते बेधोदयात्) तस्माद् राजपदादो राजसम्बन्धिनि TIT | तस्य च पुरुषेण सदाभेदान्वयः ॥ | aa त॒ घवखदिरो च्छिन्धोत्यादौ घवः खदिरश्च विभक्यथंदिलप्रकारेण बुध्यते तच लक्षणा ॥ न च
afea watfa वाद्यं । सादित्यश्एून्ययारपि दन्द-
aN
fagre दर्शनात् ॥ न च wafmerafaaed सादित्यम- सोति वाच्यं | करियामेरे धवखदिरौ हिगीत्यादि- दशेनात्। सादित्यस्याननभवाच | तस्मात् साहित्या- दिकं are: | चरत एव राजपुरोादिती सायुज्यकानै यजेयातामित्यच लचणाभावार् इन्द श्रायते | किन्तु वास्तवा HST यच तच दन्दः नच नीलघरयोारभेद् Talat कथमिति वाच्यं । aa नीलपदस्य Twa घरपद्सख चघटलमर्यः | Wie दत्यस्याश्रयाभेद् दत्ययात्॥ He, समादारदन्दे तु यदि समादारोऽयनुभूयत TA- च्यते तद्ाऽहिनङ्लमित्यादौ परपदेऽदिनक्लसमा- हारे लच्णा | THIS तात्पर्यग्राहकं ॥ न च भेरी- Bey वादयेत्यज् कथं समाहारस्यान्वयाऽपेत्ताब्- द्धि विशेषरूपस्य वादनासम्भवादिति वाच्यं। खाख्च- टत्तिवदपसम्बन्धेन तद्न्वयात् | एवं पञ्चपूनोत्या- दावपि॥ परे तु श्रदिनकङुलमित्यादो श्रदिर्नकुलख बध्यते । म्रत्येकमेकल्ान्वयः समादारसञ्ज्ना च । यत्रे aa नपुंसकलं प्राणिद्र्यत्यादि खचेणेाक्तं aaa । अन्य चेकवचनमसाध्विति वदन्ति ॥ कम्मधारयखले तु नोलत्यलमित्यादो अ्रभेदसम्ब- Sa नोलपदायं उत्पलपदा्थ प्रकारः न च तच लचणा | wa एव निषाद् सखखपतिं याजयेदित्यच न
भाषा०. कारणं सन्निधानन्त॒ TAA TTA |
fagte
ट्ट
आसत्तियाग्यताकाडनततातात्यय्यज्ञानमिष्यते ॥ ८१॥
तत्पुरुषः | लक्षणापन्तेः। किन्तु कर्मधारय लचणाभ।-
वात् ।। न च निषादस्य सद्धरजातिविगेषस्य वेदानधि-
काराद् याजनासम्भव दरति वाच्यं। निषादस्य विद्या-
प्रयक्तेस्तत एव कल्यनात् । लाघवेन मृख्यायंस्यान्वये
` तदनपपत््या कल्यनायाः फलमुखगारवतयाऽदोाष-
alfefa ॥ उपकुम्भं श्रद्धपिप्पलीत्यादा परपदे
तत्सम्बन्धिनि लकच्णा पर्व्व॑पद्ाथप्रधानतया चानचय-
बाध दति इत्यञ्च समासेन arf शक्तिः । पदशत्येव fasrerfefa ॥. पितरौ att carer पिहपदे जनकदम्बत्योः शखग्ररपदे स्तीजनकदम्बत्योलंक्तणण | एवमन्यचापि | धरा दृत्यारो न WUT | yaa रूपेण नानाघरस्ितिसम्भवात् ॥ ` श्रासत्तियेग्यतेत्यादि । अ्रासत्तिज्ञानं याग्यता-
ज्ञानं WANN तात्पय्य॑न्नानञ्च शाब्दबोधे कारणं
तचासन्तिपदाय॑माद | afaurafaafa । यत्प-
दाथेख यत्पद्ार्थनान्वयेाऽपेखितस्तयारव्यवधानेनोप-
fafa: कारणं । तेन. faftamafgary देवद त्ेने-
, त्यादौ न. शन्दवबाधः। नीला चयाः दवं पर Tart
८्<
सिद्धा° दावासत्तिभर माच्छाब्दवोधः* | श्रासन्तिभरमाच्छान्द-
भ्रमाभावेऽपि न चति; ॥ ननु यत्र Sal कुण्डली MUA देवदत्त TYR तचेात्तरपदस्मरणेन ू््वपद- ACTS AWWA! श्रवयवधाने तु उन्तरपदस्मरणा- सम्भव दति चेत्। न । म्रत्येकपद् संस्कारे श्चरमं -ताव- दिषयकस्मरणस्यायवधानेनात्पत्तेः | नानासन्निकर्षैर- कप्रत्यचस्येव नानासंसकाररेकसख्मर णात्पत्तेरपि सम- ala | तावत्पदसंसकारसदितिचरमवषन्नानस्याडाधक- ` त्वात्। कथमन्यथा नानावसेकपद्स्ररणं | परन्त् ता- वत्पदाथोानां सरणादेकदैव खले कपोातन्यायात् ताव-
त्पदाथानां कियाकम्मंभावेनानचयबोाधरूपः शाब्दमाया
भवतीति केचित् ॥ अपर तु।
यद्यद्ाकाङ्कितिं योग्ये सनिधानं प्रपद्यते।
तेन तेनाच्ितः are: पदेरेवावगम्यते ॥ ` तया च खण्डवाक्यार्थबेाधानन्तरं तयैव weet मद्ावाक्यायनोाध TAIUTH! | एतेन तावद्रणीाभि- ay: पदस्फारोऽपि fate: तन्तदषंसंसकारसद्दि- तचरमवसीपल्मेन तद्चज्ञकेनैवोपत्तेरिति ॥ इदन्तु बध्यं । यच द्वारमिल्युक्तं तच पिधेदीति ice ज्ञानादेव बेधः। नतु पिधानादिरूपाथन्नानात् | पद् जन्यपद्ाथापस्थितेस्तच्छाब्दबधे रेतुलात् | किञ्च
* नोल इूत्यादिकपाठा दिनकरोसम्मततया विद्रह्धिः समादतः। N
do
भाषा० पदार्थ तच तदन्ता योग्यता परिकीर्तिता ॥ ८९॥ यत्यद्न विना यस्याननुभावकता भवेत् | सिद्धा ° क्रियाकर्मपदानां तेन तेनैव सदह साकाङ्खलं | तेन करि- यापदं विना कथं शब्दबाधः Wray) तथा पष्पेभ्य- ` दत्यादोा स्पदयतोतिपर्ाध्याद्ारं पिना चतुथ्यंनपपन्ते पदाध्यादार आवश्यकः ।। योग्यतां निव्वेक्रि पदाथं इत्यादिना, एकपदार्थ ऽपरपदार्थसम्नन्धा याग्यतेत्यथेः । तज्जानाभावाच वद्किना सिच्चतीत्यादै न शाब्दबोधः नन्वेतसखा योा- WATaT ज्ञानं णाब्दवेाधात् राक् waa न सम्भवति वाक्या थैस्यापूव्वैलादिति चेत्। न । तत्तत्यदार्थस्मरणे सति कचित् संशयरूपस्य कवचिन्निश्चयरूपस्यापि योाग्य- ताया ज्ञानस्य सम्भवान् il ; नव्यास्तु याग्घताया ज्ञानं न शाब्दज्ञाने ATT | afea सिद्चतीत्यादो सेके बद्िकरणत्वाभावरूपाऽ- योाग्यतानिश्चयेन प्रतिबन्धान् न शब्दबाधः। तदभा- वनिखयस्य लो किकसन्निकषाजन्यद्षविगेषाजन्यज्ञान- ara प्रतिबन्धकलात् शाब्दबोधं प्रति प्रतिबन्धकलं सिद्धं । योाग्यताज्ञानपिलम्बाच शाब्द बेाधविलम्बाऽसिद्ध दति वदर्न्ति। ce क श्राकाङ्घनं निर्वक्ति । यत्पदेनेत्यादि। येन पदेन : विना यत्पदस्यान्वयाननुभावकलं तेन सद तसखाका-
५१९
भाषा आकाडन्ा, वक्तुरिच्छा तु aT परिकीर्तितं ITI सिद्धा” Bt sae क्रियापदं विना कारकपदं नान्वयवोाधं जनयतीति तेन तखयाकाङ्खा | वस्तुतस्तु क्रियाकारक- पदानां सननिधानमासत्या चरितार्थे | परन्त् घट कर्म ताबोधं प्रति चरपरात्तरदितोयाकाङ्काज्ञानं कारणं। तेन चटः कर्मम॑वमानयनं कतिरित्यादो न शब्द्मोाधः। अयमेति पता. Wa: परुषाऽपसाग्ताभित्यादौ तु परुषेण सद TAIT तात्पय्यय्रहाभावान् न तेन सदान्वयः॥ . | | तात्पर्य निव्वैनि | वक्तरिेति । यदि तात्पर्यज्ञानं कारणंनस्ात् तद् सैन्धवमानयेत्यारौ कचिदश्वख कचिल्लवणएस्य बोधा न स्ात्।। न च तात्पय्यया दकम्रक- रणदौोनामेव weedy कारण्वमस्विति वाच्यं | तेषामननुगमात् | तात्पयंज्ञानजनकलेन तेषामनु गमे तु तात्पय्यैज्ञानमेव लाघवात् कारणमस्तु) इत्यञ्च वेद स्थलेऽपि तात्पय्थंन्नानार्थमीश्वरः कल्प्यते ॥ न च तचाध्यापकतात्पय्थेन्नानं कारणमिति वाच्यं । समा- द्ावध्यापकाभावात् ॥ न च प्रलय एव नास्तोति कुतः समादिरिति वाच्यं । प्रलयस्यागमप्रतिपाद्यलात्। इत्यञ्च शुकवाक्येऽपि ईश्वरीयतात्प्यन्नानं कारणं | विसम्बादि शुकवाक्ये तु fasfagta तात्पयय॑स्य ज्ञानं कारणं . ्रन्येतु नानायादौ कबिदेव तात्पर्यज्ञानं
५९
fagte कारणं | तथाच waar fata तात्पयज्ञानं शाब्द- ara वेदे तु अ्रनादिमीमांसापरिशधिततर्ेरथीव- धारणमित्याङः ॥ पूव्यमनुभवस्मर णभेद् दुद वि्यमुक्तं | तचानुभव- प्रकारा दर्शिताः सुगमतया acd a दश्तिं। तच दि wire: कारणं ॥ अच केचिद् ्रनुभव- लेन न कारणत्वं किन्तु ज्ञानलेन । अन्यया स्मरणौ- नन्तरं ACG A स्यात् | समानम्रकारकस्मरणेन युव संस्कारस्य विनष्टलात् । मन्मते तु तेनैव सरणेन सं- GILT ACAI सरणान्तर जन्यत दत्याडस्तन्न। यच समृदालम्बनात्तरं घटपटादीनां क्रमेण स्मरणमजनिष्ट सकलविषयकस्मरणन्तु AA तच फलस्य संस्कारना- श्कत्वाभावात् कालस्य रोगस्य चरमफलस्य वा सं- स्कारनाशकतं AS तथाचन कमिकस्मरणानुप- पत्तिः। न च एनः पनः सरणाद् दठतरसंसारानप- पत्तिः | इरिल्युद्ोधकसमवधानस द्ाच्छपद्ार्थलात् ॥ न च विनिगमनाविरद्ादेव ज्ञानत्रेनापि जनकलं स्या- दिति वाच्यं । विगेषधर्भणाव्यभिचाराज् ज्ञाने सामा- न्यधश्ंणान्यथासिद्धलात्। कथमन्यथा दण्डस्य भरमि- दारा TUAA रूपेण न ACIS न चान्तरालिकस्म- रणानां संस्कारनाशकलसंशयाद् व्यभिचारसंश्यद्रति वाच्यं | श्ननन्तसंसकवारतनाश्कल्पनापत्या चरमस्मरण-
< भाषा० AAAI सखादौनां करणं मन उच्यते | अयेगपद्याज् ज्ञानानां तस्याणतवमिदष्यते ॥ ८४ ॥
सिद्धा ° स्यैव संस्कार नाशकल्वकल्यनेन व्यभिचारसंशयाभावात् ॥ स्र ॥ दृदानीं क्रमपाप्रं मनो निरूपयति | सात्तात्कार दूति । एतेन मनसि प्रमाणं द शितं तथादि सुखसाक्ता- त्कारः सकरएक् जन्यसात्तात्कारलाचाचुषवद् दत्य नमानेन करणस्य मनसः सिद्धेः ॥ न चेवं दुःखादिसा- च्ात्काराणामपि करणान्तराणि सरिति वाच्यं। ला- घवादेकस्यैव ताद्शसकलसाक्तात्कारकरणतया सिद्धेः, एवं दुःखादौनामसमवायिकारणसंयागाञ्यतया म- नःसिद्धिबद्धवया॥ मनसेोऽणले प्रमाणएमादइ । शरयागपद्यादिति | ज्ञानानां चाचृषराखनादीनां यैगपद्यमेककालोात्प- तिना स्तीत्यनुभवसिद्धं । aa नानेद्धियाणां सत्यपि विषयसन्निकपे यत्सम्बन्धादेकंद्धियेण ज्ञानमृत्पद्यते तदसम्बन्धादपि त्गादिभिः परज्ञानं नोत्पद्यते | तन्मरनाविभुवे चासन्निधानं न सम्भवतीति न fay मनः ॥ न च तद्ानीमदृषटविश्षेदधविलम्बादेव तज्ज्ञानविलम्ब दति वाच्यं। तथा सति चक्तरादीना- मपि कल्पनाऽनापन्तेः ॥ न च दी्धेश्ष्कलौभक्णादौा
९४
भाषा अथ द्रव्यािता ज्ञेया निगुण निच्िया गुणः |
सिद्धा० नानावघानभाजाञ्च कथमेकदा नानेद्द्ियज्ञानमिति वाच्यं | मनसाऽतिलाघवात् वरया नानेद्धियसम्बन्धात् नानाज्ञानात्पत्तेः | उत्पलशतपत्रमेदादिवत्। याग- पद्यप्रत्ययस्य ठु AAA ॥ न च मनसः सद्धा चवि- काशश्रालिलादुभयेपपत्तिरस्िति वाच्यं । नानावय- वतन्नाशादिकल्पने Ward | लाघवात् निरवयवस्यैव मनसः कल्यनादिति सङ्खेषः॥ द्रति सिद्धा न्तमुक्तावल्यां दइवयपदा्थव्यास्या समाप्ता ॥ ८४॥ #॥ द्रव्यं निरूप्य गुणं निरूपयति । श्रथेत्यादिना। गण- त्जाता fa मानमिति चेत्) इदं । द्रव्यकम्मंभिनसा- मान्यवति या कारणता सा किञिद्धम्भावच्छिन्ना। नि- रवच्छिननिकारणएताया असम्भवात्। न fe रूपलादिकं सन्ता वा तचावच्छेदिका) न्यूनातिरिक्तदेण्डत्तिलात्। त्रतञ्चतुर्विंशत्यनुगतं वाच्यं तदेव गणलमिति सिद्धं ॥ द्रव्यता cia यद्यपि दइव्याितलं न wad कम्मा- द्ावतिव्याभरेस्तथापि द्रवयवव्यापकतावच्छेदकसन्तान्य- जातिमच्लं acu भवति fe awd दर् यलव्यापकता- वच्छेदकं तदन्ता च गणानामिति कमोलं Kat वा नद्रव्यलव्यापकतावच्छेदकं। WATTS द्रव्यकम्मणिर- भावात् । द्रव्यललं सामान्यलादिकंन जातिरितितद्
भाषा०
Cy.
रूपं रसः स्पर्शगन्धो परत्वमपरत्वकं ॥ ८५ I
द्रो गुरतं BEY वेगे मृत्तेगुणा अमो |
WHT भावना च शब्द वुद्याद् योऽपि च ॥८६॥ एतेऽमूर्तगुणाः सव्वं विद्भिः परिकीत्तिताः। ` सह्ादिश्च विभागान्त उभयेषां गुणा मतः॥ ८७ ॥ dawg विभागश्च सह्या दित्वादि कास्तथा । `
` दिप्रथक्तादयस्तददेतेऽनेकाश्चिता गुणः ॥ ८८॥
सिद्धा
अतः शेषा गुणः सव्वं मता एकेकट्रत्तयः।
दासः ॥ निगणा ofa यद्यपि fred कश्मौदएवपि तथापि सामान्यवनच्चे aaa च सति निर्गुएलं Frey जात्यादीनां न सामान्यवच्वं कर्मणा न कम्मान्यलं द्र व्यस्य न निगणएलमिति aa atfaenfa: । निक्कियेति
सखरूपकथनं न तु लक्षणं । गगनाद् वतिवयापरेः Woy
aaa tf वेगेन श्थितिखापकोऽयुपलक्-
` णीयः। श्रमूत्तेषु न वन्तन्त दूत्यथैः। लक्तणन्तु ताव-
द्न्यान्यलं। एवमग्रेऽपि ॥ ce ॥ उभयेषामिति । मूत्तामूत्तेगणा इत्यथः ॥ ८७ ॥ अनेकाञ्चिता दूति संयोगदिलादौनि feasts चित्चतुष्टारिकं चिचतुरादरिदत्तोतिवेध्यं॥८८॥ अतः शेषा दति) रूपरसगन्धस्यर्भेकलपरि मारोक- एयक्तपर लापरत्ववुद्धि Gaz: खेच्छादेषप्रयत्रगुरुलद्र -
‘a
we बुद्धादिषरकं खशान्ताः Ve सांसिद्धिको ae I अ्रृष्टभावना शब्दा अमो वैशेषिका गुणएः। स्ादिरपरत्वान्तो द्रवः सांसिडिकस्तया ee I गुरुत्ववेग सामान्यगुणा एते प्रकीत्तिताः | सद्खादिरपरतवान्ते वत्वं सेद एव च ॥ ८१॥ ` एते तु AAEM चथ सशन्तशब्दकाः। aT SHARAN गुस्त्वादष्टभावनाः॥ ९२ ॥ अतोन्दिया विभूनान्तु ये स्युवशेषिका गुणाः । अकारणगुणात्यन्ना एते तु परिकीक्तिताः ॥ ९ ३॥ अपाकजासतु खशोन्ता TAG तथाविधं । लेदवेगगुस्तेकप्थक्रपरिमाएकं ॥ ८४ ॥
सिद्धा ° वलन्लेदसंस्कारादृ शब्दा TAG Tat Tae Noe वैशेषिका दति) विशेषा एव वैशेषिकाः खाय ठक् विशेषगणा इत्यर्थः ॥ सद्ादिरिति । सह्यापरि माण- ष्यक्तसंयोागविभागपरत्रापरलानीत्ययैः) € ove दीदधियेति। waar लचाऽपि ग्रदणयोग्यलात् ॥
वा द्येति । रूपादीनां चचरादिग्राह्यलात् ॥ ९२ ॥ विभूनामिति । वुद्धि खखदुः खेच्छादेषप्रयन्रधग्मी- धर्मभावना शब्दा इत्यथः ।। श्रकारणेति | कार णगण- पव्वका रूपादयो वच्छन्ते। वृद्यादयस्तु न ATTAT: | ARIAS, कारणाभावात् | पाकजरूपादीनां कार-
© ७
भाषा स्थितिखापक इत्येते सयुः ACUTE: | संयोगश्च विभागश्च वेगधैते तु HAST UL ५१५॥ खशन्तपरिमाणेकप्थक्र्लेदशब्दके। भवेद् समवायित्वमथ वेशेषिके गुणे ॥ LEN आत्मनः स्यान्निमित्तत्वमृष्णएस्यशगुरूत्वयाः। वेगेऽपि च द्रवते च संयोगादिद्य तथा * ॥ L911 Ra कारणत्वं स्यादथ प्रादश्कि भवेत्।
सिद्धा° एगणपुव्वकला भावाद् च्पाकज THA | ९३।९४॥।
९४ II |
स्णान्तेति। स्पशाऽचानष्णो YT: | एकष्यक्लीत्य च तल्म्रत्ययस्य प्रत्येकमन्वयाद् एकलं BRA ग्राद्यं। waren चेकषएटयत्न विवक्ितं ॥
भवेद समवायिलमिति | घटादिरूपरसगन्धस्पशाः कपालादिरूपरसगन्धस्येभ्या भवन्ति। एवं कपा- लादिपरिमाणादीनां चटादिपरिमाणद्यसमवायि- कारणत्वं ।॥ एवं शब्दस्यापि दितीवश्ब्दं nfs ce i
निमित्तलमिति । बद्यादीनां इच्छादिनिमित्त- त्वादिति भावः € ॥
fata arcuafafa | श्रसमृवायिकारणएतवं निमि- तकारणलन्च | तथा दि sua suatarea-
* प्ररापरल्वद्विलादिद्धिश्यक्लादिकं पुनः॥ दूत्यमाकरोापयं Is ॥ 0
तट
भाषा० वेशेषिके विभुगणः संयोगादि दयं तथा ॥ ९ ट ॥ THATS] भवेद्रूपं द्रव्यादेस्पलम्भकं |
भिद्धा° वायी पाकजे निमित्तं गरलं गरुलपतनयोारसमवायि प्रतिघाते निमित्तं 1 वेगा वेगस्पन्दनयारसमवायो अभिघाते निमित्तं | दववं द्रवलस्पन्दनयोारसम- वायि age निमित्तं । भेरीदण्डयेागः शब्दे निमित्तं | मेय्याकाशसंयागेा ऽसमवायी वंशदलदयविभागः शब्दे निमित्तं । व॑शदलाकाशविभागेऽसमवायीति।* प्रादे गशिकाऽव्याप्यदटृत्तिः ॥ < र ॥ चक्तरिति । रूपल्रजातिः म्रत्यचसिद्धा | रूपश्न- न्दालेखिनी प्रतीतिनास्तोति चेत् । मास्तु रूपशब्दप्र- येागस्तथापि नीलपीतादिस्वनृगतजातिविशेषोऽन् भव- सिद्ध wa. रूपशब्दाप्रयोागेऽपि नीला ad: पीता au इति वषशब्दा स्ेखिनी प्रतीतिरस्येव । एवं नोल- लादिकमपि प्रत्यचसिद्धं।। न Saat एव नोलरूपा- दि वक्रय दइत्येकव्यक्तिटृत्तिवान् नीललादिनं जाति- रिति वाच्यं । नीला नष्ट ta उत्पन्न इत्यादि- म्रतीतेर्नोलादेरत्याद विनाशशालितया ATATATA । HVA CANAAN जगद नीलमापदयेत। न च नी-
# न fafa परलारौनां नासमवार्कि(रणएत्वं न नि{मत्तकारणलस्- त्यथः । tog न्नानातिरिक्तभावं भ्रति बोध्यं द्धिल.दिपरेन च विशेषा WE । तेन परमाणद्धिलादद्यणुकादिपरिमाणएदेत॒लेऽपि न चतिः। दूत्ययमनादतः GS
८८
भाषा० FIG: VEAL स्यात् प्णक्तादिकमनेकधा ॥ << ॥
सिद्धा° लरक्रादिसमवाययोारेव विनाशओेात्पादविषयकाऽसे wera दूति वायं ) प्रतीत्या समवायानुल्ञेखात् ॥ न च स एवायं नोल दूति प्रत्ययाल्लाचवाचचैक्यमिति वाव्यं। ` भ्रत्ययस्य तज्जातीयविषयकल्रात् । सैवेयं गज्ज॑रीति- वल्ञाघवं प्रत्यचवाधितं | अन्यया घटादोनामप्येक्य- प्रसङ्गात् | उत्पाद विनाशश्ब्दबुद्धेः समवायावलम्बन- ल्वापन्तेरिति। एतेन रसादिकं व्याख्यातं ॥ चचा यमिति | चक्त्या द्यविशेषगणए इत्यथः । एवमयेऽपि | द्रव्यादररिति। उपलम्भक उपलयिकारणं॥ दरदमेव विदृणेति। wa दति! द्रव्यगृणएकमा- सामान्यानां चाक्तषप्रत्यच्तं प्रति उद्भूतरूपं कारणं ॥ श्टक्तादि कमनेकधेति । ace प्रक्तनीलपो तर क्तकब्व्- रादिभेदादनेकम्रकारकं भवति ॥ ननु कव्वृरं कथ- मतिरिक्ररूपं भवति । cet नीलपौताद्ारभेऽवयवी न तावन्नीरूपः | चअप्रत्यकतप्रसङ्गात् | नापि वयाप्टत्ति- नोलादिकमत्पद्यते । पीतावच्छदेनापि नीलेपलसि- प्रसङ्गात् | नाणव्यापयटृत्तिनोलादि कमत्पद्यते । व्याप्य- इत्तिजातौयगणानामव्ायदत्तिलवे विरोधात्। तस्मात् नानाजातीयरूपैरवयविनि विजातीयं चिचमारभ्यते। अरत एवेकं चिचभित्यनुभवेाऽपि। नानारूपकल्यने तु गारवात् । दत्यच्च नोलादीनां पीताद्यारमे afa-
१० ©
भाषा० जलादिपरमाणे तन्नित्यमन्यत् सदेतुकं | THE CHAT A मधुरादिरंनेकधा ॥ १००॥
fagre बन्धकलकल्पनाद् श्रवयविनि न पौतादुत्यत्तिः। एतेन aut व्याख्यातः। रसादिकमपि नाव्यायदत्तिः किन्तु नानाजातीयरसवदवयवेरारस्भेऽवयविनि रसाभावेऽपि न क्षतिः। तच रसनया ्रवयवरस एव waa रसनेद्धियादीनां द्रवग्रदसामथ्याभावात्। अवयविना नीर सत्वेऽपि चतेरभावात् ।॥ नव्यास्तु तच्राव्याप्यद्ट- त्येव नानारूपं | Tare: पीतादिमप्रतिबन्धकल्कल्यने गेरवात् | श्रत एव । सादित ag वेन मुखे पुच्छे च पाण्डरः । aa खुरविषाणएभ्यां स नीला दष waa i इत्यादि शस्तमप्युपपद्यते | न च व्याप्याव्या्यदत्तिजा- तीययेार्दयाविरोघः। मानाभावात्। न च लाघवा- देकं रूपं । अरनृभवविरोधात् । ्रन्यया घटादोरपि लाचवादैक्यं स्यादिति एतेन सखशादिकं व्यास्यात- fafa वदन्ति॥ ce ul | जलादीति । जलपरमारा तेजःपरमाण च रूपं नित्यं एथिवीपरमाणरूपन्त् न नित्यं । पाकन खपान्त- रोत्पत्तेः । न fe धरस्य पाकानन्तरं तद्वयवेाऽपक् ` उपलभ्यते। न दि रक्तकपालस्य कपालिका नीला-
भाषा०
fagte
१०१
सहकारी रसज्ञाया नित्यतादि च ूव्वेवत् । प्राणादयो HART ध्राणस्येवोपकार कः ॥ १०१ ॥ VITA स दधा परिकोत्तितः।
स्पशस्वगिद्धिययाद्यस्वचः स्यादुपकारकः॥ १०६॥
अनुष्णएितशोतेष्णमेद्ात् स चिविधो मतः। कािन्यादिः क्ितावेव नित्यतादि च TAT १०२॥
वयवा भवति | एवंक्रमेण परमाणावपि पाकसिद्धिः॥
अरन्यज्नलतेजःपरमाणरूपभिन्नरूपं TTR जन्यं I
wa निरूपयति । रसस्विति॥ ९०० ॥
सदकारीति। रासनज्ञाने रसः कारणभित्यथः ॥ पत्वैवदिति | जलपरमाणेा रसे frase: सव्वाऽपि रसाऽनित्य इत्यथः ।॥ गन्धं निरूपयति । प्राणएयाद्य दूति । उपकारको घ्राणजन्यन्ञाने कारणमित्यथः | अन्यो गन्ध; सब्दाऽनित्य एव । ९०९ ॥
स्पशं निरूपयति । स्पशं इति 1 उपकारक
दति स्याशनप्रत्यक्ते am: कारणमित्यथः॥९०२९॥
sunita इति । vfs arary खभाऽन्- BOTTA: । जलस्य भरोत: । तेजस उष्णः ॥ काटिन्ये-
ति। करिनसुक्मारस्पणः एथिव्या एवेत्यथः। कटि-
नल्ादिकन्त॒ न संयोगनिष्ठो जातिविशेषः । चक्तगा- ward: ॥ पुव्वेवदिति । जलतेजेावायुपरमाण-
१०९ भाषा० रएतेषां पाकजतन्तु किते नान्यच कुचचित् |
सिद्धा ° स्पशे नित्यास्तद्धिनस्पशेस्वनित्या इत्यर्थः! ९०२ ॥ एतेषामिति ॥ एतेषां रूपरसगन्धस्यभानां । नान्य- चेति एथिवया fe रूपरसगन्धसखभंपराटन्निः पाव- कसंयागादु पलभ्यते। न दि शतघापि शायमानेज- ` लादौ रूपादिकं परावत्तते ! नीरे सीरभनेोष्णञ्च अरन्वयव्यतिरोकाभ्या मैपाधिकमेवेति निर्णीयते । पव- नषटथिव्योः शीतस्यशदिवत्॥ तच्रापि एथिवीष्वपि मध्य परमाणावेव पाक दति वेशिषिका वदन्ति तेषाम- यमाश्यः। श्रवयविनाऽवष्टखेष्ववयवेषु पाका न सम्भ- वति । परन्तु वद्िसंयोा गेनावयविषु विनष्टेषु way परमाणुषु पाकः। पुनश्च पक्षपरमाणसंया गाद् चणएका- दि क्रमेण पुनम्मेदावयविपय्यन्तमत्पन्तिः | तेजसामति- शयितवेगवग्रात् पू्वव्यूदनाओे इटिति व्यूदान्तरोत्य- fasta ॥ awa इणकादिविनाश्मारभ्य कतिभिः कणेः पनरत्त्या रूपादि मद्धवतीति fragqfgarara प्रक्रिया तच स्थात् ॥ संयोागविभागयेरनपेक्तकारणं am दरति वैशेषिकखचं । खोात्तरदन्तिभावान्तरा- नपेच्लं AQ: | अन्यथा कम्मणाऽपन्तरसंयोागज- नने पूत्वेसंयेगनाशापेक्तणादव्या्िः स्यादिति uaa विभागजविभागानङ्खोकारे नवक्षणा तदङ्गोकारऽपि विभागः किञ्चित्छापेच्ा विभागं जनयेत् निरपेत्तस्य
YR
भाषा० तचापि परमाण स्यात् पाको वेशेषिके AA ॥ १०४॥ सिद्धा ° ad aaa स्यात्* | aa यदि इव्यारम्भकसंये गविना- शविशिष्टं कालमपेच्छ विभागजविभागः स्यात् तदा द्श्चण | अरय द्रवयनाश्वि्शिष्टं कालमवयवं FIR विभागजविभाग स्यात् तदा एकादश्चणा । तथा fe वद्धिसंयागात् परमाणौ Ha | ततः परमाठन्तरोण विभागः।तत च्रारम्भकसंयोागनाशः। तते इणेकनाशः। ततः परमाणो श्यामादिनाशः | तते रक्तायुत्पत्तिः। तते द्रव्यारम्भानुगृणएक्रिया। तते विभागः। ततः पुत्वेसं- SAAT: | तत श्रारम्भकसंयेगः। TAT STURT ATLA: | तते रक्ताुत्पत्तिः।। ननु श्यामादिनाशरचरे रक्तात्प- frat वा परमण द्रवयारम्भानुगणक्रियाऽस्तिति चेत् न ।अभिसंयुक्ते परमण यत् aa तदिनाशमन्त- | रेण गणेत्पत्तिमन्तरोण च तच परमाणो करियान्तरा- भावात्। कश्मैवति कम्पानत्पत्तेः। निगुे Fal RATT म्भानुगणएक्रियानुपपत्तेश्च॥ तथापि परमाणे श्वामादि- निटत्तिसमकालं रक्तायुत्पत्निः स्थादिति चेत्। न। was रूपादिष्वंससय रूपान्तरे इतुत्वात्। दूति नवच्षणण ॥ A SUSU | सा च श्रारमकसंयागविनाश्विशिष्टंकालम- ` aw विभागेन विभागजनने सति ural तथा दि वङ्कि-
* सखतन्त्राः परमाणदः पच्यन्त दूति वेेषिकमतं। दति अनाकराऽय- मतिरिक्तःपाटः॥.
९०४
सिद्धा ° संयेागाद् इणकारम्भके परमाण क्रिया। तते विभागः, तत आ्रआरम्कसंयेगनाशः। तते इणकनाश्विभागज- विभागे | ततः श्ामनाशपृव्वसंया गनाभा | तते रक्ता- त्यत््यत्तर संयो | तते ASAT द नजन्यपरमाणकम्मणि नाशः | ततेऽद्ृष्टवदात्मसंयोागाद् दइव्यारम्भानुगृण- क्रिया) तते विभागः) ततः पूल्वेसंयोगनाशः । तत आर म्मकसंया गः) तते इणएकात्पन्तिः। तते रक्ता दुत्यत्तिः॥ अरथेकाद् शत्षणा | वद्धि मंयेागात् परमाणौ HA | तते विभागः। तते द्रवयारम्मकमंयोगनाश्रः। तता द्यणक- नाशः। तते द्यणएकनाशविशिष्ठं कालमपेच्छ विभागज- विभागः। ततः पू्व॑संयेागनाशः। तत उन्तरसंयोगः। ततः परमाणकश्मनाशः। ततेऽदु्टवदात्मसंयेगाद् द्रव्या रम्मानुगृणक्रिया । ततो विभागः । ततः पूव्वेसंयोग- नाशः | तते द्रवयारम्भकसंयेागः। तते द्मणकं । तते रक्तादि | मध्यमण्रन्द्वद्कस्मादचिसयागानन रूप- नाशरक्तात्पादैा | तावत् कालमेकस्याभ्ेरख्थिरलात्॥ किञ्च यद्युत्ादको नाश्कस्तद्ा नष्टे रूपाद्ावभ्चिनाशे नीरूपञिर परमाणः स्यात्। नाशक्शचेदुत्पाद्कस्तद्ा THT ALAA THAT A स्थात् एवं परमा-
, न्तरे कम्मचिन्तनात् पञ्चमादित्तणेऽपि गणेात्पत्तिः। तथादि एकच परमाण aa तता विभागः। तत आररम्भकम॑योगनाशपरमाण्ठन्तरकम्मणो ततस्त gU-
Te
सिद्धा ०
९०५
~ | ~ | raat : नेयायिकानान्त नये इणएकाद्
कनाशः परमाणखन्तरकम्भंजयओ विभाग TAR: कालः। ततः श्यामादिनाशः विभागाच पव्वंसंयो गना द
aa कालः । तता रक्तात्पत्तिद्रव्यारमकसंया-
Tea: कालः । श्रय इणकोत्पत्तिः । अरय रका
त्पत्तिरिति पञ्चच्षणा ॥ दरवनाशसमकालं पर- माणन्तरे कम्मचिन्तनात् षष्टे गणात्पत्निः । तथा पर माणकम्मेणा परमाण्वन्तर विभागः | तत आर मभक- संयोगनाशः । WY द्वाणकनाशपरमाणन्तरकमणी । अय Waa: परमाण्वन्तरकश्मंजख विभागः। तता रक्तात्पत्तिः परमाण्वन्तरे पुवव॑संयेागनाशश्च । ततः परमाण्वन्तरसंयागः तता इणकेत्पत्तिः अरय रक्रा- त्पत्तिरिति ॥ एवं श्यामनाशत्ते परमाण्वन्तरे कमम चिन्तनात् wast | रक्रात्पत्तिसमकालं परमाण्व- MAT कमोचिन्तनात् अष्टच्णा दरति ॥ ९०४ ॥ नैेयायिकानामिति | नेचायिकानां मते इणकादौ श्रवयविन्यपि पाकेाभवति।तेषामयमाशयः।श्रवयविर्नां सच्छिद्रतादन्धेः खच्छावयत्रैरन्तःप्रविष्टैरवयदेव्ववष्टसे- स्वपि पाके न विर्ष्यते। वेभेषिकमते ऽनन्तावयवतन्ना श- कल्यने गेारवात्। Tay सोऽयं घट दृ्यादिप्रत्यमि- ज्ञाऽपि सङ्गच्छते। aaa a प्रत्यभिज्ञा aaraafaar-
ए
RoR भाषा० गणनव्यवददार तु Va: संख्याऽभिधोयते ॥ ey frag नित्यमेकल्वमनिल्ये निल्यमिष्यते | दित्वादयः TUB चपेक्ताबदविजा मताः ॥ १०६ ॥ ARAMA एते तु परिकीर्तिताः|
सिद्धा ° भाऽपि खोक्रियत दति wat निरूपयितुमाद । गण- नेति। गणनव्यवदाराखाचारणएकारणं FATS yt frafafa ! नित्येषु परमाणादिषु wad नित्यं नित्ये घटादौ एकलमनित्यमित्यथः ॥ दिवादयोा व्यासच्य त्ति "संख्या चपेचाव्रद्धिजन्याः ॥ ९०६ ॥ अ्रनेकति। यद्यपि दिलादिसमवायः waa घरा- दावपि ava तथाघेको द्वावितिप्रत्ययाभावाद् एका न दाविति प्रत्ययसम्भवाच् दिलादीनां पय्योात्तिल- QU: कश्चन सम्बन्धोाऽनेकाश्रयाऽग्युपगम्यते ॥ च्रपे्ताब्- द्धिनाशादिति । प्रयममपक्ताबुद्धि स्तते दिलेत्पत्तिः। तता विशेषणज्ञानं दिललनिविंकल्यकरूपं । ततो दि- लविशि्टप्रत्यत्तं । atarafgart तता feaata दति । यद्यपि ज्ञानान्तरं न चित्तणएमाचसायि योग्य विभुविगेषगणानां खेत्तरवन्तिगुणनाश्चलात् तयापय- पेतताबद्धेखिक्षणस्थायिलं कसप्यते | sar निव्विकल्य- काले अ्रपेच्चावृद्धिनाशाद् भ्रनन्तरं दिलस्यैव नाशःस्यात्
* एकलान वदिग्रपय्योपिकल्ं MITTS ॥ Se |
१०७
भाषा० श्रपेक्ाबुद्धिनाश च नाशस्तेषां निरूपितः ॥ १०७॥ अनेके कत्ववद्ियौ साऽपेकतानद्िरुच्यते |
सिद्धा० नतु दिवमप्रत्यक्तं। तदानीं विषयाभावात्) विद्यमान- स्येव चक्तरादिना ज्ञानजननेपगमात्। aa दिवप्र- . त्यच्चादिकमपेचचावु द्धे नाशकं कसप्यते ॥ न चापे्तानुद्धि- नाशात् कथं द्विवनाश दति वाच्यं कालान्तरे दिवप्र- AAA | अरपे्ाबुद्धिस्दुत्यादिका तन्नाशस्तन्नाश्रक दति कल्यनात् | wa एव तत्पररषोयापेचाबृद्धिजन्यदि- त्वादिकं ata wea इति कल्यते ॥ न चापे्ाबद्धेदि- लप्रत्यक्षकारणलमस्विति वाच्यं । लाघवेन दिलं प्रति ` कारणएलस्येवेो चितलात्। अ्रतीद्धिये इ्णकादावपेकताव्- द्धियागिनां। सगदिकालीनपरमाणपदावीशरोया- पेक्ताबुद्धिब्रह्माण्डान्तर वत्तिंयेोगिनामपेक्तावद्धिव्वा दि- लादि कारणमिति veo अरपक्ताबद्धिः केत्यत चाह । अ्रनेकति | श्रयमेक इत्याकारिका waa: (ee वेध्ये यच्रानियतिकल- ज्ञानं तच दिलादिभिना बहत्संस्येत्पद्यते यथां सेनावनादाविति कन्दलीकारः ॥ आचायीस्तुचिला- दिकमेव. aed मन्यन्ते 1 तथा. च faaarfear- पिका बहवलजातिः। सेनादे चोत्पन्ने चिलादो चिल- लाया दोषात् TAY दता बह्कयं सेनेति प्रती-
१०८
भाषा परिमाणं भवेन्मानव्यवदारस्य कारणं ॥ १०८ ॥ . ` अणु दीघं मदडखमिति ase ईरितः। नित्ये तदनित्यं स्यान्नित्यं नित्यमुद्ाहतं ॥ १०९ ॥ wee: परिमाणाच्च प्रचयादपि जायते। अनि्यं FURS तु सद्खाजन्यमुद्ादतं ॥ ११०॥
सिद्धा ° तिरूपपद्यते | बड्कलस्य संख्यान्तर ते तन्तार तम्याभावा- दित्यवधेयं ॥ परिमाणं निरूपयति, परिमाणमिति । परिमितिव्यवद्ारासाधारणं कारणं परिमाणमि- व्यथः ॥ ९०८ ti ततु विधं ww मद् Qa wag’) तत् परि- माणं | नित्यमित्यत्र परि माणमित्यनषच्यते ॥ ९०९ ॥ जायत दू त्यत्रापि परिमाणमित्यनुवत्तते । श्रनि- व्यमिति qaurtfad । तथा चानित्यं परिमणं सह्या- जन्यं परिमाणजन्यं प्रचयजन्यं चेत्यं; ॥ तच WET- जन्यमुदाइरति | इ्मणकादाविति। gene चसर- arg परिमाणं प्रति परमाणुपरिमाणं इ्मणकादि- परिमाणं वा न कारणं । परिमाणस्य खषमानजा- तीयात्कष्टपरिमाणएजन कलात् । इणकादि परिमाणएन्तु परमाणलापेचया नेकछष्टं । चसरणुपरिमाणन्त॒ न
* इद् खातुविध्यं प्रत्य चसिद्धं | तवाणलदखत्वे मदच्वदौवतवे च समनि- यते tial निष्यृथाजनतया विद्रद्मादतनादषरोष्छतोभ्यं पाठः |
Rok
रि $ oN भाषा० परिमाणं घटाद् तु परिमाण्जमुच्यते । प्रचयः शिथिलाख्यो यः संयोगस्तेन जन्यते ॥ १११॥ परिमाणं BRATS T नाश्स्ाश्रयनाशतः |
fagre सजातीयं । श्रतः परमाणो दिवसद्या इणएकपरि- माणस्य gua fag च चसरेणपरिमाणस्यास- मवायिकारणएमित्य्थः॥ ९९० ॥ परिमाणएजन्यमद्ादरति । परिमाणं घटाद् विति॥ परिमाणं कपालादि परिमाणजन्यं ॥ प्रचयजन्यम॒द्- दन्त" प्रचयं निर्वक्ति प्रचयदति॥ १९९९ ॥ ` नाश दति । च्रथात् परिमाणस्य । न चावयव- नाशः कथं परि माणएनाशकः सत्य्यवयविनि चि चतु- रपरमाणएविद्षेषे तदुपचये चावयविनः प्रत्यभिज्ञाने ऽपि परिमाणन्तरस्य प्रत्यचसिद्धवादिति वाच्यं । परमाणविद्धेषे णकस्य ना ेाऽवण्यमभ्यपेयस्तन्नाशे च चसरोएकनाशः | एवं HAW महावयविना नाश- स्यावश्यकलात् । सति च नाशकेऽनन्धुपगममाचेए नाशस्यापवदि तुमश्क्यलात् | शरीराद्ाववयवेपचयें ऽसमवायिकारणएनाशस्यावण्यकलाद वयविनाग्र श्रावश्च कः॥ न च पटाविनागेऽपि तन्लन्तरसंयागात् परि- माणाधिक्वयं सादिति वाच्यं । तत्रापि वेमाद्भिघा- तेन समवायिकारणएतन्त॒संयोगनाश्रात् पटनाश्खावश्च-
९९० भाषा° सह्ूयावत्त् WAH स्यात् एथकूप्र्ययकारणं ॥ ११२ It
fagre कलात् ॥ किञ्च तन्वन्तरस्य तत्यटावयवले पृ AMS एव न स्यात् | तत्तन्तरूपकारणाभावात् | तत्तन्तारवयवलाभावे च न तेन परिमाणाधिक्यं सं- युक्तद्र ान्तरवत्। तस्मात् तत्र तन्तन्तरसंयागे सति पूव्वैपट नाशस्ततः पटान्तरोत्पन्तिरित्यवण्यं ware । अवयविनः म्रत्यभिन्नानन्त् साजात्येन दीपकलिकादि- AAU न च पुव्वैतन्तव एव तन्लन्तरसदकारात् THIS सत्येव परान्तरमारभतामिति are AMAT: समान- देश्ताविरोधात्। एकदा नानाद्र वयस्य तचरानुपलभ्य वाधितलाच । पूवर वयस्य प्रतिबन्धकस्य विना zar- न्तरोत्पतन्तिरिव्यवश्वमभ्युपेयलात् ॥ yaa कारणं निरूपयति । सद्यावदिति । एयक्- अत्ययासाधारणं कारणं TAA | तनित्यतादिकं सद्या- वत् । यथा fe नित्येषु und नित्यं अनित्येऽनिव्यं अनित्यमेकलं च्राश्रयदितीयच्षणेनात्प्यते आञ्रयना- शननश्यति तथेकष्टयक्तमपि 1 दितादि वद् दिष्यक्रा- दिकमपीत्यथंः ॥ नन्वयमस्मात् एयग् दरत्यादावन्ये- न्याभावे भाषते तत् कथं TUR गुणान्तरं खीक्रियते न चास्तु wa न लन्यान्याभावं दति ara) रूपं न घट दति प्रतीत्यनापत्तेः ॥९९२॥
` भकाः
सिद्धा
९९१
अन्धान्याभावतो नास्य चरिता्थतवम्च्यते |
अस्मात् BATS नेति HAAS विलक्षणा ॥ ११३॥ अप्रा्येसु या प्रा्निः सेव संयोग ईैरितः। वीत्तितस्तिविधस्वेष आद्याऽन्यतरकम्म्रजः॥ ११४ ॥ तथेभयक्रियाजन्यो भवेत् PASSAT: |
आदिमः श्येनेलादि संयोगः परिकीर्तितः॥ ११५ ॥ मेषयोः सन्निपातो यः स॒ दिनोय उदाहतः
न डदि रूपे घटावधिकं vam गुणान्तरमस्ति न वा घटे घटावधिकष्टयक्तमस्ति येन परम्परासम्बन्धः कर्य Taq राद | आ्रन्योन्याभावत दति ॥ विलक्षएेति ॥ ननु शब्दवेल्ष्मेव न लयवे लचण्यमिति चेत्। न। वि- ना्थभेदं घटात् एयग् दूतिवर् घटो नेत्यचापि पञ्चमी स्यात् | तस्माद् यद् थकयेगे पञ्चमो Bsr नज उन्यान्याभावतेा भिन्नो गृणान्तरं कल्यत इति॥९९३॥
संयागं निरूपयति | अ्रप्राप्तयोरिति । तं विभजते, कीर्तित दूति । एष dart: ॥ ९९४॥
सन्निपातः संयोगा दितोय उभयकम्मजः । sata दति dart इत्यथः । तीयः खादिति पूव्ैण- faa ॥ ९९५ ॥
श्रादिमः afaura: । fadrat नोादनाख्यः सं-
योग दति॥ विभक्तप्रत्ययकारणं विभागं निरूपयति।
९९९
भाषा कपालतरूसंयागात् संयागसरूक्म्भयेः ॥ ११६ ॥
fagte
ठतोयः स्यात् कम्मजोऽपि दिधेव परिकोत्तितः अभिघाता नादनच्च शब्ददेतुरिदादिमः॥ ११७ ॥ शब्द्ादेतुर्दितोयः स्यादिभागोऽपि चिधा भवेत्। एककामीद्ववस्त्वादयो दयक द्वोऽपरः ॥ ११८ ॥
विभागजस्तुनीयः स्यात् ठतोयोऽपि दिधा waa |
विभाग दति॥ एककम्रति। उदादरणएन्त॒ श्येनग्रेलवि- भागादिकं पूत्वेवदष्यं।॥ ULE U AO WAT ear विभागजः कारणएमाचविभागजन्यः का- रणाकारणविभागजन्यथ्येति । area । यच कपाले RHI ततः कपालदयविभागः । तता घरार- मकसंयागनाशः। तता घटनाशः । ततस्तेन कपाल- विभागेन aaa कपालस्य दे शान्तरविभागेा जन्यते ।
तता दशान्तरसंयागनाशः) तत उत्तरदेशसंयागः।
ततः कर्मनाश cfa न च तेन क्मणेव कथं देश- न्तरवपिभागेा न जन्यत दति वाच्यं । एकस्यः कर्मण ्ररम्भकसंयोगप्रतिदन्दिविभागजनकलस्यानारमभकसं- या गप्रतिदन्दिविभागजनकलविरोधात् । अन्यथा वि- कसत्कमलकुद्रलभङ्गप्रसङ्गात्। तस्माद्यदौदमनारम-
कसंयागप्रतिदन्दिविभागं जनयेत् तदा ऽऽरम्भकसंया-
गप्रतिद्न्दिविभागं न जनयेत् । न च कारणएविभागे-
भाषा० चेतुमाचविभागव्यो देतदेतुविभागजः॥ ११० ॥ ` परतच्चापरत्वच्च दिविधं परिकीत्तितं।
१९९
` देशिकं कालिकच्चापि मूर्तं एव तु देशिकं ॥ १९०॥
सिद्धा
अपरत्वं तद्ण्पत्ववुद्धितः स्यादितीरितं ॥ १९१॥
परत्वं ख्यसंयोगभुयस््न्नानतो भवेत्। `
—
नेव दव्यनाशात् Ws FAT देश्ान्तरविभागो न जन्यत
दति वाच्यं। श्रारमकसंयोगप्रतिदन्दिविभागवतेाऽव-
यवस्य सति xa देणान्तरविभागासम्भवात् i यञ स्तक्रियया दस्ततरुविभागः ततः शरीरेऽपि विभक्त- प्रत्यया भवति तच च शरीरतर्बिभागे दस्तक्रियान
कारणं व्यधिकरणवाच्छरीर तु fear नास्ति) wa-
यविका यावदवयवकम्मनियतलात्। ्रतस्तच ATT
णाकारणविभागेन कायाकायंविभागेा जन्यत दति। रत एव विभागे गृणान्तरं । श्रन्यथा शरीरे विभक्रप्र- त्यये न Ala श्रत: संयागनारेन विभागे नान्यथा- सिद्धा भवति ॥ ९९९ ॥
परापर व्यवदारनिभित्ते परल्रापरते निरूपयति । परश्चेति | दैशिकमिति ॥९२०॥
दैशिकपरलं बडतर य्यैसंयो गान्तरितलन्ञानाद्- त्प यते | U4 तद् ल्योयस्वन्नानाद परव्मुत्पद्यते। च्रचा- वधिलारथंडितोयापेक्ला। यथा पाटलिपुचात काथ्ो-
Q
९९४
भाषा० तयोारसमवायो त् दिक्स्योगस्तद्ा य| दिवाकरपरिसखपन्दपरव्बात्पन्नतववुद्धितः ॥ Vee II MARAT तद् नन्तरबुद्धितः। अच त्वसमवायो स्यात् संयोगः कालपिण्डयोः॥१९३॥ अपेक्ताबुद्धिनाशेन नाशस्त्वेषामुद्ादतः, द्धः प्रकारः प्रागेव प्रायशेाऽपि निरूपितः ॥ १९४ ॥ ` अथावशि्धाऽष्यपरः प्रकारः परिदण्यते। अप्रमा च प्रमा चेति ज्ञानं दिविधमुच्यते ॥ १९५॥ तच्छन्ये AAA स्याद्प्रमा सा निदपिता।
सिद्धा मपेच्छ प्रयागः परः। पाटलिपुत्रात् कुरुकेचमपेच्छ प्रयागेोऽपर दति ॥९२९॥ तयेर्देगिकपरत्वापरतयेः | शअ्रसमवायी च्रसमवा- विकारणं। तदाश्रये र भिकपरलापरलाश्रये। दिवा- करेति॥ ९२२ ॥ अचर परलं श्रपरवञ्च कालिकं ग्रां! यस wal परि स्पन्दापेक्तया यस्य खय्॑परि खन्दोाऽधिकः स च्येष्ठः | यस्य न्यूनः स कनिष्ठः | कालिकपरत्वापरत्वे जन्यद्र् वय एव । Ba कालिकपरत्वापरत्योाः॥ ९२२॥ एषां कालिकेदोशिकपरलापरत्रानां॥ कमप्राक्रा बद्धं जिरूपयितमाइ । बुद्धेरिति nae mara श्रप्रमां विभजते i ame दरति । तद् भाववति
९९५
भाषा० तत्प्रपञ्चो विपय्यासः संशयेऽपि TAIT VRE आयो SS याऽऽमवुद्िः ETAT पोततामतिः। भवेन्निश्वयद्पा या संशयोऽथ Waa ॥ APO ॥ किंखिन् नरो वा खाणु्नवतयादिवुद्ितु संश्यः। तद्भावाप्रकारा धोसततप्रकारा तु निश्वयः॥ १९८ ॥ स संशयो मतिया स्यादेकचाभावभावयोः।
सिद्धा तत्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं भ्रम द्रत्यथः॥ तस्रपञ्चः श्रप्रमाप्र-
Tey ९२६॥ |
आद्य दति। विपय्यास Taq । शरीरादा यदा- त्मलप्रकारकं ज्ञानं गाराडदमित्याकारकं) एवं श- छारा पीतः wey इत्याकारकं asad निश्चयरहणं aga दति ॥९२७॥ |
किंखिदिति॥ किंखिदिति faan ।॥।.. निश्चयस्य लच्णमाद | तदभावेति | तद्भावाप्रकारकल्वे सति त्मकारकं ज्ञानं निखयः॥ ९२८ ॥.. |
संशयं waafa संशय दति। unufiinfaeg- भावाभावप्रकारकं ज्ञानं संश्य TATA! साधारणेति। उभयसाधारणेा यो VASAT संश्यकारणं | यथा SHUTS स्थाणत्वसाधारणं ज्ञाता श्रयं awa वेति सन्दिग्धे एवं असाधारणन्ञानं HITT | यथा शब्द्लं ` नित्यानित्यवयादत्तं शब्दे गृदीला शब्दा नित्यो म् वेति
भाक्र
सिद्धा
९१६
साधारणादि धरस्य ज्ञानं संशयकारणं ॥ १९८ ॥ दोषोऽप्रमाया जनकः प्रमायास्तु गुणा भवेत् |
घन््दि ग्धे। विप्रतिपत्तिस्त॒ शब्दा नित्यो न वेत्यादि शब्दा- त्मिका नसंश्यकारणं | श्ब्दव्यात्िज्ञानादीर्नां निख- यमाचजनकत्खाभावयात् | किन्त aa शब्देन काटिद्ध- यज्ञानं जन्यते | संश्यस्तु मानस एवेति ) एवं HIT भ्रामा्यसंश्यादिषयसंश्य इति! एवं व्या्संश्यादपि व्यापकस्य दत्यादिकं बध्यं) किन्तु संशये धर्भिंज्ञानं घर्श्रीदलियसन्निकेषा वा कारणमिति ९२९ i दोषद्ति। अप्रमां मरति दोषः कारणं) प्रमां प्रति गुणः कारणं। तचापि पिन्तादिरूपा दोषा च्रननुगताः। तेषां कारणएल्वं ्रन्यव्यतिरेकाभ्यामेव सिद्धं । awe
` अ्रमाजनकलन्तु अनुमानात् fag यथा प्रमा ज्ञान-
सषाधारणकारणभिन्नकारणएजन्या जन्यन्नानत्वार् रप्र
मावत् न च्व दषाभाव.एव कारणमस्ति वाचं । Ta: we इतिज्ञानस्थसे fortuna
` मामुत्पन्तिप्रसङ्गात् | विनिगमना विर दाद् च्रनन्तदा- षाभावस् ATTA ay गृणएकारणताया न्याख-
लात् ॥ न च गणएसत्वेऽपि पित्तप्रतिबन्धाच्छङ्खं न aqua wa पित्तादिदोाषाभावानां कारणएलमवश्यं वाच्यं तथा च किं awe दतुलकल्मनयेति वाच्यं |
१९७
भाषाः पित्तदू रत्वादिष्प दोषो नानाविधः Hat १२० ॥ yaa तु विश्ष्येण विशेषणवता समं | APTA गुणसत स्यादय तनुमिते गुणः ॥ १३१॥ पत्ते साध्यविशिष्टो च परामशा गुणा भवेत्। शक्ये VEG भवेद्पमिते गुणः ॥ १२२ ॥ TEATS ATA ATTA AAA प्रमा | गुणः स्याद् भमभिन्नन्तु ज्ञानमत्रोच्यते प्रमा ॥ १३६॥ अथवा ततप्रकारं यजन्नानं तदद्िशेष्यकं। `
सिद्धा ° तथा्ययव्यतिरेकाभ्यां गणस्यापि देतुत्वसिद्धेः । एवं भ्रमं प्रति गृणाभावः कारणमित्यख्यापि सुवचत्वाच | तत्र दोषाः कं इत्याकाङ्ायामाइ | पित्तेति । क्रचित् पित्तादिश्रमे पित्तं दोषः! क्चिद्न््रादः सखल्पप- रिमाणएभ्नमे era tre: | कचिच् वंशारगभ्नमे मण्डू कवसाञ्ननमित्येवं दोषा भ्रान्तिजनका TATA ९३०॥ AYR गणा CARH WAST करमणे गणान् दर्भयति । प्रत्ये लिति । werd विशेषणवद्- विशेच्यसन्निकंषी गृणः। अनुमिता साध्यवति साध्यवयाण- वेशिष्यन्ञानं गण दूति एवमयेऽपयद्यः। ९२९९२२९ ॥ प्रमां निरूपयति} भ्रमभिन्नमिति॥ ९३२२ ॥ नन् यच प्रएक्रिरजतयोरिमे रजते fa art जातं तच रजर्तागेऽपि प्रमान खात् are भमभिन्न-
| १९८ भाषा० तत् प्रमा न प्रमा नापि भमः स्यान्निव्विकस्यकं ॥१३४॥ प्रकारतादि्यन्यं दि सम्बन्धानव्गाइ A |
सिद्धा० लाभावाद् श्रत BTS | अथवेति । तदददिगशेव्यकं तत्रका- रकं ज्ञानं प्रमा TA: | Teed वेध्यं । येन सम्ब aa तदन्ता तेन सम्बन्धेन तददिशेव्यकं तेन सम्बन्धेन AGAITHA वाच्यं। तेन कपालादौ संयोगादिना चटा- दिज्ञाने नातिव्यात्निः॥ एवं सति निव्विकन्पकं प्रमान स्यात् तस्य सप्रकारकल्ाभावाद् WA ATE न प्रमेति॥ ननु क्ते कपिसंयेागज्ञानं भ्रमः स्यात् प्रमा च खा- दिति wai न) प्रतियारगिव्यधिकरणसंयोागाभाववति संया गज्ञानस्य WAST नच दत्ते संयागाभावाव- च्छेदकावच्छेदन VATA WAT A स्यात् तच संया- गाभावस्य प्रतियोागिव्यधिकरणत्वाभावादिति वाचं | तच स॑यागाभावावच्छेदकावच्छदन संयोगज्ञानस्य Baa) लच्षणस्याननुगमात् | लक्षणाननगमेऽपि न चतिः। ९२४॥ प्रमालमिति। मीमांसका दि प्रमात्वं खता यादय मिति वदन्ति तच गुरूणां मते ज्ञानस्य खप्रकाशरू- पल्रात् तज्ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं तेनेव aaa दति ॥ भटानां मते ज्ञानमतीद्दियं। ज्ञानजन्या ज्ञातता Barat | तया च ज्ञानमनुमोयतें॥ मुरारिमिश्राणां मतेऽन- व्यःस(सन WA Dadi सव्व॑षामपि मते तज्ज्ञानवि-
९९८
सिद्धा ° षयकज्ञानेन तज्न्नानप्रामाण्यं Tea | विषयनिरूषयं fe ज्ञानं * । श्रता ज्ञानवित्तिवेयो विषयः i तन्मतं दूष- यति। न ear arafafa i संशयेति । यदि ज्ञान- प्रामाण्यं खता Wey स्यात् तद्ाऽभ्यासदगशेत्पन्नज्नाने agua न स्पात् | aa दियदि ज्ञान ज्ञातं तदा प्रामाण्यं ज्ञातमेवेति ay संशयः । यदि तुज्ञानं न ज्ञातं तद्ाघभ्बिज्ञानाभावात् कथं संशयः । तस्माज्- ज्ञानम्रामा्छमनुमेयं | तथा fe द्द् ज्ञानं प्रमा सम्बा- दिप्रत्तिजनकलाद् aad aad यथाऽप्रमा । ददं थिवीलप्रकारकं ज्ञानं प्रमा । गन्धवति प्रथिवीलप्रका- रकन्ञानलात् | एवं दरदं जलज्ञानं vat) सेवति जललप्रकारकन्ञानवात्॥ नच देतुज्ञानं कथं जात- fafa वाच्यं । प्रथिवीलप्रकारकत्रस्य Sat ग्राद्यलान्। तत्र गन्धवद्धिशेग्यकलस्यापि सुग्रदत्वात् | तत्मरकारक- त्वावच्छिन्नतद्वदिशेव्यकतं परं न waa | संशयानरोा- धात् ॥ न च प्रमालस्य साध्यस्य प्रसिद्धिः कथमिति वाच्यं | दरदज्ञानप्रमावस्य खतेग्राद्यलात्॥ न चप्रका- रभेदेन प्रामा्यभेद्ाद् घटत्ववति घटलप्रकारादेः कथं प्रसिद्धिरिति वाच्यं | घरत्वप्रकारकतस्य खविशे-
* विषयविषयताकनियतखविषयताकप्रत्यदकं ज्ञानमिन्यथेः। अनुमिति- wate ज्ञानं विषयविषयताकप्रत्यच्तकं विषयाविषयकप्रत्य्ताविष- यले सति प्रत्यच्चाविषयलादित्यनुमानं | ज्ञानप्रत्यचस्थ विषयविषयले प्रमाणमिति भावः।॥
५
सिद्धा° कलस्य च खता य्राद्यलात्। घटस्य च पृव्वमुपखित- | त्वाद् घरटविशेष्यकं घरटत्वप्रकारकमिति ज्ञाने प्रामाण्यस्य बाधकाभावः! व्यवसायपरन्त॒ प्रामाण्यं न गृह्यते | तच संश्रयसामगोसच्वे संश्यस्यैवेा पपत्तेः | कि ्चाभ्यास- दशायां ठतीयानुव्यवसायादिना प्रामाण्यस्य खत एव ग्रदसम्भवात् म्रथमानृव्यवसायपरं न तद्भादकत्मिति कर्ते संशयानुरोधात् । श्रय प्रामाण्यानुभितै प्रा माघग्रहे न aw विषयनिखयरूपलाथं तच प्रामा- ग्रहा वाच्यः । सेाऽपयनमित्यन्तरणेति फलमुखी का- TAG वा नानवस्ेति चेन्न । च्रण्दीताप्रामाखय- कस्यैव निश्चयरूपलात्। यच च प्रामाण्यसंश्यस्तत्रैव परं प्रामाानुमितेरपेक्षाया ALIS WTATUTA- fafaftaa एव waa तु न संशयः 1 क्रचित् कोाच्य- नुपस्यितेः क्तचिदिभेषद् शनादितः क्विदिषयान्तरस- च्चारादिति सङ्घेपः।॥ नन् सव्वेषां ज्ञानानां यथा्ै- त्वात् प्रमालचणे तद्धिगेग्यकलं fated व्यथं। न च TF रजताथिनः प्रटत्तिभ्रेमजन्या न खात् तव मते अरमस्ाभावादिति वाच्यं । aa दि दोषाधीनस् ` परावत्तिनि खतन्तोपख्ितरजतभेद्ग्रदस्य देतु वात्। सत्यरजतस्थले तु विशिष्टज्ञानस्य सत्वात् तदेव कारणं | AE वा तचापि मेदा एव कारणमिति न वाऽन्य- या ख्यातिः सम्भवति। रजतप्रत्यचकारणस्य रजतसनि-
२९९ We Wate न al Are] संश्यानुपपत्तितः ॥ १२५ ॥
सिद्धा ° कर्षस्याभावात्। रङ्गे रजतवद्धेरनुपपत्तेरिति चेन । सत्यरजतस्थले प्रत्तं प्रति विशिष्टज्ञानस्य Yqarar: क्तप्तलात्। अन्यत्रापि तत्कल्पनात् ॥ न च सम्बादिप्र- छन्त तत्कारणएं विसम्बादिप्रहृत्तो त॒ भेदाग्रहः का- रणएमिति वाद्यं । लाघवात् wefrara aw देतु ल- ` कल्पनात् | दूत्यञ्च रङ्गं रजततविभिष्टबुद्धान्रो धेन श्लानलच्णाप्रत्यासत्तिकल्यनेऽपि न क्तिः | फलम्ख- गेारवस्यादोषलात्। किञ्च यद् रङ्गरजतयोरिमे रजते दरति ज्ञानं जातं aa न कारणवाघोऽपि। ` श्रपि च यच रङ्गरजतयोरिमे tary दति ज्ञानं तचोभयच यगपत्रत्तिनिदत्ती Bat) रङ्गं रङ्गमेदयदे रजते रजतमेद यरे ऽन्यथास्यातिभयात् | -लन्मते. TF रङ्ग HITS रजते रजतभेदाग्रदस्य च Vala! Sasa रङ्गं रजतभेदाग्रदस्य रजते रङ्गभेदाग्रदस्य च VATA | किञ्चानमितिं प्रति भेदाग्रदस् देतुले जलद afz- व्या्यधुमवद मेदायदहाद् अनुमितिनिंव्वीधा । यदि च विशिष्टज्ञानं कारणं तद्ाऽयागालके वद्धि्याप्यधूम- ज्ञानमनमित्यनरोघादापतितं। इत्थं श्रन्यथा स्याता प्रत्यचमेव प्रमाणं) TH रजततया जानामीव्यनभवा- दिति.सक्घंपः.॥ ९२१५ ॥
R
भा्वा°
ARR व्यभिचारस्यायद्ाऽपि ASAT SAT |
देतुव्या्चिय् च तकः कचित् शङ्ानिवत्तेकः ॥-१३६॥
fagte
Ut व्या्िरुक्ता age” न दभित इत्य-
तस्तं दशयति । व्यभिचारस्येति afar: सद
च्वारग्रदख afi कारणभित्य्थंः-। व्यभिचार- ग्रहस्य व्याश्धिगदप्रतिबन्धकलात् तदभावः कारणं |
शअनन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां सदचारग्रदस्यापि देतुता । गया- quay न कारणं । व्भिचारस्फृत्ता सछृदरभनेऽपि कषिद् व्या्भियदात्। कचिद् व्यभि चारशङ्ाविधूनन-
दारा श्योदशनमुपयुज्यते | यतर ठ् योद्शनादपि
wer नापैति तच विपकच्तवाधकतकाऽपेचितः | तथापि
afefacfeufa धूमः स्यादिति यद्याश्द्ा भवति तदा
सा वद्धिधूमये ; कार्यकारणभावस्य प्रतिसन्धानाननिव-
Nid! यद्ययं वद्िमान् न खात् AST धूमवान् न स्यात् | कारणं विना काय्यानुपपन्तेः । यदि कचित् कारणं वि-
नापि ufaafa sean एव वा भविव्यतीति तचा- TET भवति तदा सा व्याघाताद्पषरणीया। यदि कारणं विना काय्यं स्यात् तदा धुमाथं वककसत्यथे
भाजनस्य नियमत उपादानं aaa न स्यादिति। यच खत एव wer नावतरति तच न तकीापेत्तापीति त-
दिदमुक्तं तकः कचित् शङ्ानिवन्तंक ofa ९२६ ॥
RNG: भापा० साध्यस्य व्यापको AG देनोरव्यापकस्तथा ।
fagte इदानीं परकीचयािग्रदप्रतिबन्धाथमुपाधिं मि- रूपयति । साध्यस्येति 1 सथ्यलाभिमतव्यापकलतवे सति साघधनलाभिमताव्यापक TAA नन् स श्वामे faar- तनयलाद् TAA शाकपाकजलं नोापाधिः Wal तख साध्यव्यापकल्ाभावात्। WAAAY घटादावपि ara | एवं॑वायुः was: स्यभौश्रयलाद् दृत्यत्र उद्भ तर्ूप- वत्वं नापाधिः स्वात् । प्रत्यचलस्यात्मादिषु सत्वात् तच रूपाभावात् । एवं ध्वंसे विनाश्य जन्यवाद् दत्य च भावलं नेापाधिः स्याद् विनाश्लिख आगभावे स- त्वात् \ तच च भावलाभावादिति चेन । यद्धम्ा- वरछिन्नसाध्यव्यापकतवं तद्धम्भावङिन्नसाघनाव्यापकत्मि- च्य्थतात्प््यीत् | मितातनयलावच्छिन्रश्डामतस्य व्या- पकं एएकपाकजवलं। एवं वद्िदरव्यलःवच्छिन्नमत्य चलस्य व्यापकमद्धू रूपवन्तं af, लावच्छिनसाघनस्याव्या- पकञ्च । एवं war विनाशी जन्यत्वरदित्य चर जन्यलाव- च्छिननसाभ्यव्यापकं *भावलं। Asal त॒ VATE A धरम नास्ति 1 यद् वच्छिन्नस्य साध्यस्य aya तदवच्छिन्नस्य साधनस्याव्यापकं किचित् uta व्यभिचारिणितु
* काकः श्यामा सिचातनयलार् इत्यादावपि सिचातनयलाव- च्िब्रश्यामलत्वस्य यापकलवं एएकपाकजलं दति अनाकरोाऽयं पाठः |
भाषा०
१९४ स उपाधिभवेत्तस्य निष्कषाऽयं ATT ॥ १२७॥ सव्यं साध्यसमानाधिकरणः सद्पाधयः।
खेतारेकाश्रये येषां खसाध्यव्यभिचारिता ॥ १३८ ॥
सिद्धा”
व्यभिचारस्यानुमानमुपाधेसत प्रयोजनं ।
अन्तत उपाध्यधिकरणं यत्साध्याधिकरणं यचापाधि- wi साध्यव्यभिचारनिरूपकमधिकरणं तदन्यतरला- वच्छिन्नस्य साध्यसख Bw साधनस्य चाव्यापकलमु- वाधेः सम्भवतीति ॥ ९२७॥
श्रत एव लच्छमपि रूपमेतदनुसारेणए दयति | aq दति । खस्येति । खं उपाधिः खच्च साध्यश्च Bays तयेाव्यभिचारिता इत्यर्थः ॥ wes ii
उपाेदूंषकतावोजमाःद । व्यभिचारस्येति। उपा-
भियभिचारोण साध्यव्यभिचारानमानं उपाधेः भ्रया-
जनमित्यर्थः | aut चच ग्एद्ध्साध्यव्यापक उपा-
पिस्तच शएुद्धेनेष्वाधिवयभि चारेण साध्यव्यभिचारान्-
मानं \ यथा धूमवान् वदङ्धेरित्यादो वद्धिरभूमवयभि-
वारी श्राद्रेन्धनव्यभिचारिलाद् दति व्यापकब्यभि-
चारिणा व्याययभिचारावश्यकत्वाप्त्) यच तु किञ्चि- द्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापक उपाधिस्तच agaafa उपा- धिव्यभिचारेण साध्यव्यभिचारानमानं) यथा war मिचातनयलाद् दत्य मिच्रातनयलं श्यामवव्यभि-
भाता०
सिद्धा
ww
शब्देपमानयेनेव प्रथक् प्रामाण्यमिष्यते ॥ १२८ ॥ `
¢ ~ AN १ 9 अन्मानगताथत्नादिति वेशेषिकं मतं |
चारि। मिचातनये शाकपाकजलव्यभिचारिलादिति। वाधानुन्रीतपचेतरस्तु साध्ययापकताग्रादकम्रमाणभा- वात् सव्याघातकलाच नेपाधिः। वाघोन्नीतस्तु पत्ते तर उपाधिभंवत्येव | यत्र व्छिरनुष्णः छतकलाद् इ-
` व्यार WAU वङ्केरुष्एलय्रदे वज्धीतरलमुपाधिः। यच साध्यव्यापकल्रादि कं सन्दिद्यते स सन्दिग्धापाधिः। पत्ते
तरस्त॒ सन्दिग्धापाधिरपि नोाद्वावनोयः कथयकसम्प्र- दायानुरोधादिति ॥ केचित्त सत्मतिपक्तात्यापनमुपा- धिफलं । तथाहि अयागेलकं धूमवदङकेरित्यादी श्र- योागालकं धूमाभाववद् ज्राद्रेन्धनाभावाद् दति सम्म-
तिषक्तसम्भवात् । इत्यञ्च साधनव्यापकोऽपि. कचिदुपा-
धिः। यथा करका एथिवी कटिनसंयोागवच्वादित्यादरो अरनुष्णाशोतस्यर्शवच््वं ॥ न चा खरूपसदुपाधिरेव दूष- एमिति वाच्यं | PARTITE TUTTE RANA | रच च साध्यव्यापकपक्तादटत्तिरूपाधिरि ति वदन्ति | शब्दा पमानयारिति॥९२९॥ | वेशेषिकाणणं मते प्रत्यच्तमनुमानच्च प्रमाणं शन्दा-
पमानयोारनुमानविघयेव प्रमाणं । तथा fe दण्डेन
गामभ्याजेत्यादिपदानि वैदिकपदानि वा तात्पण-
भषाः
-सिद्धा°
RE तन्न सम्यग्विना NAAT शब्दादि बोधतः ॥ १४० ॥ दैवि ७ न तिरेकत PAY भवेद् व्याभरेरन्वयव्यतिरकतः।
विषयस्मारि तपदार्थसंसगंज्ञानपूव्वकानि श्राकाङ्खादि-
मत्पदकदम्बलाद् घटमानयेतिपदकदम्बवत् | यदा एते पदार्था मिथः संसगवन्तः योग्यतादिमत्पदोाप- स्थापितवलात् तादु श्पदायेवत्। दृष्टान्तेऽपि दृष्टान्ता न्तरेण साध्यसिद्धिरिति । एवं गवयव्यक्तिप्रत्यच्तान- न्तरं गवयपद् गवयलप्र र त्तिनिभित्तक* श्रसति त्य न्तरे THAI म्रयुज्यमानलात् | यथा गोपदं गल- प्रटृत्तिनिभित्तकं। यदा गवयपदं सप्रटन्तिनिमिन्तकं साधुपदलार् इत्यनुमानेन पक्षधम्भ॑तावलाद् गवयलम्र- टत्तिनिमित्त कं भासते तन्मतं दूषयति तनन सम्यगिति।॥ विना व्यािन्ञानं शब्दादिते बेोधस्यानभविकलात् 3 न fe ada शब्दश्रवणाद्यनन्तरं व्याधिन्ञाने मानम- सीति । faq waa शब्दस्थले यदि व्याभिन्ञानं कल्यते तदा सव्वेचानुमितिखले पदज्ञानं कर््पयला शाब्दबोध एव किंन सखीक्रियत दति॥९४०॥ दैविष्यमिति । seats fe fafad केवलान्वयि- केवलव्यतिरेक्यन्वयव्यतिरेकिभेद्ात् । aatafaqa: केवलान्वयी | यथा ज्ञेयं अभिघेयादित्यादौ । तच fe wada ua - विपक्षासच्ं ॥ ननु स्वेषां
* गवग्रतावच्छि्रि णएक्वमित्यथेः!! .
¢
९९ 4
८ ~ ~ SN भाषा० अन्वयन्याधिरुक्तेव व्यतिरकादथोच्यते ॥ १४९ ॥ साध्याभावव्यापकलवं देत्वभावस्य AHA |
सिद्धा० धश्मौणां reward केवलान्यसिद्धिरिति चेन | ASAI सर्व्वसाधारण्ये तरेव कवलान्वयिलात् ॥ किञ्च उत्तिमदत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिलं कवलान्व- fad | ay गगणणभावादौ प्रसिद्धं ॥ waa: केवलव्यतिरेकी | यथा प्रथिवी दतरेभ्यो fuga गन्धव्वादित्यादौ । aa fe जलादि चयेादश्मेद स्य पुव्वेमनिशिततवा निथितसाध्यवतः सपक्स्याभाव ` दूति ॥ सत्सपत्तविपक्ताऽन्वयव्यतिरेकौ । यथा वद्धिमान् धूमादित्यादौ | तच सपक्तस्य मद्ानसाद् विंपचस्य जल- इदादेश् स्वादिति ॥ ९४९॥ तजर व्यतिरेकिणि व्यतिरोकव्याश्षिज्ञानं कारणं तदथं व्यतिरेकव्यािं निन्वक्रि। साध्याभाववयापकलं देत्भावस्य यद्धवेद् इति । साध्याभावव्यापकोभृता- भावप्रतियागिलमित्ययः। wae वेध्यं) येन सम्ब- न्धेन यच येन रूपेण व्यापकता गद्यते. awa वच्छिन्नप्रतियागिताकतद्धम्मावच्छिनाभाववन्तान्नानाद् यत्सम्बन्धेन यद्धुम्भावच्छिन्नस्य व्याप्ता wud त- त्सम्वन्धावच्छिन्नम्रतिये गिताकतद्धम्भावच्छिन्राभावस्य सिद्धिः इत्यञ्च यच विशेषणएतादिसम्बम्भेनेतरवव्याप-
A te भाषा० ATH नेवेच प्रमाणान्तरते्यते ॥ १४९ ॥
सिद्धा० ma गन्धाभावे Dad तच गन्धाभावाभावेनेतरला- त्यन्ताभावः सिध्यति) यच तु तादाव्यसम्बन्भेनेतरव्या- पकता Ded तच ताद्ात्यसम्बन्धेनेतरस्याभावः fa- च्यति। स एवान्यान्याभावः। एवं यच संयागसम्बन्धेन धूमं ग्रति संयोगसम्बन्धेन वद्केव्यपकता गद्यते तच संयाग- | सम्बन्धावच्छिनप्रतियोगिताकवद्युभावेन जलद्धद सं- यागसम्बन्धावच्छिनप्रतियोागिताकधूमाभावः सिध्यति | शच्च व्यतिरेकव्या्धिग्रदे वयतिरेकसदचारनज्ञानं का- रणं। कोचिन्त् व्यतिरेकसडचारोणान्व व्याधिरेव द्यते न तु व्यतिरेकव्या्िन्ञानं कारणं | awa यतिरेकसद- चाराद्माभिग्रदस्ततर व्यतिरेकोव्युच्यते | साध्यप्रसिद्धिस्त चटाद्ावेव ज्ञायतां पश्चात् एयिवीलावच्छेदेन साध्यत दति वदन्ति॥ a श्रथापत्तेस्िति । ward प्रमाणान्तरं मन्यन्ते कचन! तया दि aa देवदत्तस्य शतवर्षजीविलं च्यातिः- श्स्ादवगतं जीविने Way प्रत्य्तादवगत aa शतवषेजीविल्रान्यथानुपपत््ा वद्दिःसत्वं करप्यते तद्- नुमानेन गताथेवान्नेष्यते तथाददि जीविलस्य afe:- सत्वग्रदसत्वान्यतरव्याप्यतं wed । तचान्यतरसिद्ध जायमानायां ग्रदसत्ववाधा ददिः सच्चमन्मिते भासते।
भाषाः
सिद्धा०
१९८ व्यतिरोकव्यापिवुद्धा चरिताथा दि सा यतः |
सुखन्त् जगतामेव काम्य धर्मण जन्यते ॥ १४३॥
aaa दुःखं स्यात् प्रतिक्रलं सचेतसां । निदुःखत्वे सुखे चेच्छा तज्ज्ञानादेव जायते ॥ १४४॥
एवं पोना देवदत्ता दिवानभुक्क इत्यादौ पीनलख भाजनव्याप्यलावगमाद्धजनं सिध्यति । दिवाभाजन-
चापे राचिभाजनं सिध्यति । अ्रभावप्रत्यत्तस्यानुभ-
विकलादनुपलम्भोऽपि a प्रमाणान्तरं । किञ्चान्-
पलम्भष्याज्ञानस्य VAS ज्ञानाकरणएकल्वात् प्रत्यक्तलं |
ज्ञानस्य VIS तु तचाष्यनुपलम्भान्तरपेकतेत्यनवस्था ।
चेष्टापि म्रमाणन्तरं.न। तस्याः सङद्धतग्रादकशब्द-
समारकतेन लिपादिसमशोललाच्छव्द एवान्तभावात्।
: . यच तु व्याघ्यादिग्रदस्तचानुमितिरेवेति॥ ९५४२॥
सुखं निरूपयति Gar जगतामेव काम्ये धर्मण जन्यः इति । काम्बमभिलाषविषयः। धमति waa
सुखत्वेन काव्यकारणभाव दत्यथेः॥९४२॥
.. -दुःखन्निरूपयति । अधर्मेति । अ्रघम्ब॑लेन cada
„. . काय्यकारणभाव. wae: । . प्रतिकूल भिति दुःखत्व- ज्ञानादेव सर्वषां खाभाविक्रविषय cea: il दच्छां , निरूपयति । निदुःखल्र दति ॥९४४॥
भावाः
fast °
९९०
इच्छा तु तदपाये Meenas Nae ।
चिकोणा छतिसाध्यत्वप्रकारेच्छा च या भवेत् ॥ VBL तद्धेतुः छतिसाध्ये्टसाधनत्वमतिभवेत् ।
बलवद् दिष्टदेतुत्वमतिः स्यात् प्रतिबन्धिका ॥ Wve i ACUTE Ve कस्यचिन्मते।
दच्छा fe फलविषयिणी उपायविषयिणणी च}. फलन्त् सुखं दुःखाभावश्च । तच फलेच्छां प्रति फल- शानं कारणं | आरत एवं खतः पुरुषार्थः सम्भवति | यज्जानं सत् खटत्तितयेव्यते स खतः पुरुषार्थ दूति तलच्णात् | इतरेच्छानधीनेच्छाविषयल्े फलिते Sa: | उपायेच्छां प्रतीष्टसाघधनतान्ञानं कारणं ॥ चिकीषति, रतिसाध्यवप्रकारिका कतिसाध्यक्रिया- विषयिणीच्छा व्िकोषा \ पाकं क्त्या साधयामीति तदनभवात् 1९४५ ॥
fanat प्रति छतिसाध्यतान्नानमिष्टसाधनता- ज्ञानञ्च कारणं चत एव sat कुतिरखाध्यताभा- arg चिकीषौ ॥ बलवदिति बखवद्ष्टसाधनताज्ञानं तच प्रतिबन्धकं 1 war मधुविषसंष्रक्ताननभाजने न विकीषौा 1 aaqee: प्रतिबन्धक इत्यन्ये ॥ २९४६ ॥
कस्यव्विष्डत दति! वलवदनिष्टाजनकलन्नानं कार-
एमित्यर्थः। रतिसाध्यतान्नानादिमता बलवद् निष्टसा-
Hele
सिद्धा
WR दिष्टसाधनतानुद्धिभवेद् SHI कारणं ॥ १४७ ॥ प्रवत्तिश्च fraps तथा जोवनकारणं। एवं प्रयत्रतैविध्यं तान्तिकेः परिदर्शिंतं ॥ १४८ ॥ चिकीषोा छतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वमतिस्तथा |
धनताज्ञानश्एन्यस्य बलवद् निष्टाजनकलज्ञानं विनापि चिकीषोयां विलम्बाभावात् कस्यचिन्मत दत्यखरमेा दशितः देषं निरूपयति । द्ष्टसाधनतेति। दुःखोपाय- विषयकं दषं प्रति दिष्टसाघनतान्नानं कारणमित्यर्थः, वलवदिषटसाधनताज्ञानञ्च प्रतिबन्धकं । तेन नान्त- रोयकद्ः खजनके पाकादौ न द्वेषः॥ २४७ ॥
यत्नं निरूपयति । ्रटत्तिखेति । wafafreter- जोवनयानियन्नमेदात् प्रयनस्तिविध दत्यथैः॥९४८॥
चिकीषेत्यादि । मधविषसंएक्रानभेाजनादौ वल- वद्निष्टानुबसिल्ेन विकीोषाभावान्न प्रटत्तिरिति भावः। छृतिाध्यताज्ञानादिव बलवद् निष्टाननृवन्पित्व- ज्ञानमपि खतन्लाचयव्यतिरेकात् प्रहन्ता. कारणमि- त्यपि वदन्ति ॥ काय्यतान्ञानं प्रवन्तंकमिति गरवः |
autre ज्ञानस्य yout जननीयायां चिकोषातिरिक्त
नापेल्तितिमसि। सा चरुतिसाष्यतानज्ञानसाध्या। दच््छा-
याः खप्रकारप्रकारकधोसाध्यलनियमात्। चिकोषादि
कछतिसाथ्यलप्रकारिकच्छा ।.तच कतिसाध्यलं प्रकार
एरर
सिद्धा ° सतत््रकारकनज्ञानं चिकीषायां तद्वारा प्रत्त Tei न विष्टसाधनताज्ञानं aa देतु; । छत्यसाथ्येऽपि प्रट- त्या पन्तेः। छत्यसाध्यताज्ञानं प्रतिवन्धकमिति Vy तद्- भावापेत्तया छृतिसाध्यता ज्ञानस्य yal | न च इयो- रपि Saga गारवात्।। ननु तन्मतेऽपि मधुविषसंएका- WTA चेत्यवन्दने च म्रदत्यापत्तिः काव्येताज्ञान-. सत्वादिति चेन । सविगशेषणवत्ता प्रतिसन्धानजन्यकार्य्य- arate ्रवन्तंकलवात् | काम्ये दि वागपाकादौ का- मना सखविशेषणं। ततश्च बलवद् निष्टनन् बन्धिकाम्य- साधनतान्ञानेन कार्य्यताज्ञानं। ततः WA | way भाजने न म्रवत्तते। ATA कामनायाः पुरुषविरेषण- लाभावात्। नित्ये च शचादिकं परूषविरेषणं । तेन चादि ज्ञानाधीनरूतिसाध्यताज्ञानात् AA ASA: UI ननु aziwar लाघवेन बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धीष्टसा- धनताविषयककःा्ताज्ञानमेव sare बलवद् नि- छाननुबसिलश्च दष्टा त्पत्तिनान्त रीयकदुः खाधिकदुः- खाजनकलं बलवद्धिष्टविषयदुःखाजनकलं वेति चेन्न । दटसाघनलकरुतिसंौष्यलययंगपज्ज्ञातु मश्क्यलात्। सा-
` ध्यवसाघनलयेविरोधाद् afage तु arsed सि- द्धस्य च साधनलं। न च एकमेकनेकद् सिद्धमसिद्धच्च ज्ञायते तस्मात् WARIS ज्ञायते मैवं। लाघवेन बलवद् निष्टाननुबन्धीष्टसाघनते सति रुतिसाच्यतान्ञा-
१२२
fagte नस्य देतुलात्। न च साध्यवसाघनव्येर्विरोघः। यदा- कदाचित साधष्यलसाधनलयोारविरोाधात्। एकदासा- ध्यलसाधनलयोाश्चाज्ञानात्॥ नवीनास्तु ममेदं कतिसा- थ्यमिति ज्ञानं न प्रवत्तंकमनागतेष्टस्य ज्ञातु ATA | fay यादृशस्य पुंसः इतिसाध्यै यदिष्टं argue खस्य प्रतिसन्धाय तत्र प्रवर्तते तेनादनकामस्य तत्- साघनताज्ञानवतस्तदुपकरणएवतः पाकः कतिसाध्यस्ता- दृश्खादमिति प्रतिसन्धाय पाके प्रवत्तत TAS AA | खकल्पितलिपयादिप्रदत्तौ यौवने कामेद्धेदादिना स- मोागादो च तद्भावात् | ददन्तु बाध्यं) aaraifag- साधनलादि ज्ञानं प्रवत्तंकं। तेन भावियोवराच्ये बालस्य न vata तदानीं छतिसाध्यलान्ञानात्। एवं दपा भोजने न प्रवन्तते। तद्ानीमिष्टसाधनलाज्ञानात्। प्रव- त्तते च रो गदूषितचिन्तो विषादि भच्वणे तदानीं बल- वदनिष्टाननुबसिलज्ञानात् ॥ न चास्तिकखा गम्यागम- नशुबधादिप्रत्तै कथं बलवदनिष्टाननुबधििववुद्धि- नरकसाधनलन्ञानादिति वाच्यं | उत्कटरागादिना नरकसाधनताधीनिरोधनात् । टार तु कतिसाथ्य- ताज्ञानाभावान्न चिकौषोाप्रटरन्ती किन्विष्टसाधनता- ज्ञानादिच्छामाचं। afay ्रढत्तिरूपा बाध्या । तेन जवनयोानियल्नसाष्ये म्राणपञ्चकसच्चारे न Wala: | इत्यञ्च म्रवन्तंकलानुरोधादिधेरपि तावान, दूत्यञ्च
१२८
सिद्धा ° विश्वजिता यजेत इत्यारौो यच फलं न श्रूयते तचापि | Ga: फलं RAAT | नन्वडर दः सन्ध्यामुपासीतेत्यादा cera: Veta: कथं ॥ न चाथेवादिकं ब्रह्मलेा- कादि मअत्यवायाभावावा फलमिति वाच्यं। तथा सति काम्यते नित्यलद्ान्यापत्तेः। कामनाभावेऽकरणएापत्तेख। इत्यञ्च फलश्चतिस्तचार्थवादमा तमिति चेन्न । यद- णश्राद्भादरोा नित्यवनैभित्तिकलयेारिव भरणीथाद्ध काम्यलनेभिन्तकलयारिव नित्यवकाम्यवयोारष्यविया- धात् ॥ न च कामनाभावेऽकरणापत्तिः | चिकालस्त- वपाठटाद्ाविव कामनासद्धावस्यैव कल्पनात् ।॥ नन् वेद बेधितकाखंतान्ञानात् wala: सम्भवतीति चेन्न । द्रष्टसाघनल्रमन्ञाय ताद्श्काय्य॑तान्नानसदसेणापि प्र्रत्तेरसम्भवात्।। यदपि पण्डापूव्वंफलमिति azfa न} कामनाभावे ATUIG AAA | कामनाकल्पने लवार्थवादि कफलमेव राचिसचन्यायात् RATATAT प्रहृत्यनपपत्तेः | तेन । | चयं क चिदुपात्तस्य दुरितस्य प्रचचते। अ्रनत्पत्तिं तया चान्ये प्रत्यवायस्य मन्ते ॥ एवं | | सन्ध्यामपासतेये तु सततं शंसितव्रताः | विधूतपापासते चान्त ब्रद्मलाकमनामयं ॥ एव |
सिद्धा °
१२५
दद्याददरदः are पिदभ्यः प्रौतिमावद्न्।
दत्यादिकमेव फलमस्तु i नच पिदग्रीतिः कथं फलं व्यधिकरणल्ादिति वाच्यं) गया्रद्धाराविव उट श्चत्वसम्बन्धेनेव फलजनकलवस्य क्रचित् कल्यनात् 1 Wa एवोक्तं शास्द्भितफलमनष्ठानता Cai दति 1 fagui ana तु खस्य खगंफलं यावन्नि- त्यनैमित्तिकानुष्टानसख सामान्यतः खगंफलकल्यनात् पण्डापुव्वाधप्रटत्तिश्च न सम्भवति । न fe तत्छुख- दुः खाभाववत् सखतः पुरुषाथः.। न वा ततूसाधनं। waaay कथं प्रदृत्तिरिति चेत् इत्थं । चथा दि नित्यरूते प्रत्यवायाभावस्तिष्ठति तदभावे तद- भावः। एवं ्रत्यवायाभावस्य सत्वे दुःखप्रागभावसच्चं तदभावे तदभाव इति योागक्तेमसाधारणकारणताया Sayama प्रत्यपि सुवचत्वात् एवमेव प्रायञ्चि- warty दुःखप्रागभावदेतुलमिति॥ ननु न HTS भक्तयेदित्यच fray कथं नज्थान्वयः | दृष्ट साधनला-
भावस्य कृतिसाथ्यलाभावस्य च बोाघधयितुमश्क्यवा-
दिति चेन्न। तच वाधादिष्टसाघनलं छतिसाध्यलञ्च न fant: किन्तु बलवदनिष्टाननुवन्धिलमाच्रं तदभावश्च नजा वध्यते | Waal बलवद् निष्टाननुबन्धोष्टसाघनते सति afaarad विध्यर्थः । तदभावश्च नजा बोध्यमानो विशिष्टाभावो विश्रेद्यवति विशेषणाभावे विश्राम्यति ॥
१९६
सिद्धा० नन श्यनेनाभिचरन यजेतेत्यच कथं बलवद निष्ाननव- faaay । श्येनस्य मरणानकूलव्यापारस्य दिसालेन नरकसाघनलतात् ।॥ न च वेघधलान्निषेघध दति वाच्यं । श्रभिचारे wafer ॥ न च मरणानुकूल- व्यापारमाचं यदि feat तदा खद्गकारस्यकरूपकन्तख दहिंसकलापत्ति गललय्रानभक्तणजन्यमरणे खात्मवधि- लापत्तिखेति वाच्यं । मरणाद् श्यकलस्यापि fatiqu- त्वात् । अरत एव सप्नमीतिलाग्यङ्गस्य न fara | अन्यो- टे कचिप्तनाराचदतत्राह्मणएस्य तु वाचनिकं प्राय- faufafa Wai श्येनवारणायादृष्टादारकलेन वि- ेषणात्। श्रत एव काशोमरणाद्यथैरुतशिवपूजादरपि न दिंसालं ॥ न च सा्तान्मरणजनकरसेव दिंसालं wag न तथा किन्तु तज्जन्यापूव्वेमिति वाच्यं । खद्धाघातेन ब्राह्मणे ब्रणएपाकपरम्परया गते fear- त्वानापत्तेः । . केचित्तु wae fart न ठु मरणं | ष्टेनजन्यखद्गघातादिरूपा fear श्रभिचारपद्ाथेः। तस्य च पापजनकलवं | चरतः श्येनस्य वैधलात् पापा- जनकल्वेऽपि अरथिमपापं प्रतिसन्धाय सन्ता न प्रव- न्त॑न्ते ॥ आरआचायास्त श्राप्ताभिप्राया विध्य्थः। पाकां कुयार् इत्यादो आज्ञानिरूष्येच्छावाचिवाक्लिद्ाच- सयेच्छावाचिलं लाघवात् | Way खगंकामे यजेते त्यादौ AM खर्मकामरुतिसाध्यतयाऽभीष्ट TAA | तत
भाषा उधाद्ानस्य चाध्यतत TTA जनकं भवेत् ॥ १४९ ॥ `
faafag भवेद् देषाद् दिष्टसाधनताधियः!
सिद्धा° आश्रष्टलेनेष्टसाघनलादि कमनुमाय yada | कलच्न-
भक्तणादोा तदभावान्न म्रवत्तते। यस्तु वेदे चैरषेयलवं anata तं प्रति पिधिरोव तावद्नभं ca श्रुतिः कू- AAT पुंयोगे मानं ॥ न च कन्लेसरणं वाधकं। कपि- लकणादादिकमारभ्याद्यपग्यन्तं कटेसमरणस्येव प्रतो मानलात्। अन्यया सतीनाम्यकरटकलापत्तेः | त्रैव कर्टस्मरणमस्तीति चटेदेऽपि छन्दां सि afat तस्मा- दित्यादिकन्चंखररणएमस्येव । एवं प्रति मन्न्तरं चेष श्रुतिरन्या विधीयत दत्यपि दष्टं हि WILT भगवान् वेदा HAGA पुरा ।
faarat खटषिपय्येन्ताः सखनत्तारोाऽस्यन कारकाः
दति tee स्ततिमाचं ॥ न च पोारुषेयलभ्रमादि- समवादर्प्रामा्यं स्वादिति ari i नित्यसर्व्वन्नतेन नि्दाषलात्) अत एव युरुषान्तरभ्रमादिसम्वान्न कपिलादेः aaa ize किञ्च वसूानामेवानित्यलस्व wena सुतरां aaa वेदस्वानित्यव- . fafa ॥ उपाद्ानयस्येत्ति । उपादानस्य समवायिकार- wars wad प्रत्ता कारणमिति ॥ ९४९ ॥ दिष्टसाधनतान्ञानसख दुःखसाधनविषयकनिल्रन्तिं
T
Rae
भाषाः Tal जोवनयेोनिसु VAIN AT AIA Vell TLC प्राणसच्चारकारणं Ofc ia * |
- ` अनीद्धियं Wee स्यात् एरथिव्यादि दय तु तत्॥१५९॥ alae तद्नित्यं स्यान्नित्ये नित्यमद्ाहतं | | तद् वासमवायि स्यात् पतनाख्ये तु कर्मणि 11 WYP II सांसिदधिकंद्रवत् स्यान्नेमित्तिकमथापरं |
सिद्धा ° प्रति जनकलमन्यव्यतिरेकादवधारितमिति मावः i aa दति । जीवनयेनियनोा यादज्जीकनमन वर्त्तते | स चातीट्द्रियः॥ ९५० it
तच प्रमाणम । शरीर प्राणसञ्चारकारणं परिकोत्तितमिति\प्राएसच्चारो दि अधिकः ्ासादिः WAAR: | TAY प्राणसञ्चारस्य यनसाष्यवानुमा- नात् प्रत्यच्यनस्य वाधाचातीद्िययनसिद्धिः। स एव जीवनयेनिप्रयन्नः ॥ aed निरूपयति | अ्रती-
द्ियसिति ॥ १२५९ ॥ ्रनित्ये इ्मणएकाद तह्ुरुलमनित्यं । नित्ये पर- मार नित्यं | गरुलरमित्यनुवन्तते । तह्वुरुलवं समवायि असमवायिकारणं । पतने श्राद्यपतने TAT: ॥ ९५२ ॥ द्र वलननिरूपयति। सांसिद्धिकमिति, saa दिविधं
* तत् प्रकोकतितमिति पाठान्तरः 1,
९२८
wine सासिदधिकन्तु सलिले fama falas ॥ १५३॥ परमाणे जले नित्यमन्यच्रानित्यमुच्यते । नेमित्तिकं वह्भियगात्तपनोयघुतादिपषु ॥ १५९४ ॥ द्रवत्वं स्यन्दनं चतुनिमित्तं BFE तत् । ` संहा जलं स नित्याऽणवनित्याऽवयविन्यस। १५५॥ AMAL TANS द् चनस्यानुक्रूलता |
सिद्धा सांसिद्धिकं नेमित्तिकञ्चेति। दितीयं नेमित्तिकं पर- माणाविति॥ ९५२ ॥ जलपरमाणे gaa नित्यं । अन्यच एथिवीपर- ATUTST जलद्मणकाद्ा च द्रवत्मनित्यं | कूचचित्ते जसि कुत्रचित् एथिव्याञ्च नेमित्तिकं द्रवत्वे । aa का वा नैमित्तिका्यस्तद्शेयति ॥ नैमित्तिकमिति) वज्धीति पद्न्तेजाऽथकं | तथा च तेजःसंयोगाग्मिसंया- गजन्यं नेमित्तिकं xadi तच सुवषादिरूपे तेजसि घुतजतुप्रतिष्टथिव्यां aaa इत्यथः ॥ ९५४ ॥ द्रवत्वं wea देतुनिंमित्तं aye तु तदिति । देत्रिति असमवायिकारणएभिव्यर्थः । Ee सक्तुका- दिसंयागपिशेषे agad सतेदसदितमिति बोद्धव्यं । तेन Raga न सङ्गः uae निरूपयति । जले afa जल एवेत्यर्थः । WaT सेदः । ९१५५ ॥ ननु एथिव्यामपि तैलेद उपलभ्यते । न चात
१४०
भाषा GATS Aisa स्ितिखापकभावने que it मृत्तमाच तु वेगः A कण्डजा वेगजः PAT । स्थितिखापकसंस्कारः रिता कचितुस्वंपि॥ १५७] अतोद्दियाऽसे विज्ञेयः कचित् खन्दऽपि कारणं सिद्धा ° sara: तथा सति ददनमप्रातिकूल्यं स्यादत चाद) तेलान्तरे तत्प्रकषाद् दइनस्यानुक्रूलतेति | तत्प्रकषौत् सेदप्रकषात्। AT उपलभ्यमानस्ेदाऽपि जलीय एव। तख WRAITH HS | अपरष्टेचं दि जलं व्क नाशयतीति भावः॥ संखकारन्निरूपयति । संसकारेति । वेगस्थितिस्थापकभावनाभेद्ात् संसकारस्तिविध दत्य येः ॥ ९५६ ॥ | oe मूत्तमात्रे तु वेगः स्यात् कर्मजो वेगजः aly दिति कर्म॑जवेगजभेदादगेा दिविध cae: | were fe नेादनजनितेन कम्मंणा वेगा जन्यते । तेन च पव्वै- कर्म्मनाश्ादुत्तरं कम्मं | एवमयेऽपि । विना च वेगं कर्मणः कम्प्रतिबन्धकत्वात् पूल्वैकममो नाश्र उत्तरकमो- त्प्तिख न स्यात् । यच वेगवता कपालेन जनिते घटे वेगा जन्यते स वेगजो वेगः ॥ सितिखापक दृति, च्राृष्टश्राखादौनां कपित्यागे * ware सितिस्या- पकसाध्यलात्। कचिदिति 1 wad चिव्यादिषुखि- तिखापकं केचिन्मन्यन्ते तदप्रमाणमिति ara: ॥९५ ७॥
># परित्यागे दति ary Wh
भाषाः
fagte
१४९१
भावनाख्यस्त् संस्कारो जोवव्रत्तिरतीद्धियः ॥ WE ॥ उपेत्तानात्मकस्तस्य निश्चयः कारणं भवेत्| समरणे प्र्यभिन्नायामप्यसा SLT ॥ ९५८ ॥
रसा स्थितिस्थापकः । कचिद् च्रारुषटशाखादैौ ॥
भावनाख्य दति ॥१५८॥ |
तस्य UATE | उपे्तात्मकज्ञानात् संस्कारान्
त्पत्तेरुपेचानात्मक Ta | तत्संशयात् संस्का रान्-
त्य त्तेनिं खय cam | तेनोपेक्तान्यनिखयतेन संस्कार प्रति दतुतेति भावः॥ ननु सरणं प्रतयुेच्तान्यनि ्चयलरेन Sada तेनेपे्लादिसथसे न समरणं tay संस्कारं प्रति ज्ञानलेनैव देतु तास्िति चेन्न! विनिगमनावि-
ररेणापि dart प्रति उपेक्तान्यनिश्चयलेन हेतुतायाः
सिद्धलात् । किञ्च उपेत्तास्यले संस्कवारकल्यनाया गर्- लात् संस्कारं प्रति चोपेचान्यलेन देतुतायाः fag लात् ॥ तच प्रमाणं दणंयति। स्मरणे प्रत्यभिज्ञाया- ager दतुरुच्यते दति 1 रती संस्कारः समरणं प्रत्यभिज्ञान जनयति ।. चरतः संस्कारः Wey ।
विना व्यापारं पूव्वौनुभवस्य सर णादि जननासामथ्यात्।
सखसव्यापारान्यतराभवे कारणत्वासम्मवात् ॥ न च प्रत्यभिज्ञा . प्रति तत्तासंस्कारस्य. waaa म्रत्यभि- जायाः संसकारजन्यतलेन रतिलापत्तिरिति वाच्यं,
१४९
भाषा० धररधम्ावद््टं स्याट् WH खग॑ादि साधन | गङ्गाज्ञानादि यागादि व्यापारः परिकीत्तितः॥१९०॥
fagte श्रप्रयोजकलात् | परे तु अनुद्ुदधसंसकारात् प्रत्य- भिन्नानुदयादुद्ुद्धसंस्कारस्य awa तत्तत्स्र- waa प्रत्यभिन्नं प्रति Fad Haya Tare: ॥ १५८ ॥ अदृष्टं निरूपयति | warearfafai खगादिस- कलसुखानां खगसाघनीभूतश्रोरादीनाञ्च साधनं WA THU तच प्रमाणं दशंयितुमाद्। यागादीति। यागादिव्यापारतया दि wa: Heya | च्रन्यथा या- गादीनां fat विनष्टतया निर्यापारतया च काला- न्तरभाविखगेजनकलं न स्यात् तदुक्तमाचार्यैः ‘| चिरध्वस्तं फलायालं न कम्मातिशयं विना दृति ॥ ननु यागध्वंस एव व्यापारः स्यान् न प्रतियोगित- द्धंसयेारेकच्राजनकलवं | सव्व GUTS मानाभावात् ॥ न च aad फलानन्यं मन्मते चरमफलस्यापुव्वेनाश- कलान्न तथालभिति वाच्यं । कालविशेषस्य सदका- रिलाद् इत्यत WE | गङ्गालानेति | गङ्गा्तानस्य डदि खर्गजनकलत्रेऽनन्तानां जलसंयोा गध्वंसानां व्यापा- रलमपेच्यैकमपून्धै कल्यते लाघवादिति भावः ॥ ९६०॥.
भाषाः
सिद्धा०
९९२
कर्मनाशाजलसखप्रादि ना नाश्यस्त्वसा मतः| अधन नरकादीनां चेतुनिन्दितकम्म्रजः ॥ १६१ ॥ प्रायश्चित्तादि नाश्याऽस जोवव्रत्तौ विमा गुणे |
ननु घ्वंसाऽपि न व्यापारोञस्हु॥ न च निवया- पारस्य चिरष्वस्तस्य कथं कारणत्मिति वाच्य॑। अनन न्यथासिद्धनियतपृर्वंवन्तित्वख त्रापि सत्वात् । रव्य वदि तपुत्बवत्तिलं fe चक्तःसंयोागादः कारण्लं नतु
सर्व्व कायकालदत्तिबमिव समवायिकारणस्य का-
रणत्वमित्यत Be) कम्म॑नाशजलस्पशादिना नाश war मत tii यदि fe wad न स्यात् तदा कम्मंनाशाजलस्पशादिना AUS AY न स्यात्। न fe तेन चागादिनाशः प्रतिबन्धो वा कन्तुः शक्यते | तस्य प्वेमेव suafefa ॥ एतेन देवताप्रीतिरेव फलमित्यपासतं | Wrarret wa देवताप्रीते- रसमवात् । देवातायाश्चेतनतेऽपि तत्प्रीतेरनद्श्य- लात् । प्रीतेः खुखखरूपलेन विष्ुप्रीत्यारो तदसम्भ- वात् | जन्यखुखादे स्ततच्राभावात् | तेन विष्णु प्रीतिजन्य- लेन पराभिमतखगादिरेव विष्णुप्रीतिशन्देन लच्यते ॥ श्रध नरकादीनां देतुर्जिन्दितकर्ममज दति । नरक- दुःखादिसखकलदुःखानां नारकिशरौरादीनाञ्च सा- धनमघम्भं इत्यथः ॥ ९६९ ॥
प्रमाणमाद । प्राय्ित्तादिनाश्चाऽश । MATA
९४९
भाषा" इमे तु वासनाजन्धो ज्ञानादपि विनग्यनः ॥ १९ ॥
सिद्धा० विमा गृणाविति। यदि quar न स्यात् तदा प्रायञ्चित्तादिनाश्वतं न स्यात् । न हि तेन ब्रह्महन- नादीनां नाशः प्रतिबन्धो वा विधातुः waa तस्य पुव्वविनष्टलादिति भावः 1 जीवेति । दई खरस्य धम्भा- धम््ाभावादिति भावः 1 दमा तु वासनाजन्ये ज्ञा- नादपि विनश्यत दति। sar waren) वास- नेति io wat ज्ञानिना. ad सुकृतदुष्कृतकमरेणी नं फलायालमिति भावः |. ज्ञानादपीत्यपिना भाग- परिग्रहः ।॥ ननु तच्वन्ञानस्य कथं धम्माघाना- शकलं | नाभुक्तं चीयते करं कल्यकाटि तेर पीति वच- नविरोधात् । इत्यञ्च तच्वज्ञानिना इटिति काच- Se सकलकम्मणां भागेन चय दति चेन्न । तच भोा- गस्य वेद बेाधितनाशकोापसत्तितिलात् | कथमन्यथा प्रा- यित्तादिना कश्मंणां नाशः । तदुक्तं । ज्ञानाश्भिः सव्वकम्माणोत्यादिना | भूयते च। चीयन्ते चाख Haha तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे दति ।। ननु तत्वज्ञानिनस्तर्दि शरौीरावखथानं सुखदुःखादिच न स्यात् ज्ञानेन चं स्वेषां कम्मणां नाशादिति चेन्न । प्रारब्धेतरकम्मणामेव नाशात् । तत्तच्छरौरभागजनकं दि यत्क्मां तत् प्रारब्धं तद्भिप्रायमेव नाभुक्तमिति वचनमिति ॥ ९६२॥
९९१५
भाषा० शब्दो घ्वनिश्च वश्च श्ठद्ङ्गादिभवो ध्वनिः। कष्टसंयेगादिजन्या वासते कादयो मताः ॥ १६३॥ स्वः शब्दा Shee: ATTA VHA वीचोतरङ्गन्यायेन ae ACA ॥ १९४॥ ROTH UA: कस्यचिन्मते | उत्यन्नः कौ विनष्टः क इति वुदेरनित्यता ॥ १९५॥
सिद्धा शब्दं निरूपयति । शब्दा घ्वनिख॒ ay ग्द क्गा- feua घ्वनिः) कण्ठसंयागादिजन्या वासते काद्या
मताः Waa शब्दा Wah: भरातेात्यन्नसत गद्यते
द्रति ॥ नभेादन्तिराकाशसमवेतः ॥ दूर स्थशब्दस्याग्रद- Was | भ्रातेति ॥ ननु श्छदङ्गा्वच्छेदनेात्यनने शब्दे STS कथयमुत्पत्तिरत BE वीवितरङ्गन्यायेन तदु त्पत्तिस्छ कीत्तितेति। arama वदिदे श्दिग- वच्छननोऽन्यः शब्द स्तेनेव शब्देन जन्यते | तेन चापर स्त- yaa | एव॑ क्रमेण Barapa Daa इति ॥९६३॥। १६४ ॥ कद्म्बकारकन्यायादुत्पन्तिः कसचिन्मते ThA ्रा- GMAT दशदिच दशशब्दा उत्पद्यन्ते, ततखान्ये दश- शब्दा उत्पद्यन्त इति भावः । afar कल्ये गारवादुक्तं कस्यचिन्द्ते दति ॥ ननु शब्दस्य नित्यलादुत्पत्तिः कथ-
* कद म्बृगालकंति पाढठान्तरः॥ ॥
१४६ भाषा० साऽय क इति वुद्िसत् साजात्यमवलम्बते | तद्वाषधमित्याद् सजातोयेऽपि द् शनात् VE UI इति ओमद्ामरापध्यायविद्यानिवासभटाचाय्येसुत- ओ्रोयतविश्नाथपच्चाननभट्ाचाय्यविरचिते भाषाप- QT समाप्तः॥ * ॥
सिद्धा मत are | उत्पन्नः का विनष्टः क इति बद्धेरनित्य-
तेति। शब्दानामत्पाद विनाशप्रत्ययशलिलादनित्यव- fama: ॥ ९६५ ॥
नन् स एवायं ककार दत्यादिप्रत्यभिनज्ञानाच्छ- sat नित्यं । इत्थं चात्पादविनागशवुद्धिभ्रमरूपा चेत्यत We । सोऽयं क दति बुद्धिस्तु साजात्यमवल- wal तरेतषधमित्यादौ सजातीयेऽपि दभ॑नादिति। तच प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य तत्सजातीयलं विषया न ठु ag- क्यभेदो विषयः! उक्तप्रतीतिविरोाधात् | दत्यञ्च दयोा- रपि qa waafafay नन् सजातीयलं सोऽयमिति- ग्रत्यभिन्ञायां भासते इति कुच दुषटसित्यत ATs तदेवेति 1 यदौषधं मया कतं तदेवान्येनापि कत- भित्यादिद्शनादिति भावः॥९६६॥
दति ओ्रीमदामदापाध्यायविद्यानिवासभटाचाय्यं- पचश्रीयतविश्चनायपञ्चाननभटाचाय्विरचिता. सि- द्धन्तमक्रावलो PAT ॥ॐ॥
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ae Se ee
wo
भाषापरिच्छेद स्य Wg । BEE TEAR WE We R Re यविन्नध्वस विघ्रध्वस १२ 8 समवायिकारणत्वं समवायिकारणववं शद् श जनकः , जनक | १६ द् गुयकंम्ममात्त गणकम्ममाचर ge CRIS ब्रद्ये्ादि बरद्येत्यादि 8d श गाचरो गाचसे Bd 8 aaa वत्व Be Re बेशिश्छ ata ५९ € Tara yaa ६५ श ary नेध्यं ox २९ पदतन्धा पदजन्यं ८८ tz . Sat दम्पत्योः < १९८ मेवापत्ते नेवापपत्तेः ९६ १२ यत्व aaa € २९ दित्वदि दित्वादिः Ae x एथकत्व एथेकत्व १९९ २१. पाटलीपुच्ात पाटलीपुचात् Ae R8 ata, कचित् १२८ © वद्यभावेन वह्मभाएवेन | ARR र् कदाचित कदाचित् VBR श साधन साधनं _ 28% श नाश्यस्सा नाश्यस्वसा